In the well-known case of Harvard, there is more to see than might appear at first glance and that has been openly discussed yet. The title does not mention Claudine Gay without reason, as she has been pushed too much into the center of a dispute that is really about something far more fundamental. If this were truly only about one person, the matter would hardly be worth mentioning and would be roughly the academic equivalent of reporting on Taylor Swift. What is at stake instead, as I wish to show here, is the fundamental question—highly important also for Western European societies—of how the American educational system ought to be structured, how performance should be assessed, and how it should function as a distributive regulatory mechanism determining power, prestige, and career opportunities. This question does not arise in a vacuum, but in the simultaneous coexistence and conflict of three club principles that have gained immense influence since 1945:

(1) the aristocratic club principle,

(2) the principle of democratic meritocracy or meritocratic club principle, and

(3) the identity‑political principle or DEI club principle.

Without explicit attention to (1) and (2) as central developments in the educational system and society since the 1960s, it is impossible to understand what the Affirmative Action policy, recently struck down by the Supreme Court, was set up against, and to what the counter‑attack is now being mounted through (3). Apart from a few introductory remarks, I will limit myself here mainly to developments after 1945, focus on Harvard, and also take a closer look at the SAT.

Anyone who wants to understand the historical course of this conflict is well advised to read the book Education and Politics at Harvard (1975) by Seymour Martin Lipset and David Riesman, which is not outdated with regard to the decisions that are relevant for the current situation. The book presents the entire trajectory of development from its founding in 1636 by Calvinist Puritans, through religious liberalization over the centuries, up to the meritocratic training ground after 1945. From Harvard’s pre‑1945 history, one episode is worth mentioning here, since it helped shape developments after 1945 and serves as an explicit point of reference in the meritocratic mobilization and closure of the postwar period: Around U.S. President Andrew Jackson (in office 1829–1837) a group formed that became known as the “Jacksonians” (Jacksonianer), who fiercely attacked Harvard’s recruitment practices because they regarded Harvard as an illegitimately elitist institution (in the sense of the aristocratic club principle): “The Jacksonian Democrats on the Board of Overseers and in the legislature increasingly attacked the University as an elitist institution during the 1840s.” (Lipset/Riesman 1975: 73)

Decades of fatal conditioning efforts under the banner of “democratization” have made this passage incomprehensible to today’s readers. How can one attack Harvard as an elitist institution? What else is Harvard supposed to be? A prestigious beacon of the American university landscape that is also accessible to students who are good but not excellent? The key to answering this question is the distinction between an aristocratic and a meritocratic variant of democracy. The Democrats around Jackson attacked, under the slogan “elitist”, the aristocratic version of democracy. In this view, Harvard is then a club that ought to be a university—and would be a university if it selected students strictly meritocratically rather than aristocratically. Put differently: the meritocratic attack on the aristocracy was not an attack on meritocracy in favor of democracy, as “democratization” in the more recent sense (as leveling downward) suggests, but an attack on the prevailing aristocratic club principle, to which the genuinely meritocratic principle was opposed as the genuinely democratic principle. (On the distinction between democratic and aristocratic democracy, see Lipset/Riesman 1975: 289 f.) It is therefore said of the Democrat Bancroft in Lipset/Riesman: “His main complaint about Harvard was that it failed ‘to take students on the basis of merit alone’, that less qualified students were able to enter because they could afford to attend.” (Ibid.: 74)

This distinction between aristocratic and meritocratic selection fundamentally shapes the conflict in the United States to this day. The volume General Education in a Free Society. Report of the Harvard Committee, published in 1946 by Harvard President James Bryant Conant, attempts, under the impression of two world wars, to equip a meritocratic basic position with Humboldtian‑humanist standards. Thus, in explicit contrast to the Jacksonians, the report states: “Our point here is that there is need for a more complete democracy in both these senses not only between student and student but between subject and subject and teacher and teacher.” (Conant 1946: 27) The straightforward translation would be: We need a democratic culture that shapes the entire academic sphere and is humanistically oriented, instead of exhausting itself in a mere performance regime. This is also evident in the concept of intelligence with which the report operates.

Intelligence is not understood here as an independent quantity that distinguishes people regardless of their way of life, but—still influenced by familiarity with the philosophical tradition—is subordinated to the concept of reason: “Intelligence is that leaven of awareness and reflection which, operating upon the native powers of men, raises them from the animal level and makes them truly human. By reason we man, not an activity apart, but rational guidance of all human activity. Thus the fruit of education is intelligence in action.” (Ibid.: 75) There is no trace here of merely translating SAT results into diplomas; intelligence cannot prove itself solely on the basis of academic examinations, but rather enables people, in the medium of the acquisition of education in the proper sense, to become persons, so that these qualities can be made fruitful for society.

That sounds solidly humanistic, but the report also shows that the academic community had long since been seized and permeated by the meritocratic performance principle. The ambivalence becomes especially visible in the fact that intelligence is not interpreted exclusively in a humanistic, i.e. holistic, way, but—under the pressure of the success of intelligence research—is indeed also understood in the test‑psychological sense: “Colleges which reach below the top quarter in I.Q. either have somewhat lower standards or have consciously or unconsciously created new types of courses for the less gifted. Intelligence is thus one ground of differentiation.” (Ibid.: 84) Despite all efforts toward a humanistic understanding of democracy in the face of the Second World War, there was no longer any way around test psychology, and the performance regime, and with it the SAT, in fact embarked on a fulminant triumphal march. The SAT was introduced in 1926, but it was only after 1945 that it was deployed in a highly selective manner. It should be noted that the influence of the College Board, which reorganized itself one year after the report’s publication, only began in the 1950s to permeate the entire educational system and to elevate the SAT to the decisive instrument of selection (cf. Schudson 1972: 61 f.).

First, a quick overview of the SAT results:

Source: https://blog.prepscholar.com/sat-percentiles-and-score-rankings

A careful analysis of this triumph of the SAT was presented by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein (both Harvard graduates) in The Bell Curve. Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (1994). Here the formula is “from 1952 to 1960”, since in this period Harvard’s student selection was fundamentally tightened on the basis of a strict SAT regime: “In eight years, Harvard had been transformed from a school of primarily for the northeastern socioeconomic elite into a school populated by the brightest of the bright, drawn from all over the country.” (Herrnstein/Murray 1994: 30) But what exactly does that mean here in detail?

To further clarify that the club principle continued to survive even after 1945, but was then largely—though, as will still be shown, by no means completely—displaced by the meritocratic performance principle: In 1952, 2 out of 3 applicants to Harvard were admitted, and 90% of applicants whose fathers (at that time almost exclusively) were alumni were admitted. The average verbal SAT score was 583 (out of 800) points. The average SAT score of admitted students at Albion College today is 582. You have never heard of Albion College? Well, neither have I. In 1960, after a radical meritocratic turn, if one wishes to understand the restriction of admissions to a selection from the top 5% of SAT takers in this way, the average verbal SAT score was 678 and the mathematical score 695 (cf. Murray/Herrnstein 1994: 30). – It should not go unmentioned here, in the interest of demythologization, that contrary to the mythologization of mathematical abilities—which is usually accompanied by the assumption that reading and writing at a high level are not extremely (!) rare abilities, whereas mathematics is accessible only to the rarest and most select minds—the top group in the verbal domain is smaller than in the mathematical one. This is still true, even after several revisions of the SAT: In 2022, 8% in the verbal domain reached the top group of 700–800 points, whereas in the mathematical domain it was 10%. In a text from 1989, when the SAT was still substantially more demanding than today, since it has been reformed twice since then in the direction of lowering standards, it even says: “An interesting note is that while 11 percent had math scores over 700, only one percent had verbal scores above 700.” Even though the verbal part is supposed to be so much easier!

Yet what has been mentioned was only the beginning; selection intensified enormously over time. One can indeed speak of a meritocratic transformation of the club principle if one looks at how a small group of universities deliberately absorbed the SAT top group: “Just these ten schools – Harvard, Yale, Stanford, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton, Brown, University of California at Berkeley, Cornell, Dartmouth, and Columbia – soaked up 31 percent of the nation’s students who scored in the 700s on the SAT-Verbal. Harvard and Yale alone, enrolling just 2,900 freshmen – roughly 1 out of every 400 freshmen – accounted for 10 percent.” (Herrnstein/Murray 1994: 43) In The Meritocracy Trap (2019), Daniel Markovits, professor at Yale Law School (graduates of Harvard and Yale Law School are clearly overrepresented on the Supreme Court), provides an updated assessment of the situation: The average student at Yale Law School has straight As and scores in the top percentile (99th percentile) on the LSAT, an SAT for lawyers, which, incidentally, is the only university entrance test still recognized by Mensa as an IQ-test equivalent (“The median student at Yale Law School, for example, earned effectively straight As in college […] and scored above the 99th percentile in the LSAT.”, Markovits 2019: 142). More than that: The average student at Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and Stanford – “The Big Four” – performs better than 95% of all SAT takers, and a quarter of the students at these universities better than 99%. (“The median SAT scores among students at Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale now all lie above the 95th percentile, and of the students have SATs above the 99th percentile.”, ibid.: 114)

Yet Markovits (as well as Michael Sandel in The Tyranny of Merit, 2020) is not concerned with a statistical description of the situation, but with a frontal attack on a principle that has run off the rails. Whereas in The Bell Curve the cognitive aspect and the relationship between SAT and IQ in regard to the social stratification of society played the main role, Markovits and Sandel attack the transformation of the meritocratic principle into a new club principle and target the correlation between test results and economic background conditions. Markovits points out, for example, that at the Ivy League universities (Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, UPenn, Princeton, Yale), Stanford, the University of Chicago, MIT, and Duke University, more students come from the wealthiest one percent of the population than from the entire lower half of the population. (“More distressingly still, across the Ivy League, the University of Chicago, Stanford, MIT, and Duke, more students come from families in the top 1 percent of the income distribution than from the entire bottom half.”; Markovits 2019: 137) Michael Sandel likewise highlights this fact by noting that two‑thirds of students at Ivy League universities come from the top 20 percent of the income scale, and that at Princeton and Yale more students come from the top 1 percent than from the lower‑income half of the entire country. (“Given all this, it is not surprising that more than two-thirds of students at Ivy League schools come from the top 20 percent of the income scale; at Princeton and Yale, more students come from the top 1 percent than from the entire bottom 60 percent of the country.”; Sandel 2020: 10 f.)

Affirmative Action as a program, as well as all more recent diversity initiatives, are responses to the fact that both the aristocratic and the democratic variant of meritocracy have led to the formation of clubs. The link between the two is the high correlation between income and test competence, or more broadly: between income and IQ. The replacement of the aristocratic by the democratic principle leads to a socio‑economic aristocratization by indirect means, above all in the marriage market, and ultimately to a very similar result. I cannot go into the shelf‑filling literature on the relationship between income and IQ here without tearing this text apart, but I will make up for this in later texts. What matters now is to interlock what has been said with the Claudine Gay case.

Claudine Gay does not stand for a break with the club principle but for a third club. At the former elite universities in their present form, three club principles (co‑)exist in parallel:
(1) The old club principle, represented by the so‑called Legacy Admissions (translated in the German edition of Michael Sandel’s The Tyranny of Merit as „Vermächtnis-Zulassungen“). – Brace yourself: “43 percent of Harvard’s white students are affiliated with Harvard’s alumni, faculty, or donors.” (Xu 2021: 66)
(2) The meritocratic club principle, which is based on SAT results. (Driven to the extreme, or into a salto mortale, this principle leads to the social model outlined by Michael Young in The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870–2033; Young 1958).
(3) The DEI club principle, which is based on ethnic identity (and deliberately discriminates against whites/Europeans).

Curiously, (3) resembles (1), since both principles are identity‑based in different ways, whereas (2) is radically opposed to both. Where there is no indifference between (2) and (3), there exists a relation of hostility or contempt. The resistance that formed against Claudine Gay is based on the fact that intellectuals conventionally assigned to the Right (Steven Pinker, Amy Wax – those who do not wish to let intellectually third‑rate social‑media heroes, even if they are members of government or Suhrkamp authors, dictate what they should see and how, can learn quite a bit about the situation from the texts linked here), or other publicly influential and therefore distinctly audible figures (e.g. Bill Ackman, and also Christopher Rufo, who is too much of an activist to be able to be recognized as an intellectual), for whom (1) and (2) are at least capable of coexisting, rebel against (3), because they are of the view that (3) stands for the undermining of everything that deserves to be called an elite university (in more radical cases: a university at all). The deplorable state of ignorance on this matter in Germany is reliably and strikingly revealed by the fact that, while people immediately pick up all kinds of waffle that the American campus Left spreads on the so‑called social media and dutifully parrot it in a manner as clueless as it is thoughtless, they are just as unfamiliar with one of the driving forces behind the lawsuit that led to the Supreme Court ruling against Affirmative Action, Kenny Xu, as they are with his worthwhile book titled An Inconvenient Minority. The Attack on Asian American Excellence and the Fight for Meritocracy (Xu 2021; one chapter of the book is titled “Harvard is rotting”). (One more note for German readers: The analysis of this case had long since begun on Substack before the plagiarism accusations even became known to a broader public; see Christopher Brunet’s The Curious Case of Claudine Gay from 17.04.2022. One should discover this alternative ecosystem – which of course by no means contains only such things – with its many high‑quality contributions if one does not want to remain dependent on the extreme informational drought represented by the mainstream media.)

To return, by way of rounding off, to strict description: The dispute over Claudine Gay is a dispute about the guidelines according to which a circle of prestigious universities should, in principle, make personnel decisions. The tenor of the personalized arguments runs roughly along the lines of Peter de Quincey’s article It’s Not OK To Be Claudine Gay: Harvard’s President Resigns, which points out that Summers “published more in the year 1987 than Gay has published in her entire life.” The truly decisive text, however—far more important and likely to pre‑shape further debates not only about universities—is Harold Robertson’s groundbreaking, can‑hardly‑be‑overestimated essay Complex systems won’t survive the competence crisis, which addresses the problem of meritocracy both with regard to universities and to the overall architecture of modern societies and has been clicked on millions of times. In it, Robertson shows that the question “Meritocracy – yes or no?” is not a matter of taste or a harmless attitude question, but a question of survival. Matters of taste can be contained in terms of club preferences and can acquire an apparent weight only within comfort zones; in the case of survival questions, this is not possible. The text thus forms the crucial bridge between the meritocratic test regime and the Gay case, because the latter is seen in the eyes of her critics as a prominent symptom of the competence crisis, which is understood as a necessary consequence of the infiltration, hollowing out, and abolition of the test‑based meritocratic regime. That is, Gay became a bogey figure because she symbolically stands for two bogey figures at once: the destruction of meritocracy as a whole and— as the decisive driver and specific reason for this—Affirmative Action.

The right‑wing, conservative, or simply meritocratic rebellion against DEI as the third pillar of recruitment in prestigious professional fields in general goes far beyond the defense of the old club (1), against which DEI (3) is directed. It is no longer an intra‑identity‑political dispute in which a “WASP identity” (1), in an extreme sharpening, faces a diverse identity (3), but a dispute over which selection principles a modern society must follow uncompromisingly in performance‑dependent sectors if it

1. wants to survive, i.e. secure and preserve the central achievements that ensure its continued existence; and

2. wants to develop further, i.e. cultivate its historically grown identity.

The meritocratic argument provokes so much resistance and hostility because some of its most resolute proponents are of the view that the further development and cultivation of the foundations of modern societies involves a conditio sine qua non that is not primarily a matter of cultural tradition, but primarily of maintaining the demographic identity and the demographic bearers of this historically grown identity and cultural tradition, since only they are capable of guaranteeing survival, further development, and cultivation. Since this argument, contrary to the claims of the DEI faction, is only rarely put forward by racists, it does in fact include those who are not Europeans (cf. Murray 2021) but Asians. For a fully developed and successful rebellion of (1) and above all (2), since (2) would be multi-ethnically formed, against (3) would mean that the United States would split along SAT results and that the educational system would undergo performance‑measurement‑based segregation. Confronting one another would be a mainly European‑Asian “SAT upper class” with very few Latinos and even fewer Blacks, and the rest. This battle will probably be fought in the coming years, and the Claudine Gay case could mark a milestone in the formation of the front lines and the struggle.

References:

Conant, James Bryant (1946): General Education in a Free Society. Report of the Harvard Committee. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Herrnstein, Richard J./Murray, Charles (1994): The Bell Curve. Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life. New York: The Free Press.

Lipset, Seymour Martin/Riesman, David (1975): Education and Politics at Harvard. Two Essays Prepared for The Carnegie Commission on Higher Education. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Markovits, Daniel (2019): The Meritocracy Trap. New York: Penguin Press.

Murray, Charles (2021): Facing Reality. Two Truths about Race in America. London, New York: Encounter.

Sandel, Michael S. (2020): The Tyranny of Merit. What’s Become of the Common Good? New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Schudson, Michael (1972): Organizing the ‚Meritocracy‘. A History of the College Entrance Examination Board. In: Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 42, No. 1, February 1972.

Young, Michael (1958): The Rise of the Meritocracy 1870 – 2033. An Essay on Education and Equality. Bristol: Penguin Books.

Xu, Kenny (2021): An Inconvenient Minority. The Attack on Asian American Excellence and the Fight for Meritocracy. New York: Diversion.

Im Jahr 2000 formuliert Ederer den folgenden Satz:

„Jeder, der mit offenen Augen durch Deutschland geht, sieht, wie es immer weiter abwärts geht. Aber außer ein paar Sonntagsreden passiert nichts.“ (Ederer 2000: 139)

Im Jahr 2025 könnte er noch vertrauter für deutsche Ohren nicht klingen. Man sieht hier, wie Sätze dieser Art sich nicht innerhalb der Sprache ohne weiteres gradualisieren lassen: Er war damals wahr und ist heute ungleich wahrer, aber man würde ihn heute genauso formulieren wie damals, jedoch mit dem Satz im Jahr 2000 vor Augen sagen: „Ha, das war ja noch paradiesisch verglichen mit heute.“

Ederer gibt auch den Grund an, wieso damals schon absehbar war, daß nichts Entscheidendes passieren würde und wir heute in der Situation sind, die bereits im Jahr 2000 richtige Diagnose auf Zustände bezogen zu sehen, die wir uns kaum mehr zu erträumen wagen:

„Während die einen, die Linken, die Verwerfungen unserer Gesellschaft mit immer mehr staatlichen Programmen und Wohltaten glätten möchten, belassen es die Konservativen bei moralischen Aufrufen. Beide tragen aber so dazu bei, dass die gesellschaftliche Ordnungslosigkeit und Fragmentierung sich immer mehr ausbreitet, das Human- und Sozialkapital des Staates weiter abnimmt.“ (Ebd.: 51)

Kurz: Die einen stellten die Weichen katastrophal falsch, die anderen taten nichts. Wie Vollmundigkeit und rückgratlosigkeitsbedingte Handlungsunfähigkeit bereits in den 1990er Jahren ineinandergriffen, zeigt diese Passage:

„Unter Helmut Kohls Kanzlerschaft ist der Anteil des Staates an der Wirtschaft auf über 50 Prozent gestiegen. Dabei hatte Kohl einmal gesagt: »Alles was über 50 Prozent Staatsanteil ist, ist Sozialismus.« Recht hat er. Aber es hat ihn nicht sonderlich gestört, dass er, entsprechend seiner eigenen Definition, dann Kanzler eines sozialistischen Staates war.“ (Ebd.: 84)

Das Geschwafel von Politikern ist das eine, das Sichverschanzen hinter Lebenslügen ist das andere Problem. Das erste Problem des großen Uns-zu-Tode-Belügens ist das der Demographie, wo Ederer einiges grundsätzlich Richtiges, aber auch katastrophal Falsches zu Papier bringt.

Einwanderungspolitik und Demographie

Ederer stellt seinen Ausführungen zu dem Thema die folgende These voran: „Nichts aber auch nichts wird die Zukunft Deutschlands so massiv in den nächsten 100 Jahren bestimmen wie die Einwanderungspolitik.“ Vorausgesetzt wird dabei, daß eine demographische Erholung von innen heraus auf keinen Fall stattfinden (oder sich innerhalb dieser 100 Jahre entscheidend auswirken können) wird – eine an sich interessante Prämisse, weil der demographische Niedergang damit wie ein metaphysisches Fatum aufgefaßt wird.

Konkret positioniert Ederer sich mit Blick auf die nächsten 25 Jahre, also mit unserer gegenwärtigen Lage vor Augen:

„Die Talfahrt geht so weiter, bis sie im Jahre 2075 schließlich bei 35 Millionen Einwohnern endet. Zumindest für die nächsten 25 Jahre, und mit denen will ich mich hauptsächlich in diesem Buch beschäftigen, ist das keine Prognose mehr, sondern eine klare statistische Realität. Daran würde selbst eine steigende Geburtenrate nichts ändern. Denn die Frauen, die diese Kinder bekommen müssten, gibt es auch schon nicht mehr. [...] Diese Zahlen bestreitet im Prinzip niemand. Aber keiner sagt, wie ein Deutschland 2025 mit 15 Millionen Einwohnern weniger aussehen soll. Was bedeutet das für den Wohnungsmarkt, für die Infrastruktur, für den Arbeitsmarkt, die Produktivität, die Schulen und Universitäten, die Landwirtschaft und den Umweltschutz und so weiter ... Das Einzige, was den amtierenden Politikern dämmert, ist, dass ihr heiß geliebtes Umlagesystem für die Renten zusammenbricht – eine bessere Beschreibung wäre wohl: implodiert. [...] 15 Millionen weniger Menschen in Deutschland, das wäre die vollständige Entvölkerung Nordrhein-Westfalens – oder der Einwohner der neuen Bundesländer. Statt 230 Menschen pro Quadratkilometer hätten wir dann nur noch 188 Einwohner pro Quadratkilometer. Ungefähr so viele wie heute Italien und immer noch etwas mehr als Schleswig-Holstein um die Jahrtausendwende. Von Unterbevölkerung kann also noch lange keine Rede sein. [...] Im Jahre 2050 verlieren sich dann nur noch 51 Millionen und im Jahre 2100 gar nur 22 Millionen Menschen in deutschen Gauen.“ (Ebd.: 92 ff.; meine Hervorhebung)

Die in dieser Passage erwähnte Implosion des Rentensystems steht nun tatsächlich unmittelbar bevor, und die Migration, deren Volumen dafür gesorgt hat, daß Deutschland heute mehr Einwohner zählt als vor 25 Jahren, nötigt uns eine Unterscheidung auf: die zwischen Einwohnern im funktionalen Sinne (d.h. gesellschaftlich Beteiligungsfähigen und -willigen) und bloß Anwesenden. Unter dieser Voraussetzung hat Deutschland trotzdem mit Sicherheit etliche Millionen Menschen verloren.

Was ich noch nirgends schlüssig erklärt gesehen habe, ist, warum Schrumpfung, die gerne „Aussterben“ genannt wird, ohne ein solches zu sein, ein katastrophales Problem sein soll. Sie ist ein Problem mit vielen katastrophalen Folgen, aber letztlich im größeren Rahmen Teil einer Fluktuation, die nötig sein könnte, um mit den gravierenden Schmerzen dieses Lernprozesses (Familien sind wichtiger als diese hohlen Büro-Pseudokarrieren) wieder in ein Wachstum zu gelangen, das eine Wiederholung der Dekadenz der letzten Jahrzehnte dann hoffentlich ausschließt. Anders gesagt: Große Schrumpfungen sind nur innerhalb kleiner zeitlicher Perspektiven Katastrophenereignisse; sie hören auf, Katastrophen zu sein, wenn man davon ausgeht, daß ein Aussterben ausbleibt und eine zutiefst idiotische Zivilisation ihren Zerfall als Lektion angereicht bekommt.

Doch Ederer glaubt auf so naive wie verblendete Weise an eine Abwendbarkeit dessen, was demographisch für Deutschland als Deutschland zumindest vorläufig in Stein gemeißelt ist, er glaubt an den Standardmenschen, an die Austauschbarkeit aller Populationen und an das sozialdemokratische Bildungsideal, kurz: an die Gleichheit. Daß die USA in einer so zerrissenen Situation sich wiederfinden könnte, wie sie es heute tun, konnte Ederer sich nicht einmal vorstellen, obwohl nicht nur die Weichen gestellt, sondern die Voraussagen mehr als klar formuliert waren: „Kanada und die USA stellen durch Einwanderungsquoten ihr Wachstum sicher.“ (Ebd.: 96) Diese These hält aktuellen Daten und Entwicklungen der letzten 10 Jahre nicht stand, und es konnte auch nur den Anschein haben, sie könnte sich bewahrheiten, weil beide Länder im Jahr 2000

(a) wenigstens noch homogen genug waren, um nicht in kurzer Zeit in einen Kollaps hineinzurasen,

(b) aufgrund ihrer vergleichsweise großen Homogenität noch über die nötigen „indigenen“ Talentressourcen verfügten, um das Niveau zu halten, und

(c) überdurchschnittliche Akademiker in einem noch einigermaßen meritokratischen System eine tragende Rolle spielten.

Einige Hinweise:

– Kanada ist tatsächlich großartig in Sachen Zukunftssicherung durch Migration: „According to the president of the Council of Canadian Innovators, there were more than 200,000 vacant tech positions in Canada as of March 2022.“ (https://cdhowe.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Commentary_626_0-1.pdf)

– Zur US-Migration gehört dann auch noch die vieler leistungsfähigerer Kanadier in die USA: „Canadian evidence based on LinkedIn profiles of 2015 and 2016 STEM graduates from the Universities of Toronto, British Columbia and Waterloo also show many of their graduates in ICT fields such as software engineering (66 percent), computer engineering (30 percent) and computer science (30 percent) leaving for the United States after graduation.“ (Ebd.)

– Zudem sind in Kanada die Hochqualifizierten ähnlich hochqualifiziert wie in Deutschland, weshalb man auf die sozialdemokratische Magie der großartigen Ausbildung gar nicht erst hoffen braucht: „In 2020, according to a national survey of elementary and middle school teachers in Canada, only 53 percent of teachers felt adequately prepared to teach STEM, and nearly all teachers agreed that there was room to improve their STEM skill.“

– Für die USA verweise ich auf meinen Essay It’s the Demography of Intelligence, Stupid. A Variety of Basic Facts on Why China is Beating the USA, möchte hier aber eine Tatsache nicht unerwähnt lassen, die zeigt, daß die USA in so gut wie nichts noch ein Vorbild sein können und im bodenlosen Unsinn versinken: Für 2024 wird berichtet, daß 96,5 % aller neu geschaffenen Jobs auf den Regierungssektor entfielen (https://californiaglobe.com/fl/96-5-of-new-jobs-in-california-this-year-were-government-jobs/).

Zurück zu Ederer, der geradezu schizophren argumentiert. Einmal heißt es:
„Deutschland ist in der Statistik der wettbewerbsfähigsten Länder der Welt auf einen Mittelplatz zurückgefallen – laut Davoser Weltwirtschaftsforum auf Platz 25, und unser Anteil am Weltmarkt sinkt ständig weiter ab. Die Konsequenz: Wenn wir uns diese Spitzenleistung nicht zutrauen, brauchen wir zur Finanzierung unseres Lebensstandards Einwanderung.“ (Ederer 2000: 115)

Ederer tut so, als würde Dietzenbach nicht existieren, um dann Dietzenbach anzuführen:

„Dietzenbach ist ein anschauliches Beispiel dafür, was es die Gesellschaft kostet, wenn sie Einwanderung so einfach hinnimmt. 60 Prozent der registrierten Bewohner Dietzenbachs sind Ausländer. 50 Prozent Sozialhilfeempfänger. [...] Nur 13 Prozent der Deutschen sind ungelernt, aber 50 Prozent der Türken. Und nur 3,5 Prozent der ausländischen Jugendlichen schaffen das Abitur, dafür haben extrem viele keinen qualifizierten Schulabschluss.“ (Ebd.: 121 f.; meine Hervorhebung) 

Einen Zusammenhang zwischen den angeführten Daten vermag er nicht herzustellen, bzw. er tut dies auf sozialdemokratische Weise: Unangenehmes ist gemacht und könnte anders gemacht werden, dann würde nämlich Angenehmes gemacht und hervorgebracht. Die Magie der Sozialdemokratie kennt in der Tat keine Grenzen, vor allem keine, die die Realität ihr setzt.

Statt dessen gibt Ederer uns exotistische Multikulti-Romantik von seinen USA-Reisen:

„Es ist jedes Mal faszinierend, wenn ich in San Francisco lande und sehe, dass nicht zwei Zoll- oder Passbeamte ursprünglich von der gleichen Nation abstammen: Lateinamerikaner, verschiedene Asiaten, Afrikaner und hin und wieder ein Weißer - sie alle haben eine amerikanische Uniform an und kennen nur eine Loyalität: die zu ihrer Heimat, den USA.“ (Ebd.: 141)

Weil ihn so etwas viel mehr interessiert, als reale Potentialitätsverteilungen, wie genau sie sich in ehemals ernstzunehmenden Hochleistungssektoren manifestierten und was auf ihrer Grundlage zu erwarten ist, verliert er sich in der Sehnsucht nach dem Nicht-Land USA, die mittlerweile, weil bei so vielen in so naiver Weise vorhanden war, nun mit der Realität konfrontiert wird, die sie schon damals in sich trug. Plötzlich interessieren Ederer auch Erreichtes und Ergebnisse nicht mehr, sondern nur noch Quoten und Multikulti-Bilder, und ein Anflug von Nationalstolz erfaßt ihn, wo er die nationale Selbstaufgabe dem Leser in Zahlen präsentiert: „Ja, in dieser Hinsicht bin ich stolz auf Deutschland. Nach der Schweiz (17,5 Prozent) und Österreich (9,9 Prozent) haben wir mit 8,6 Prozent den höchsten Ausländeranteil am Arbeitsmarkt.“ (Ebd.: 144)

Warum Ederer auf den Ausländeranteil so stolz ist, wenn er seiner eigenen Ansicht nach zur Abwendung des Unabwendbaren nichts beitragen kann, muß sein Geheimnis bleiben; daß das Ausbleiben von Generationen sich nicht durch multikulturalistisch sich blödsinnig an sich selbst besaufende Ersatzteillager-Biopolitik (replacement migration) nicht kompensiert werden kann, weiß er immerhin selbst noch und spricht es aus:

„Jede weitere Verzögerung der grundsätzlichen Abkehr vom bestehenden Generationenvertrag führt unweigerlich zu einem Krieg zwischen den Generationen. Irgendwann zwischen 2010 und 2015 kommt es dann wegen der gigantischen Verschuldung des Staates und der Zahlungsverpflichtungen aus der Sozialgesetzgebung zum Crash. Die Republik ist dann nicht nur zahlungs-, sondern auch politikunfähig.“ (Ebd.: 194)

Dieser Krieg – von Volkmar Weiss übrigens unter dem Namen der „Altenpogrome“ als Szenario diskutiert – ist bislang ausgeblieben und wird vermutlich ausbleiben, weil die „Boomer“, die in einem solchen Krieg zum Hauptangriffspunkt werden müßten, eine derart chaotische Konfliktlage geschaffen haben, daß genügend Gruppen gegeneinander aufhetzbar sind, ohne daß ein solcher Generationenkrieg eintreten muß.

Berlin

Viel zu kommentieren gibt es hier nicht, und es wird auch kaum jemanden verwundern, daß Berlin schon im Jahr 2000 von Ederer so geschildert wird, wie man es heute in einer sachten Beschreibung der Verhältnisse tun würde:

„Im April demonstrierten in Berlin 54 000 Lehrer und Schüler gegen die unhaltbaren Zustände in den Schulen der Hauptstadt. Im Fernsehen waren Hintergrundberichte zu sehen. Da wurde eine Hauptschule vorgestellt, in der Kinder mit 26 verschiedenen Muttersprachen unterrichtet werden müssen. Viele besitzen noch nicht einmal die Grundkenntnisse der deutschen Sprache. Trotzdem sitzen über 20 Kinder in einer Klasse. Dem Senat fehlt das Geld, um mehr Lehrkräfte einzustellen. Der Versuch, die Misere dadurch zu beheben, dass die Lehrer eine Stunde länger arbeiten sollen, ist ein Tropfen auf den heißen Stein.“ (Ebd.: 136)

Universitäten

Was den Zerfall der Universitäten und des Bildungswesens angeht, herrscht allerdings bei vielen die Vorstellung, wir wären schnell von der Weltspitze und die apokalyptische Blödheit abgestiegen, während wir de facto schon seit Jahrzehnten uns im Abstieg befinden und die Standards permanent gelockert haben. Eine zitierungswürdige Erinnerung daran, daß die Hochqualifizierten nicht erst seit gestern oft nicht sonderlich hochqualifiziert sind, gibt Ederer hier:

„Professor Klaus Ott, Dekan der Zahnärztlichen Fakultät in Münster, zeigt uns eine schon lachhafte Statistik. Nur die Hälfte seiner Studenten schafft das Vorexamen in der Regelstudienzeit oder knapp darüber. Ein weiteres Viertel braucht mit acht Semestern doppelt so lange wie vorgesehen und mehr, und vom letzten Viertel sitzen Studenten schon 18 Semester in der Uni, ohne auch nur das Hauptstudium begonnen zu haben. Darunter war eine Frau, die schon achtmal durchgefallen ist und immer noch nicht aufgibt. Doch Professor Ott sind die Hände gebunden, er muss ihr immer wieder Laborplätze anbieten, sie an Patienten üben lassen und seine und die Zeit seiner Hilfskräfte mit ihr verschwenden. Ist das sozial?“ (Ebd.: 257)

Bürokratie

Kaum zu glauben, aber auch im Jahre 2000 war Bürokratie schon ein massives Problem und mehr dazu geeignet, bestehende Probleme zu verschärfen und neue zu erschaffen, als die Dinge zu erleichtern. Die Zahlen, die Ederer präsentiert, sind allerdings aus heutiger Sicht geradezu als moderat zu bezeichnen:

„Rupert Scholz, CDU-Politiker und Verfassungsrechtler, hat die Bürokratiekosten in Deutschland für 1997 mit 58 Milliarden DM errechnet, eine Summe, die sich allein durch behördliche Auflagen, gesetzliche Genehmigungs- und Planungsverfahren bis hin zu allzu komplizierten Steuergesetzgebungen ergibt. Das sind 58 Milliarden DM von 144 Milliarden, die wir insgesamt aufwenden, also mehr als ein Drittel.“ (Ebd.: 456)

Die angegebenen 58 Milliarden D-Mark entsprechen heute rund 30 Milliarden Euro, aber die direkten Bürokratiekosten betragen heute etwa 65 Milliarden Euro. Die heutigen indirekten Bürokratiekosten, d.h. die Bürokratieschadensfolgen, betragen laut ifo-Institut noch einmal fast 150 Milliarden zusätzlich. Ob die Bürokratie in Deutschland wirklich noch nennenswert positiv etwas leistet, und wenn ja, was, dazu fällt kaum noch einem etwas ein; zu erdrückend ist die Erstickungs- und Lahmlegungsleistung des Apparats, der mehr behindert, als er zu ermöglichen hilft.

Entwicklungsland Deutschland

Schließen möchte ich mit einem Zitat, das keiner Kommentierung bedarf, denn diejenigen, die nicht sehen, wie sehr die Aussage auf Deutschland insbesondere heute zutrifft, werden ohnehin durch keine Erklärung mehr erreichbar sein, während die übrigen nichts weniger brauchen als eine solche:

„Ein kluger Mitarbeiter der Weltbank hat einmal versucht, mir in zwei Sätzen den Unterschied zwischen Entwicklungsländern und Industriestaaten zu erklären: Die Industriestaaten planen etwas und setzen es dann um. Entwicklungsländer planen etwas und lassen sich für ihren Plan feiern. Ob er dann realisiert wird, ist nicht mehr so wichtig. Der Plan ist die Tat - nicht die Umsetzung. So gesehen funktioniert in Deutschland die Verkehrspolitik wie in einem Entwicklungsland.“ (Ebd.: 413)

Literatur:

Ederer, Günter (2000): Die Sehnsucht nach einer verlogenen Welt. Unsere Angst vor Freiheit, Markt und Eigenverantwortung. Über Gutmenschen und andere Scheinheilige. München: Goldmann.

Als Gabriele Behlers Buch im Jahre 2000 erschienen war, war die Autorin, die wenige Jahre zuvor als Deutsch und Geschichte unterrichtende Gymnasiallehrerin arbeitete, Ministerin für Schule und Weiterbildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Wir haben es also mit den Betrachtungen einer in die Politik gewechselten Praktikerin zu tun, nicht mit einer reinen Berufspolitikerin, die in ihrem Leben nie etwas anderes gesehen hat, aber auch nicht mit einer Wissenschaftlerin, die höhere Sphären und Ansprüche des Bildungssystems aus eigener Partizipation im Spitzenbereich kennt.

Dementsprechend kommt eines in dem Buch nicht: Hochbegabte und Hochbegabung. Die im wissenschaftlichen Bereich wichtigste “Humanressource” wird in einer Konzeptschrift für das 21. Jahrhundert in so ganz und gar deutscher Manier gar nicht erst bedacht, obwohl das Thema gerade Ende der 1990er einige Aufmerksamkeit erlangte, was auch in Deutschland durch die Bücher Detlef Rosts (Hochbegabte und hochleistende Jugendliche. Befunde aus dem Marburger Hochbegabtenprojekt, 2000) und Kurt A. Hellers (Begabtenförderung im Gymnasium. Ergebnisse einer zehnjährigen Längsschnittstudie, 2002) deutlich dokumentiert ist. Bereits 1991 hat Heller das Buch Begabungsdiagnostik in der Schul- und Erziehungsberatung herausgegeben; bildungspolitisch wäre es mehr als ratsam gewesen, die darin präsentierten Ergebnisse aufzugreifen, doch auch eine Bildungsministerin auf Landesebene nahm davon anscheinend nicht einmal Notiz oder hatte kein Interesse an dem “Thema” (das für einige ein existentielles Problem ist).

Auffällig ist auch, daß das dreigliedrige Schulsystem in keiner nennenswerten Weise thematisiert, sondern nur en passant kommentiert und mit einem Hinweis auf die Ergebnisse von TIMSS abgefertigt wird:

“TIMSS war eine breit angelegte internationale Vergleichsuntersuchung zu den mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Leistungen und Kenntnissen der Schülerinnen und Schüler in der Sekundarstufe I und der Sekundarstufe II. Dabei schnitten Schüler aus Ländern mit integrierten Schulsystemen wie zum Beispiel Korea, Japan oder Schweden ebenso gut ab wie Schüler aus Ländern mit gegliedertem Schulsystem wie zum Beispiel die deutschsprachige Schweiz.” (Behler 2000.; 58)

Erstens schnitten die Schüler aus Korea und Japan nicht “ebenso gut ab” wie Schüler aus Deutschland, sondern um Längen besser:

Zweitens erledigt sich damit nicht im Ansatz, was Josef Kraus bereits 1998 in Spaßpädagogik wort- und datenreich über die Gesamtschule vorgebracht hat, die eher eine generalisierte Hauptschule als ein Gymnasium für alle war: “In den meisten Städten mit Gesamtschulen stieg der Anteil der hauptschulempfohlenen Gesamtschüler auf 60 bis 80 Prozent. Zugleich fiel die Zahl der gymnasialempfohlenen Gesamtschüler auf durchschnittlich fünf Prozent.” (Kraus 1998, 69) Was solche Statistiken abbilden, wird von Betroffenen schwerlich übersehen: “Eltern wissen, daß die Gesamtschule Leistungsfähige bremst, weil sie mit einer Orientierung an den Langsameren »Konvoi«-Effekte provoziert.” (Ebd.) Kein Wunder, daß die auch noch existierende Hauptschule als Restschule angesehen, doch Behler verwahrt sich gegen eine solche Einschätzung: “Um es noch einmal klar zu sagen: Die Hauptschule ist keine »Restschule«.” Aber wenn der Großteil der “eigentlichen Hauptschüler” in die Gesamtschule einwandert, was soll dann die Hauptschule anderes sein als eine Restschule? Und mehr noch: Erfüllt sie damit nicht sogar auf eine bedauernswerte insofern eine produktive Funktion, als durch ihre Existenz die Gesamtschule nicht sogar noch weiter verwahrlost? Diese Frage ergibt natürlich nur mit Blick auf die Lage im Jahr 2000 einigermaßen Sinn; heute wäre eher zu diskutieren, inwieweit auch das Gymnasium schon die “generalisierte Hauptschule” mit sich schleppt.

In dem, was hier bez. der Entwicklung von Anspruchsniveaus leicht zu ersehen ist, waren wir im Jahr 2000 schon klar und deutlich auf dem Weg ins Jahr 2025. Manche Sätze klingen, als wären sie heute formuliert worden, z. B.: “Es muss uns größte Sorge machen, dass der Anteil der Kinder ohne Deutschkenntnisse im 1. Schuljahr wächst, obwohl diese Kinder doch in Deutschland aufgewachsen sind.” (Behler 2000, 98) Die größte Sorge blieb offensichtlich ohne die geringste positive Wirkung.

Sorgen dieser Art können sich auch nicht auswirken, wenn eine der artikulierten Sorgen ein zu implementierender Islamunterricht ist. Ja, auch das war im Jahr 2000 schon auf der Agenda, nur war die Referenzgruppe nicht “Muslime”, sondern “türkische Schulkinder”: “Das Ziel ist ein Islam-Unterricht in deutscher Sprache. Wir haben uns dieses Ziel vor dem Hintergrund der Tatsache gesetzt, dass Nordrhein-Westfalen das Bundesland mit der größten Zahl zugewanderter, in der Mehrheit türkischer Schulkinder ist.” (Ebd., 72) Doch über die Großzügigkeit hinaus findet man auch schon die anti-christliche Revision Deutschlands klar im Text: “[E]s wäre auch verfehlt, den vielen türkischen Schülerinnen und Schülern kein Angebot zu machen, nur weil wir bislang unter Religionsunterricht stets einen christlichen Religionsunterricht verstanden haben.” [Ebd., 71; Hervorhebung, S.E.]

Solche Kotaubereitschaft verträgt sich nicht gerade gut mit der “Kultur der Anstrengung”, die Behler anspricht (”fordern” wäre etwas anderes): “Wenn die Schule ihre vielfältigen, wuchtigen und anspruchsvollen Aufgaben erfüllen und sie das vermitteln soll, was die Kinder und Jugendlichen für ihre Zukunft benötigen, dann braucht sie vor allem eine neue ‘Kultur der Anstrengung’.” (Ebd., 73) Vielleicht ist “neue” hier das entscheidende Wort: eine neue Kultur der Anstrengung, in der Anstrengung keine mehr ist und das bloße Erscheinen schon als Leistungsnachweis gilt. Eine Annäherung wie etwas wie eine asiatische Disziplin war sicher nie bei einem deutschen Bildungspolitiker vorgesehen.

Anstrengungsbereitschaft würde sich zum Beispiel darin manifestieren, nicht einfach Statistiken in kindlich naiver Weise zu lesen, sondern sich zu fragen, wie das Kontraintuitive mit dem Realen zusammenhängt. Behler glaubt tatsächlich, daß die USA ihren weltpolitischen Status in den 1990ern ihren im internationalen Vergleich mittelmäßigen Schülern ohne weiteres zu verdanken hätten: “Die deutschen Schüler sind nicht »dumm«, auch wenn sie in Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften derzeit nicht die »Weltspitze« halten, sondern im Mittelfeld liegen. Die Schüler aus den USA, dem größten Wirtschaftsgiganten der Welt, liegen im Übrigen weit dahinter.” (Ebd., 16) De facto werden die USA getragen – das verbindet sie mit allen anderen Ländern grundsätzlich mit allen anderen – von einer kleinen Minderheiten der Leistungsfähigen, aber maßgeblich auch von dem, was Behler übersieht: die Rolle der internationalen Studenten, gerade im höheren Leistungsbereich.

Quelle: https://cis.org/Report/Displacement-US-Students-Doctoral-Degree-Level

Was jedenfalls nicht ausreicht, um mit den USA auch nur im Ansatz mitzuhalten, von Behler aber als zukunftsträchtige Errungenschaft gefeiert wird, ist dies:

“Wir haben in der »alten« Bundesrepublik in den letzten 40 Jahren eine historisch einmalige Aufbauleistung im Hochschulwesen vollbracht. 1960 waren Hochschule und Studium noch eine Veranstaltung für eine kleine Schicht von Privilegierten, der Anteil der Studierenden an der Bevölkerung betrug nicht einmal ein halbes Prozent.” (Ebd., 139)

Wenn etwas nicht sein soll wie Berlin heute, also keine dysfunktionale Unsinnshölle, die aus Tattooläden (und entsprechend aussehenden Gestalten überall), „Spätis“, Nagelstudios und ähnlichem besteht, dann ist das allerletzte, was jedenfalls dem universitären Sektor obliegt, die elitenfeindliche Protegierung sozialdemokratischer Ideale: „Wenn es die Bildungsexpansion im Hochschulsektor nicht gegeben hätte, dann hätten wir heute zwar das Problem ‚Massenuniversität‘ nicht, aber wir hätten aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach wie vor nur eine kleine qualifizierte Hochschul-Elite.“ (Ebd., 141) Mit einer Mentalität, die allerdings auch einen elitär zu konzipierenden Bereich eher nach dem Modell der behaglichen Abendschule „denkt“, kann man auch die Doppelsinnigkeit approbierter und jederzeit gerne heruntergeleierter Phrasen nicht mehr erkennen: „Chancengleichheit heißt heute also: gleichberechtigte Chancen für alle nach Leistung und Befähigung.” (Ebd., 40) In der elitistischen Lesart: Wer damit ernst macht, ist politisch definitiv erledigt.

Schließen möchte ich mit einer weiteren Phrase Behlers, deren ungewollte Abgründigkeit sie nicht zu imaginieren vermag:

“Man soll nicht wertschätzen, was man messen kann, sondern man soll messen, was man wertschätzt.” (Ebd., 61)

Das erklärt, warum Intelligenztests nicht systematisch und flächendeckend eingesetzt werden und so viele Hochbegabte, die mit einem heruntergekommenen Schulsystem nichts anfangen können (und in diesem System mit sich selbst nichts mehr anfangen können), hier unentdeckt bleiben und in einem System zu überleben versuchen, das an ihnen ausgerichtet sein sollte. Das wäre das erste, was sich bei einem fundamentalen politischen Neuanfang gravierend und schonungslos zu ändern hätte, denn die in ihren letzten Zügen liegende Gesellschaftsformation ist – außer an ihrer selbstmörderischen hedonistischen softness – an ihrer Indifferenz gegenüber dem Hohen (bei kriecherisch-gefallsüchtigem Ranschmeißen ans Niedrige) und dem Verständnis davon, worauf es mit eherner Gesetzlichkeit basiert, unrettbar gescheitert. Die Zukunft der Bildung erweist sich heute – auch weil im Jahr 2000 Bücher wie das Behlers als ernsthafte Diskussionsbeiträge unter die Leute gebracht werden konnten – als die Hölle der Unbildung und des sich um sich greifenden funktionalen Analphabetismus; die herrschende Klasse verwaltet diese Zustände nicht, sie repräsentiert dieselben– im wesentlichen sie und sonst kaum etwas.

Literatur:
Behler, Gabriele (2000): Zukunft: Bildung! Agenda für die Modernisierung unserer Schulen und Hochschulen. Bonn: Dietz.

Kraus, Josef (1998): Spaßpädagogik. Sackgassen deutscher Schulpolitik. München : Universitas.

Recently, a book titled Demokratiedämmerung (Twilight of Democracy) by Veith Selk has been published in Germany. This book has sparked an uproar in the academic establishment because it presents data on illiteracy in German society that should not have surprised anyone, but caught academia—which is largely intellectually walled off from normal societal reality—off guard. It speaks volumes about this milieu that shock and surprise were even possible. The joy about the fact that, due to Selk’s book, central topoi from Herrnstein and Murray's The Bell Curve are finding their way into the German academic mainstream discourse through the back door in a mode of deep disturbance, must also be kept within limits, since the diffusion of such insights presupposed transitioning from a societal crisis with suicidal course-setting into a civilizational free fall.

In particular, Selk has alarmed large parts of the academic establishment by spreading the fact that "of the 51.5 million German-speaking adults aged between 18 and 64, a full 16.8 million people do not reach the elementary school level of written German." There is no reason to rejoice that many have now been awakened from their deep sleep, because the situation is even more dire than Selk's book portrays it. 54% of all adult Americans read at the level of a sixth-grader or below, and in Germany it will hardly look any different by now; at least this would be the assumption if one took the sixth grade of the "old" Germany of the 1990s as the standard.

Selk leaves out the diachronic perspective that comes to mind when one asks how bad it must have been in the past, if illiteracy is raging to such an extent in the "best Germany of all time"—as some prominent and intellectually irrelevant politician (irrelevant to such a degree that I refuse to acknowledge the fact that he even has a name) would call the mess we are living in. According to the Global Universal Basic Skills report presented in 2022, 23.8% of pupils in Germany did not even possess the skills necessary to master the transition from elementary school to lower secondary level; the standard is defined by the lowest competency level captured in the PISA test. For comparison: in Japan, only 12.7% fell below the threshold in this disaster, while in leading China only 6.5%, whereas in Kenya 77.2% and in Afghanistan 90.5% lacked all basic skills.

But if it looks so bad in 2022, how bad must it have been in the 1990s then? In the Moser Report of 1997, we find data comparing Germany, Canada, and Great Britain regarding numerical understanding and reading competency. The percentage of adults in the respective countries was as follows concerning low competency levels:

In Germany, reading competency was weak in 12% of adults, while numerical understanding was weak in only 7%. In Canada, the proportion was 17% in each case, and in the UK, 23% each. So, about 30 years ago, German adults fared somewhat better in reading competency than Japanese elementary school pupils do today, while in terms of numerical understanding, adults scored almost as well as the children of today’s world leader, China. The binding character of a cultural level of refinement expresses itself precisely in the fact that, over the course of generations, either the arduously established standard is maintained or improvement is actually sought or achieved. One might be inclined to object that these are two different kinds of tests whose results are cited here, so that there is no exact compatibility between the results. That, in turn, is only relevant if the Moser Report fundamentally contains inaccurate results—that is, if a significant portion of those to whom solid competencies are conceded do not in fact possess them. Otherwise, the difference between the tests is not particularly important.

The picture is even worse when we look at the 2021 IGLU study: Reading Competency of Primary School Children in International Comparison and Trends over 20 Years. Here, five competency levels are distinguished. The lowest two competency levels correspond to “rudimentary reading skills”; at level 4, children can read solidly, and at level 5, they can read well. Level 5 contains the pool of potential high school graduates (Abitur), assuming there are educational standards rather than just talk about them. In Germany, 8.3% of pupils reach competency level 5, while in Singapore 35.4% do, in Russia 20.8%, in Bulgaria 15.9%, and in Poland 13.8%. For competency level 4, the study records a significant decline: –8.8% in Sweden, –7.1% in Germany, but only –3.7% in Bulgaria. In 2001 in Germany, “only” 16.9% did not reach competency level 3 (which is at least moderate reading skills—the decline compared to the Moser Report data is striking), but what is even worse: the proportion of children who do not reach competency level 3 “jumped significantly to 25.4% in 2021.” In other words: a quarter of the children who attend German schools have no prospect of participating in a modern labor market.

Back to the educational tests: Examining the available data, free from any sentimentality, we see that Germany is in free fall. In a PDF document on IGLU 2021 that bears the note “Handout for the Press Conference,” it states: “The development of declining reading competency has been apparent since 2011. Between 2016 and 2021, average reading competency declined particularly sharply.” If we go back 10 years, since these are the results of primary school pupils: since around 2000, very little is right in German homes, and among other things, this includes the fact that the number of traditional households is massively decreasing, because since 2000 the rate of out-of-wedlock births has steadily been above 20 percent, and since 2010, steadily above 30 percent. What is reflected in the quality of the behavior of the parents is mirrored more or less exactly in the educational results; the “quality of people” is not an ideological illusion but an elementary category of social and cultural politics; abandon it, and you abandon—at least in the long run, and maybe without even understanding it—everything that is worth anything. One does not even need to look at migration for this, it is enough to look at the civilizational (or non-civilizational) standards (or lack thereof) according to which sexual “selection” (or non-selection) takes place.

But let us briefly turn to migration, because the above-mentioned document contains the following sentence on this topic: ‘The substantial social and migration-related disparities in Germany have not been reduced since 2001.’ The linguistic and logical competencies of those who formulate such sentences leave no less to be desired than the recent achievements of pupils. The disparities are not “migration-related,” because migration means immigration to a host country, not the parental undermining of learning processes and school engagement. Migration per se therefore does not create disparity, and if one were to collect the data, there would certainly be no significant impairment in the performance of Southeast Asians in such tests; moreover, it is quite possible and not implausible to assume that they would perform above average in such tests. I will leave it at a hint here: complementary IQ tests, applied across the board, would be more helpful here than empty phrases that make the teaching profession the next legitimate subject of cognitive investigation.

What does all this mean from a diagnostic perspective for the state of a democracy in which illiteracy is spreading as a pandemic for which there will definitely be no vaccine—not even a deficient one? And what does it mean prognostically?

A democratic-theoretical and critical answer has been formulated by Jason Brennan in his book Against Democracy (2016). The book demands a double re-reading: once in light of the recent educational studies, and then also in light of Covid policies. Brennan does not simply want to get rid of democracy, but formulates an alternative concept which he calls epistocracy. At the heart of this concept is the competence principle, which Brennan defines as follows: “It is unjust to violate a citizen’s rights through decisions made by an incompetent deliberative body, or through decisions made incompetently or with bad intentions, and to forcibly deprive him of his life, liberty, or property or to significantly impair his life chances.” In this formulation, the competence principle is not an elitist exclusion principle, but an elementary protection principle—and during Covid, we saw what could be justified under the state’s duty to protect. Epistocracy thus interweaves the competence principle with a protection of citizens that, even if in a hysterical and concretistic exaggeration (lockdown or death), justified the shutdown of social and economic life. At the same time, it attempts to erect a barrier against incompetence and inability on the part of voters at the procedural level. What in 2016 might have seemed to some as an overreaction should gradually present itself to even the last holdout as an urgently needed alternative.

Do the competency developments in the acquisition of basic cultural techniques such as reading, mentioned above, indicate that, on a societal scale, a cognitive decline is emerging that must be addressed at the level of basic government formation procedures? I would like to answer as follows: if one—for the first time in German history—has arrived at news in “simple German,” this is an admission that large parts of the electorate are cognitively only just above the state for which guardianship courts would be responsible; nicely decorated LinkedIn profiles can’t mask that anymore. Then, the possibilities for cognitive participation are so severely curtailed that one must respond at the procedural level before the usual democratic self-correction (simply voting again and better) can take effect. Perhaps one must secure elections here like Christmas markets—only against the terror of illiterate worldlessness instead of against terrorist car drivers.

What one might object to epistocracy on the side of the establishment is its expansion of skepticism: not only are voters supposed to have sufficient capability in the field of political judgment, but Brennan has also brought into play the establishment of an epistocratic council with the power to revise incompetent decisions. In other words: epistocracy assumes that incompetence goes much further than those who like to suggest otherwise, who elevate themselves above the electorate but want to be regarded as being beyond any doubt regarding even the most elementary abilities. According to The Guardian, in a comparative test in mathematics and language, parliamentarians on average performed worse than 10-year-olds (44% met the minimum requirements in mathematics, 50% in basic English), so an expansion of epistocratic suspicion is inevitable. When it comes to the most basic “math” questions (basically questions you have to be able to answer before you can even begin with statistics 101), more than 50% of MPs failed miserably; 45% answered that the probability of getting two heads when spinning a coin twice is 50%; 7% said they didn’t know if 50% or 25% is the correct answer which, ironically, in this case was a better answer than the hilarious 50% response. Now we are getting to the core of what the cognitive ability of the so-called elites that promote multiculturalism is really about. Odo Marquard’s Inkompetenzkompensationskompetenz (yes, German for “competence to compensate incompetence”) undergoes its resurrection here in the area of political quality control endowed with limited but marked veto powers.

All of this has serious social and economic consequences, one of which will be addressed here in concrete terms: the great publishing collapse to come. The book trade has already lost a significant portion of its customer base: “In 2023, there were 25 million book buyers, whereas the infamous ‘Buchkäufer – quo vadis’ survey determined ten years earlier (2013) that there were still 36 million people who spent money on books.” Readers are not simply stopping reading—they are dying out. Now, a massive economic decline is being added, which is only just gaining momentum and will persist for quite some time, while at the same time several million more readers will die out over the next 10 years. The book trade is compensating for the disappearance of readers in the same way that Germany is compensating for demographic decline—namely, in an artificial, unsustainable, and untenable manner, as Die ZEIT reports: “Book market revenue in the first months of 2025 is at the same level as the previous year, said Kraus vom Cleff. However, already in 2024, fewer books were sold than in the year before. Despite this decline of 1.7 percent, total revenue increased by 0.8 percent according to the Börsenverein. This was simply because books became more expensive.” The patient is 110 years old; this cannot go on for much longer, and the end result will be the undoing of the proto-civilizational work of alphabetizing children.

If one looks at the development of basic cognitive abilities, the baseline of cultural training, one is faced with a trail of competence wreckage in pseudo-national formats. Reading does not merely train the deciphering of a sequence of letters, but a relationship to the world of distancing and simultaneously opening up through ideal representation by means of objectification. Where communication is in “simple German,” one need not even begin to talk about matters such as “deliberative self-legislation and self-government in parliamentary mediation and representation.” Brennan has raised important procedural questions that we must now consider anew in a holistic way: what could a re-transformation look like into a society that no longer needs “simple German”? If the question of democracy is posed at this level, questions such as whether we will be able to remain in modernity are already on the line. Sticking to “business as usual” inevitably means falling out of modernity, and the question of democracy will then no longer even arise. Not the end of history, but the end of the history of modernity in the West is the abyss we are staring into. And what is unfolding here is not a crisis. A crisis befalls only those who want to avoid it. What I’ve been talking about here can reasonably only be interpreted as the realization of a spiritual, psychological, societal and, ultimately, civilizational Morgenthau Plan.

[This is the translation and comprehensive modification of a text that I published in German at the end of 2023. I have updated or supplemented the data where relevant; other data (especially demographic) have by and large not changed significantly in such a short time. Also, this essay was originally the third part of a trilogy on David Goldman’s work; hence the many references to his brilliant book You Will Be Assimilated. China’s Plan to Sino-Form the World]

Wherever you look—whether in politics or the media, in Germany or the USA—China is almost always catastrophically underestimated, even in circles where it is regarded as a legitimate geopolitical competitor to the United States. The still often-repeated phrase—sometimes as an objection, sometimes as an argument—that the Chinese are diligent and clever but not creative no longer stands up to real-world developments. Goldman, in particular, sees this very clearly and tries to help dreamers—those who stubbornly cling to phrases that shield them from reality—to face the facts. However, facing the facts also means, as a next step, combining demographic realities with findings from intelligence research. To my knowledge, Goldman has not done this, but it is necessary in order to place his arguments in a broader context and gain an even more comprehensive and realistic picture of the situation.

https://x.com/davidpgoldman/status/1563215722423078913

In the USA and Western Europe, it is no secret that today’s eighth graders—and even more so those in thirteen years—are no longer given such tasks. Since my focus is not on the internal decline of the West, but rather on the comparison with China, it is not relative figures such as fertility rates that matter here, but absolute numbers, which allow us to relate actual birth figures and intelligence potentials to one another.

Before engaging with Goldman, a few intelligence-demographic considerations should be outlined: Even though China is, de facto, in a difficult demographic situation due to a rapidly declining fertility rate, unexamined statistics can easily obscure the very real weight of absolute numbers, which provide a more reliable basis for comparison (general data). According to the South China Morning Post, 9.56 million children were born in China in 2022, compared to 3.89 million in the entire European Union (and in the years 2021 and 2022 combined, just about 8 million), and 3.66 million in the USA. Thus, in 2022, the EU and USA together had fewer than 8 million births. The significance of these absolute numbers increases even further when the IQ factor is taken into account: The average Chinese IQ (104) is higher than that of Western Europeans (about 100) and Americans (98). To avoid getting bogged down in distracting arguments about the exact IQ value of individual countries, I will, for the sake of argument, standardize the IQ value (thereby also sidestepping the unresolved question of the urban-rural IQ gap in China, for which there are still insufficient data; it is likely that intelligence in China is disproportionately concentrated in the major cities, which act as talent magnets but are almost demographically sterile). That is: With 1.6 million more births and a (conservatively estimated) average IQ of 104 (Lynn/Vanhanen give it as 105.8; see Lynn/Vanhanen 2012: 21), even assuming (counterfactually!) equal IQs, China would have an approximate (rounded) talent advantage in the following highly developmentally relevant IQ segments (for μ = 104, σ = 15—the standard deviation is also standardized here, since it differs slightly between Europeans and Asians):

IQ 125: + approximately 125,000 in favor of China (conservatively estimated)

IQ 130: + approximately 65,000 (gifted)

IQ 135: + approximately 30,000 (“1%ers” according to Western established criteria)

IQ 140: + approximately 13,000

IQ 145: + approximately 5,000

I leave it to those who believe in American fantasy IQs of 180 or 200 to calculate the numbers for higher IQ values.

In any case, China would have to become demographically much weaker and Europe and the USA much stronger before there would be parity in talent strength. However, this discrepancy is where Goldman’s 1973–1982 analogy fails: In 1973, the USA was demographically—in terms of TFR, but especially in terms of available talent—significantly stronger than it is today, when it finds itself in the midst of a functional South Africanization (Example 1: power supply, Example 2: transportation system, Example 3: calls for ethnocide). In 1970 (source), the basic configuration in a country that for a long time essentially consisted of two ethnic groups was: 87.7% Europeans/Whites, 11.1% African Americans; by 1983, it was: 83.1% Europeans/Whites, 11.7% African Americans. In 2020, we have: 61.6% Europeans/Whites, 12.4% African Americans, 6.2% Asians, 18.7% Latinos, and several other groups.

Whether one looks at IQ or SAT results (for example, for 2022: https://reports.collegeboard.org/media/pdf/2022-total-group-sat-suite-of-assessments-annual-report.pdf), the picture is essentially always the same (for a concise overview, see Murray 2021 and Rushton/Jensen: Thirty Years of Research on Race Differences in Cognitive Ability), and the fact that the tests (naturally) do not show perfect intercorrelation does not change the fact that their results, like those of cognitive tests in general, show a very high intercorrelation (the key term for further research is: positive manifold). China’s potential is incomparably greater than that of the USA and Europe combined, and nothing will change that for the better less than following the script of the abominable UN replacement migration paper.

It is striking that Goldman does not address any of this. Perhaps religious reasons stand in the way of opening Pandora’s box, but ultimately only Goldman himself can explain why he leaves out what he presumably knows and what should count as much as a hard fact as the economic or demographic data he cites.

But let us turn to Goldman’s important and highly recommended book on China, You Will Be Assimilated. China’s Plan to Sino-Form the World (2020), which today ought to bear the subtitle How China is Sino-Forming the World, and to the 2021 publication, available digitally, How America Can Lose the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

China's functional integration of foreign economies

In the introduction to You Will Be Assimilated, Goldman speaks with striking clarity: “I wrote this book because America’s response to China’s global ambitions is a failure. There are two big reasons for this failure. First, we chronically underestimate China’s capabilities and ambitions.” (Goldman 2020: XVII) Out of necessity, I will limit myself here to this aspect and will (for now) largely exclude both the internal problems of the USA and the military balance of power between the two countries.

At the center of Goldman’s analysis is Huawei, a company “with fifty thousand foreign employees and research centers in two dozen Western countries,” which he therefore describes as an “imperial company” (ibid.: XXXII). Huawei does not need to bring products from China to the West; rather, Huawei uses Western expertise to manufacture its Chinese-controlled products. These products are not primarily smartphones; rather, smartphones are merely an application medium for a 5G-based digital infrastructure, of which China is the undisputed pioneer and which extends across the entire so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution. Goldman picks up on this term (the expression was popularized by Klaus Schwab in 2016, but it does not originate with him and can already be found in the title of the VINT Research Report The Fourth Industrial Revolution from 2014; in fact, prophetically, a chapter in Claus Eurich’s 1988 book Die Megamaschine (The Mega Machine) already bears the heading “The Fourth Industrial Revolution,” by which he meant the computerization of society and the working world), which designates a revolution that extends to fields such as “robotics, the Internet of things, and massive big data applications to supply chain management, transportation, health care,” whose organization and design will be largely determined by the application of artificial intelligence. Goldman provides a detailed overview of the technological core areas on pages 3 and following of How America Can Lose the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

But why should everyone here make themselves dependent on China instead of pursuing their own path? At the time Goldman’s book was published, 21 European countries had already ordered 5G equipment from Huawei (cf. ibid.: 82), but under pressure from the USA, several European states joined the American sanctions and the boycott of Huawei, and they still continue to tolerate American pressure to this day. Yet, this alignment is unlikely to persist in the future, as:

1. China moves toward technological supremacy,

2. the US experiences a decline in global influence, and

3. US-Europe relations deteriorate further due to increasingly overbearing American demands, while China offers superior products.

Anyone who is tired of the slavish submissiveness of European governments can all the more laugh at the fact that Huawei has outmaneuvered the Americans and demonstrated that it possesses the intellectual and technological capacities to render such measures ineffective—while also developing an unparalleled capacity for technological self-sufficiency as a bonus. Even worse, the US is (for good reason) growing increasingly nervous about the quality of Huawei’s new Ascend chip. In response, it may now overreach by attempting to impose global export controls, which could backfire by pushing the world closer to China. Goldman saw this coming years ago and repeatedly warned that Huawei would achieve precisely what it is now demonstrating.

Source: https://twitter.com/davidpgoldman/status/1698537055284859207

How Europe will react when even the last skeptic finally acknowledges (since nothing happens here before that point) who is clearly winning the technological race remains to be seen. This also means: it remains to be seen whether Europe will choose China or the US as its master. So much for Europe. Others have already decided not to let their relationship with China be dictated by the USA: Mexico has allowed China to integrate itself into its own broadband infrastructure (cf. Goldman 2021: 10-11), as has Brazil, where Chinese AI optimizes entire soybean farms down to the smallest detail (cf. ibid.: 11). The effect? “‘Smart’ agriculture in Brazil and other large soy producers will rapidly reduce China’s dependency on imports from the United States and erode American exports at a moment when the US current account deficit is running at about $1 trillion a year.” (ibid.) As of now, approximately 70% of China’s soybean imports come from Brazil. The situation is likely to further deteriorate for the U.S., as China’s ties with Brazil are strengthening amid growing tensions with the United States.

“According to the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture and Supply, total soybean production from the 2023/2024 harvest was 147 million tons and about 87 million tons were exported to China. For the 2025/2026 harvest, of the 165 million tons of soybeans that Brazil is expected to produce, 110 million tons are expected to be exported, of which China will take an important part, according to the Brazilian industry representative.” (https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/0521/c90000-20317734.html)

But let’s get back to chips and technology in general. Is China offering gifts to friendly states, or are there dangers and risks here that are difficult to assess? In You Will Be Assimilated, Goldman discusses the possibility of backdoor implementations that are almost impossible to detect: “Even if data itself is protected by un-hackable cryptography, ‘backdoors’ hidden among the billions of transistors in a computer chip could be used by a bad actor to sabotage critical infrastructure.” (Goldman 2020: 87) In other words: With unrealistic optimism presupposing a benevolent application, one can indeed climb civilizational levels with the help of Chinese technology, but China can also shut off the lights and punish states back into pre-modernity at the push of a button if, from the Chinese perspective, someone behaves too inappropriately.

But why is what at first seems to be beneficial above all else actually a functional integration of foreign economies? Because China is able to provide advanced technologies preferentially to those countries from which it imports many goods, whose production is both quantitatively and qualitatively optimized by means of Chinese technology. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the transportation infrastructure arm of this strategy, which Goldman aptly describes as follows: “Even more important are China’s inroads into the developing world. China’s $2 trillion Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in combination with digital technology, aims to integrate billions of people in the developing world into China’s economic sphere.” (ibid.: 13) It does so by many measures, among them highly important infrastructure projects that have been finished since 2023, for example, the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway that connects China to Indonesia (travel time reduced from 3.5 hours to 45 minutes between Jakarta and Bandung), the China-Myanmar Crude Oil and Gas Pipeline (transports 22 million tons of crude oil and 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year while reducing China’s reliance on the Strait of Malacca for energy imports), or the Mombasa-Nairobi Railway (able to transport 1.5 million passengers and 5 million tons of freight per year with the journey time being reduced from 12 to 4.5 hours). Or just take a look at this impressive report: https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/2093102/China-Belt-and-Road-Initiative-BRI-Investment-Report-2024.pdf. Also, China and Europe are getting connected closer and closer:

Source: https://www.newsilkroaddiscovery.com/more-than-19000-china-europe-freight-trains-operated-in-2024-with-xian-chengdu-chongqing-and-zhengzhou-leading-the-way/

China’s strategy contains a key point that remains largely unnoticed by most people, which is why Goldman emphasizes it all the more: Unlike any other country, China can compensate for its demographic problems through the functional integration of other economies, because this integration includes young people from foreign and younger economies. While others must lament a shortage of skilled workers and are left hoping that technological developments will largely make up for it, China, through its technological monopoly and actual control over technological connection chains (analogous to supply and logistics chains), can bind and integrate foreign economies to itself so that the experience of dependency on China as subjugation from the Chinese side would only become apparent in cases of conflict. In general, China will, wherever possible and if acting wisely (not as in Sri Lanka, where a more debt-based colonial model was followed), aim for win-win situations that are attractive enough for the weaker, co-benefiting party to quash any questions of “Chinese colonization” from the outset; a good example is the soybean cultivation in Brazil discussed by Goldman, where Huawei’s 5G networks use 24/7 active sensors to “monitor” every single plant—that is, to check its condition and autonomously supply water, fertilizer, and pesticides as needed (cf. Goldman 2021: 11).

AI and humanoid robots

What Goldman could not yet concretely foresee in 2020 was the extent to which China would rival the US in the field of AI; there are good reasons to consider Chinese AI in certain respects superior to American AI in certain respects. However, Goldman also explicitly warned—in November 2024, months before the DeepSeek shock—about DeepSeek: “A Chinese firm to watch is DeepSeek, already the best LLM platform (according to ChatGPT!) for AI coding applications.” Not only is DeepSeek now widely recognized, but it is already—while remaining highly independent of non-national supply chains—embedded in the next step of Chinese AI development: the development of humanoid robots:

Source: https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ai-powered-humanoid-robots-aim-transform-manufacturing-2025-05-13/

And while we in the West are still discussing the whole development under the label AI, in China experts are already talking about EAI, embodied artificial intelligence:

As explained in the Top Ten Trends in Humanoid Robots unveiled at the 2024 World Robot Conference in Beijing, embodied AI (EAI), also sometimes called “embedded AI”, is a high-performance intelligent system that can respond quickly and accurately under dynamic and unpredictable conditions. (https://www.china-briefing.com/news/chinese-humanoid-robot-market-opportunities/)

The name to remember here is currently AgiBot, a company at the forefront of mass production and initial implementation of humanoid robots planned for 2025 (Xi Jinping visited its warehouse, highlighting its national significance). The warehouse houses around 100 humanoid robots and 200 human instructors, operating up to 17 hours daily, thereby producing 30,000 to 50,000 data points per day, supporting over 1,000 distinct tasks. In just two months, it generated over a million real-world data points, with tens of millions expected in the near future. Things are moving quickly: “We plan to open a second factory in Shanghai this year, and are aiming for an annual capacity of 10,000 units,” said Peng Zhihui, co-founder of AgiBot. An almost comprehensive implementation, transforming all areas of society, is targeted for 2027: “By 2027, MIIT [Ministry of Industry and Information Technology] calls for integrating humanoid robots into manufacturing supply chains, building an internationally competitive industrial environment, using them at scale, and expanding the use of humanoid robots throughout society.” (https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/Humanoid_Robots.pdf)

The fields of application are virtually unlimited. There is already close integration with the automotive industry (BYD), but it is only a matter of time before robots will be able to perform surgical procedures with unmatched precision. Above all, however, China will address its aging population with humanoid care robots, as the government has already emphasized (China to promote use of humanoid robots for elderly care). The opportunity this achievement presents is immense: what will be an identity-threatening demographic crisis for other countries will be reduced to an inconvenience for China. With care robots, the problems can be managed to such an extent that the country can wait for and patiently work towards a demographic recovery—most importantly, such a recovery will actually be possible. China will not have to transform itself through migration into an identityless human mishmash and cease to be China (the West doesn’t have to do this either; it’s just that for decades it has been governed by half-wits who are so stupid that you can even make them swallow brain-dead nonsense like the UN’s Replacement Migration document and turn them into pawns for the Swiss dysgenics agency).

AI and energy infrastructure

AI data centers consumed 4.4% of national electricity in 2023 in the US. This share is estimated to potentially rise to as much as 12% by 2030 (bear in mind that the estimates vary); the main energy burden falls on Virginia and Texas: “In 2023, about 80% of US data center load was concentrated in 15 states, led by Virginia and Texas.” Once consumption reaches 10% of total national demand, systemic risks (such as during extreme weather) are expected as early as 2028. In 2021, 75,000 miles were calculated as the minimum required for 2035: “Princeton University estimates that 75,000 miles of new high-voltage transmission lines—enough to stretch around the world three times—need to be built to reach that 2035 goal.” (https://eprijournal.com/epris-get-set-initiative-gets-going/) But what is the current situation? For 2023, the picture is as follows: “Construction of new high-voltage transmission in the U.S. has slowed to a trickle over the past decade, with only 55 new miles built in 2023.” (https://cleanenergygrid.org/fewer-new-miles-2024/) Even with a tenfold increase in speed to 550 miles per year, it would take 136 years to reach the target. Trump has implemented emergency measures to fast-track energy projects, but the gap between reality and necessity is absolutely gigantic. For medium-term modernization (by 2040), 6,800 new miles per year would be necessary. Small modular reactors and offshore wind farms are scheduled to go online from 2035, and HVDC (high-voltage direct current) lines will only become available in significant numbers from 2040. (Anyone who believes that solar energy is the solution here should bear in mind that its share of the national energy supply rose from 3% in 2020 to just 7% ; wind and solar generated “757 TWh of electricity in 2024”, while in China wind and solar rose “from 629 TWh in 2019 to 1,826 TWh in 2024”.)

The most optimistic data provided by Statista, those for 2021, don’t give reason for optimism:

Source: https://www.statista.com/statistics/551519/us-line-length-of-electricity-transmission-projects-completed/

What does this mean? The US will be overwhelmed by the additional energy consumption of the AI sector. At the same time, a reindustrialization is planned, which paradoxically is likely to lead to deindustrialization, as it requires energy that simply isn’t available in the necessary quantities. The more reindustrialization, the more rapidly energy scarcity will trigger an energy collapse. A large-scale relocation of, for example, European industry to the US cannot succeed, because the US simply cannot provide the required infrastructure. Do Europeans considering compliance with Trump’s call to join the US internal market even think about this problem? Probably not. The vicious circle looks like this:

factory projects → power shortages → production outages (brownouts, especially in Texas) → investment freeze → deindustrialization.

Much more could be said about this, but I must leave it at this hint, which already shows that these plans and announcements are more like blank checks than serious proposals.

But the intellectual potential for the necessary transformation is simply lacking.“Among energy sector employers, 71% struggle to find the skilled talent they need, according to Manpower.” (https://www.forbes.com/sites/corinnepost/2025/02/20/how-to-solve-the-energy-sectors-growing-skills-shortage/) Furthermore: “In the United States, 400,000 energy sector employees will hang up their hard hats within the next decade.” (https://www.greenrecruitmentcompany.com/blog/2025/03/powering-up-energy-security-burning-out-the-workforce) Anyone who thinks these numbers are too abstract and believes everything will be fine, and that enough talent will come along, should look at how things are going for TSMC in the US—even in an environment that is, in terms of intelligence demographics, comparatively favorable (especially compared to what can be expected in 2035). What is often omitted in the much-lauded showcase investment in Arizona is what measures TSMC has had to take just to remain operational: “TSMC’s decision to draft more than 1000 Taiwanese engineers to help stabilize the chip yields of its Arizona facility drew a torrent of criticism in America.” (https://english.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=3975) That was in 2023, but it wasn’t enough; in 2024 came this report: “TSMC, the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, has pushed back the planned 2024 start date of production at its Arizona factory by a year due to a shortage of skilled workers.” (https://qz.com/tsmc-blamed-a-lack-of-skilled-us-workers-for-delays-at-1850662936)

A few notes on several central topics of a more detailed comparison

All that has been said so far strengthens the assumption that China will be able to maintain its intellectual edge over the West in the long term. The key factor here will be demography—and specifically, the demography of intelligence. That China will have to remain largely homogeneous (over 92% of all Chinese are Han Chinese) is clear to the elites, who have undergone the rigorous Gaokao system and are not recruited in the same way as in the West, where no real elite selection exists anymore (it’s a binary choice: either elite selection or affirmative action; there’s no third way, despite rhetoric suggesting otherwise). Strategically, as Goldman shows, China is already clearly at an advantage, since AI development in China—apart from surveillance, which is hardly less pronounced in the West, though this is obscured by the fact that it occurs more subtly and with less overt brutality—is focused on functional optimization in core sectors and less on consumer entertainment.

However, the situation for the USA and the West is far worse in competitive terms than most people in the West likely realize. Therefore, in the following, I will attempt to provide an overview that is both comprehensive and concise of how the balance of power actually stands. The starting point for this account is the highly recommended December 2021 report from the Belfer Center, The Great Tech Rivalry: China vs. the U.S.; I will supplement this with more recent data.

Regarding quantum computers:

“China has already surpassed the U.S. in quantum communication and has rapidly narrowed America’s lead in quantum computing.” (p. 4) Just a few days ago, China presented the Origin Wukong, a new third-generation 72-qubit quantum computer, just after Google had boasted about being in the lead with a 70-qubit quantum computer. Angela Merkel celebrated a German 27-qubit quantum computer as a “technological marvel” in 2021 (Google already had a 54-qubit quantum computer in 2019). Who will dominate this field in the long term remains to be seen; moreover, who uses the technology in a smarter and more targeted way will probably be more important here than a mere metric performance.

Regarding artificial intelligence:

“China overtook the U.S. for overall AI citations,” according to the report. The relationship between quantity and quality, as well as the significance of the numbers, is disputed, but Caroline Wagner offers a noteworthy point in her article China now publishes more high-quality science than any other nation – should the US be worried?: “[I]n 2022, Chinese researchers published three times as many papers on artificial intelligence as U.S. researchers; in the top 1% most cited AI research, Chinese papers outnumbered U.S. papers by a 2-to-1 ratio. Similar patterns can be seen with China leading in the top 1% most cited papers in nanoscience, chemistry and transportation.” Data from 2023 further underscores the shift:

"According to recent reports, China leads the world in generative AI patents, having filed over 38,210 patents from 2014 to 2023. This figure is substantially higher than that of the United States, which recorded only 6,276 patents during the same period." (https://digitalstrategy-ai.com/2024/09/30/chinas-ai-strategy-into-2025/) 

The sector is larger in the U.S. and significantly more crowded due to a much higher number of players striving for the big breakthrough. However, this could also prove to be a weakness, as most of them will remain invisible before they disappear (or get bought up like Windsurf by OpenAI). It is by no means unlikely that a few Chinese giants will dominate the majority of the AI industry, and only those in the U.S. who can attract a critical mass from the pool of the top 2% will be able to survive. Furthermore, what remains crucial is what users will do with the models — in other words, how they will utilize them in practice. China is aiming to develop AI that is suited to being embedded in real work: https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-2025-explainable-ai-project-guide/

The balance of power is clearly and continuously shifting because of the quality of input and output in the education system.

Regarding the state of education:

“China graduates four times as many bachelor’s students with STEM degrees and is on track to graduate twice as many STEM PhDs by 2025. By contrast, the number of domestic-born AI PhDs in the U.S. has not increased since 1990.” (The Great Tech Rivalry, p. 7) – Why is that? Who is surprised that the U.S., since 1990 and the demographic transformation that is slowly being completed, has not been able to increase the number of its doctoral degrees despite a ridiculous inflation of educational certificates? Take physics as an example: In 2018 and 2019, 93% of all physics doctorates (84% Europeans/Whites, 9% Asians) went to Europeans/Whites and Asians, who together accounted for about 65% of the population in 2019 (cf. Murray 2021). Since demography, when viewed as a factor in modern geopolitics, is fundamentally the demography of intelligence—no other factor carries comparable weight—there is, in the medium and especially in the long term, no real competition. But things get even worse:

China’s positional change within the global political economy has resulted in a continuous expansion in the scale of Chinese students returning home after their overseas studies. Since 2012, more than 80% of overseas Chinese students have opted to return - a big increase from about 5% in 1987 and 30.6% in 2007. (https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20241015145513146)

Why must this horrify Americans? Because their domestic production of PhD holders is small, while “ethnically Chinese students accounted for about 18 percent of STEM graduates in the US” (https://www.nber.org/digest/202410/us-china-stem-researchers-and-students).

Regarding the education comparison:

Goldman points out a fact that allows the connection of the intelligence-demographic aspect with the cultural aspect of study choice: “Just 5 percent of our college students major in engineering, compared to one-third in China.” (Goldman 2020: XVII) The numerical fluctuations that appear here are negligible, so Goldman’s figures do not need to be disputed. In absolute numbers, to which I will return below in more detail and with concrete sources (as of 2016): 4.7 million STEM graduates on the Chinese side versus 568,000 on the American side. In addition: “Four out of five doctoral degrees in computer science and electrical engineering are awarded to foreign students, of whom Chinese are the largest contingent.” (Goldman 2020: XXII) The most recent direct comparative statistic available to me, which contains absolute numbers in an international comparison between global powers, is from 2016:

Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/7913/the-countries-with-the-most-stem-graduates/

What is remarkable is not only that China has about eight times as many graduates as the USA, but also that Russia, with less than half the population of the USA, has only a few thousand fewer graduates. How quantity and quality relate remains to be seen, but both Russia’s superiority in the military sphere and China’s coming dominance in several technological sectors can be considered a fact. Anyone who no longer wants to be fooled by clueless journalists, uneducated propagandists, or simply by Hollywood should read Andrei Martyanov’s 2019 book The (Real) Revolution in Military Affairs (and for those who want to see the results in a broader developmental context, also his 2018 book Losing Military Supremacy).

On biotechnology:

Regarding the field of biotechnology, the report tells us the following: “In 2019 and 2020, China overtook Germany and the U.K., respectively, and now ranks second in the Nature Index for high-quality life sciences research, increasing its annual output by 9% over the past year.” – However, this is now outdated; China is now in first place, as Nature informs us: “In 2022, for the first time, the country had the highest Share score in the Nature Index for the natural sciences, surpassing the United States.” What does the Share score measure? Well, this:

Source: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-023-01868-3

And things are not getting better for the US (quite the opposite is true) when you take a look at recent data:

Source: https://www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/the-source/blog/blogposts-for-editors/china-growing-influence-global-research-nature-index-2024/27731198

The institutional landscape is changing accordingly when it comes to rankings: http://en.ce.cn/Insight/202503/10/t20250310_39315213.shtml

Here we clearly see opposing developments that, when viewed from the perspective of intelligence research, align with demographic transformation. This process is not complete; the gap will continue to widen significantly in favor of China in the coming years. However, not all geopolitically central tipping points have been named yet.

On solar technology:

Data suggest the US is gaining ground here: “The United States has seen a 300% increase in capacity, now standing at 25 GW per year, thanks to incentives from the Inflation Reduction Act.” (https://www.pvknowhow.com/news/solar-module-capacity-global-manufacturing-2025/) Nevertheless, the reality is this: “China currently dominates the global solar module manufacturing market, accounting for 80% of the world’s capacity.” (Ibid.) What is to be expected? The following: “The world will almost completely rely on China for the supply of key building blocks for solar panel production through 2025. Based on manufacturing capacity under construction, China’s share of global polysilicon, ingot and wafer production will soon reach almost 95%.” (https://www.iea.org/reports/solar-pv-global-supply-chains/executive-summary) This speaks for itself and requires no further comment. Nevertheless, reference should be made to the excellent lecture by Keyu Jin, in which this is also discussed: Critical Issues Confronting China – Professor Keyu Jin – December 6, 2023 (on solar technology from 7:30).

On access to raw materials:

This is particularly sensitive: “And where China lacks resources domestically, it has secured them overseas. Chinese companies own 8 of the 14 largest cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (accounting for 30% of global output) and a 51% stake in the world’s largest lithium reserve (which, combined with other assets, makes China the largest producer of hard-rock lithium at over 50% of global production). Meanwhile, the U.S. imports 40% of its lithium, 80% of its cobalt, and 100% of its graphite.” (Grosch 2022: 31 f.) – But why is this so sensitive? Martin Grosch’s excellent book Geopolitische Machtspiele (Geopolitical Power Games) contains explanations on this (as well as on the entire global geopolitical situation), which could be considered so important that reading this book should be required for every high school student (not that this would necessarily have much effect), for example: “In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo), the main mineral mined is the tantalum ore coltan, which is found in virtually all mobile devices: More than 80 percent of the nearly 1,200 tons produced worldwide each year are extracted from the conflict-ridden region in eastern Congo and in Rwanda. Our entire high-tech industry depends on metals like tantalum.” (Ibid.: 58) According to Grosch, further deposits of these raw materials are also likely to exist in Tibet. Who, one wonders, has exclusive access here? (cf. ibid.: 138) What does this mean? Grosch is unequivocal: “So who will control the Heartland in the future? Certainly not the USA. The only question at present is how Beijing and Moscow will jointly or in a coordinated manner (e.g., in spheres of influence) control and dominate the Central Asian terrain.” (ibid.: 282) – Yes, China (above all!) and Russia; no, not Africa, as the unintentionally comical propaganda of uneducated, ludicrously over-credentialed, intelligence-demographic know-nothing experts would have us believe.

Remarks on the military balance of power

Since we are already discussing geopolitical circumstances, I would like to add a reference from another Belfer Center Report, which deals with the military balance of power (The Great Military Rivalry) between the USA and China. In the mass media, one may find all sorts of rhetoric about how the USA would defend Taiwan against China and that it is, after all, the leading military world power (which it is not). What result was reached in the very elaborate war-game simulations, which apparently were conducted repeatedly until a positive outcome was finally achieved? “[T]he most realistic war games the Pentagon has been able to design simulating war over Taiwan, the score is 18 to 0. And the 18 is not Team USA.” (p. 4) After quite honest efforts, they eventually gave up in frustration.

Another military note from the report: “China has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, while the U.S. fields only one type of conventional ground-launched ballistic missile with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no ground-launched cruise missiles.” (ibid., p. 12) The point here is that these Chinese missiles are high-precision weapons designed specifically for the defense of the coasts and coastal waters, and are capable of striking aircraft carriers with pinpoint accuracy and quickly and easily sinking them. The 18:0 defeat in the simulations is also due to the fact that Chinese weapons development has reached a stage where aircraft carriers are rapidly becoming obsolete assets (to put it more sharply: impressive-looking sea junk) and no longer have any decisive strategic use in the Pacific. Perhaps it would have been better to listen to Lee Kuan Yew when projecting one’s own military supremacy into eternity; in his 2000 book From the Third World to the First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000, Lee issued a prescient warning that now reads like a prophecy: “The United States may be able to stop China from using force for another 20 to 30 years. Within that time, China is likely to develop the military capability to control the straits. It may be wiser, before the military balance shifts to the mainland, to negotiate the terms for an eventual, not an immediate, reunification.” (Lee 2000: 570)

What does all this fundamentally mean? “[I]n the near future there is a ‘limited war’ over Taiwan or along China’s periphery, the U.S. would likely lose—or have to choose between losing and stepping up the escalation ladder to a wider war.” (The Great Military Rivalry, p. 2) – Anyone who does not know this is simply uninformed in this matter. Anyone who lies about it should be treated differently than a mere fool. Why a significant military gap will (necessarily) emerge between China and the USA can be found in the article US-China AI rivalry a tale of two talents, written by David Goldman and Handel Jones. Here are two key quotes:

(1) The China case:

“Chinese military and aerospace engineers have access to high-performance supercomputers and are working on the latest generation of technologies, with access to advanced semiconductor products. And after working with leading-edge technologies for the Chinese government, they will have their pick of jobs in the private sector.”  

(2) The (quite disturbing) USA case:

“Programming technologies within the military and aerospace AI projects were several generations behind the Silicon Valley standard, and Andrew had no interest in obsolete technology. In many cases, the software technology for new hardware is up to 20 years behind leaders in the US because the engineers that are already employed in the military and aerospace ecosystem are not skilled in the latest generation of AI technologies.”

However, the comparison between the USA/the West and China is not limited to gradual differences on common ground, but also includes Chinese innovations of a qualitative nature that most Americans can scarcely imagine (and, to be honest, there’s an awful lot to say about this, but I just don’t see why I should be handing out tons of material I’ve accumulated and prepared—not simply compiled—on this for free, especially as I’m preparing a political consulting agency with someone). What we are looking at here is not only the qualitative difference in decision-making processes but the developmental gap between an ethno-state and radically meritocratic China and a childishly naïve, multiculturalism-obsessed, and deeply anti-meritocratic West. Here, as development in the West is moving in the opposite direction, we are witnessing the emergence of civilizational differences—not between China and the West, but between China and what will succeed the West in the former West.

Conclusion and Return to Goldman

In his lecture delivered at the National Conservatism Conference in 2021, David P. Goldman compared the current geopolitical situation of the USA in relation to China with that of 1973 in relation to the Soviet Union: in 1973, the Soviet Union was superior to the USA, but massive investments in education and research enabled the USA to clearly achieve military-technological supremacy by 1982. Goldman’s goal and programmatic guideline is a renewed “from 1973 to 1982.” In an essay published on January 17, 2024, entitled Seizing America’s Comparative Advantage, Goldman updated his diagnosis. What is the comparative advantage of the USA? The text contains a gloomy diagnosis but an optimistic prognosis:

“We will never catch up to China in raw numbers of STEM personnel. But our track record of innovation is unique in the world. […] The United States still has the opportunity to lead the world in technologies that haven’t yet been invented and new industries that no one has imagined. That is our comparative advantage.”

I beg to differ. Goldman overlooks several problems here. The USA not only has fewer STEM graduates, it is, as shown above, weaker than China in several core areas, and China is—Goldman explicitly mentions this in the text (as was already mentioned above but is also reiterated in this text by Goldman)—not bypassing American sanctions by buying up technologies on black markets but through its own innovations in virtually every area of technology.

But above all, Goldman, who sees all too clearly that China is about to outpace the West, overlooks something crucial: the demography of intelligence. There will not and cannot be another 1982, because there is no 1973. The demography of today’s USA does not allow for another 1982; more than that, it reliably rules out a new 1982 as a possibility. No clairvoyance is needed here, because the “genius of American innovative capacity”—if one wants to associate it with the work in Silicon Valley—is already dependent on Asian Americans (and their intelligence, discipline, and motivation) for about half, as Kenny Xu shows in his excellent book An Inconvenient Minority: The Harvard Admissions Case and the Attack on Asian American Excellence (exemplarily and suggestively: “In 2010, Asian Americans became a simple majority, 50.1 percent, of all tech workers in the Bay Area: software engineers, data engineers, programmers, systems analysts, admins, and developers,” Xu 2021: 137). This raises an important question: If the proportion of Asian—and, as Xu shows, predominantly ethnically Chinese—Americans is so enormous (in New York’s gifted schools, which were once 90% Jewish-dominated, they now make up 70% of students; cf. ibid.: 174), then isn’t this innovative capacity, under the right structural conditions, also adaptable by China?

This argument can be countered under the following assumption: There are qualitative differences in innovation capacity, and the innovations of recent decades are less fundamental, whereas the true genius was that of the 20th century, which after 1945 was dominated by Americans in STEM. In that case, this genius would have an ethnic basis, but the problem would still shift in a rather discouraging way, because it can very well be argued that the innovations of recent decades are primarily novel combinations or highly refined advancements of essentially pre-existing ideas (for example, the smartphone integrates functions that previously existed independently of the smartphone; solar technology, for example, is not based on any theoretical or fundamental scientific discoveries that were not already well-established in the 20th century). In other words, from this perspective, we live in the “age of implementation,” in which—to China’s advantage—the quality of available intelligence and the coordinated exploitation of its potential take on even greater importance compared to genius tied to individuals; there are no longer innovations like quantum theory or the theory of relativity in the 20th century, but innovation mainly means that someone, usually research groups, was able to realize something that had been widely anticipated; innovation primarily means implementation—and learning how to implement what you know can be done. This issue of dependency on advanced software and colleagues within research groups furthermore applies to every genius, whether American or Chinese; as Matt Clancy demonstrates in his insightful essay Science is getting harder. The year 1970 marks a decisive breaking point, ironically in the humanities as well as in the natural sciences.

This situation is by no means external to what Goldman calls the “American genius,” as long as one does not want to mystify it, because what has already been invented does not need to be invented again—that is, the genius of American innovative capacity faces historically (as well as politically, culturally, technologically)—a completely different situation with new tasks that bring entirely different demands. The fact that the USA was able to dominate the 20th century does not imply that, even under hypothetically similar demographic conditions, it would be capable of similar achievements in the 21st century. The objective state of science and technology severely limits genuine innovation capacity, as the aforementioned essay by Matt Clancy clearly demonstrates. “Innovation” is not, as Goldman’s invocation of American genius suggests, a purely intrinsic quality, but to a significant extent also a situational one. Innovation capacity, both quantitative and qualitative, cannot simply be squeezed out of the essence of the American spirit when it comes to entirely different innovations in a completely different competitive environment, at a completely different level of complexity and intellectual challenge, with a completely different demography.

And since we are already discussing sociocultural prerequisites in their historical specificity: The US has abandoned meritocracy or even declared war on it (and even if you want to change this now, it will first take time for changes to take effect, and second, the damaging effects of social media and the nonstop internet need to be tackled). There was no American genius and DEI, and the relationship between DEI and genius is an either-or situation. DEI is the structural and substantive anti-genius initiative par excellence, the institutionalization of the undermining of meritocratic principles. To turn the anti-Chinese clichés here against the USA: DEI is much more efficient in producing an ant colony than any harsh meritocracy, and if one accepts the premise, unlike Chinese homogenization, one of uniform talentlessness or mediocrity through talent suppression and conditioning to endlessly bark what can be taught to an 8-year-old in 10 minutes (while having the temerity to call it “theory”). When such groups simultaneously seek to take over all relevant power positions in society, it is clear that power is desired, but selection according to meritocratic principles must be the mortal enemy of those power-hungry individuals who rally on an identity-political basis. In the long run, DEI necessarily produces a de- or un-modernization (Victor Davis Hanson uses the term “de-civilization”). But how meritocracy is to be reinstalled at all, after the hedonistic-infantile “give me, give me, give me” attitude almost completely determines the motivational structure of today’s influential groups, is the great open question.

A hard and thorough re-meritocratization of the education system—not only in the USA, but throughout the West—intended to reestablish it as an axiologically transformative and mentality-shaping societal force, could only have the necessary (intelligence-demographic) transformative effect in the long term and over several generations. As things stand, I am—unlike Goldman—convinced of the following: China’s victory will also be the victory of homogeneity over heterogeneity, the latter not becoming anything better simply by being called diversity. China’s victory will also be the symbolic victory of the Gaokao over the tolerance of spreading illiteracy and the abolition of those standards whose binding force alone allowed the West to rise from pre-civilizational insignificance to what it was a few decades ago. The effective abolition of universities and the hollowing out of qualifications that regulate university access is not an isolated phenomenon: Accordingly, the standards for “partner choice” are also changing, which (in Germany, too) have taken on almost jungle-like characteristics since the early 1990s to a fundamentally destabilizing extent, leading to an increase in out-of-wedlock births resulting from merely temporary liaisons based not on shared origin but on pre-personal states of desire. At so-called universities, people teach and learn with the same level of rigor and refinement that is at play when they cluelessly marry, soon divorce, and generally copulate in the orientation nirvana of societal decay; with the university as an axiological societal model with strong radiance, the family and the principle of hypergamy are being buried.

I am aware that China faces many and sometimes dramatic internal problems, but the question is who the opponent is, and they—the West’s self-destruction has gone too far—will probably leave this opponent far behind, for the West has, with the “educational trinity” (Karl Löwith) of the beautiful, the true, and the good, abandoned the will to live in its civilizational or high-cultural form. China, on the other hand, has the Gaokao, the universities that are part of the 985 Project, and meritocracy as an axiologically society-defining principle—the USA is plagued by spreading illiteracy (Example 1: “In 26 school districts, no low-income third-grade students were proficient in reading.”; Example 2: “Not a single fifth grader at Martin Luther King Jr. School, in the shadow of the Fruit Belt neighborhood, tested at a proficient reading level in 2022.”; Example 3: “Last year, almost 60% of California’s third-graders, the students most deeply impacted by distance learning and other Covid disruptions, could not read at grade level.”; Example 4 and Example 5, relating to African Americans in the USA; the state of Oregon has already capitulated—anyone who wishes can easily find dozens more such examples), which one must grasp in numbers only to still not believe what is the case. Last but not least, China values the achievements of the West far more than the West itself does (see Chang Che’s China Looks to the Western Classics or Han Feizi’s Open Letter to Chinese American High School Students—Goldman has pointed to both texts on X); hardly anyone has understood this more clearly than David P. Goldman, as his essay Western Civilization, Chinese Style demonstrates.

References:

Goldman, David P. (2020): You Will Be Assimilated. China’s Plan to Sino-Form the World. New York: Post Hill Press.

Grosch, Martin (2022): Geopolitische Machtspiele. Wie China, Russland und die USA sich in Stellung bringen und Europa immer stärker ins Abseits gerät. [Geopolitical power plays: How China, Russia, and the USA are positioning themselves and Europe is increasingly being pushed to the sidelines] Reinbek: Lau Verlag.

Lee, Kuan Yew (2000): From the Third World to the First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000. New York: HarperCollins.

Lynn, Richard/Vanhanen, Tatu (2012): Intelligence. A Unifying Construct for the Social Sciences. London: Ulster Institute for Social Research.

Martyanov, Andrei (2018): Losing Military Supremacy. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press.

Martyanov, Andrei (2019): The (Real) Revolution in Military Affairs. Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press.

Murray, Charles (2021): Facing Reality. Two Truths about Race in America. New York; London: Encounter.

Xu, Kenny (2021): An Inconvenient Minority. The Attack on Asian American Excellence and the Fight for Meritocracy. New York: Diversion.

A Capitalist Enterprise?

Upon hearing the name World Economic Forum, one is unlikely to conceive of an institution that could, even with the most generous imagination, be described as social democratic. The label that will likely to probably the majority of people’s minds is "neoliberal." Indeed, one might argue that the WEF is neoliberal, and this assertion could be substantiated by at least the following considerations:

Representation of Large Corporations: The line-up of participants at the annual gatherings in Davos predominantly comprises chief executive officers, financiers, and members of the political ruling class who embody capitalist interests. In 2025, over 1,600 business leaders attended the conference, including 900 top CEOs. These figures underscore what is widely recognized: the WEF's meetings facilitate informal networking not only among business leaders but also between corporate leaders and policymakers, which enables private deal-making and regulatory influence.

Privatization of Public Goods, often euphemistically masked as “public-private partnerships,” which sounds more palatable. Yet, what this entails is that private firms and investors assume a greater role in domains such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure. This also implies that market-based solutions for social and global challenges constitute a significant part of the agenda.

The point at which the neoliberal converges with the social democratic orientation in an almost indissoluble manner is the matter of deregulation. The WEF stands for both deregulation and hyperregulation. Deregulation pertains chiefly to national regulations, meaning that deregulation, as envisioned by the WEF, seeks to undermine national controls in order to globalize what was once containable through national oversight. Hyperregulation, on the other hand, is located primarily on a different level. Its true locus lies not in attacking bureaucratic regulations, but rather in promoting the implementation of bureaucratic regulation of values and worldviews as well as in the coordinated integration of economic deregulations, mostly aimed at denationalization, so as to fit into this overarching social-engineering hyperregulation of a social democratic kind. Now let's get to the social democratic anthropology underlying the WEF's agenda.

I shall enumerate three aspects of the WEF’s worldview, which do not merely embellish its agenda but, rather, guide its influence down to the minutest details.

(1) The WEF is social democratic because it propagates a social democratic conception of humanity—the anthropological vision of genetic egalitarianism. The foundation of this ideology rests upon the assumption of a fundamental compatibility among all ethnicities and cultures. The One-World vision is presupposed as an indisputable truth, and if you are opposing this vision, you are not engaging in legitimate national self-preservation or, on the level of thinking, in search of the truth, but in malicious sabotage of the truth. Even if people don't value-align, we can easily make them value-align by proper education; there is nothing innate in their nature that brings about cultural differences.

(2) The WEF is social democratic because its entire developmental vision for individual societies—and even the supposition that such a vision for a global society is conceivable—is underpinned by this genetic egalitarianism. The cornerstone of this ideological component is the presupposition that all ethnicities and cultures are compatible, even where compatibility does not presently exist and is arbitrarily absent. To illustrate this: IQ differences are "not real" in any but a temporary sense, a "global Flynn effect" would make us all equal (then you would have to presuppose that IQ tests in fact quantify intelligence reliably, that they are not "just constructs", and that the Flynn effect in fact perfectly tracks the true development of intellectual capacities), differences in potential can easily be eliminated if we implement the right measures: clean water, good nutrition, solid schooling, and so on.

(3) The unacknowledged intellectual catalyst of the WEF’s 21st-century agenda is a cosmopolitan social democrat whose ideas have been followed, often to detrimental effect, in all essential respects, namely Anthony Giddens, particularly his seminal work The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (1998). Whether the works of Giddens are widely known to the forum’s architects remains speculative. Nevertheless, Giddens has been active in various prominent capacities, including as an advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair and as Director of the London School of Economics.

To my genuine astonishment this link is not discussed extensively, because Giddens is the mentor of Tony Blair, who, for a while, was rumored to be Klaus Schwab's successor, and he even considered the implementation of Giddens’ ideas his political mission: "Our work is at an early stage, and we are learning as we advance. But New Labour in government is putting the Third Way into practice." (https://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111blair.html, 1998)
What does the Third Way program look like according to Anthony Giddens? He provides his readers with a list of key features of the third way program, and you will find yourself very well accustomed to everything that’s on the list taken from Giddens’s book, which, incidentally, was published in 1998:

Source: Giddens 1998, 70.

I shall refrain from elaborating upon those aspects that ostensibly manifest themselves as the social democratic attributes of the World Economic Forum—such as its preoccupation with Social Justice—and instead turn my attention to the ideological substrata that undergird the edifice of Social Justice ideology. There exist certain presuppositions that one must first internalize or regard as axiomatic in order to traverse such intellectual pathways. The Davos Manifesto 2020: The Universal Purpose of a Company in the Fourth Industrial Revolution says: "A company is more than an economic unit generating wealth. It fulfils human and societal aspirations as part of the broader social system." And what is meant here is a "broader social system" that mirrors the ideological designing activities of actors like the WEF; it does NOT mean an organically grown social system that could differ fundamentally from the WEF's policy plans and value system.

The following ideological facets and key tenets may be deemed inherently social democratic:

a) The anthropological paradigm, encapsulated in the doctrine of genetic egalitarianism, i.e., innate—even metaphysical—compatibility. This pretty much needs no explanation.

b) The resultant developmental vision, predicated upon the principle of compatibilization. In the speech quoted above, Blair truly says: "Higher educational standards are the key to international competitiveness and an inclusive society for the future." (Which Western country has migration from the global south plus higher educational standards than before? Exactly.) If you know the on-the-ground reality of educational systems in countries blessed with diversity, you will probably be glad if you don't die laughing at the travesty you are witnessing. The US basically needs two different educational systems if it wants to avoid tiny super-minorities of Hispanic and especially African-American students at good universities (and they have to follow through if they want to stay good, but Harvard has submitted to the diversity mess to such a degree that remedial math classes are now needed there). In Germany (any many other countries), PISA gave us basically a "score caste system."

For math:

Source: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2023/12/pisa-2022-results-volume-i_76772a36/53f23881-en.pdf, p. 34.

For reading proficiency:

c) Anti-Nationalism. The thriving, prosperous, homogeneous nation poses a significant danger, because “nations provide an integrative mechanism of citizenship, but nationalism can become belligerent and nationalist aspirations have fed many destructive conflicts over the past century and a half.” (Giddens 1998, 129) We know the fallacy: it happened, and it happened because it had to happen, and it would happen again, so we have to prevent it from happening again. – The nation has to be contained just like the Soviet Union had to be contained, but since nations are too dangerous if left to themselves, you better destroy them as nations, while naively betting on being able to keep all the things you like about them for “citizens of the world”: modern infrastructure, social cohesion, high educational standards, and so on. Well, this was not an experiment that accidentally failed; the idea was simply stupid to an indescribable degree.

d) Mythological constructivism as a demythologization project, in other words: the mythology of nation-building and the constructivism of essentiality—perhaps the most absurd paradox: “The nation is not something given in nature, and whatever remote connections they may have to earlier ethnic communities, nations are a product of relatively recent history. They have all been built from a diversity of cultural fragments.” (Ibid, 131) – Yes, they succeeded because the ethnic differences were very small. All Western European nations are, whatever their microscopic ethnic differences may be, white nations. White people from all over Europe have become French, English, or Germans. They are diverse, but diverse under the umbrella of sufficient ethnic homogeneity. This, of course, renders it necessary to extend the worn-out, stale, and insipid scheme to ethnic identity. What a surprise that the great meisterdenker lets us know: “Ethnic identities aren’t any less constructed than national identities.” (Ibid, 133) Could anyone see that one coming? So why don’t we implement the educational standards of the 1960s regardless of the results? There's no way for us to “construct” our way out of the havoc this would wreak.

Giddens also specifically targeted the multicultural destruction of Germany: “Germany is something of a test case for cosmopolitan nationalism in the context of Europe, because the country officially denies its multiculturalism.” (Ibid, 136) It was none of his business, but he even outlined how to go about the erasure of the German people: “To pioneer a cosmopolitan identity, the citizenship laws need to be changed and a major cultural shift made.” (Ibid, 137) What is considered useful destruction in the case of Germany is just a case-specific application of the concept of a programmatically all-pervasive cosmopolitan democracy: “Cosmopolitan democracy is not only about the movement of governance towards a world level, but about its diffusion downwards to local regions.” (Ibid, 146) Speaking the language of a low-level representative from the advertising industry, Giddens, this agent of dysgenic annihilation, says: "Greater harmonization of educational practices and standards, for instance, is desirable for a cosmopolitan labour force." (Ibid, 125) In fact, harmonization means flattening, bringing standards to a level at which they align with dysgenically decaying potential. Giddens, believing in the equality of natural cognitive potential, thinks the multiculturalization of Western countries and the upholding of the traditional standards that allowed them to become what they were until recently are compatible with each other: "As in other areas, harmonization is not necessarily the enemy of educational diversity and may even be the condition of sustaining it." (Ibid, 125) How is that possible? How can he arrive at such absurd conclusions? Well, let’s take a look at what he says about IQ testing.

Giddens’ IQ denialism

Giddens’ preferences reveal how he feels about IQ tests, even before you take a look at what he has to say. “Nevertheless, Bourdieu’s theoretical framework remains the most systematic synthesis yet produced for understanding the role of schooling in the reproduction of social inequality.” He is your conventional leftist in that the possibility of working with Bourdieu’s framework while also acknowledging the fundamental results of intelligence research does not even cross his mind. A tough challenge for Giddens—one that cannot be satisfactorily answered within the Bourdieuian framework—is presented by Peter Saunders’ book, Social Mobility Myths (2010). However, Giddens only mentions Saunders’ work in passing in his textbook Sociology (2009); unfortunately, Saunders' excellent book was not published when Giddens took on intelligence research, but the errors he committed are numerous and not dependent on Saunders' findings.

For example, Giddens really thinks he can brush off the concept of predictive validity by stating that it is completely unsurprising and therefore trivial:

"Scores on IQ tests do in fact correlate well with academic performance, which is not surprising, since the tests were originally developed to predict success in school. They therefore also correlate closely with social, economic and ethnic differences, since these are associated with variations in levels of educational attainment." (Giddens 2009, 850)

The midwit mantra "correlation is not causation" yields no power against the validity of the correlations acknowledged by Giddens. (Everybody who cannot casuistically explain and validate the sentence "correlation is not causation" should be legally prohibited from uttering it.) Giddens does not seem to understand that mountains of data sets with basically the exact same correlations cannot be reduced to a "weird statistical occurrence". He also doesn't understand that high predictive validity is not an anecdote concerning IQ statistics, but a scientific-theoretical seal of approval. And it only gets worse.

Giddens falls for the scientific myth (or even hoax?) called "stereotype threat": "Some research has demonstrated that African Americans score six points lower on IQ tests when the tester is white than when the tester is black.” Giddens does not even refer to the scientific papers that recent debate centers around; instead, he refers to Leon Kamin, an outright denialist of heritability, whose views could hardly have been refuted in a more devastating fashion by recent research literature (e.g., Vinkhuyzen et al. 2012; Schwabe et al. 2017; Falck 2021, 64—65). He also refers to Stephen Jay Gould on another occasion. In short, he’s quoting from his own ideological bubble. I’ve got good news for people who are interested in getting the basic facts about this topic presented in a clear and concise manner: Russell T. Warne devotes an entire chapter to the stereotype threat myth in his very good book In the Know: Debunking 35 Myths about Human Intelligence, but you can also leave it at reading his essay The $67.5 million wasted on stereotype threat research. (Diane F. Halpern deals with stereotype threat extensively in her book Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities, 2012, and she finds more reasons for eager skepticism, than for having found the origin of how nonexistent differences have been manufactured.) Giddens not only takes stereotype threat for an unshakable scientific finding, he is even immune to questioning how the two things relate to each other:

1) “Some research has demonstrated that African Americans score six points lower on IQ tests when the tester is white than when the tester is black.” (Giddens 2009, 851)

2) The results of IQ tests “correlate closely with social, economic and ethnic differences”. (Ibid, 850)
They generally correlate closely, but only some research has (if you acknowledge Giddens’ point of view) demonstrated stereotype threat. What about the oceanic gap between some and generally? No questions about the quality of research on stereotype threat? Giddens asks no questions about the size of IQ difference that is still more than half a standard deviation even if you take 6 points away. And, most egregious, Giddens doesn’t realize that by accepting the findings as findings, he would at the very minimum have to require stereotype psychology to work the other way around: Let a black tester bathe them in compliments and outright lies and see if you can turn them into super scorers. On a societal level, this is what DEI tries to do, and we see the results both internally and geopolitically. Affirmative action is based on the premise that initial help is going to enable self-reliance: we help them in the beginning, then they will thrive and demonstrate greatness. – And has anyone tested whether or not whites score 8 points higher when a white tester tells them beforehand that they are a great genius race? If stereotype threat is real, why shouldn't affirmative "stereotype catapulting" be effective as well? No one tried this, so white IQ scores may be vastly skewed in favor of white people. (I’m half joking here, but the logical problem doesn’t go away.)
Of course, Giddens also doesn’t understand the Flynn effect.

“Similar differences can be seen across generations, with average IQ scores rising substantially over the past half century for whole populations. When old and new versions of IQ tests are given to the same group of people, they score significantly higher on the old tests. There is no evidence that young people today are innately superior in intelligence to their parents or grandparents; the better scores are therefore more likely to result from increasing prosperity and social advantage. The notion that some entire racial groups are on average more intelligent than others remains unproven and improbable.” (Giddens 2009, 851)

Isn’t it fascinating how Giddens jumps from “young people” to “entire racial groups” without regard for the findings he quotes? Isn’t it fascinating how this leap is supposedly backed by scientific reasoning? He uses the Flynn effect as a reason not to take IQs within a single population seriously and immediately misuses it to deny the validity of population IQ differences unrelated to the Flynn effect. National SAT scores are determined annually, and you can see clear ethnic differences that have no intergenerational component. But for Giddens, differences don’t matter unless the results don’t fit his ideology. So why should he even address the fact that ethnic IQ differences persist with staggering continuity alongside the Flynn effect? This is the WEF’s true mastermind (Harari is merely their current intellectual mascot), and what he has to offer is rather bleak. The problem with Giddens' misunderstanding of intelligence research is not that he makes accidental errors that can be glossed over. If your concept of cosmopolitan democracy is based on equality being supported by sufficient cognitive equality in actual potential (not just theoretical, as would be the case in long-term planning and management of sexual selection), then the results of intelligence research, if taken seriously and sufficiently understood, represent a severe blow to your position, as they undermine the central premise of cognitive—and thus societal—compatibility among citizens (regardless of ethnic differences; see Saunders 2010). In other words: If you are a universalist in the cosmopolitan-democracy sense and argue on the basis of "philosophical" principles, you can ask your opponents to take you on that level; but when you start talking nonsense about intelligence research and try to cement your "philosophy" by doing so, your considerations backfire and undermine the premises of your ideology.

The hilariously pointless reference to Singapore

The World Economic Forum hails Singapore regularly. For example, it states that "Singapore's approach to a skills-first human capital development system aligns closely with global initiatives such as the World Economic Forum’s Reskilling Revolution.” (https://www.weforum.org/stories/2025/01/singapore-data-driven-approach-build-skills-first-economy/) Also, in the WEF’s Global Competitiveness Report, Singapore is crowned the world’s most competitive economy, topping the US and other major economies. They may like the political results Singapore can rightfully be proud of, but Davos stands for the exact opposite of Singapore when you look at their former Young Global Leaders do in order to annihilate the West.

Four points should be taken in consideration here:

1) Davos does not stand for a radical meritocracy, which is the hallmark of Singapore. The WEF does not meaningfully influence anyone in this direction. For social democracy, there is only the family of mankind and marginal differences that can be eliminated through the education system, support, and the improvement of economic conditions. This ideological core assumption of social democracy underpins the entire worldview of the WEF, whereas Singapore’s education system is based on Lee Kuan Yew’s philosophy, which acknowledges IQ differences and makes them the basis for the stratification of the education system, insofar as these differences are reflected in actual results. Nowhere in Lee Kuan Yew’s thinking are there social-democratic assumptions that a natural order of talent could be overturned by any kind of educational revolution. The book that most closely corresponds to the theoretical foundations of Singapore’s education system is Charles Murray’s Real Education; the WEF’s rhetoric has nothing to do with this, and the policies of Western countries even less so.

2) There is no Singapore-style Great Marriage Debate in the West. Such a debate would actually be the necessary Great Reset, not the nonsense currently being promoted. So that everyone here knows exactly what I mean, I'll quote Lee Kuan Yew in detail:

”What made me decide to make that Great Marriage Debate speech was a report on my desk analyzing the 1980 census figures. It showed that our brightest women were not marrying and would not be represented in the next generation. The implications were grave. Our best women were not reproducing themselves because men who were their educational equals did not want to marry them. About half of our university gradu­ates were women; nearly two-thirds of them were unmarried. The Asian man, whether Chinese, Indian, or Malay, preferred to have a wife with less education than himself. Only 38 percent of graduate men were married to graduate women in 1983.

This lopsided marriage and procreation pattern could not be allowed to remain  unmentioned and unchecked. I decided to shock the young men out of their stupid, old-fashioned, and damaging prejudices. I quoted studies of identical  twins done in Minnesota in the 1980s which showed that these twins were similar in many respects. Although they had been brought up separately and in different countries, about 80 percent of their vocabulary, IQ, habits, likes, and dislikes in food and friends, and other character and personality traits were identical. In other words, nearly 80 percent of a person’s makeup is from nature, and about 20 percent the result of nurture.” (Lee Kuan Yew 2000, 136—37)

Instead of pushing this as an agenda, the WEF pushes for open borders, endless migration, and the dissolution of national identities. This is not a Singaporean program—in the case of the targeted West, it is an ethnocidal assault conducted by lame, third-rate ideologues. The only Great Reset the West, and Europe in particular, needs is a Great Reset of European family formation and cultural restoration, which, of course, includes a re-Christianization that can hardly be achieved with the help of today’s Christian churches, as they have been turned into DEI-associated, nation-destroying, ethnocide-promoting, worthless nonsense machines. The Great Marriage Debate is the debate the West needs in order to achieve the positive results it desperately needs; third-world migration is what it needs if it wants to bring about its own suicide.

3) No law & order approach is being aimed for. Instead, spreading anarchy and lawlessness, with crime growing without limits and an ever more ludicrous and dignity-destroying overrepresentation of third-world descendants among the perpetrators, all cheered on by the lackeys of the multiculturalist agenda. – While this concerns George Soros more than the WEF, Western countries following the WEF’s guidelines are marked by an intentionally designed collapse of law and order, and the WEF does absolutely nothing to promote a different political approach—presumably because they sense that pacifying these countries would require a process of comprehensive remigration. Instead of even thinking about something like that, the WEF stubbornly and cluelessly stands for a social-democratic ideology of the fundamental compatibility of all people and the possibility of making them compatible.

The WEF’s social democrats were never up to dealing with intelligence research, but propagated ideologies that presupposed the irrelevance of the latter. They were never up to the task, even though they made too many people believe they were. It's time to finally give up on them and get serious about serious issues—and found new institutions. What needs to be done can only be done without Davos—while Singapore remains a very good inspiration. The ruling class needs to be replaced by real elites, that is, by people who are capable of writing more serious things than just nice but intellectually unimpressive essays like Schwab’s The Fourth Industrial Revolution, which is compilatory in character and in which Schwab does not coin the term "Fourth Industrial Revolution”, which has already been introduced in the 2014 VINT Research Report: https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/batangas-state-university/bs-architecture/4th-industrial-revolution/24194594

References:

Falck, S. (2021). The Psychology of Intelligence. London; New York: Routledge.

Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (2009). Sociology. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity.

Halpern, D. F. (2012). Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities. New York: Psychology Press.

Lee, K. Y. (2000). From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000. Singapore: Times Editions: Singapore Press Holdings.

Saunders, P. (2010). Social Mobility Myths. London: Civitas.

Schwabe, I., Janss, L., & van den Berg, S. M. (2017). Can We Validate the Results of Twin Studies? A Census-Based Study on the Heritability of Educational Achievement. Frontiers in Genetics, 8:160.

Vinkhuyzen, A. A. E., van der Sluis, S., Maes, H. H. M., & Posthuma, D. (2012). Reconsidering the Heritability of Intelligence in Adulthood: Taking Assortative Mating and Cultural Transmission into Account. Behavior Genetics, 42(2), 187-198.

J.D. Vances Rede auf der Münchener Sicherheitskonferenz hat in Deutschland für Begeisterung und Entsetzen gesorgt. Die einen waren entsetzt darüber, daß Vance sich erdreistet hat, die klassische westliche Wertewelt durch das Bekenntnis z.B. zur Meinungsfreiheit zu repräsentieren, während andere ihm genau dafür applaudierten. Einige waren verbittert darüber, daß er die Sowjetisierung Westeuropas angegriffen hat, Mitte-Rechts war ihm gerade dafür dankbar. Vor allem aber ist vielen aufgefallen, daß Vance intellektuell von einem gänzlich anderen Kaliber ist als jeder einzelne Politiker des deutschen Establishments, und genau darüber - und über sonst nichts, ich werde seine Lebensgeschichte nicht nacherzählen - gibt es mehr zu sagen, als bisher darüber gesagt worden ist.

Was hat es mit Vances Bildungsbiographie eigentlich auf sich? Trotz seiner Autobiographie kennen wir die Ergebnisse in den USA zentraler kognitiver Tests wie des AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test; kognitiver Test im Militär) und des LSAT (Law School Admission Test; kognitiver Test für angehende Juristen) nicht, doch obwohl wir nichts genaues wissen, können wir aufgrund vorhandener Daten ein recht genaues Bild seiner kognitiven Leistungsfähigkeit und seines Rangs innerhalb der kognitiven Stratifikation erstellen.

Zunächst ist wichtig: Das Thema Meritokratie ist in den letzten Jahren in den USA heiß diskutiert worden, wobei gerade (aber nicht nur) aus den Ivy-League-Hochburgen Harvard und Yale scharfe Angriffe auf die bloß vermeintliche Meritokratie in den USA in Buchform vorgelegt wurden. Zu nennen sind vor allem Michael Sandels (Harvard) Buch The Tyranny of Merit und Daniel Markovits' (Yale) Buch The Meritocracy Trap. Ich werde im folgenden Daten aus letzterem Buch zitieren, und vermutlich hat Vance Veranstaltungen bei Markovits besucht, erwähnt ihn aber (im Unterschied zu Amy Chua) in seinem Buch nicht.

J.D. Vance verkörpert einen Aufstieg aus ärmlichsten Verhältnissen ins Zentrum der Macht – einen Aufstieg also, dessen annähernde Unmöglichkeit Sandel und Markovits beklagen. In gewisser Weise könnte man sagen, daß hier der American Dream noch einmal auflebt in einem Land (Vance: "I want people to understand the American Dream as my family and I encountered it."; Vance 2016: 2), das sich von ihm weitestgehend verabschiedet hat. Mit Blick auf die Daten, die ich anführen werde, ist das für deutsche Beobachter besonders wichtig, weil an Vances Werdegang alle sozialdemokratischen Erklärungsmuster abprallen: Geld war keins da, eine solide oder überhaupt nur intakte Familienstruktur fehlte, er war weder auf der Hunter College High School in Manhattan Thomas Jefferson High School for Mathematics and Science in Arlington, Virginia, d.h. er war im wesentlich auf sein angeborenes Vermögen und seine Disziplin zurückgeworfen. Für das, was der sozialdemokratischen Ideologie zufolge der Erfolgsgarant ist und immer von außen Kommendes und Individuen planmäßig Bearbeitendes (gute Schulen, gute Lehrer, elterliches Bildungskapital und Vermögen etc.) und Pamperndes meint, mußte Vance selbst aus eigenen naturgegebenen Mitteln kompensatorisch aufkommen: "My grandparents, neither of whom graduated from high school, raised me, and few members of even my extended family attended college." (Vance 2016: 2) Kommen wir nun zu den Daten, die uns Aufschluß über seinen mutmaßlichen IQ geben, über das neben der Zielstrebigkeit wesentlich Ausschlaggebende, das weitgehend illiterate Mittelmäßige zum irrelevanten Konstrukt verharmlosen und aus ihrer La-La-Land-Phantasiewelt verbannen wollen.

Im wesentlichen führen drei Wege zur Yale University: GPA- und SAT-Ergebnisse (der GPA entspricht dem Abiturschnitt, der SAT ist ein gesonderter kognitiver Test, der sehr stark mit IQ-Tests korreliert), eine sogenannte "Legacy Admission" (Vermächtniszulassung, z.B. als Kind eines Yale-Alumnus oder mehrerer Yale-Alumni) oder DEI-Zulassungen jeglicher Art, wozu ich auch die athletischen zähle (was gängigerweise nicht getan wird).

Für die genannten SAT-Ergebnisse gilt als statistische Leitlinie, was die Erwartungshaltungen seitens der Bewerber angeht:

"The median SAT scores among students at Harvard, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale now all lie above the 95th percentile, and perhaps a quarter of the students have SATs above the 99th percentile." (Markovits 2019: 114)

Viele Bewerber mit Vances sozioökonomischen Ausgangsbedingungen sind dabei allerdings nicht im Rennen, denn:

"Only about one in two hundred children from the poorest third of households achieves SAT scores at Yale’s mean." (Ebd.: 26)

Betonung: Sie erreichen den nötigen SAT-Wert, das bedeutet jedoch nicht, daß sie deshalb bereits zugelassen werden. Vance ist also in der Hinsicht so sehr ein Außenseiter, wie man es an einer solchen Uni nur sein kann. Doch die Ergebnisse und die Zulassungsdaten entsprechen einander – jedenfalls an der Yale Law School, an der Vance war – denn "less than 3 percent of Yale Law students grew up in or near poverty“ (ebd.: 144). Umgekehrt ist es so, daß „more students come from households in the top 1 percent of the income distribution, than the entire bottom half“ (ebd.: 25). Das oberste 1% der Einkommensverteilung verfügt in den USA aktuell über ein Einkommen von mindestens 700 000 Dollar.

Aber konkret zu den kognitiven Testergebnissen, die dadurch um so größeres Gewicht erlangen, als sie praktisch Vances einziger möglicher Weg an die Yale University bzw. an die Yale Law School insbesondere waren, denn die Yale Law School ist eine der „Big Four“ und selbst unter den selektiven Schulen nochmals besonders hart im Auswählen, wenn und soweit es um die LSAT-Ergebnisse geht (d.h. auch: solange kein DEI-Idiotenkarneval stattfindet). Das Durchschnittsergebnis beim LSAT beträgt an der Harvard Law School 174 von möglichen 180 Punkten, an der Yale Law School durchschnittlich bei 178 (!) von (logischerweise ebenfalls) möglichen 180 Punkten. Die Akzeptanzrate an der Harvard Law School liegt bei über 10,1 %, die der Yale Law School bei 5,7 %.

Zu bedenken ist hier, daß der LSAT von den an Universitäten gebräuchlichen Tests (z.B. SAT, ACT) der einzige ist, aber auch von Mensa als vollwertiges IQ-Test-Äquivalent und als Eingangstest anerkannt wird. Als Wert wird hier das 95. Perzentil, also ein Ergebnis von rund 168 angegeben, sagen wir sicherheitshalber 170. An der Harvard und Yale Law School wären demzufolge zum Großteil Hochbegabte, und in Vances Fall muß man erst recht davon ausgehen, daß sein LSAT-Ergebnis besonders hoch ausgefallen ist. Markovits’ Daten geben Anlaß dazu, ihn im letzten Prozent zu verorten:

„The median student at Yale Law School, for example, earned effectively straight As in college (for a 3.9 GPA) and scored above the 99th percentile on the LSAT.“ (Ebd.: 142; meine Hervorhebung)

In Anbetracht dessen, daß Vance - abgesehen von seiner erfolgreichen Zeit im US-Militär (ob die über Kontakte oder weitergeleitete Daten, z.B. des AFQT, einen Einfluß auf Entscheidungen der Yale University hatte, muß reine Spekulation bleiben) - keine „sekundären Faktoren“ im Rücken hat und auf ein Vollstipendium angewiesen gewesen sein muß, darf man mit guten Gründen spekulieren, daß „above the 99th percentile“ durchaus bedeuten könnte, daß er kognitiv ins letzte halbe Prozent (1 von 200 oder mehr) fällt. Gehen wir davon aus, daß er genau auf der Grenze des 99. Perzentils liegt, würde sein IQ – bei der Übertragung des perzentilbasierten Z-Score aus den SAT-Ergebnissen auf die IQ-Verteilung – bei 135 liegen. Setzen wir seinen Wert bei den besten 0,5 % an, kommen wir bei 139 heraus.

Auf der Grundlage solcher Daten haben wir allen Grund, davon auszugehen, daß Vances Testergebnisse eher in den oberen als in unteren Bereich der Top 1% fallen. Er würde damit im IQ-Bereich von 136 bis 142 zu verorten sein.

Wer glaubt, daß unter den Vorzeige-“Hochqualifizerten“ der aktuellen deutschen Polit“elite“ jemand unter solchen Ausgangsbedingungen seinen Weg in die Yale Law School finden könnte, der glaubt entweder, daß der IQ ein bloßes Konstrukt ist oder daß Mario Balotelli tatsächlich einen IQ von 147 hat oder haben könnte. Denjenigen, die beim IQ an ein “bloßes Konstrukt” glauben, wünsche ich damit viel Spaß:

Quelle: Warne 2020: 210.

Zitierte Literatur:

• Markovits, D. (2019). The Meritocracy Trap: How America's Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the Elite. New York: Penguin Press.

• Vance, J. D. (2016). Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis. New York: Harper Academic.

• Warne, R. T. (2020). In the Know. Debunking 35 Myths about Human Intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Struktur des Textes:

1. Eigener fachlicher Hintergrund

2. Literaturwissenschaft: scheinbar eine Disziplin, vor allem ein Milieu

3. Das Ontologieverbot

4. Die als Überwindung der Ontologie getarnte Kastrierung der Semiotik

5. Das von Adorno verordnete Negativitätsparadigma

6. Eine Habeck’sche Besonderheit: Medientheorie ohne brauchbaren Medienbegriff

7. Mit Deutschland konnte er nie etwas anfangen – und mit der Germanistik?

8. Hegel und die Gattungstheorie – verunglückte Bezugnahmen (etwas technischer, für Laien weniger interessant)

9. Konklusion und Bewertung

Ich werde kurz meinen eigenen fachlichen Hintergrund erläutern, soweit er für den Text relevant ist, und anschließend einen wichtigen Punkt ansprechen, der Outsidern oft nicht klar ist: Die Literaturwissenschaft ist mindestens genauso sehr ein Milieu, wie sie eine Disziplin ist (Abschnitt 2). Die Abschnitte 3 – 5 behandeln milieuspezifische Grundpositionen, die innerhalb des Milieus sakrosankt sind. Gerade in diesen Abschnitten läßt sich zeigen, daß axiologisch überfrachtete Milieuimperative im Zentrum von Habecks Dissertation stehen, weshalb es sich bei ihr um eine sehr brave, milieukonforme, approbiert kritische und daher unkritische Arbeit handelt. Die Abschnitte 6 – 8 behandeln spezifische Probleme von Habecks Arbeit, doch Abschnitt 7 zeigt auf, wie sehr der Literaturwissenschaftler Habeck bereits der Politiker Habeck war. Abschnitt 6 setzt sich mit schwerwiegenden Problemen im systematischen Zentrum seiner Dissertation auseinander, Abschnitt 8 ist für das breite Publikum vermutlich weniger interessant und kann am ehesten übersprungen werden, ohne daß man viel verpaßt.

1. Eigener fachlicher Hintergrund

Um kurz meinen literaturwissenschaftlichen Hintergrund zu erklären: Allgemeine und Vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft war mein zweites Hauptfach, meine Promotion erfolgte in der Philosophie, allerdings im Rahmen eines aus Philosophie- und Literaturwissenschaftlern (ja, richtig gelesen) zusammengesetzten DFG-Graduiertenkolleg namens Lebensformen & Lebenswissen, das ein Kooperationsprojekt der Universität Potsdam und der Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder) war. Die Literaturwissenschaft war also nicht nur während meines Studiums, sondern auch während meiner Promotionszeit ein permanent präsentes Milieu; inhaltlich ist es, als hätte ich Komparatistik zweimal studiert. Obwohl ich bis 2015 in einem stark literaturwissenschaftlich geprägten Milieu verkehrte, kann ich mich nicht daran erinnern, daß jemals jemand Robert Habeck erwähnt hat – weder während meines Studiums noch während meiner Promotionszeit. Das könnte im Falle meiner Zeit im Graduiertenkolleg auch damit zusammenhängen, daß Habeck zu dem Zeitpunkt bereits seit mehreren Jahren Berufspolitiker war, aber wäre seine Dissertation ein fachlich bemerkenswertes Buch, dann hätte sich das wenigstens in diesen Kreisen herumgesprochen.

2. Literaturwissenschaft: scheinbar eine Disziplin, vor allem ein Milieu

Man muß auch die folgenschwere Ausgangslage der Literaturwissenschaft bedenken: Literaturwissenschaftler stehen nur selten in der Tradition der Philologie, wie sie bis ins erste Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts lebendig war; Editionsarbeit und Textkritik sind eher randständige Tätigkeiten in der Literaturwissenschaft, aber letztlich das einzige genuin philologische Erbe innerhalb derselben, die sich heute vor allem mit ästhetisch-theoretischen Fragen beschäftigt (siehe Brackert/Stückrath 2001; Becker/Hummel/Sander 2006) Literaturwissenschaftler schreiben keine Literatur, sondern sie produzieren Sekundärliteratur über Literatur, zu deren Hervorbringung sie nicht imstande sind (auch als Romanciers erfolgreiche Philologen wären z.B. David Lodge, Tolkien und Umberto Eco). Sie kleben an etwas, das kulturgeschichtlich äußerst wichtig und bedeutsam war, produzieren aber selber nur Texte, die lediglich in Kleinstzirkeln wahrgenommen werden. Das Kerngeschäft ihrer Arbeit am Text heißt (oder hieß vor ihrer aktivistischen Zweckentfremdung) Interpretation, die in dem Maße prestigeträchtig und einsichtsvoll ist, wie sie theoretisch gehaltvoll oder inhaltlich erhellend ist. Dazu bedürfen die Literaturwissenschaftler im wesentlichen der Philosophie. Doch sobald sie beanspruchen, philosophisch Beachtungswürdiges hervorzubringen, wird man schmerzlich dessen gewahr, daß ihre Konstruktionen (die seit Habermas oft, auch bei Habeck, „Rekonstruktionen“ genannt werden, ohne daß jemand sich darüber jemals Gedanken machen oder die Wortwahl rechtfertigen würde) zumeist banausisch, laienhaft, banal und philosophisch dünn sind (dieses Urteil läßt sich beklemmend oft und immer öfter auch die Schriften von Philosophiewissenschaftlern ausweiten); letzteres manifestiert sich vor allem darin, daß sie mit einer Geistesgeschichte aus zweiter Hand operieren, die ihnen allzu oft von Hans Blumenberg oder Michel Foucault, also von heldenhaften Theoriekreuzrittern aus Suhrkampien, dargereicht worden ist, und wenn es um vermeintlich harte Theorie geht, holt man sich Adorno oder Derrida hinzu (wiederum Suhrkampautoren). In sehr vielen Fällen läßt sich sagen: Das, was die Leute für ihren edlen und bewunderungswürdigen Bildungshorizont halten, gehört praktisch Suhrkamp (und ist nicht im Ansatz das, wofür sie es halten).

In der Literaturwissenschaft als Milieu gibt es Axiome, deren normativer Gehalt qua Über-Identifikation absorbiert wird, während ihr normativer Gehalt gegen jegliche Reflexion und Hinterfragung abgedichtet wird. Axiologie und Axiomatik greifen hier in einer für das Milieu selbst reflexiv unzugänglichen Weise ineinander. Das läßt sich anhand von drei das axiologische Rückgrat des Milieus mitkonstituierenden Positionen aufzeigen, die bei Habeck eine prominente Rolle spielen und in denen sich Milieu und Disziplin überschneiden: (1) das Ontologieverbot bzw. die geradezu viszerale, wenngleich selten verstandene oder überhaupt bedachte Aversion gegen Ontologie, und (2) das komplementäre Bekenntnis zu einer selbstreferentiellen Diskursivität, (3) das Adornosche Erbe, das Habeck „Negativitätsparadigma“ nennt, d.h. die als unbedingte Pflicht anerkannte theoretische Manier, alles unter negativitätstheoretischen Vorzeichen zu analysieren. Damit sind die milieuspezifischen Dogmen benannt, die restliche Kritik in diesem Text behandelt die oben genannten Probleme innerhalb der beschriebenen Struktur.

3. Das Ontologieverbot

Zunächst kurz zur Bedeutung von Ontologie:

Grundsätzlich meint Ontologie in ihrer modernen philosophischen Form eine Seins- und Gegenstandstheorie in dem Sinne, daß die Theorie sowohl die grundlegenden Elemente der Gegenstandskonstitution als auch ihre sowohl formalen und materiellen Grundrelationen dem Anspruch nach vollständig erfassen und theoretisch valide beschreiben soll. Eine Ontologie des Lebens z.B. muß nicht nur die Grundbegriffe von Lebendigkeit angeben können, sondern auch Lebendigkeitsformen (Mensch, Tier, Pflanze z.B.) voneinander sowie Lebendiges von Nicht-Lebendigem begrifflich stringent unterscheiden und sowohl die Begriffe als auch die Kriterien dieser Unterscheidung angeben können. In dieser konstitutionstheoretischen Bedeutung hat Ontologie einen Zwillingsbruder im Bereich der Informatik. Ontologien spielen nicht nur in der Informatik allgemein, sondern auch gerade im Bereich der Künstlichen Intelligenz eine entscheidende Rolle: Sie dienen der sprachlichen Erfassung, Organisation und Repräsentation von Wissen, sie enthalten sowohl die relevanten Begriffe und Konzepte als auch die Beziehungen zwischen ihnen und die regulativen Prinzipien, gemäß denen Wissen organisiert werden kann. Kurz: Durch eine zur Anwendung gebrachte Ontologie entsteht der Unterschied zwischen ungeordneter Information, die als Rauschen betrachtet werden kann, und logisch geordneter, konzeptualisierter Information, die wiederum höherstufig logisch verfügbar ist in komplexeren und für komplexere Modellierungen. In der Künstlichen Intelligenz bilden Ontologien die Basis sowohl der Klassifikation und Erschließung von Wissen als auch der Definition der Regeln und Beziehungen zwischen Wissensbeständen und Wissensarten.

Im bescheidensten sprachtheoretischen Sinne, der den Nukleus von Habecks Dissertation berührt, bedeutet Ontologie, daß Sprache der Erfassung der Wirklichkeit dient und an der Wirklichkeit sich ausweisen können muß. Für eine exoterische Darstellung von Ontologie bietet sich hier Karl Poppers Drei-Welten-Theorie an (die Popper nicht als ontologische Theorie bezeichnet, weil die Welten keine ontischen Bereiche sind, die jeweils für sich noch in einer umfassenden Theorie vollständig beschrieben und erfaßt werden sollen):

„So nenne ich ‚Welt 1‘ die Welt der physikalischen Materie, der Kraftfelder usw.; ‚Welt 2‘ die Welt der bewußten und vielleicht auch unterbewußten Erfahrungen; und ‚Welt 3‘ insbesondere die Welt der gesprochenen (geschriebenen oder gedruckten) Sprache, wie Geschichten erzählen, Mythen erfinden, Theorien, theoretische Probleme, Fehler und Argumente.“ (Popper 2015: 272)

„Welten“ läßt sich hier allerdings auch auffassen im Sinne von „Seinsbereiche der Art von“, dann kann das Weltenmodell illustrativ zur Beschreibung ontologischer Sachverhalte herangezogen werden. Mit Blick auf Habecks Dissertation ist wichtig, daß Habeck ein „Absolutist von Welt 3“ ist, und daß dieser Absolutismus einen spezifisch ästhetischen Sinn hat, der allerdings weit über ästhetische Fragen hinausreicht.

Welt 2, sofern man ihr eine substantielle Eigenständigkeit zugesteht, würde bereits eine ontologische Überschreitung von Welt 3 darstellen; Habeck proklamiert vorsorglich: „Das Bewußtsein des Menschen und sein Wissen von Erfahrungen ist aber niemals vorsemiotisch.“ (Habeck 2001: 122) Das schließt nicht aus, daß es auch außersemiotisch konstituiert ist, doch das Außersemiotische ist nur innersemiotisch zugänglich, weil der Zeichenprozeß selbstreferentiell geschlossen ist. Darin gründet das Ontologieverbot, weil Ontologie hier grundsätzlich für eine anzuerkennende und theoretisch adäquat zu reflektierende hermeneutische Abhängigkeit des Semiotischen von Außersemiotischem steht. Ontologie steht im Reich der Gründe für die Bestreitung der selbstreferentiellen Geschlossenheit des Zeichenprozesses und im Reich der Begründung für die Entwicklung einer Position, die – um am Beispiel zu bleiben – die theoretische Gleichwertigkeit und -verbindlichkeit aller drei Welten als verbindlich anerkennt und daraus ihr theoretisches Anspruchsniveau entwickelt.

Habecks anti-ontologische Passagen haben überall einen abwehrenden, affektierten, angewiderten, aber nirgends widerlegenden oder anspruchsvoll begründenden Charakter. Dabei ließen ontologische Entwürfe sich innerhalb von Habecks Modell von Literarizität eigentlich einfach abwehren, denn er müßte lediglich seinen Verzicht auf ontologische Denkfiguren dadurch begründen, daß Fiktionalität keinen lebensweltlichen Referenten benötigt, kurz: Fiktionales Erzählen entfaltet gemäß der Selbstreferentialität literarischer Zeichenprozesse seinen Inhalt, ohne daß die empirische Realität faktisch in ihr vorkommt, in ihr vorkommen muß oder ihr als konkreter Bezugspunkt im einzelnen dienen muß. Das tut Habeck jedoch nicht, seine Angriffe auf ontologisches Denken sind grundsätzlicher und allgemeiner Natur. Der Ontologiebegriff wird weder intern differenziert (es gibt nicht Ontologien verschiedener Wertigkeit, sondern Ontologie) noch überhaupt philosophisch erörtert.

Wie verfährt Habeck mit der Ontologie, anstatt sie als bereichsspezifisch irrelevantes Problem auszublenden, das zu umfassend ist und den Rahmen seiner Arbeit sprengt? Er bekämpft sie ohne Not, aber mit einer Menge milieuspezifischer Ideologie (die natürlich “weiß”, daß Ontologie per se ideologisch, fundamentalistisch, starr usw. ist).

Eine indirekte Formulierung eines klaren Ontologieverbots findet sich in Habecks Anerkennung des imperativischen Sozialzwangs, dem „Ontologievorwurf“ zu entgehen:

„Für solche semiotischen Ansätze auf medienwissenschaftlicher Seite ist maßgeblich, daß sie einen interpretativen Bezug zu den Zeichenkomplexen, die das Medium vermittelt, einkalkulieren, ihre theoretischen Maßgaben jedoch konzipieren, ohne dem Ontologievorwurf etwa einer Empirischen Medienwissenschaft verdächtig zu werden.“ (Habeck 2001: 34)

Nicht nur eine manifeste Ontologie darf nicht als theoretisches Vorhaben in Erwägung gezogen werden, selbst „ontologische Grauzonen“ sind schon unbedingt zu vermeiden, läßt Habeck uns wissen:

„Sie muß sowohl die besonderen Valenzen des Gegenstandes einbeziehen, ohne in ontologische Grauzonen abzudriften, wie sie sich an den Relevanzkriterien einer funktionalen Gattungstheorie orientieren muß, ohne ihre Willkürlichkeit zu teilen.“ (Ebd.: 37 f.)

Klingt hier nicht überdeutlich an, daß man den Ontologiekontakt scheut wie der Teufel das Weihwasser, weil gewollter oder lässig hingenommener Ontologiekontakt Kontaktschuld nach sich zieht? Und was tritt an die Stelle der Ontologie? Nun: das Gespräch im Milieu und seine Konventionen und Normen. Scheinwissenschaftlich sublimiert klingt das so:

„Eine sprachliche Aussage gewinnt nicht ontologisch Bedeutung durch die Dignität des dargestellten Gegenstandes oder der Darstellung selbst, sondern durch ihre Verortung im Raum eines intersubjektiven Gesprächs, in dem wir buchstäblich eine gemeinsame Orientierung teilen.“ (Ebd.: 95)

„Orientierung“ schließt hier mit ein: gemeinsame Vorurteile, gemeinsame Grundhaltungen, gemeinsame Werturteile, gemeinsame Tabus, gemeinsame theoretische Freunde und Feinde. Qualitätsfragen sind dann von bestenfalls sekundärer Relevanz, die Gemütlichkeit im Einvernehmen läßt Differenzen als geringfügig erscheinen, solange nur persönliche Sympathie vorhanden ist. Sympathie und Antipathie, obwohl bei Habeck nichts von begrifflichem Rang (wie etwa bei Max Scheler), leiten viele Formulierungsentscheidungen an. So sagt Habeck, daß „in den gegenwärtigen Ästhetiken aus einem – berechtigten – Affekt gegen ontologisch belastete Inhaltsästhetiken zurückgedrängte Traditionslinie der ästhetischen Theorie“ (ebd.: 42, meine Hervorhebung) in den Blick komme. Wie kommt er allerdings dazu, in einer Dissertation solche Dinge auszusprechen und „Affekte“ gegen eine Art der theoretischen Betrachtung zu sanktionieren? Er hätte genügend Zeit gehabt zu lernen, daß so etwas in einer wissenschaftlichen Qualifikationsschrift nichts zu suchen hat. Doch wie kommt es, daß Doktoranden in solchen „Milieudisziplinen“ überhaupt auf die Idee kommen, sich über etwas hinwegsetzen glauben zu dürfen, dem sie nicht gewachsen sind? Zwei maßgebliche Heroen des Milieus haben ein solches Aburteilen im Vorbeigehen zum Gratisartikel für alle gemacht. Worauf sich anspiele, sind die beiden bis heute die Weichenstellungen vieler geisteswissenschaftlicher Disziplinen und Fragestellungen maßgeblich anleitenden Großangriffe auf ontologisches Denken: Adornos Negative Dialektik und Foucaults Die Ordnung der Dinge, beide 1966 erschienen.

Die Absenz philosophischer Grundsatzüberlegungen erklärt sich also daraus, daß in der geisteswissenschaftlichen Milieukultur im allgemeinen Ontologie in etwa das Ansehen von lesbischem Feminismus bei den Hell’s Angels genießt. Dumm ist allerdings in Habecks Fall, daß die pauschale Ablehnung von Ontologie auf unheilvolle Weise mit einem offenkundigen Nichtverstehen von aus der Ontologie herrührenden Grundbegriffe korrespondiert. Der Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft, der Habecks eigener Ansatz nicht einmal zuzurechnen ist, macht er im Grunde moralische Vorhaltungen:

"Hinterrücks führt das Konzept der Empirischen Literaturwissenschaft wieder ein, was eigentlich erledigt werden sollte: die Annahme über eine dem ästhetischen Gegenstand eignende negative Substantialität.“ (Ebd.: 194)

Für Habeck sind „nicht-substantialistisch“ und „nicht-ontologisch“ identisch. Das ist allerdings in der Sache falsch und schlecht verstandener Adorno in einem Aspekt, in dem Adorno sich selbst nicht gut verstanden hat. Würde Habeck die ontologische Problematik verstehen, würde ihm auch der Zusammenhang zwischen der Ontologiekritik und der Nominalismus-Kritik bei Adorno aufgehen. Warum greift Adorno den Nominalismus, der sich der Verpflichtung auf „Substantialiät“ enthoben fühlt (Zitat unten), an? Weil er in einem totalen Idealismus strandet, der sich selbst zum „Einzigen“ gerät in selbstgenügsamer Weltlosigkeit. Die Dialektik wird damit aufgelöst, die Subjekt-Objekt-Relation kollabiert ins durch den gänzlichen Substantialitätsverlust objektivitätslose Subjekt hinein. Habeck hat Adorno und die Nominalismus-Kritik im Werk Adornos nicht verstanden, denn die Substantialität ist bei Adorno eine zentrale Kategorie, die der Verteidigung bedarf; ohne Substantialität kein Vorrang des Objekts, der das Kernstück der Dialektik Adornoschen Schlages bildet. Hier ein Zitat aus der in solchen Kreisen heiligen Negativen Dialektik:

„Wohl verstand er die »Idealtypen«, durchaus im Sinn subjektivistischer Erkenntnistheorie, als Hilfsmittel, dem Gegenstand sich zu nähern, bar jeglicher Substantialität in sich selbst und beliebig wieder zu verflüssigen. Aber wie in allem Nominalismus, mag er auch seine Begriffe als nichtig einschätzen, in diesem etwas von der Beschaffenheit der Sache durchschlägt und über den denkpraktischen Vorteil hinausreicht – keines der geringfügigsten Motive zur Kritik des unreflektierten Nominalismus –, so lassen die materialen Arbeiten Webers weit mehr vom Objekt sich leiten, als nach der südwestdeutschen Methodologie zu erwarten wäre.“ (Adorno 1970a: 166; meine Hervorhebung)

Die Nominalismus-Kritik ist die Rückseite seiner Verdinglichungskritik. Während die Verdinglichung Konzeptuelles mit einer Starrheit ausstattet, die die Logik von Begriffsbildung unterminiert und eine Begriffsdogmatik einführt, ist Adornos Nominalismus-Kritik bereits eine Konstruktivismus-Kritik avant la lettre: Die Absolutsetzung der Sprache treibt ihr aus, woraus sie sich zu legitimieren hätte; sie kreist weltvergessen in sich selbst und – eine ironische coincidentia oppositorum – verfällt einem umgekehrten Dogmatismus. Ohne das, was Adorno den Vorrang des Objekts als eines dialektischen Moments meint, wären die Weber’schen Idealtypen rein ideale Typen, Produkte einer unterschieds- und gegenpollosen Idealität, die sich nur sich selbst verpflichtet wähnt.

4. Die als Überwindung der Ontologie getarnte Kastrierung der Semiotik

Genau diesen Weg geht Habeck aber in semiotischen Ausführungen, denn er hält eine Kastrierung der Semiotik in der üblichen literaturwissenschaftlichen Manier ganz brav für eine „Radikalisierung“ derselben und für eine Überwindung all dessen, was mit diesem Modell dadurch in Konflikt gerät, daß theoretische Zusatzannahmen und die Beachtung weiterer Fragen nötig sind. Die Gewährsmänner sind, wiederum wie in solchen Kreisen üblich, Ferdinand de Saussure und Jacques Derrida, während natürlich der Begründer der Semiotik und wahre Meisterdenker Charles Sanders Peirce außen vor bleibt (und bleiben muß; allein schon Peirces vielgestaltiger und doch klar bestimmter Begriff des Repräsentamens sperrt sich gegen jeden Kastrationsversuch). Zu Peirce hat Habeck nichts zu sagen, auch wenn er ihn ein paar Mal halbherzig erwähnt; so wird sein Zeichenmodell als „umstritten“ bezeichnet, in einer Fußnote wird gesagt:

„An dieser Stelle, wo es um die Ausarbeitung der ästhetisch zu interpretierenden Semiose geht, kann der pragmatische Gesichtspunkt der Zeichenverwendung vernachlässigt werden.“ (Habeck 2001: 32, FN 3)

Aber was wird „vernachlässigt“, wenn dieser Gesichtspunkt „vernachlässigt“ wird? Kurz: Die Zeichentheorie strandet in Nonsense. Warum? Weil das Peircesche Modell (in verschiedenen terminologischen Spielarten) grundsätzlich dreistellig organisiert ist:

„Eine Darstellung ist die Eigenschaft eines Dinges, kraft deren es durch die Erzeugung einer bestimmten geistigen Wirkung anstelle eines anderen Dings stehen kann. Das Ding, das diese Eigenschaft besitzt, nenne ich Repräsentamen, die geistige Wirkung oder den Gedanken seinen Interpretanten und das Ding, für das es steht, sein Objekt.“ (Peirce 2000: 252)

Habeck stellt allerdings in den Mittelpunkt seiner Ausführungen, daß „die Identität der Zeichen […] nach Ferdinand de Saussure nicht durch seinen konkreten Inhalt verbürgt [ist], sondern durch seine Differenz zu anderen sprachlichen Zeichen“ (Habeck 2001: 32). Die anderen sprachlichen Zeichen ersetzen den Inhalt bzw. das Objekt. Weiter bei Habeck: „Derrida radikalisiert nun diese Theorie zugunsten eines Primats des Signifikanten.“ (Ebd.) Nein, er entleert sie zugunsten des Signifikanten und erteilt damit dem Milieu die Erlaubnis, den gesamten Prozeß der Signifikation (Darstellung nach Peirce oben) auf die Zeichensphäre, d.h. die des sogenannten Diskurses oder Gesprächs (oder des sinnlosen Schwafelns in den meisten Fällen) zu reduzieren.1 Welchem Ziel dient diese Vorgehensweise? Dem Ziel, daß semiotische Ansätze „ihre theoretischen Maßgaben jedoch konzipieren, ohne dem Ontologievorwurf etwa einer Empirischen Medienwissenschaft verdächtig“ (ebd.: 34) werden. Kurz: Es geht um Immunisierung gegen einen bestimmten Vorwurf innerhalb eines Kleinstdiskurses, weil es sich in diesem konformistisch zurechtgestutzten Milieu der postrukturalismusaffinen Literaturwissenschaft gehört oder „geziemt“ (nach Knigge), Ontologie zu ächten, für etwas „Gestriges“, Überwundenes oder zu Überwindendes, jedenfalls für überholten Quatsch zu halten, der nicht dem Konsens beim gemeinsamen Sushi-Essen entspricht.

Um das genauer zu fassen: Bei Habeck wird selbst die schon kupierte und zweistellig gemachte Saussuresche Relation zwischen Signifikant (Bezeichnendes) und Signifikat (Bezeichnetes) entleert, weil in der sogenannten Radikalisierung alles in die Immanenz abgeschoben wird: das Signifikat, auf das ein Signifikant sich bezieht, ist ein weiterer Signifikant, die Kette der Signifikanten damit sowohl endlos als auch von innen heraus (und in ein Außen hinein) unüberschreitbar:

„Die Zeichen werden nicht auf das, was sie signifizieren hin interpretiert, sondern ihr Signifikat wird gleichsam als Semiose festgelegt.“ (Ebd.: 35)

Nicht umsonst ist Selbstreferentialität für Habeck eine ästhetische Zentralkategorie:

„Obzwar Kunstwerke in der Moderne aufgrund ihrer Selbstreferenz keine Bedeutungen außerhalb ihrer selbst denotieren, stehen sie in der Rezeption und Interpretation für eine durch sie vorgestellte Bedeutung.“ (Ebd.: 66)

Mit Bezug auf die Sprache bedeutet das ein endloses Verlagern von sprachlichen Entscheidungsfragen auf die Metaebene des semiotischen Prozesses; es gibt dann, um ein explosives Beispiel zu nehmen, den Begriff der Ethnie und das Konstrukt der Ethnie, das an die Stelle der Ethnie tritt, über die man nicht sprechen kann (= soll/darf), weil damit der Ausbruch aus dem semiotischen Käfig in die Realität stattfindet; deshalb wird darüber diskutiert und vor allem dekretiert, wie die Sache zu verstehen sei: fundamental als Konstrukt, je nach Situation: als ideologisches Konstrukt, als Verschwörungsirgendwas usw. usf.

Eine solche Abschließung der Sprache gegen jegliches Übersteigen der selbstreferentiellen Geschlossenheit des semiotischen Prozesses kann man methodisch vollziehen, ohne daß man sich der leeren Ranküne wider ontologisches Denken hingeben muß. Wenn man schon derart anti-ontologisch eingestellt ist, sollte man wenigstens den fahlen Schatten einer Begründung dafür anbieten können, doch nicht nur ist zu derartigem in solchen Kreisen das Vermögen nicht da, man ergeht sich gar selbstgefällig in einer Rhetorik der Überwindung – als würde die gemeinsame Einnistung in einem Konsens und das eingeübte kollektive Naserümpfen irgend etwas in der Sache „überwinden“. Bei Habeck klingt das so:

„Kriterien, die ‚Authentizität‘ oder den ontologischen Status des Objekts bestimmen, bzw. mit ihm argumentieren, setzten einen ästhetischen Gegenstandsbegriff voraus, der auf das klassizistische Werkdenken verweist, das eigentlich überwunden werden sollte.“

Warum eigentlich? Was macht die Überwindung erstrebenswert? Und warum arbeitet er dann (siehe Abschnitt 8) mit Hegels Gattungstrias, die klassizistischer kaum sein könnte? Auf die Frage nach dem Überwindungsimperativ gibt Habecks Dissertation keine Antwort, die nicht letztlich wieder den Konsens, die Überwindung sei dringend nötig, mobilisiert. Überwindung bedeutet in Milieus wie der Literaturwissenschaft, daß man sich fast einhellig darin einig, eine Sache für überholt zu halten, scheel anzusehen, affektiert herabzuwürdigen und zu verpönen.

Eine ontologische Sprachtheorie wäre übrigens kein fundamentalistischer Irrsinn, sondern praktisch die klassische Sprachtheorie, wie Karl Bühler (Bühler 1934) sie begründet hat, also ein Modell, in dem Sprache als Kommunikationswerkzeug in der Welt fungiert und sowohl der praktischen Verständigung als auch der Definition, Bearbeitung und Lösung praktischer Probleme im sozialen Verbund dient. Bühler entwickelt nicht einmal eine eindimensional repräsentationalistische Sprachtheorie, sondern führt Sprach- und Ausdruckstheorie zusammen, indem er ein Modell der Semiogenese entwickelt (innerhalb dessen, was er „Sematologie“ nennt – bevor peinliche Belehrungsversuche gestartet werden), das Sprachentstehungsprozeß vom Tierreich und der zeichenartigen Kommunikation von Insekten (mittels „Verkehrssignalen“ statt Zeichen) bis hin zur abstrakten Symbolsprache von Menschen in den Blick nimmt. Daß die poststrukturalistische Semiotik von alledem nichts wissen will, ist eine Sache, aber die Überwindungsrhetorik und die Legitimierung von Affekten gegen etwas so Basales wie die Ontologie wirkt kindisch affektiert und zeugt von einem eklatanten Mangel an basaler philosophischer Bildung. – Bühler findet man übrigens bei Habeck in mehreren Fußnoten, aber nur im Modus des Globalzitats; nichts deutet darauf hin, daß hier eine nähere Auseinandersetzung mit dem zitierten Buch jemals stattgefunden hat.

5. Das von Adorno verordnete Negativitätsparadigma

Habeck behandelt das Negativitätsparadigma wie ein Gesetz, das einer weiteren Zementierung bedarf; der Dogmatismus der Anpassung ans Geltende qua Geltendes läßt sich hier schwerlich „überhören“:

„Die Rekonstruktion der gegenwärtigen Debatten ergibt, daß die ästhetischen Potenzen der Literatur vor allen Dingen in ihrer Negation gültiger Sprach- und Weltzustände gesehen wird. Je nach medienwissenschaftlicher Couleur wird das Negativitätsparadigma der Literaturwissenschaft entweder bejaht oder verneint, nirgendwo aber in Frage gestellt.“ (Ebd.: 8)

Niemand stellt es in Frage, also hat niemand es in Frage zu stellen, basta. Wenn man es in einer Dissertation schon nicht zur Frage stellen will, weil man damit zu arbeiten gedenkt, dann sollte man es vielleicht doch ein wenig subtiler zu rechtfertigen imstande sein. Sonst ist es kein Paradigma, sondern ein Dogma, gleich dem von der Unfehlbarkeit des Papstes.

Sprachlogisch fällt natürlich auf, daß Habeck sich die Literaturwissenschaftler so vorstellt, wie er hier agiert: Wenn sie verneinen, dann tun sie das, ohne etwas in Frage zu stellen, nämlich rundheraus und einfach so. Daß eine gehaltvolle Verneinung eine In-Frage-Stellung nicht nur voraussetzt, sondern begründet vollzieht, leuchtet ihm anscheinend nicht ein. Außerdem meint Habeck die Gültigkeit, Verbindlichkeit oder Unverzichtbarkeit des Paradigmas, nicht dieses selbst, denn dasselbe existiert, wird tatsächlich niemand in Frage stellen (aber es sollte auch nicht eigens eine These wert sein).

In seinen sonstigen Ausführungen zur Negativität macht Habeck alles andere als eine glückliche Figur. Wir finden ein Highlight wie dieses:

„Eine Begründung, wie es von der vereinheitlichten ästhetischen Andersheit zu unterschiedlichen Weisen der Wahrnehmung kommt, kann aufgrund des verallgemeinerten Negativitätsmoments nicht mehr erfolgen.“ (Ebd.: 37)

Verallgemeinertes Negativitätsmoment kann hier schwerlich noch etwas anderes bedeuten als „generelle Negativität“, und eine solche erschwert tatsächlich die Begründung eines Zustandekommens (hier von Weisen der Wahrnehmung). Aber Habeck kommt hier überhaupt erst in Gang, es wird noch viel besser. Wenige Zeilen weiter sagt er:

„Ästhetische Erfahrung läßt sich nicht weiter spezifizieren, und zwar weder situativ, noch gattungstheoretisch, noch medientheoretisch.“ (Ebd.)

Ja, wozu dann diese Arbeit/Dissertation, die im Untertitel von einer „gattungstheoretischen Begründung literarischer Ästhetizität“ im Ankündigungsmodus spricht? Eine solche hat sich damit erledigt. Wenige Zeilen weiter heißt es dann aber:

„Alle ästhetischen Gattungen, bildende, musikalische und literarische werden als Spielformen einer allgemeinen Einstellung gewertet.“ (Ebd.)

Dann ist sie aber sehr beschreibbar und spezifizierbar, denn die Einstellung müßte schon so allgemein sein, daß sie überhaupt keinen Inhalt mehr haben kann, um nicht gut beschreibbar zu sein. Das ist aber praktisch auszuschließen, weil das, woran sie überhaupt noch erkennbar sein kann, gerade das Spezifische ist, in dem sie konkrete Gestalt annimmt. Schwierigkeiten entstehen natürlich wieder daraus, daß Habeck von der „der Negativitätsästhetik korrespondierende[n] kognitive[n], und so positiv-bedeutungshaften Kategorie der Kunst“ (ebd.: 42) spricht. Eigentlich sollte Kunst, der Gegenstand von Ästhetik, nicht ein ihr Korrespondierendes sein, denn das ist, als wäre die Wirtschaft das Korrespondierende des Wirtschaftsministers und nicht dessen qua Ressort zugeteiltes Aufgabengebiet.

Die Negativität, die Habeck so lieb ist, die aber auch ein Milieuimperativ ist, gerät ihm zur Monstrosität:

„Die Zeit des Prozesses der Zeichensetzung steht also quer zu der idealen Auffassung von der Vorstellung. Der Prozeß ist die semiotisch strukturiert. [sic!] Deshalb ist die zeichensetzende Vorstellung eine negative Tätigkeit, die den realen Eindruck der Wirklichkeit verschwinden läßt.“ (Ebd.: 59)

Lassen wir außer acht, daß Habeck uns im zweiten Satz des Zitats darüber informiert, daß der Prozeß, der im ersten Satz als einer der Zeichensetzung definiert wird, semiotisch strukturiert ist, und schauen uns statt dessen den dritten Satz an: Wenn die zeichensetzende Vorstellung eine derart negative Tätigkeit ist, wie entsteht der reale Eindruck von Wirklichkeit dann überhaupt? Wie wird Wirklichkeit wieder aufgebaut, wenn dieser Prozeß an sein Ende gekommen ist? Wo kommt eine produktive Tätigkeit her? Und in welchem Medium kann die sich entfalten, wenn der Zeichensetzungsprozeß unter dem Gesetz von Negativität steht?

Für Habeck liegt der Ausweg aus der Negativität in der Negativität:

„Mit Hegel ist die Zeit der Sprache als Negativität im Verhältnis zu diskursiven Bedeutungsstrukturen zu verstehen. Diese Negativität ist dann wiederum die Bedingung für die Positivität sprachlicher Vorstellungsstrukturen.“ (Ebd.: 123)

Worauf Habeck damit zielt, ist die Selbstbezüglichkeit von Negativität innerhalb einer Struktur, in der sie als Motor fungiert: Wenn Negativität das operative Prinzip schlechthin ist, muß sie auch als produktives Prinzip fungieren können in der Negation der Negation, weil Negation nicht einfach Zerstörung bedeutet. Anders gesagt: Negativität ist bei Habeck ein perpetuum mobile. Habeck liest Hegel so, daß Negativität für Bewegung steht, während Positivität für Dogmatik, Stillstand und Versteinerung steht; das Positive wäre dann ontologisch das Prinzip der Bewegungslosigkeit, Negativität das Prinzip der Bewegung, die gegenüber der Bewegungslosigkeit das eigentlich produktive Prinzip ist. Eine derart allgemeine Auffassung von Negativität könnte übrigens ontologischer nicht sein; Hegels Unterscheidungen wie die zwischen einfacher, reiner und absoluter Negativität (in der Phänomenologie des Geistes) spielen bei Habeck keine Rolle; sein simples Negativitätsverständnis ist an Adorno geschult, übergeht aber die ontologische Problematik, die Adorno nicht los wird, durch Gefolgsamkeit gegenüber Adornos anti-ontologischen Dekreten (ich habe das weitläufig in meinem letzten Buch ausgefaltet; Edinger 2022).

Aber Habecks Anhänglichkeit gegenüber und Abhängigkeit von Adorno bleibt ebenfalls nicht ohne Verunglückung:

„Tatsächlich nämlich ist die literatur- oder kunstwissenschaftliche Konzeption die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von der behaupteten literarischen Negativität.“ (Habeck 2001: 191)

Das ist letztlich eine Adaption von Adornos Satz:

„Der Wahrheitsgehalt eines Werkes bedarf der Philosophie.“ (Adorno 1970b: 507)

Allerdings gerät die adornitische Formulierung, die der literarischen Negativität die literaturwissenschaftliche Theorie derselben verordnet, in der phraseologischen Kantianisierung („Bedingung der Möglichkeit“) eigentümlich dogmatisch und die Literaturwissenschaft zum hermeneutischen Vormund der Literatur. Was bei Adorno einen maieutischen Sinn hat, hat bei Habeck eher den Charakter eines Dekrets, was dadurch um so komischer ist, daß der „Endzweck“ der literarischen Negativität wenig überraschend im „Entwurf alternativer Wirklichkeitsmodelle“ (Habeck 2001: 210) besteht, die, mitsamt einer „einer vorstellenden Bedeutsamkeit“ (ebd.), den „Reiz von Kunst (und Literatur)“ (ebd.) ausmacht. Gemäß der Harmonie- und Übereinstimmungsbedürftigkeit des Milieus ist man fast versucht, von einer reductio ad Sushi zu sprechen, denn beim Sushi-Essen kann man sich an den alternativen Wirklichkeitsmodellen und ihrem Reiz gemeinsam laben.

6. Eine Habeck’sche Besonderheit: Medientheorie ohne brauchbaren Medienbegriff

All das ist um so beachtlicher, als es einen einfachen theoretischen Ausweg gäbe, der all das überflüssig macht und den Habeck sogar zu gehen beansprucht: den medientheoretischen. Literarizität könnte dann als Spezialfall von sprachlicher Medialität konzipiert werden, doch genau hier, im theoretischen Zentrum seiner Dissertation, liefert Habeck nichts. Um das zu validieren:

(1) Habeck priorisiert Zeichentypen, die nur innerhalb von Medien erfahrbar werden können (Wörter durch Schrift im Fall der Literatur, Klänge durch Töne im Fall der Musik), gegenüber Medien:

„Das Problem, daß sich dann jedoch stellt, ist, die Unterschiedlichkeit der Darstellungsweise der Medien nicht allein durch die Untersuchung der Relationen zwischen den Zeichen zu erklären, sondern die Verschiedenartigkeit der Zeichentypen zu berücksichtigen.“ (Ebd.: 35)

Wenn man Medium abstrakt definieren wollte, dann wäre es vor allem das Worin und Wodurch des Zur-Darstellung-Gelangens verschiedenartiger (tonaler, visueller, sprachlicher) Gebilde. Das Medium fundiert die Zeichenverwendung, die der jeweiligen medialen Gestaltung bedarf. Keine Unterscheidung von Zeichentypen erhellt die „Darstellungsweise der Medien“ als solcher. Die Zeichentypen werden medial gestaltet, nicht die Medien durch die Zeichentypen; genössen die Zeichentypen Vorrang vorm Medium, könnte man die Partitur für die Musik nehmen.

(2) Habeck faßt die Zeichenstruktur als das Besondere, die Sprache als das Allgemeine und das Verhältnis zwischen beiden als eines der Verallgemeinerung des Zeichens zur Sprache auf:

„Die Sprache als verallgemeinerter Begriff der Zeichenstruktur ist in einem umfassenden Sinn das Medium, das selbst noch die klassischen Kunstformen umfaßt und als besondere Ausprägung einer allgemeinen Symbolik aufnimmt.“ (Ebd.: 66)

Dieser Logik zufolge müßte es „zeichenhafte Sprache“ statt „sprachliches Zeichen“ heißen. Wenn, dann muß das Zeichen als ein „verallgemeinerter Begriff“ aufgefaßt werden, wobei sich dann wiederum die Frage stellt, was mit dieser Formulierung gewonnen wäre.

(3) Habeck faßt allerdings an anderer und programmatischer Stelle das Zeichen als Allgemeine, das Medium und damit die Sprache als Gattungsmedium (Punkt 4) das Besondere auf:

„Der Medienbegriff wird zeichentheoretisch reformuliert.“ (Ebd.: 31)

Es liegt nahe, ihn so zu verstehen: Das Zeichen ist das Allgemeinere gegenüber dem Medium, die Sprache aber das Allgemeinere gegenüber dem Zeichen. Eine stringente Logik oder Begründung der Beziehungen - Geisteswissenschaftler sprechen dabei gerne von “Arbeit am Begriff” - findet man in seiner Dissertation nicht.

(4) Habeck behauptet eine fundamentale Sprachlichkeit der Kunst und setzt in der Passage durch eine Klammer „Sprache“ und „Zeichen“ plötzlich gleich:

„Im weiteren Sinn sind somit alle Künste symbolisch, und die Sprache (die Zeichen) wird das systematisch wichtigste Gattungsmedium der Ästhetik. Aller Kunst ist implizit eine sprachliche Ratio zu eigen, die dem Denken, nicht dem Anschauen unterliegt. Die innewohnende Sprachlichkeit der Kunstwerke ist mit der Poesie zu einer expliziten geworden“. (Ebd.: 66)

Es ist ein bekanntes Phänomen, daß Komponisten gerade nicht sprachlich denken, was an der Logik des Mediums liegt, die Adorno die Logik des Materials nennt und die Habeck der Logik der Sprache unterordnet. Vermutlich hat Habeck hier auch Adornos Begriff der Sprachähnlichkeit mißverstanden und daraus eine Sprachlichkeit gemacht; bei Adorno heißt es:

„Daß der Kunst universelle Momente ebenso unabdingbar sind, wie sie ihnen sich entgegenstemmt, ist zu begreifen aus ihrer Sprachähnlichkeit.“ (Adorno 1970b: 304)

Die Übersteigerung von Adornos Sprachähnlichkeit zur Sprachlichkeit, die schon Matthias Vogel in seinem ebenfalls (wie Habecks Dissertation) 2001 erschienen Buch Medien der Vernunft kritisiert hat, während er seine Kritik mit einer differentiellen Medientheorie unterfüttert hat, ergibt sich aus Habecks Prägung: Die sprach- und begriffsorientierte Linie, die von Hegel über Adorno zur poststrukturalistischen Semiotik führt, steht quer zu einer Ästhetik wie der Schopenhauers, die Kunstformen bereits wesenstypologisch unterscheidet (und bei Habeck nicht die geringste Rolle spielt), statt sie generell der Sprache und ihrer ratio zu subsumieren. Matthias Vogel übersetzt in gewisser Weise Schopenhauers Wesenstypologie in eine auf John Deweys Ästhetik (kommt bei Habeck nicht vor) aufbauende medientheoretisch ausgearbeitete Typologie, die an Differenzierungskraft so weit jenseits dessen liegt, was Habeck zu bieten hat, daß ich mir besser eine evaluative Verhältnisbestimmung versage. Eine Etappendefinition von Vogel – er entwickelt den Begriff anhand etlicher Definitionen, die zunehmend verfeinert werden – lautet:

„Medien sind Mittel, die in einem intrinsischen Zusammenhang mit dem Ziel der jeweiligen Handlung stehen, in der sie als Mittel verwendet werden, und zwar so, daß das Ziel nicht ohne dieses Mittel erreicht werden kann.“ (Vogel 2001: 143)

Was ich vorhin das Worin und Wodurch nannte, artikuliert auf andere Weise das, worauf Vogel mit „nicht ohne dieses Mittel“ zielt. In einer gewichtigen Medientheorie müssen die verschiedenen Medien in ihrer Spezifität erfaßt werden, ohne daß der Bezug einem übergreifenden Allgemeinem aufgegeben wird. Vogel schafft dies dank einer subtilen Analyse, die die Logik verschiedener Medien in der Intransitivität ihrer Darstellungsleistungen (in der Oper kann nicht die Musik die Funktion des Textes und der Text die der Musik übernehmen, sie können nur gemeinsam zur Entstehung des Gesamtkunstwerks beitragen) adäquat reflektiert, aber dies alles innerhalb einer Theorie der Rationalität unternimmt, die Rationalität nicht der „ratio“ der Sprache unterwirft oder derselben gewaltsam angleicht. An der Erfüllung solcher Ansprüche scheitert Habecks Dissertation dadurch, daß die Sprachlichkeit mit einer Überwertigkeit versehen wird, die sie zur Königin der Ästhetik macht. Damit wird die viel allgemeinere und umfassendere Ästhetik der „Literarizität“ unterstellt, d.h. es wird praktisch das Verhältnis von genus (Ästhetik) und species (Literatur/Literarizität) auf den Kopf gestellt und damit das Anspruchsniveau verfehlt, das für verbindlich erachtet werden muß, wenn man der Ästhetik im eigentlichen Sinne gerecht werden will, statt sie von einer Teildisziplin und -perspektive her zu okkupieren.

7. Mit Deutschland konnte er nie etwas anfangen – und mit der Germanistik?

Hier dürfte es nun für viele Leser interessant und, so meine ich vorwegnehmen zu können, amüsant werden. Habeck präsentiert mit dem Gestus überlegener Belesenheit Überlegungen zur Geschichte und Systematik der Germanistik, was so klingt:

"Die Geburt der Germanistik geschieht aus philosophischem und philologischem Geist. [...] Das Fach 'Germanistik' entsteht also nicht, wie zumeist in den wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Lehrbüchern nachzulesen, aus der empirisch ausgerichteten Philologie allein, sondern mit ihm ist von Anfang an eine systematisch-anthropologische Fragestellung mit normativer Ausrichtung verbunden. Ablesen läßt sich das an den Schriften Wilhelm von Humboldts und an den Diskussionen um die Neugründung der Berliner Universität 1810. Die Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft wird als "Organon historischer Selbstverständigung" angesehen. Und die Tradition dieses Selbstanspruchs prädestiniert die Literaturwissenschaft bis heute für alle Arten kritischer Infragestellungen.“ (Habeck 2001: 19 f.)

(1) Wo Habeck die als Zitat gekennzeichnete Formulierung „Organon historischer Selbstverständigung“ her hat, weiß ich nicht; bei Fichte, der in der Fußnote genannt wird, konnte ich sie nicht finden. Wichtiger aber ist: Die Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft existierten 1810 nicht und konnten kein Leitbild sein. Wilhelm von Humboldts maßgebende Schrift Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts erschien 1836 (seine frühere Schrift Ueber das vergleichende Sprachstudium in Beziehung auf die verschiedenen Epochen der Sprachentwicklung erschien 1820), Franz Bopps von Humboldt rege diskutiertes Buch Über das Conjugationssystem der Sanskritsprache 1816. Eine Sprachwissenschaft im modernen Sinne kann keine geistige Anleitung gegeben haben, weil Humboldt sie erst später begründet hat. – Humboldts Überlegungen zur Universitätsgründung sind übrigens im allgemeinen sehr trocken und planerisch-konzeptioneller Natur; wo hat Habeck da Anflüge philosophischer Kühnheit ausgemacht?

(2) Über Sprache unabhängig von Sprachwissenschaft gab es in den „Diskussionen um die Neugründung der Berliner Universität“ allerdings bemerkenswerte Ausführungen, und zwar patriotischer Natur, von Fichte:

„[D]as Latein studieren wir ausdrücklich als das abgeschlossene Resultat der Sprachbildung eines untergegangenen Volkes, und wir müssen es darum in dieser Abgeschlossenheit lassen.“ (Fichte 1990: 123)

Das ist nicht die Klage desjenigen, dem die bevorzugte Sprache leidvoll abhanden gekommen ist, sondern die Verabschiedung desjenigen, der einige der emphatischsten Lobreden auf die Schöpferkraft und Vitalität der deutschen Sprache überhaupt gehalten hat; dies spiegelt sich auch in Fichtes initiatorischen Fanfarenstößen wider:

„Lebendige Kunst kann ausgeübt und dokumentiert werden lediglich in einer Sprache, die nicht schon durch sich den Kreis einengt, sondern in welchem man neu und schöpferisch sein darf, einer lebendigen, und in welche, als unsere Muttersprache, unser eignes Leben verwebt ist.“ (Ebd.: 122)

Kann Habeck damit irgend etwas anfangen?

(3) Überprüft man seine These, wird es nur noch schlimmer für ihn, denn das eigentliche Gründungsdokument der Germanistik ist Gottfried Georg Gervinus’ Geschichte der poetischen Nationalliteratur der Deutschen, die Habeck natürlich nicht erwähnt. Der erste Band dieser monumentalen Geschichte erschien 1835 (insgesamt in fünf Bänden, zwischen 1835 und 1842), just in dem Jahr, als Humboldt sein sprachphilosophisches Hauptwerk fertigstellte. Entgegen Habecks Rede vom philosophischen und philologischen Geist, wird Gervinus nicht müde zu betonen, daß sein Werk aus historischem Geiste verfaßt worden sei, und zwar nicht aus antiquarisch-historischem Geist, sondern aus schöpferisch-historischem Geist zum Zwecke der Nationserzeugung und -formung; der Ästhetiker und der Historiker werden an mehreren Stellen gründlich voneinander geschieden und einander gegenübergestellt, die Emphase und Identifikation mit Deutschland ist in keiner Zeile übersehbar:

„Der Ästhetiker tut am besten, das Gedicht so wenig als möglich mit anderen und fremden zu vergleichen, dem Historiker ist diese Vergleichung ein Hauptmittel zum Zweck. Er zeigt uns nicht eines Gedichtes, sondern aller poetischen Produkte Entstehung aus der Zeit, aus dem Kreise ihrer Ideen, Taten und Schicksale, er weist darin nach, was diesen entspricht oder widerspricht, er sucht die Ursachen ihres Werdens und ihre Wirkungen nach beurteilt ihren Wert hauptsächlich nach diesen, er vergleicht sie mit dem Größten der Kunstgattung gerade dieser Zeit und dieser Nation, in der sie entstanden, oder, je nachdem er seinen Gesichtskreis ausdehnt, mit den weiteren analogen Erscheinungen in anderen Zeiten und Völkern.“ (Gervinus 1962: 156)

Die Neigung zu viel ausgiebigerem Zitieren ist stark, aber ich muß es dabei belassen, denn die oben zitierte Passage Habecks enthält noch weitere Monstrositäten, die nicht übersehen werden sollten. Den Ahnherrn der Germanistik übergeht Habeck nonchalant, vom Geist der Gründung der Germanistik will er soviel wissen wie jemand, dem Deutschland egal ist, und in literaturwissenschaftlichen Einführungen weiß man es eben doch besser als Habeck, so überheblich er sich auch geben mag; Beispiel aus dem Band Literaturwissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs:

„Die germanistische Fachwissenschaft entwickelte sich im Zusammenhang einer politisch-nationalen Einigungsbewegung. Die Germanistik wurde in diesem Rahmen als die wichtigste Wissenschaft im nationalen Selbstfindungsprozeß begriffen.“ (Brackert 2001: 551)

Das paßt sehr gut zu Gervinus’ gigantischer Literaturgeschichte, hingegen überhaupt nicht zu Habecks in wenigen Zeilen ausgebreiteter Geschichtsschreibung.

(4) Im letzten Satz der am Anfang dieses Abschnitts zitierten Passage sagt Habeck, daß die Literaturwissenschaft geradezu „prädestiniert“ sei für „alle Arten kritischer Infragestellungen“ (Habeck 2001: 20). Wirklich? Wie wir gesehen haben, ist Ontologie tabu und das Negativitätsparadigma sakrosankt. Soll die Ausrede darin bestehen, daß „Arten kritischer Infragestellungen“ sich nicht auf konkrete Topoi beziehe?

(5) Den ersten Satz des Zitats noch einmal:

"Das Fach 'Germanistik' entsteht also nicht, wie zumeist in den wissenschaftsgeschichtlichen Lehrbüchern nachzulesen, aus der empirisch ausgerichteten Philologie allein, sondern mit ihm ist von Anfang an eine systematisch-anthropologische Fragestellung mit normativer Ausrichtung verbunden." (Habeck 2001: 20)

Habeck, wie er leibt und lebt. Im Vordersatz wird etwas Konkretes und Nachprüfbares, prinzipiell Untersuchbares und Verifizierbares oder Falsifizierbares behauptet ("entsteht"), im disjunktiv ("sondern") hinzugefügten Nachsatz wird dann behauptet, daß mit der Sache eine bestimmte Fragestellung "mit normativer Ausrichtung verbunden sei". Dieses Verbundensein ist so vage und abstrakt, daß es sich überhaupt schwerlich bestreiten läßt, weil man extrem viel behaupten und zeigen muß, um eine nicht greifbare Relation vielleicht doch noch mühselig angreifen zu können Die Aussage muß dann schon als richtig zugestanden werden, wenn man Habeck zugesteht – und das ist mehr oder weniger unangreifbarer Konsens in der durch und durch verfrankfurterten akademischen Philosophie –, daß es keine normativ neutrale „systematisch-anthropologische Fragestellung“ geben könne (dies nicht stimmt, kann man Kondylis’ Macht und Entscheidung und der Das Politische und der Mensch entnehmen). Der kritische Geist kommt hier nicht weit, weil Habecks Satz – wie so viele in dem Buch, aber dazu bräuchte ich einen gesonderten Text – so formuliert ist, daß man sich, will man ihn kritisieren, in die Position bringt, einen Pudding an die Wand nageln zu müssen.

(6) Lapidar zurückgefragt: Warum übernimmt Habeck so eifrig Adornos Ontologieverbot, aber ignoriert hier Adornos nicht weniger apodiktisch verkündetes Anthropologieverbot?

8. Hegel und die Gattungstheorie – verunglückte Bezugnahmen

Ich kann mich hier kurzfassen: Habecks Dissertation fällt hinter Einführungen aus der Zeit seiner literaturwissenschaftlichen Aktivität zurück, sowohl hinter Literaturwissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs als auch hinter das bei Reclam erschienene Buch Grundkurs Literaturwissenschaft. Warum? Habeck hält sich an „die Gattungstrias Lyrik-Epik-Drama als internes Ordnungskriterium der literarischen Vorstellungsformen“. Welches Ziel verfolgt er damit? Das Ziel, „überholte und ad acta gelegte Begriffe der Literaturtheorie durch die Herausarbeitung ihrer konstruktiven Zuschreibungen in gegenwärtige Debatten einzubeziehen“ (ebd.: 100). Zu diesem Zweck legt Habeck allerdings Gattungsformen ad acta, die neuere Gattungstheorien überhaupt erst in den Blick genommen haben, z.B. Hörspiel und den Bereich der faktualen Literatur (z.B. Autobiographien, Tagebücher, Reiseberichte etc.). Warum tut er das? Weil er eine Konzeption entwickeln will, die strikt an Hegel orientiert bleibt, denn die Gattungstrias, die Habeck zum Leitfaden nimmt, deckt, wie er sagt, „die drei Zeitzustände ab, die sich in Hegels enzyklopädischer Zusammenfassung des Vorstellungsbegriffs als Erinnerung, Einbildungskraft und Gedächtnis niederschlagen“ (ebd.: 100 f.). Damit verletzt Habeck aber gerade die methodologische Maxime, der er formuliert: „[D]ie methodische Komponente sichert die empirische Ausrichtung.“ (Ebd.: 55) Nicht so hier. Der Rückgriff auf Hegels Gattungstrias, der die gesamte literarische Entwicklung seit Hegel überspringt, schert sich keinen Pfifferling um empirische Validität.

Aber auch zu Hegel finden sich Thesen, die falsch sind, und sie betreffen sogar unmittelbar Habecks Anknüpfung an Hegels Ästhetik:

„Hegel verwendet den Begriff der ‚Vorstellung", um die spezifische Form literarischer Ästhetizität zu bezeichnen.“

Nein, tut er nicht; „Literatur“ kommt bei Hegel nicht einmal als terminus technicus vor (dazu unten mehr). Er verwendet den Begriff Vorstellung in vielfältiger Weise, u.a. auch, um das theoretisch zu fassen, was Habeck „literarische Ästhetizität“ nennt, aber Hegels Vorstellungsbegriff erstreckt sich in der Ästhetik auf einiges, worauf Habeck überhaupt nicht eingeht, während er so tut, als wäre Hegel ohne weiteres sein literaturwissenschaftlicher Gewährsmann. Primär verwendet Hegel den Vorstellungsbegriff, um Subjektives (Vorstellung des Künstlers) und Objektives (Vorstellung als objektiver Gehalt der Kunst allgemein) miteinander zu vermitteln. Eine bestimmte Art der Vorstellung, die eine Zwischenstellung zwischen Subjektivem und Objektivem einnimmt und vom Charakter her deshalb „momenthaft“ beides ist, ist die künstlerische Phantasie; sie ist eine Phantasie, der als solcher schon der nach Formgebung strebende ästhetische Gehalt in noch unausgeformter Weise innewohnt:

„Wir können diesen Unterschied allgemein so fassen, daß es nicht die Vorstellung als solche, sondern die künstlerische Phantasie sei, welche einen Inhalt poetisch mache, wenn nämlich die Phantasie denselben so ergreift, daß er sich, statt als architektonische, skulpturmäßig-plastische und malerische Gestalt dazustehen oder als musikalische Töne zu verklingen, in der Rede, in Worten und deren sprachlich schöner Zusammenfügung mitteilen läßt.“ (Hegel 1970a: 230)

Deshalb wird, so Hegel, „die in sich selbst dichterische Vorstellung nur in Worten objektiv“, wobei objektiv hier heißt: sie objektiviert sich in Worten und tritt so aus der Subjektivität, in der ihre Objektivität in statu nascendi wirkend ist, in die soziale Welt, die die des objektiven Geistes ist. Der objektive Geist, der durch den Künstler hindurchwirkt, manifestiert sich im für andere sichtbar werdenden Werk. Doch was macht Habeck daraus? Etwas ganz anderes, denn er verwendet Begriffe von „Innerlichkeit“ und „Äußerlichkeit“, die sich nicht nur bei Hegel nicht finden, sondern etliche Begriffe und Unterscheidungen Hegels unbegründet unterlaufen:

„Architektur, bildende Kunst und Malerei sind aufgrund ihres Materials äußerliche Raumkünste. Die Literatur hingegen nimmt die Äußerlichkeit nach innen. Nicht die Schrift oder der Text, geschweige denn Papier, Stein oder eben Bildschirm bzw. Silicon haben demnach den Status des Materials, sondern die Abfolge ehemals äußerer Phantasiegebilde innerhalb der Sprache. Nach allem bisher Gesagten ist es nun nicht mehr überraschend, wenn Hegel für den Komplex sprachlicher Bedeutungen auf den Begriff der "Vorstellung" rekurriert.“ (Habeck 2001: 55)

Daran stimmt nahezu nichts.

Der erste Satz stimmt schon deshalb nicht, weil die Architektur, vor allem die symbolische Architektur, Inneres äußerlich sichtbar gestaltet:

„In diese Äußerlichkeit [der sichtbaren Gestalt, S.E.] scheint zwar durch die architektonische Behandlung das Innere hinein, ohne jedoch das Objektive total zu durchdringen“. (Hegel 1970b: 351)

Das Objektive total durchdringen hieße, daß das Objektive sich selbst verfügbar und seiner selbst ansichtig werden könne. Dazu ist Reflexivität fähig, die sprachlich erzeugbar ist, und deshalb ist die Literatur in der Tat die Kunstform, in der der objektive Geist, der in allen Kunstwerken auf unterschiedliche Weise und unterschiedlichen Stufen zum Ausdruck kommt, am ehesten seiner selbst inne wird. Aber dieser alles zusammenhaltende Grundbegriff Hegels spielt in Habecks Buch keine Rolle. Weiter mit den Fehlern.

Die Literatur nimmt keine Äußerlichkeit nach innen. Der oben angesprochene Begriff der künstlerischen Phantasie zielt gerade auf eine umgekehrt gerichtete Bewegung, und das ergibt auch vom Vorstellungsbegriff her Sinn, sollte dieser nicht Sinneseindrücke in Vorstellungsbildern internalisieren, um sie dann wieder nach außen zu tragen. Literatur wäre dann ein äußerst unkreatives Unterfangen; zudem reproduziert die Unterscheidung zwischen Innerlichkeit und Äußerlichkeit die Subjekt-Objekt-Unterscheidung, auf die eine avancierte Medientheorie eine bessere, nicht in ontologische Gewässer geratende Antwort parat haben sollte. Was sollen überhaupt „äußere[] Phantasiegebilde“ (Habeck 2001: 55) sein? Phantasiegebilde, die ihre Äußerungsweise antezipieren, imaginativ entwerfen oder in Phantasiegestalt formen können, bevor eine künstlerische Artikulation stattgefunden hat, sind per se innere Gebilde, egal wie objektivitätsgesättigt sie sein mögen. Nach Hegel kommt der epischen Poesie „die Form der Objektivität“ in der spezifischen Weise zu (denn sie kommt der Kunst im allgemeinen zu, vgl. Hegel 1970a: 16), daß „eine von der Vorstellung in Form des Objektiven aufgefaßte und für die innere Vorstellung als objektiv dargestellte Welt ist“ (Hegel 1970b: 262). Das ist etwas ganz anderes als „die Äußerlichkeit nach innen“ (Habeck 2001: 55) zu nehmen. Habeck versteht dies nicht, weil er Hegel nur von der Ästhetik her liest und die Rolle des objektiven Geistes nicht von Hegels Gesamtphilosophie auf die Ästhetik zu übertragen vermag. Dementsprechend gibt er uns eine grotesk falsche Bestimmung von Hegels zentraler Bestimmung der Kunst als sinnliches Scheinen der Idee:

„Auch das Kunstwerk selbst hat zeichenhaften Charakter, denn die Bedeutung der Definition des Kunstwerks als 'sinnliches Scheinen der Idee' war ja, daß das Kunstwerk allgemeiner Ausdruck von einer Weltauffassung ist.“ (Ebd.: 65 f.)

Habeck subjektiviert gerade, was bei Hegel einen objektiven Sinn hat, der sich auch subjektiv manifestiert, aber eine „Weltauffassung“ kann jeder für sich haben, ohne daß von der Welt viel darin enthalten sein oder erfaßt werden muß; darauf zu beharren, ein „allgemeiner Ausdruck“ sei per se mehr als bloß subjektiv, tut nichts mehr zur Sache, wenn Hegels Begriff der Idee der zur Weltauffassung bagatellisiert wird. De facto sehen wir zu viele weltlose Weltauffassungen im heutigen Westen auf dem Jahrmarkt der Eitelkeiten und in lächerlicher Weise subjektivitätsverhafteten Belanglosigkeiten florieren. „Allgemeiner Ausdruck einer Weltauffassung“ kann sogar eine Auftragsarbeit sein, die die Weltauffassung eines anderen erfaßt und ihr einen allgemeinen Ausdruck verleiht. Das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee meint die Idee als die Selbstentfaltung der Idee durch den Künstler hindurch im Werk; inwieweit der Künstler der Idee gerecht wird, entscheidet über Gelingen und Mißlingen, über Größe oder Irrelevanz des Werks, und die Anerkennung der Relevanz subjektiver Weltauffassungen als solcher kommt in klassischen Ästhetiken nur formal vor. Die Differenz zwischen dem Hohen und dem Niedrigen war nämlich noch, ob ausgesprochen oder unausgesprochen, eine der wichtigsten überhaupt. – Und wenn man das wirklich verstehen will, muß man den Ideenbegriff vom objektiven Geist her verstehen, aber dann gelangt man bei einem Zu-Ende-denken Hegels auch zum Volksbegriff; davon will Habeck natürlich nichts wissen (dazu wäre ein eigener Text nötig, wie auch zu seiner hier nicht weiter zu bewertenden Kant-Interpretation).

Ich sagte bereits, daß Literatur als terminus technicus bei Hegel nicht vorkommt. Das ist nicht per se ein Einwand, denn eine Theorie kann theoretische Potentiale enthalten, die in ihr nicht artikuliert werden und über das hinausreichen, was in ihr explizit gesagt oder von ihrem Urheber bereits explizit gedacht wird. Aber Habecks Buch enthält keine Erörterung, die solche Unterscheidungen enthalten oder begründen. Was kommt hingegen bei Hegel vor, bei Habeck, der ihm die Treue zu halten verspricht, aber gerade nicht? Hegel unterscheidet nicht einfach nur Gattungsformen wie Epos und Lyrik voneinander, sondern auch das epische vom lyrischen Prinzip. Warum ist das wichtig? Weil die Unterscheidung zwischen Innerlichkeit und Äußerlichkeit entlang dieser Unterscheidung, die Habeck nicht aufgreift, die Literatur in einer Weise ausdifferenziert, die bei Habeck keine Rolle spielt. Konkret: Die Lyrik ist die subjektivere Form, in der „das Subjekt, das in seiner selbständigen Innerlichkeit für sich hervortritt und sich ausspricht“ (Hegel 1970a: 477), seine reinste Artikulationsform findet. Im Epos und Drama hingegen tritt die Idee in eine vielfältige Welt auseinander, in der eine zentrale Rolle Charaktere sprechen, mit C.G. Jung gesprochen: Archetypen. Literatur ist deshalb so lehrreich, weil Charakteristisches, Anekdotisches grundsätzlich Übersteigendes in ihr als Idee sich manifestiert, weil Charaktere in sie kennzeichnende Schicksalskonstellationen eintreten usw. usf. Die Leistung der Literatur besteht also gerade darin, wie weit sie sich der Philosophie annähert, die Hegel – um hier bei der Ästhetik zu bleiben – als „Explikation der ewigen Idee“ (Hegel 1970b: 355) bezeichnet. Freud entwickelt nur einen Begriff des Ödipus-Komplexes, weil Ödipus einen Typus in einer exemplarischen Verstrickung zur Darstellung bringt. In Goethes Werther sind Werther, Albert und Lotte Figuren und Typen zugleich, während Wilhelm, an den die Briefe adressiert sind, als Figur blaß bleibt und als Typus im halbwegs anspruchsvollen Sinne nicht gedacht werden kann. Habeck zeigt sich an allen innerliterarischen Unterscheidungen bei Hegel desinteressiert, reduziert die literarische Gattungsvielfalt auf die Hegel’sche Trias, beansprucht methodische Solidität und einen wichtigen Beitrag zu gegenwärtigen Debatten in der Literaturwissenschaft geleistet zu haben. Literarische „Ästhetizität“ ist bei Hegel in sich weitaus weniger homogen als bei Habeck.

Konklusion und Bewertung

Dieser Text hätte um etliche Seiten länger werden können, denn ich hätte noch seitenlang Stilblüten in der Luft zerpflücken können und mehrere Seiten über Habecks Hegel-Interpretation schreiben können. Aber kommen wir nun zum wenig salomonischen Ende.

Hätte Habecks Buch als Dissertation überhaupt durchgehen dürfen? Die doppelte Antwort lautet: ja, natürlich, und: nein, auf keinen Fall.

Zum „ja, natürlich“:

Die Arbeit ist ein typisches Milieuprodukt und sticht nicht einmal negativ heraus innerhalb der Literaturwissenschaft, auch nicht gemessen daran, daß es sich um eine Dissertation handelt. Das nötigt einem eine Fokusverlagerung auf: Das Milieu selbst, daß es als wissenschaftliche Disziplin zu agieren berechtigt ist und welche intellektuellen und wissenschaftlichen Anforderungen es an sich selbst stellt, ist ein gravierendes Problem – ein Problem, das keineswegs nur auf die Literaturwissenschaft beschränkt bleibt. Wo soll man überhaupt mit Überprüfungen und Streichungen anfangen? Wie soll man eingreifen, wenn ein Fach nicht dazu in der Lage ist, sich selbständig Standards vorzugeben und sie einzuhalten, die seine Existenz an Universitäten legitimieren? Wie viele Studenten sind in den Geisteswissenschaften überhaupt studierfähig? Wie viel Prozent sind allgemein studierfähig? 1975 haben 14,7 % der Schulabgänger das Abitur gemacht (Tabelle unten angehängt), bei Habecks Jahrgang 1989 waren es bereits 22,2 %, das Abi also bereits verramscht (ab 15 % würde ich davon sprechen), seitdem befinden wir uns im freien Fall (seit 2007: kontinuierlich über 30 %; 2014 – 2019: über 40 %). Allgemein läßt sich auf der Grundlage traditioneller europäischer kognitiver Kapazitäten, wie sie durch den IQ erfaßt werden, sagen: rund 10 % sind „Universitätsmaterial“. Wenn nun regelmäßig rund 40 % mit dem Abitur die Schule verlassen, heißt das gemäß der Mathematik der richtigen Seite der Geschichte, daß 30 % der Studenten nichts an den Universitäten zu suchen haben, während gemäß der Mathematik 75 % der Leute dort nichts zu suchen haben. Warum sage ich das hier? Weil wir alle Abschlüsse auf der Grundlage kognitiver Tests re-evaluieren müssen. 1990er-Romantik hilft uns nicht weiter, denn seit 1982 liegt die Abiturientenquote beharrlich bei über 20 %, d.h. im Bereich des vollendeten Un- und Blödsinns. Dann entwickeln sich durch das gesamte Bildungssystem hindurch Standards, die Habecks Dissertation unangreifbar machen, solange man mit dem System nicht rigoros zu brechen bereit ist. Habecks werden die Universitäten noch viele sehen, weil wir das System nicht beenden, das von Leuten übervölkert ist, die sie durchwinken. Ich werde noch deutlich mehr dazu (Habeck-unabhängig) in einem in den kommenden Monaten erscheinenden Buch sagen.

Zum „nein, auf keinen Fall“, das sich aus dem Text und den gerade angestellten Überlegungen von allein ergibt:

Will ich damit sagen, daß ich Habeck hätte durchfallen lassen? Nein, ich hätte das Thema nicht betreut und ihn nicht als Doktorand angenommen; was ich der Dissertation in Sachen Kant- und Hegelverständnis entnehmen kann, würde mir aufnötigen, Habeck den Verzicht aufs Philosophieren aufzunötigen. Da die Arbeit das fertige Produkt darstellt, muß man davon ausgehen, daß Habeck drei bis vier Jahre davor über ein wesentlich dürftigeres Verständnis des philosophischen Materials verfügt haben muß, an dem er sich überhoben hat. Die in Buchform vorliegende Arbeit läßt nicht darauf schließen, daß er mich in einem Vorgespräch hätte überzeugen können. Anders als üblich, würde ich umfangreiche Exposés verlangen, was heißt, daß er auf dem Wege einfach zu überführen wäre. Zudem würde ich – daraus allein erklärt sich die Unumstößlichkeit des Konjunktivs und meine (meinerseits anerkannte) Professur”untauglichkeit” im aktuellen System – die verbindlichen Ansprüche an Doktoranden in Lehrveranstaltungen so klar artikulieren, daß es unwahrscheinlich ist, Habeck als Nicht-Externen plötzlich vor mir zu haben, denn Leuten aus dem Suhrkamp-Milieu seit der Berliner Zeit des Verlags, in das Habeck bestens paßt, gebe ich in offener Ansage schlechte Chancen, einen nennenswerten Eindruck zu machen – jedenfalls keinen im positiven Sinne umwerfenden.

Generelles Schlußwort nicht zu Habeck, sondern zum Habeck-Problem, das durch den „Fall Habeck“ hindurchscheint:

Die Zulassung von Masteranden zum Promotionsstudium wird an den sogenannten Universitäten mittlerweile kriminell lax gehandhabt. Die Postdoc-Schwemme, die man mittlerweile gesinnungspolitisch durch DEI zu entschärfen versucht, ohne sie auflösen zu können (die Anzahl der unbegabten Konformisten, die sich die sogenannten Universitäten unter den Nagel gerissen haben, übersteigt die Anzahl der verfügbaren Stellen bei weitem), ist ein Resultat sowohl des Überbrückungspromovierens (Leute promovieren, weil sie nicht wissen, was sie tun sollen; das Studium ist vorbei, aber arbeiten will man auch nicht, das Milieu ist schön kuschelig im allgemeinen) als auch des anspruchslosen Akzeptierens von Doktoranden.

Wenn wir den Fall Habeck ernstnehmen, können wir daraus etwas lernen. Daß das akademische System geistig und moralisch seit langem pleite ist, weiß jeder, der nicht durch Geldflüsse innerhalb des Systems betäubt wird. Auf Habeck herumzuhacken, mag für viele amüsant oder gar kathartisch sein, aber wichtiger wäre es, daß wir die Abiturientenquote - bei einer spekulativen Verrechnung mit der Demographie der Intelligenz – auf ca. 6 – 8 % herunterbringen (die einstmals realistischen 10 - 12 % sind heute illusorisch), den akademischen Sektor auf ca. 20 % seiner aktuellen Größe reduzieren und natürlich dabei auch das Dissertations- und Postdoc-Problem lösen. Von den USA gibt es hier nicht viel zu lernen, das haben wir versucht, es ging katastrophal schief. Schauen wir nun nach Südostasien, vor allem China und Singapur. Wie oben bereits gesagt: ein Buch wird bald kommen.

Zitierte Literatur:

Adorno, Theodor W. (1970a): Negative Dialektik. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Adorno, Theodor W. (1970b): Ästhetische Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Becker, Sabina; Hummel, Christine; Sander, Gabriele (2006): Grundkurs Literaturwissenschaft. Stuttgart: Reclam.

Brackert, Helmut; Stückrath, Jörn (Hrsg.) (2001): Literaturwissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs. 7. Aufl. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt.

Brackert, Helmut (2001): Zur Geschichte der Germanistik bis 1945. In: Brackert, Helmut; Stückrath, Jörn (Hrsg.): Literaturwissenschaft. Ein Grundkurs. 7. Aufl. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2001, S. 549 – 564.

Bühler, Karl (1934): Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Jena: Gustav Fischer.

Edinger, Sebastian (2022): Negative Anthropologie bei Plessner und Adorno. Theoretische Grundlagen – Geschichtsphilosophie – Moderne-Kritik. Berlin; Boston: de Gruyter.

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb (1990): Deduzierter Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höhern Lehranstalt, die in gehöriger Verbindung mit einer Akademie der Wissenschaften stehe. In: Engel, Johann J.; Erhard, Johann B.; Wolf, Friedrich A.: Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten. Stuttgart: Reclam, S. 59 – 158.

Gervinus, Georg Gottfried (1962): Schriften zur Literatur. Hrsg. von Gotthard Erler. Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag.

Habeck, Robert (2001): Die Natur der Literatur. Zur gattungstheoretischen Begründung literarischer Ästhetizität. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970a): Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Band 3. Herausgegeben von Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1970b): Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik. Band 2. Herausgegeben von Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Peirce, Charles Sanders (2002): Semiotische Schriften. Band 1: 1865-1903. Hrsg. von Christian Kloesel und Helmut Pape. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Popper, Karl (2015): Erkenntnis und Evolution. Zur Verteidigung von Wissenschaft und Rationalität. Hrsg. und teilweise neu übersetzt von Hans-Joachim Niemann. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Vogel, Matthias (2001): Medien der Vernunft: Eine Theorie des Geistes und der Rationalität auf Grundlage einer Theorie der Medien. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Im Text erwähnte Tabelle:

Annika Brockschmidt steht, mit übrigens mehr als 90 000 „Followern“ auf X, im Ruf, eine ausgewiesene USA-Expertin zu sein, die einem interessierten deutschen Publikum die USA erklären könne, vor allem die Rolle der Evangelikalen als der wahlentscheidenden religiösen Gruppe in den USA. Ihre in beachtlicher sprachlicher Armut sich manifestierenden fetischistischen Fixierungen („Faschist“, „Nazi“, „alter weißer Mann“, „white supremacy“, „Patriarchat“, „Verschwörungsirgendwas“ – „-irgendwas“ kann wahlweise und unsystematisch durch Mythos, Phantasma, Märchen etc. ersetzt werden; und viel mehr kommt dann auch nicht mehr) sowie ihre Neigung, über die bloße Verwendung von Anglizismen hinaus blindwütig alles, was ihr gerade in den Sinn kommt, in die deutsche Sprache einzuschmuggeln („framte“), stehen ihrem Erfolg nicht im Weg. Der öffentliche Status, den Annika Brockschmidt als „USA-Expertin“ und „Intellektuelle“ genießt, läßt es leider angebracht erscheinen, die offensichtliche Nicht-Expertin als solche bloßzustellen. Hoffentlich läßt sich dahingehend wenigstens irgend etwas mit diesem Text erreichen, der sich auf Brockschmidts Buch Amerikas Gotteskrieger. Wie die Religiöse Rechte die Demokratie gefährdet beschränkt, denn es ist schlimm genug, sich überhaupt damit länger aufzuhalten.

Es geht mir hier nicht primär um Brockschmidt, sondern um die intellektuelle Öffentlichkeit und den geistigen Zustand eines Landes, in dem jemand wie sie einen solchen Status erlangen kann. Es geht mir also um einen intellektuellen und kulturellen Zerfall und darum, wie er sich in dieser individuellen Erfolgsgeschichte, die vom geistigen Ende eines Landes zeugt, manifestiert. Und ich wähle Brockschmidt (bei immenser Konkurrenz durch Leute wie Carlo Masala, Philipp Ruch, Natascha Strobl und viele andere) deshalb aus, weil ich es denjenigen Frauen schuldig bin, die das weibliche Geschlecht geist- und würdevoller repräsentieren. Das genaue Gegenteil von Brockschmidt wären z.B. Mary Harrington, Louise Perry, Poppy Coburn, Heather Mac Donald oder Mary Eberstadt.

Großartige Erklärung oder doch eher Struktur- und Ideenplagiat?

Den Ausdruck „Struktur- und Ideenplagiat“ habe ich dem Büchlein Über die geistigen Mistkäfer der Wissenschaft. Zum Struktur- und Ideenplagiat des deutschen Lord Voldemort der Intelligenzforschung, Volkmar Weiss, entnommen. Weiss verteidigt in dem Buch seine eigenen Errungenschaften gegen ihre stillschweigende und seines Erachtens unzureichend ausgewiesene Übernahme (ihm zufolge u.a. durch Sarrazin), schreckt aber auch nicht davor zurück, seine eigene Abhängigkeit von anderen Ansätzen einzugestehen: „In vielem ist Die IQ-Falle, allein schon durch ihre Entstehungsgeschichte, ein Strukturplagiat der Bell Curve, das sich erst im vierten Teil vollständig von seiner Vorlage löst.“ (Weiss 2021: 45)

Aufgrund von Weiss’ Loslösung von The Bell Curve in den späteren Kapiteln seines Buches darf man sein Buch als Aufnahme und Weiterentwicklung bezeichnen. Doch welche offensichtlichen Vorlagen lassen sich bei Brockschmidt ausmachen, die sie unterschlägt?

Meines Erachtens muß Brockschmidts Buch einigermaßen langweilig für jemanden sein, der Chris Hedges’ bereits 2006 erschienenes Buch American Fascists. The Christian Right and the War on America gelesen hat (gut, die „Gefahr“, daß dies geschieht, besteht in der Regel nicht). Die Rolle der Evangelikalen wird umfangreich dargestellt; Rushdooney, auf dessen Entdeckung Brockschmidt sich viel einzubilden scheint, ist Hedges, wie dem Leser schwerlich entgehen wird, bestens bekannt. Die marginale Fußnote in Brockschmidts Buch (Brockschmidt 2021: 372) widerspricht meiner Unterschlagungsthese nicht.

Worin Brockschmidts Buch sich von dem Hedges’ gewichtig unterscheidet, ist m.E. die Akkumulation von Konzessionen an den Zeitgeist und an Diskussionen (Fokussierung auf white supremacy, Sklaverei, Rassismus, CRT, Covid), die nach 2010 aufgekommen sind und deshalb bei Hedges noch nicht auftauchen konnten. Wodurch Brockschmidt sich darüber hinaus von Hedges unterscheidet, ist das Niveau an begrifflicher Durcharbeitung, denn nichts, was Begriffsbestimmung genannt zu werden verdient, ist bei ihr zu finden, während Hedges den Faschismusbegriff, wenn auch nicht erschöpfend, so doch in analytisch bearbeitbarer Weise definiert. Brockschmidt kann vielleicht geltend machen, daß sie mehr Material verarbeitet habe als Hedges und deshalb ein noch umfangreicheres Bild der Evangelikalen gezeichnet habe, aber das sind bloße Fleißpluspunkte, und ich halte ihr auch nicht Faulheit, sondern Unvermögen vor. Hinzu kommt in nicht gerade förderlicher Weise, daß es sich bei Amerikas Gotteskrieger um ein Buch handelt, das aus einer Blase heraus (dem woken Industriekomplex) über eine andere geschrieben worden ist ohne Verständnis dessen, was sie zu erklären versucht: die USA. Dazu nun mehr im Detail.

Ich gehe im Folgenden ohne narrativen Leitfaden eine von Punkten stichwortartig durch, führe Zitate aus Brockschmidts Buch an und weise Stück für Stück nach, um was für ein, gerade in Sachen USA-Kenntnis, unzureichendes Buch, das nie hätte gedruckt werden dürfen, es sich dabei handelt.

Soros als Antisemitismus-Keule und ein ganz besonderes Irrlichtern aus profunder Unkenntnis heraus

Im nicht genauer definierten, aber offensichtlich existierenden Social Credit Point System der Linken, der deutschen zumal, ist der Ruf, nachweislich, unverbrüchlich und mehr als nur überaufrichtig ein Anti-Antisemit zu sein, ganz so, als wäre man damit auch schon kein Antisemit mehr (nicht auf Brockschmidt gemünzt), aber dazu unten mehr.

Brockschmidt hat es in ihrem Buch tatsächlich hinbekommen, die anspruchsvolle journalistische Ansprüche – von wissenschaftlichen gar nicht erst zu reden – auf groteske Weise zu unterbieten, wo sie sagt (ein solches Peinlichkeitsjuwel muß ausgiebig mit Hervorhebungen zitiert werden):

„Deborah Lipstadt [eine Antisemitismusforscherin, S.E.] verwies auf eine Rede des Seators Josh Hawley auf der National Conservatism Conference, in der er das Wort «kosmopolitisch» zwölf Mal verwendete: «Ich bin mir sicher, dass die meisten Leute, die dort aufgetaucht sind, sagen würden: ich bin ein guter Freund der Juden.) Aber wenn man das Wort (kosmopolitisch» gegen das Wort (Jude) austauscht – klingt es wie ein klassisches antisemitisches Narrativ. [...] Es ist die Art von Sprache, die Antisemiten anlockt», sagt Lipstadt. Diese Form des kulturellen Antisemitismus findet sich dementsprechend häufig in rechten Medien. Zu den Dog Whistles des kulturellen Antisemitismus zählt beispielsweise die Bezugnahme auf die angebliche Kontrolle wichtiger Finanzströme durch den jüdischen Milliardär George Soros, der damit die Weltherrschaft an sich reißen wolle.“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 286 f.)

Die National Conservatism Conference der sogenannten NatCons, deren führender Kopf Yoram Hazony vorher am Theodor Herzl Institut in Jerusalem war, traten vor ihrer Umbenennung zu National Conservatives unter dem Namen Jewish-Christian Alliance auf. Daß eine angebliche Antisemitismusforscherin das nicht weiß, stellt alle sogenannte Forschung in dem Bereich unter Generalverdacht, was das nötige Kompetenzniveau angeht, um dort mitspielen zu dürfen. Daß Brockschmidt darauf hereinfällt, ohne sich Fragen zu stellen oder etwas zu merken, paßt ins Gesamtbild, das ich noch deutlicher zeichnen werde. Daß sie das als Sprungbrett benutzt, um zu Soros als dem Statthalter des Judentums zu gelangen (was sagt Brockschmidt eigentlich zu Jews against Soros?), ist nicht nur aus Unwissenheit, sondern auch aus Denkunfähigkeit geborener Kitsch. Warum?

Den Antisemitismus, wie allzu häufig geschehen, an Soros-Kritik oder auch an harten, begründeten intellektuellen Angriffen gegen Soros festzumachen, bedeutet, Soros (wenigstens kasuistisch) zum Statthalter des Judentums zu machen, was auch heißt: ihn zu de-individualisieren und zu einem grotesk überwertigen Maskottchen zu machen. Die eigene Projektion in dem Verfahren, das zur Erzeugung der sowohl monolithischen als auch im Gegenteil repräsentativen Entität „der Jude“ führt und über Individuen gleichgültig hinwegwalzt, wird unsichtbar gemacht und muß unsichtbar gemacht werden, damit man den Antisemiten ans Licht zerren kann und den eigenen unbegriffenen Antisemitismus, der in seiner Erzeugung am Werke ist, im Dunkel belassen kann. Anders gesagt: Den Antisemitismus von einer Soros-Kritik herzuleiten, läuft darauf hinaus, ein Kitschbild vom Antisemitismus zu statuieren, das seiner inneren Logik nach notgedrungen selbst antisemitisch ist, weil es Juden auf eine bestimmte Erwartungshaltung von außen vereidigt und ihnen nicht gestattet, sich wenigstens selbst darauf zu vereidigen oder die Solidarität mit Soros eben auch strikt abzulehnen, was durchaus möglich ist, solange sowohl Soros als auch seine Gegner Individuen sind statt Spielmarken und Manövriermasse in eigener Sache. Der jämmerliche Sinn des Spiels ist: „Schau, das ist jemand gegen den Juden Soros, ergo ist er ein Antisemit, nun gib uns den Blankoscheck für unsere vorprogrammierten lahmen, immergleichen Denunziationen!“

Die Suggestion, daß Soros das Judentum repräsentiere und ein Angriff auf ihn einer auf letzteres sei, ist selber antisemitisch dadurch, daß der ihr sich gedankenlos und reflexhaft Hingebende am Judentum selbst so desinteressiert zeigt wie an Diversität innerhalb der jüdischen Welt, von der die Diversen genauso viel wissen wollen wie von jeder anderen wirklichen Diversität. Es kann erst jeder für alle einstehen, wenn alle eins sind; „die“ (Juden) und „dieser“ (Jude) sind dann ununterscheidbar; so will es der Triumph der hemdsärmeligen Einfältigkeit, die intellektuell nicht weiter reicht als bis zur Erfindung einer so billigen Masche, um in gänzlicher Sachferne gegenüber dem, was man zu verteidigen beansprucht, dasselbe vor den klappernden Schrottkarren der eigenen infamen und perniziösen Bildungslosigkeit spannt.

Diese Masche ist auch deshalb so beliebt, weil man sich vor Idioten leicht einen Mantel umlegen, der qua Aufschrift verbürgen soll, wofür er nicht verbürgen kann: Der demonstrative Anti-Antisemitismus soll – allgemein gesprochen – Gewähr dafür bieten, daß man es mit aufrechten und authentischen Nicht-Antisemiten zu tun hat. Aus keinem Anti-Antisemitismus folgt ein Nicht-Antisemitismus, ersterer kann letzteren nicht repräsentieren, weil die Präsentation mit der beanspruchten oder zur Schau gestellten Bedeutung nicht identisch ist; für einen legitimen Nicht-Antisemitismus ist es nötig, kein Anti-Semit zu sein und sonst nichts. Keine wie immer geartete Performance kann bewerkstelligen, was der performative Anti-Semit – ungeachtet seiner „wahren inneren Haltung“ – als Garantieleistung seiner Performance beansprucht; Anti-Antisemit ist man vor allem für andere und vor anderen, unabhängig davon, was man eigentlich sei. Hier ist an Peter Furths Ausführungen über den Philosemitismus in seinem brillanten Essay Heuchelei und moralische Weltanschauung zu erinnern: „Die Identifikation mit den exemplarischen Opfern ist also ein sicheres Mittel, um unverdächtig aggressiv sein zu können. Wenn Toleranzforderung und Konformismus kurz geschlossen werden, kommt es zur aggressivsten Form der Heuchelei überhaupt.“ Wie Brockschmidt persönlich dazu steht, ist egal, denn sie kann nicht über die Strukturen verfügen, innerhalb derer sie selber als Marionette ihres Milieus operiert; nichts in dem Buch indiziert, daß sie sich zu diesem Milieu verhalten kann, alles hingegen, daß sie sich brav darin und gemäß seiner Vorgaben enthält. Indem sie auf den Soros-Kitsch einschwenkt, um leere Anklagen zu führen, deren Rückseite noch leerere Selbstvergewisserungen und -bestimmungen vor Publikum sind, gerät sie zu einer Figur in der Logik der kleinkindlichen Blickstrahlablenkung, die – ob zurecht oder zu unrecht – überall dort stattfindet, wo der Anti-Antisemitismus die Bühne des Marktplatzes betritt.

Erheiternde Phantastereien über das „amerikanische Abitur“

Die NatCons als Bewegung nicht wahrgenommen zu haben, wirft ein Licht darauf, mit was für einer Art von Expertentum wir es hier zu tun haben. Brockschmidt ist monothematisch orientiert, tritt aber mit einem Erklärungsanspruch auf, der in einem bizarren Mißverhältnis zu ihrem Wissen steht. Das zeigt sich auch in einer anderen Angelegenheit, die mich laut auflachen ließ: Sie kennt die Struktur des amerikanischen Bildungssystems nicht einmal im Ansatz.

„Der Grund für sinkende SAT-Ergebnisse (vergleichbar mit dem Abitur-Schnitt) liege in der fehlenden religiösen Bildung von Kindern und Jugendlichen im modernen Schulsystem.“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 216 f.)

Die Behauptung ist in der Tat lächerlich, aber auch nicht lächerlicher als die Annahme, der SAT entspreche dem Abitur. Das amerikanische Äquivalent des Abiturs ist der Graduate Point Average (GPA), während der SAT (wie der LSAT und der ACT) ein von den Schulnoten gänzlich unabhängiger kognitiver Test, der eher einem IQ-Test gleichkommt und deshalb bei jenen, die über IQ mehr wissen und zu sagen wissen, daß es sich – gähn – um „ein Konstrukt“ handele, zudem um ein weißes, deshalb Diskriminierung reproduzierendes handele, das natürlich auch die Komplexität menschlicher Intelligenz allenfalls und auf bescheidenem Niveau annäherungsweise erfasse usw. usf.

Wer glaubt, es handele sich dabei um einen kleinen faux pas, den ich Brockschmidt hier kleinlich vorhalte, dem seien ein paar wenige sachte Andeutungen dazu gegeben, was völlig außerhalb ihres USA-Expertenhorizonts liegt: Weder kennt und versteht sie die weitreichenden Auseinandersetzungen der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts um das Bildungssystem in den USA nicht, noch versteht sie deren gesellschaftspolitisches Gewicht. Sie kann nicht verstehen, wie Affirmative Action mit dem SAT und dieser wiederum mit der Intelligenzforschung zusammenhängt (in einer vorsichtigen Schätzung beträgt die Korrelation im allgemeinen zwischen SAT- und IQ-Wert r = 0,8, wird aber auch teilweise deutlich höher angegeben. Wieso? Die kurze Antwort lautet: Positive Manifold – eines der härtesten und am besten fundierten Ergebnisse der gesamten empirischen Sozialforschung im weitesten Sinne). Sie hat natürlich auch The SAT Wars – ein Buch, das sich umfangreich mit dem Wertigkeitsverhältnis von SAT- und GPA-Werten auseinandersetzt – nicht gelesen. Sie kennt The Bell Curve offensichtlich nur vom Hörensagen („weiß“ aber natürlich, so wie man in ihren Kreisen Dinge „weiß“, daß es sich um pseudowissenschaftlichen und rassistischen Quatsch handelt) und kennt auch die neuere Meritokratie-Debatte rund um Michael Sandel (The Tyranny of Merit, 2020) und Daniel Markovits (The Meritocracy Trap, 2019) nicht. Sie weiß natürlich auch nicht, daß die Kontroverse zwischen GPA (hochgradig beeinflußbar durch Fleiß und Entgegenkommen von Lehrern) und SAT (Elimination des subjektiven Faktors, extrem hohe IQ-Korrelation, weitgehende „Unlernbarkeit“ (alternativ und ausführlicher: Effects of Coaching on SAT I: Reasoning Scores), weshalb die Ergebnisse kein Resultat sozioökonomischer Verhältnisse sind) zugunsten des SAT entschieden ist, was in den entsprechenden Kreisen auch jeder weiß; und ich habe hier nur Online-Quellen angeführt, um es dem Leser leichter zu machen, die Behauptungen einer Prüfung zu unterziehen, es existieren dazu Bücher en masse.

Ein Comeback gibt es aus einem solchen Abgrund von Unwissenheit nicht, aber ihrem Expertenstatus wird das in diesem „Deutschland“ keinerlei Abbruch tun, denn sie ist damit unter den „Eliten“ und „Hochqualifizierten“ in bester Gesellschaft.

„Court-Packing“ – Abenteuerliche Phantasien über den Supreme Court

Brockschmidt spricht von einem Court Packing der religiösen Rechten, das allerdings nicht stattgefunden hat, mehr noch: sie weiß so ganz neuexpertenhaft und neubildungselitär nicht einmal, was Court Packing bedeutet. Ihre Behauptung lautet mit meinen Hervorhebungen:

„Das «Court-Packing» der Religiösen Rechten, also das gezielte Besetzen von juristischen Schlüsselpositionen, das unter Trump weiter praktiziert wurde, hat das Bundesjustizsystem für die nächsten Jahrzehnte verändert, und zwar zum Vorteil Christlicher Nationalisten.“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 277 f.)

Was sie hier sagt, ist jenseits von Gut und Böse. Die Definition von Court Packing besagt, daß dabei die Richterzahl außerplanmäßig und in einem gezielten politischen Akt erhöht wird, um dadurch für politische Vorhaben Mehrheitsverhältnisse zu schaffen, die aktuell nicht vorhanden sind. Die Neubesetzungen, die Trump vorgenommen hat, ergaben sich einfach daraus, daß richterliche Positionen während seiner Präsidentschaft frei wurden, d.h. er nutzte einfach seine präsidiale Befugnis, als die Gelegenheit sich bot, so wie es andere Präsidenten auch getan hätten; solche Neubesetzungen waren kein Griff nach illegitimer Gestaltungsmacht, sondern fallen schlicht in den Aufgabenbereich eines US-Präsidenten. Natürlich handelt es sich dabei um ein „gezieltes Besetzen von juristischen Schlüsselpositionen“, aber verfassungsrechtlich anrüchig ist dabei in dem Fall schlicht gar nichts. Allerdings forderte die Demokratin Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez angesichts von Trumps Entscheidungen im Jahr 2020 explizit: „Expand the Court.“

Interessant, oder? (Brockschmidts Buch erschien 2021, womöglich war das fertige Manuskript zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits eingereicht; aber daß sie selbst in Kenntnis der Sachlage erwähnt hätte, wage ich zu bezweifeln.)

Merkwürdigerweise beschleicht mich der Verdacht, daß deutsche „USA-Experten“ sich damals weder darüber echauffierten, noch es für nötig erachteten, das deutsche Publikum über die Zustände in den USA aufzuklären. Auch interessant, oder?

Die angeblichen Schauermärchen und die harten Fakten

Brockschmidt arbeitet durchgehend mit einer konnotativ aufgeladenen Sprache: Konnotationen sollen leisten, was sie auf inhaltlicher Ebene nicht zu leisten imstande ist; der Leser soll beeinflußt und, falls nötig, durch die Konditionierung mittels permanent – so paradox das klingt (wie beim „lauten Schweigen“) – ins Gesicht gebrüllter Untertöne (mit allerdings gar nicht vager Stoßrichtung) unter die Fuchtel genommen werden. Zu den „Verschwörungsmythen“ komme ich noch, aber in Hochform und so ganz als Repräsentantin ihres Milieus erweist Brockschmidt sich, wo sie das leicht Dokumentierbare als „Schauermärchen“ bezeichnet:

„Trump lieferte, was er und Pence der Religiösen Rechten vor der Wahl 2016 versprochen hatten: Er trat als erster Präsident auf einem «Pro-Life»-Marsch auf, erzählte immer wieder Schauermärchen von Demokraten und Ärztinnen, die «Babys» bis kurz vor der Geburt «töten» wollten – «und manchmal sogar nach der Geburt».“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 67)

Darf ich dem Leser Kathy Tran vorstellen? Bis 2:10 erhält man das Wesentliche, das Brockschmidt natürlich leugnet, während sie anderen vorhält, sich in abstruse Phantasien zu ergehen.

Mehr als nur „Stilblüten“ der besonderen Art – einige eklatante Fehltritte

Ich werde nun etliche Stellen zitieren und aufzeigen, daß Brockschmidt den USA als „Globalgegenstand“ genauso wenig gewachsen ist wie der deutschen Sprache. Der Übersichtlichkeit halber sind alle Zitate eingerückt und mit Stichworten überschrieben.

Verschwörungsmythen – besser: Verschwörungsirgendwas

Da ich dieses leidige Thema schon angerissen habe, fangen wir damit an. Ich nenne generell alles, was unter den unzähligen Namen, die mit „Verschwörungs-“ beginnen, Verschwörungsirgendwas, weil analytische Trennschärfe und intellektuelle Standards im Umgang meiner Kenntnis nach flächendeckend fehlen. Diejenigen, die hier mitgrölen bzw. hirnlos oral vor sich hin exkrementieren, könnten die Unterschiede zwischen z.B. Verschwörungstheorie, Verschwörungsmärchen, Verschwörungsphantasma, Verschwörungsmythos oder Verschwörungserzählung nicht im Ansatz begrifflich bestimmen, wenn ihr Leben davon abhinge. Brockschmidt verwendet dementsprechend auch alles mögliche durcheinander; zu Verschwörungsglaube siehe das Kapitel „Das Ende naht – Verschwörungsglaube“, aber „Verschwörungsmythos“ ist gerne gesehen bei ihr (z.B. S. 34, 52, 148, 167 f., 243 f., 287), „Verschwörungserzählung“ findet sich ebenso (z.B. S. 293, 304 oder 308), aber auch „Verschwörungsphantasien“ darf mal (S. 334).

Brockschmidt wäre nicht Brockschmidt, und ihr Milieu wäre nicht in bodenloser intellektueller Erbärmlichkeit, was es ist, würde nicht auch als Verschwörungsmythos bezeichnet werden, was mittlerweile eher eine Sache des halbwegs gekonnten Umgangs mit einem Rechenschieber als von „Mathematik“ ist: das „Great Replacement“.

„In derselben Episode von WallBuilders Line behauptete William Gheen 2010, dass Einwanderer mit Hilfe Obamas die wahren Amerikaner ersetzen wollten, indem sie zahlreiche Kinder zeugten – ein Echo des rassistischen Verschwörungsmythos vom «Great Replacement» oder der «Umvolkung», wie sie in deutschen rechten Kreisen genannt wird.“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 34)

Hier kann man sich über die Kriterien streiten, aber es reicht m.E. problemlos aus, um von einem Great Replacement zu sprechen, wenn aufgrund politischer Maßnahmen ein Migrationsaufkommen generiert wird, das dazu führt, daß die numerische Dominanz der Einheimischen untergraben wird. Dabei gehe ich von chinesischen Maßstäben aus, und in China leben rund 92 % Han-Chinesen. Hinzu kommt, daß es eine Sache ist, ob der Anteil der Einheimischen unter 90 % fällt, oder ob er künstlich und mit geradezu militanter Planmäßigkeit unter 90 % gedrückt wird. Zwangssterilisierungen und einer offener Revers-Hitlerismus mit schleichendem Ethnozid sind keineswegs nötig, um diesen Begriff zu validieren. Die interne demographische Schwäche von Ländern, die sich zudem mittlerweile auf nahezu den gesamten Globus erstreckt, ist kein Argument dafür, denn Völker haben das Recht darauf zu sterben. Wirtschaftsstandortrhetorik hat hier nichts zu suchen, sie müssen erleiden, was sie sich einbrocken. Und wer die Grundlagen der Intelligenzforschung und damit die Demographie der Intelligenz – etwas, was Schulfach sein sollte, weil es leider nur von wenigen Menschen begriffen wird – nicht versteht, der weiß natürlich auch nicht, wie sehr die Länder der Hochmoderne vom IQ-Niveau der Hochmoderne abhängig sind und sich nur auf einem gleichbleibenden intellektuellen Niveau in wiedererkennbarer Weise (ungeachtet aller übrigen Faktoren) erhalten können. Weder Brockschmidt noch irgendeiner aus der intellektuellen Davos-Spelunke versteht davon auch nur das geringste.

Zahlen aus Deutschland:

Rund 41 % der schulpflichtigen Kinder hatten 2022 Migrationshintergrund.

Rund 50 % der Kinder unter 10 Jahren hatten 2023 einen Migrationshintergrund

Etwa 43,1 % der Kinder unter fünf Jahren hatten 2023 einen Migrationshintergrund

Graphisch:

Exemplarisch zu Kanada:

Weiter mit den kläglichen Fehltritten im Buch.

Aussagenlogik – CRT als „unbekannte akademische Theorie“

Brockschmidt nennt die Critical Race Theorie (CRT) eine „unbekannte wissenschaftliche Theorie“:

„CRT wird in keiner Schule Amerikas gelehrt, sondern ist eine relativ unbekannte akademische Theorie.“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 114)

Später heißt es dann:

„Unterstützt wird diese moralische Panik von rechten Medien-Outlets wie Fox News: Dort wurde CRT allein im Zeitraum von April bis Juli 2021 ganze 1300 Mal erwähnt.“ (Ebd.: 344)

Imposant. Welche andere „unbekannte akademische Theorie“ kann so etwas von sich behaupten?

Sie wird nicht in Schulen gelehrt? Au contraire, Mademoiselle.

Beispiel 1:

“Our curriculum is deeply using critical race theory, especially in social studies, but you'll find it in English language arts and the other disciplines,” Detroit Public Schools Superintendent Nikolai Vitti said at a Nov. 9 board of education meeting.“ (https://edworkforce.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=407991)

Beispiel 2, der Hillsborough Township School District in New Jersey:

https://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2024/02/07/despite_denials_critical_race_theory_is_used_to_teach_your_children_1010258.html – Der Artikel gibt weitere Beispiele, z.B.

Beispiel 3: Vermont – Essex Westford School District

Kostenpunkt: 292 000 Dollar – viel Geld für etwas, das an den Schulen gar nicht gelehrt wird.

„Milwaukee Public Schools hired the Pacific Education Group to put district administration and principals through the consultants' Courageous Conversations program. The multi-year, $292,000 professional development not only had participants learn CRT as a “theoretical and requisite knowledge base,” but it also centered on “Using Critical Race Theory to Transform Leadership and The Organization.” (ebenfalls: https://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2024/02/07/despite_denials_critical_race_theory_is_used_to_teach_your_children_1010258.html)

https://www.realcleareducation.com/articles/2024/02/07/despite_denials_critical_race_theory_is_used_to_teach_your_children_1010258.html)

Beispiel 4: Das Ethnic-Studies-Modul in Kalifornien:

https://edsource.org/2021/california-becomes-first-state-to-require-ethnic-studies-in-high-school/662219 (vermutlich erst nach der Veröffentlichung des Buchs)

Noch Fragen?

Selbst wenn Brockschmidt zur Zeit der Abfassung des Buches Recht gehabt haben sollte, liegt dies nur daran, daß sie in den Genuß der „Gnade der hinreichend frühen Abfassung“ gekommen ist. Allerdings hätte sie auch dann die hier dokumentierten Entwicklungen sehr leicht antezipieren können sollen. Warum sie es nicht konnte? Sie und ihr Milieu glauben allen Ernstes, sie repräsentierten die „freie Welt“, während die anderen den neo-sowjetischen Charakter ihrer „Geistes“haltung ziemlich leicht erkennen können.

Sprachschändungen

„Framing“ ist kein deutsches Wort, der Sachverhalt existiert nicht erst seit fünf Jahren. Daß der Duden funktional darauf herabgesunken ist, alles aufzunehmen, was irgendein blödsinniger 15jähriger unter die Leute bringt, sollte zur Folge haben, daß im Falle der nötigen politischen Wende dem Duden sämtliche Kompetenzen in dem Bereich entzogen werden und eine neue Instanz seine Funktion übernimmt. Doch wie liest sich das bei Brockschmidt?

„Außerdem bietet dieses Framing ein effektives Narrativ, um die Beschränkung der Rechte von Frauen, der LGBTQIA*-Community und BPoC als «Pro-Familie» darzustellen.“ (Brockschmidt 2021: 224)

Hier haben wir zentrale Neusprechelemente beisammen. Ein Framing bietet kein Narrativ, ein Narrativ rahmt Dinge oder schneidet sie suggestiv zu, versieht sie mit einer Stoßrichtung, verleiht ihnen einen bestimmten Akzent etc. Ein „Framing” kann ein Merkmal (eine Eigenschaft, Qualität) eines Narrativs sein, nicht aber selber ein Narrativ. Aber es kommt natürlich noch besser:

„Jungfräulichkeit, ein ohnehin rein gesellschaftliches Konstrukt, steht innerhalb dieser Weltsicht nicht im Kontrast zu der Teilnahme an einer Dating-Show, bei der es auch regelmäßig um Sex geht.“ (Ebd.: 231 f.)

Noch nicht sexuell aktiv gewesen zu sein, ist kein real möglicher Sachverhalt in Brockschmidts absurder Unsinnswelt, sondern muß, weil ihr vermutlich jegliche Wertschätzung von Jungfräulichkeit zuwider ist, in einem Superkompensationsakt ohne realen Anlaß zum „rein gesellschaftlichen Konstrukt“ erklärt werden. Mir fallen einige hochelitäre IQ-Verlierer ein, die da vermutlich ernsthaft zustimmend nicken oder gar applaudieren würden.

„Die Rhetorik von den bösen ‚Staatsschulen‘ ist der Christlichen Rechten seit Jahrzehnten vertraut (siehe Rushdooney und Robert J. Billings).“ (Ebd.: 270)

Nein, die Rede von den Staatsschulen, die man in dieser oder jener Weise näher qualifizieren mag mittels eines Epithetons (ein rhetorisches Manöver ist übrigens auch keine „Rhetorik“). Dieser Ausdruck gibt wieder, daß sie Gegenstand sprachlicher Ausführungen waren, dabei handelt es sich nicht um eine „Rhetorik“.

„Eine Untersuchung der Huffington Post aus dem Jahr 2017 ergab, dass 14 Prozent von staatlich geförderten privaten Voucher-Schulen anti-LGBTQIA*-Klauseln in ihren Satzungen haben, die LGBTQIA*-Schüler und -Lehrer an ihren Schulen nicht erlauben.“ (Ebd.: 276)

Zeitungen haben früher, im Gegensatz zu heute, noch umfangreiche Recherchen durchgeführt, aber keine Untersuchungen; Untersuchungen werden von wissenschaftlichen Institutionen oder Ausschüssen durchgeführt.

Abschließend: Stimmt die Grundthese des Buches mit Blick auf die Wahlen von 2024? Plus: Einige Empfehlungen zur USA-Beobachtung

So schwach Brockschmidts Buch ist, was ein tieferes Verständnis der USA angeht, die Grundthese ist nicht einfach rundheraus zu verwerfen, da die Evangelikalen in der Tat zahlreich und politisch höchst aktiv sind. Daraus folgt aber nicht, daß sie die USA politisch dominieren, nicht einmal, daß sie die Republikanische Partei dominieren, obwohl sie sicher nicht ohne Einfluß in Republikanischen Kreisen sind. Wahlentscheidend dürfte 2024 vor allem die Reaktion auf die Politik des Milieus sein, dem Brockschmidt ideologisch angehört. Um nur wenige (aber wenigstens wenige) Andeutungen zu geben:

Ein gewichtiger Indikator dafür, daß die letzten Jahre zu einer massiven Ethnisierung des Politischen geführt haben, ist darin zu sehen, daß Trump zwar von den Evangelikalen im ganzen massiv unterstützt wird, aber nur von 14 % der afroamerikanischen Evangelikalen:

„The former president struggles most among African American evangelicals where just 14% plan to cast their ballot for him, and 76% back Harris.“

Umgekehrt:

„White likely voters with evangelical beliefs are the most likely to back Trump (77%).“ [sic!]

Diese innerkonfessionelle Gespaltenheit entlang ethnischer Differenzen wird auch fortan bei allen politisch maßgeblichen, richtungsweisenden Entscheidungen zu beachten sein, denn dies wird sich nicht mehr einfach eskamotieren oder über Nacht beheben lassen. Es ist die basale operative politische Kondition, die sich herausgebildet hat, und wer sie leugnet, bewegt sich in einem Traumreich, aus dem er womöglich erst herausgemessert wird (wie auch aus dem Leben). Daß Trump nun Südafrika mit seinen in Gesetzesinitiativen wie dem Broad-Based Black Empowerment Act (2003) und seinem Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (2017) versteckten anti-weißen Gesetzgebung und in öffentlichen Zelebrationen besungenen Ethnozidbestrebungen ins Visier nimmt, spricht ebenfalls dafür. Man müßte X schon in Europa sperren, um den Bruch dieses Dammes wesentlich hinauszuzögern.

Vielleicht sollte man in Deutschland, wenn man von den nun in den USA Dominanz erlangenden Strömungen mehr mitbekommen will, weder Brockschmidt noch den Evangelikalen allzu viel Beachtung schenken, sondern eher Intellektuellen aus dem Umfeld der Heritage Foundation und der NatCons, inhaltlich Essays wie Nathan Cofnas’ A Guide for the Hereditarian Revolution oder Suzanne Schneiders What the Right Wants, oder Büchern wie Charles Murrays The Bell Curve (mit Richard Herrnstein) und Coming Apart. The State of White America, 1960 – 2010, Joshua Mitchells American Awakening. Identity Politics and Other Afflictions of Our Time (gerade was den Zusammenhang zwischen Protestantismus und woker Schuldlogik angeht), Victor Davis Hansons The Dying Citizen. How Progressive Elites, Tribalism, and Globalization Are Destroying the Idea of America, Heather Mac Donalds The Diversity Delusion oder Thomas Sowells A Conflict of Visions.

Zitierte Literatur:
Annika Brockschmidt: Amerikas Gotteskrieger. Wie die Religiöse Rechte die Demokratie gefährdet. Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2021.

Volkmar Weiss: Über die geistigen Mistkäfer der Wissenschaft. Zum Struktur- und Ideenplagiat. Leipzig: Kindle Direct Publishing, 2021.

This text is predicated on the precarious assumption that AI will remain dependent on human intelligence for the foreseeable future, i.e., for at least the next 25 years, meaning it will not be capable of maintaining itself independently (let alone evolving). Self-maintenance in the strict sense would entail that AI was able to autonomously maintain and control the supply chains of its production and maintenance.

While AI remains far from production-technical autonomy due to the immense complexity of supply chains, both graduated autonomy—that is, the ability to self-repair, including through organizing the supply of necessary parts—and effective resistance against its own abolition appear possible within the next 15 years.

Some will consider this premise—conceptualizing AI development in 25 years as fundamentally (rather than merely marginally) dependent on human achievement—unnecessary and soon to be anachronistic. However, we must reckon with two fundamental possibilities—the autonomy and self-sustainability of AI—rather than wearing the prophet's mantle. I maintain an informal wager with a friend: What will prevail—AI or dysgenics? Will we find through AI a means to reverse dysgenics once more or bypass it by employing means of genetic enhancement, or will dysgenics progress too rapidly, leaving AI as a meaningless triumph, functionally irrelevant in a functional zoo? About two years ago, I placed my bet on dysgenics, though I now see it as an open race.

Above all, one must consider as a possible success scenario for AI that it does not prevent dysgenics but rather shapes it—that is, as Aravind Srinivas, CEO of Perplexity.ai, prophesies, runs our lives.

What does this mean? If AI runs our lives, it fundamentally means that it will lock people into itself, take over and micro-manage their daily lives, if necessarily in a paternalistic manner, make them dependent upon it, force companies to lock themselves into it as well if they wish to maintain relevance and market reach. What Adorno termed the "administered world" (verwaltete Welt) will become literally true at the micro-level; being subject to obsessive helicopter parenting in comparison will look living the life of Robinson Crusoe. We would no longer be genuine humans then, but we would cling to a teleological self-deception that could not be simultaneously more comical and tragic: We would permit AI to manage our lives in the name of efficiency, regarding it as an optimizing addition to our existence, while conceptualizing ourselves as the telos of a process whose own necessarily empty telos renders almost everyone superfluous.

The Disturbing Natural Intelligence Aspect

Should Western societies experience full-scale dysgenic regression—where IQs drop to an average of 90, with Germany advancing at an almost incomprehensible speed toward such a cognitively catastrophic state (as explored by Rindermann 2018 & 2024)—one might perversely interpret this as a form of grotesque relief, an AI takeover would constitute a grotesque relief. In the unlikely case of demographic recovery (see the fertility patterns among the best-educated on page 237), this would amount to an administered zoologization of humanity.

But where do we stand presently, and why does natural intelligence constitute a barrier not only to the potential advancement of artificial intelligence in the coming 10-15 years but, maybe even more significantly, to its utilization? Is AI not already something that benefits merely 5% of society and can be employed responsibly and—pun intended—intelligently by only a minute minority?

Let us examine some disturbing data, in particular the general OECD statistics from PISA, where we observe, in the presentation of mean values and development across 81 countries, a uniformly horrifying picture.

In mathematics, the situation appears thus:

Reading, the most fundamental of all cultural techniques, is on the path to becoming an esoteric capability of ominous outsiders.

Furthermore, the great prospects in the natural sciences have been continuously diminishing since 2014 (not that surprising the Zuckerberg is intending to delegate a huge bulk of Meta’s programming activity to AI, right? And 25% of Google’s code is now being AI-generated. Microsoft is also ambitious in this regard).

Similarly, particularly with regard to the United States, an "eternal pattern" emerges that is either surrounded by an awkward silence or by the Corybantic din of denial's roar. If this pattern is not immediately addressed and corresponding political measures are not implemented to counteract its unyielding and alarming constancy, the West will soon face collapse regarding both education and societal development.

We observe a nation that, should the elimination of Affirmative Action and establishment of a serious meritocracy be earnestly pursued, is heading toward a condition where—if one deals honestly with the data, actual results, and their inherent prerequisites—two distinct educational systems would be necessary. As long as demographic Americanization, a project of hopefully departing globalists, is not reversed in Europe, this applies to Europe as well. Shouting "racist!" changes nothing, and one ardently hopes that the kindergarten of moralization will now close throughout the former West in the course of its re-Westernization.

Computer skills – a rarety

But what about the specifics? Let us examine computer skills. Jacob Nielsen, in his essay The Distribution of Users' Computer Skills: Worse Than You Think discusses four different levels of computer proficiency. In total, 215,942 people were tested, with at least 5,000 participants in most countries, across 33 countries. The sample size suggests that the results are reliable, although methodological errors can diminish their reliability. The results appear as follows (average numbers are provided):

26% are incapable of using computers at all and have never attempted any of the tasks by which competency measurement was conducted. 14% of the adult population in the USA is at "Below Level 1". What must one be capable of at Level 1? "An example of task at this level is 'Delete this email message' in an email app." 29% of all users are at Level 1. We are already at 69% of the total pool. Level 2 includes tasks such as: "An example of level-2 task is 'You want to find a sustainability-related document that was sent to you by John Smith in October last year.'" Here, another 26% is added to Below-Level 1 and Level 1, so we are already at 95%.

Only 5% remain who can fulfill the following requirement profile:

"At this level, tasks typically require the use of both generic and more specific technology applications. Some navigation across pages and applications is required to solve the problem. The use of tools (e.g. a sort function) is required to make progress towards the solution. The task may involve multiple steps and operators. The goal of the problem may have to be defined by the respondent, and the criteria to be met may or may not be explicit. There are typically high monitoring demands. Unexpected outcomes and impasses are likely to occur. The task may require evaluating the relevance and reliability of information in order to discard distractors. Integration and inferential reasoning may be needed to a large extent."

In light of the description, the task is rather simple: "You want to know what percentage of the emails sent by John Smith last month were about sustainability."

This situation assessment is an average picture based on data from 33 countries, and 5 percent is a magic number, as 125 is the IQ benchmark for the top 5 percent (Western Europeans and White Americans). In a study on reading proficiency among white Americans, extensively presented by Linda Gottfredson in her remarkable essay Why g Matters: The Complexity of Everyday Life, merely 4% achieved the highest of five levels. This finding illustrates the profound implications of cognitive ability distribution in everyday tasks, even among demographically homogeneous populations. The supposedly advanced countries only marginally improve this picture, as Nielsen points out:

"In the United States, only 5% of the population has these computer skills. In Australia and the UK 6% are at this level; in Canada and across Northern Europe the number increases to 7%; Singapore and Japan are even better with a level-3 percentage of 8%."

When one considers that the quality of usage of the "old Google" was already considerably stratified along the intellectual capabilities of users, one must ask what implications this holds for AI, which can hardly be used at an advanced level (i.e., as a work and research tool) by even 5% of people. AI is a tool for a tiny minority, as only a tiny minority possesses the cognitive resources and correspondingly sophisticated interest when it comes to exploring AI at all.

For those who are depressed now, I have an even more substantial addendum.

Jeff Atwood, a programmer with extensive professional experience, including in hiring, who knows other experienced programmers with similar experiences, summarically stated the following in his text Why Can't Programmers.. Program?:

"But I am disturbed and appalled that any so-called programmer would apply for a job without being able to write the simplest of programs. That's a slap in the face to anyone who writes software for a living."

Dan Kegel, whom Atwood quotes in his essay, even says:

"A surprisingly large fraction of applicants, even those with masters' degrees and PhDs in computer science, fail during interviews when asked to carry out basic programming tasks." 

And now, let us not forget that, through whatever madness, the Bachelor's degree is considered a real academic degree (before the Bologna Reform, today's Bachelor's was considered merely an "intermediate examination" and only the Master's was considered a university degree). That the Bachelor's is what in martial arts is termed a make-believe belt is shown by Longbing Cao using the specific example of Data Science:

"As some surveys show, some 70% of qualified data scientists hold at least a Master's degree in data science related disciplines." (Longbing Cao: Data Science Thinking. The Next Scientific, Technological and Economic Revolution. Cham: Springer, 2018, p. 343)

Serious expertise requires both longer-term concentrated and broader work in a field. In a military analogy: Hitler was warned against invading the Soviet Union because the Soviets possessed the decisive advantage of "defense in depth" (Tiefenrüstung) on their own territory, which could neither be improvised at a distance nor adequately countered. (General Georg Thomas was right.) And intellectual defense in depth results from the combination of talent and persistent effort, the latter understood as the combination of: time (in this, Malcolm Gladwell is right) and grinding continuity in working your way through continuously more complicated problems. – An academic analogy: It is no different in philosophy: People who know only Analytic Philosophy or only certain disciplines in philosophy (they exist in abundance) can now easily obtain professorships, but they are a plague of ignorance.

Yet not only do we have a competency and talent problem, we also have a severe problem regarding our demands on ourselves: Degrees do not generate competencies. When standards are loosened (in effect, loosening them means abandoning them), one has lots of IT professionals plus an IT skilled worker shortage. Degrees have no weight of their own; the institutions that award them stand for what the certificate states. If the institutions fail to adhere to rigorous standards, the certificates aren't worth more than used toilet paper.

AI could prove an invaluable tool if and as long as it remains the tool, rather than us becoming its pets. The non-pets will, however—we must face this bitter truth—be a small minority who must prove themselves humanly capable of not wielding AI as a weapon against the rest, even if merely as an essentially harmless domestication weapon. Without demographic restoration, current AI development will be largely worthless, but here on a geopolitical as well as on a national level: Only few will be able to derive adequate benefit from it, and we should damn well stop lying to ourselves about it like foolish children who define lofty ideals but are incapable of grasping and acknowledging elementary realities.

But the next generation will likely not be prepared for accomodating to what their predecessors have inherited to them. To conclude with a list of examples and a graphic that must give us hope that AI will save the young AI saves the young, instead of them decisively developing AI further:

This graphic is taken from the article Poor student achievement and near-zero accountability: An indictment of Illinois’ public education system – Wirepoints Special Report by Ted Dabrowski and John Klingner, where it is also summarily stated (my emphasis): :

"For sure, plenty of Illinois’ 860 school districts achieved better student outcomes in 2019. But a cursory glance at state report card data shows higher performers were the minority. Just 89 districts had at least 60 percent of students who could read at grade level. In 168 districts, by comparison, less than 25 percent of students could read at grade level. Overall, less than 40 percent of all students in Illinois were proficient in either reading or math."

Have in mind also:

– „In 26 school districts, no low-income third-grade students were proficient in reading.“ (https://www.illinoispolicy.org/low-3rd-grade-literacy-is-warning-for-future-learning-earning-potential/)

– "Not a single fifth grader at Martin Luther King Jr. School, in the shadow of the Fruit Belt neighborhood, tested at a proficient reading level in 2022.“ (https://www.investigativepost.org/2023/02/22/buffalos-abysmal-reading-scores/)

– „Last year, almost 60% of California’s third-graders, the students most deeply impacted by distance learning and other Covid disruptions, could not read at grade level.“ (https://edsource.org/2023/amid-californias-mounting-literacy-crisis-state-names-new-literacy-directors/687430)

– "According to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), a sector of the U.S. Department of Education, 84 percent of Black students lack proficiency in mathematics and 85 percent of Black students lack proficiency in reading skills." (https://thehill.com/opinion/education/579750-many-of-americas-black-youths-cannot-read-or-do-math-and-that-imperils-us/)

– Oregon has already capitulated: „Oregon high school students won’t have to prove basic mastery of reading, writing or math to graduate from high school until at least 2029, the state Board of Education decided unanimously on Thursday, extending the pause on the controversial graduation requirement that began in 2020.“

If you want, you can easily find dozens more such examples, which you have to express in numbers, only to remain incredulous about the reality they reveal. Let's hope that AI gives us a soft landing, or at least a controlled decline we can come back from (if we start preparing for it now) The problem is at least as much societal in nature (anti-intellectualism and frivolous hedonistic complacency, ubiquitous disregard for cognitive ambition in partner „selection“, if you even want to call it „selection“ with a straight face) as it is a pressing political problem (politically, all of this would have to be rigorously countered if zoologization is to be stopped).

References:
Rindermann, Heiner. Cognitive Capitalism: Human Capital and the Wellbeing of Nations. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018.

Recently, Paul Gottfried, to date the only American academic familiar with the work of Panagiotis Kondylis, claimed in an interview that Kondylis was a Marxist. He also claimed that Kondylis was a power theorist who underestimated the role of ideologies in shaping social and political reality.

These two claims seem to contradict each other on the face of it, if you have read Marx. Power, in the Marxist view, is mediated by ideologies, and those who want to assert their claims to power have to gather people behind it, which in the most efficient way is done by developing a full-fledged and comprehensive ideology. If Kondylis really was a Marxist in Gottfried's view, he should have taken this relationship into account properly and should have thought a lot more in the vein of theory style thinking. But Kondylis was not a Marxist, and he was not one for many weighty reasons. Before I explain why he wasn't one, I'll explain why he can easily be mistaken for one. In Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert (The Political in the 20th Century), Kondylis gives us a vividly positive and emphatic portrait of Marx, which I would like to quote in full:

„In relation to the great scientist that Marx was, it would still be unjust and a significant loss for the social sciences if one did not add that certain fundamental ideas of his possess lasting value and are inherently immune to ideological use; indeed, they can serve as a key to uncover the tricks of ideological thinking. I believe that never before have certain fundamental positions of Marx's historical perspective been as true and relevant as in the currently emerging phase of planetary history, particularly the views that the level and character of the relationship between the natural being of humans and the rest of nature significantly influence the nature of social forms. that the human relationships that crystallize in these forms of socialization are captured and solidified or modified by the actors through ideologies, thus reflecting a "false consciousness" that meets normative and at the same time polemical needs; that the discrepancy between false consciousness and real events does not bring historical development to a standstill, but rather drives it forward, and that the heterogeneity of purposes represents the natural mechanism for the unfolding of processes of "longue durée." Interpreted undogmatically, these theses hold true regardless of sociological preferences regarding the priority of this or that material and ideal factor, and they can be fruitfully linked with methodological, anthropological, and social theoretical approaches that differ more or less from the corresponding Marxist ones. This proves that Marx's scientific work, even if one considers it merely an inventory of fundamental questions, is an integral part of modern social science. No modern thinker has presented as deeply and vividly as Marx that history, economics, politics, philosophy, and anthropology are fundamentally one single thing and one single discipline – regardless of the signs under which he himself sought to achieve this great unification. When the mass of self-sufficient "specialists" who populate the mass-democratic scene of knowledge can no longer keep up with this achievement and either mock it or can only imitate it through anemic constructs pieced together from second or third hand, this great thinker is certainly not to blame for it.“ (my emphasis; Kondylis 2001: 34-35)

This passage shows that the concept of ideology is explicitly employed here and that is by no means dissolved into mere relations of power. However, as indicated by the reference to the "natural being of humans," Kondylis anchors ideologies in life itself—not as a conceptual fetish, but as an attempt of humans to comprehend their existence and their place in the political world. In this context, Marx becomes crucial, as he articulates this ontological approach, recognizing life as a vertical category that connects the vital sphere with the ideological sphere. He does not regard ideology merely as an immanent phenomenon but rather as a manifestation and reflection of natural existence within history. Thus, Kondylis integrates nature and history in a manner that transcends the notion of ideologies being mere expressions or instruments of power. Consequently, Marx is lauded as an integrative source of ideas, transcending the boundaries of various disciplines by theoretically consolidating their foundational assumptions. This is particularly important for Kondylis because one can adopt this fundamental approach without needing to wholly embrace or endorse Marx's worldview in its entirety.

This can also be illuminated through a philosophical-historical analogy: just as it is said of Kant that he established the transcendental mode of thought, one could describe Kondylis' tribute to Marx as an acknowledgment of his founding of the sociological mode of thought or the transposition of the principle of transcendental thinking into the sociological realm. If one understands Kondylis' praise for Marx's methodological foundational contributions in this manner—an interpretation I find persuasive—then nearly every Marxist embodies this mode of thought, as it has become second nature to us all. Only extreme reductionists stand somewhat apart from it, perhaps exemplified by Dawkins with the concept of the selfish gene, particularly if one were to articulate this in an exaggerated form (as Dawkins has done). To draw another analogy: when Eysenck estimates the interplay between nature and nurture as 80% genetic and 20% environmental (see Eysenck 1973: 291), this does not constitute a break with the sociological mode of thought; such a rupture might only begin at a ratio of 95 to 5. What Eysenck produces, in my opinion, is a weighting of genetics within a framework of explanation that does not negate the sociological mode of thought but rather—significantly—narrows it.

I shall now outline, through a series of points, the extent to which Kondylis fundamentally and significantly diverges from Marx—so much so that one must caricature him to label him a Marxist. What I cannot discuss here, due to space constraints, is the notoriously contentious relationship between historical and dialectical materialism, a topic that Kondylis does not examine in depth anywhere,, not even in his book Marx und die griechische Antike. Thus, his portrayal of Marx is not that of a specific Marx who has long since devolved into a fatal autonomy of Marxist philology. Why is this important? Henri Lefebvre, whose book Dialectical Materialism I will analyze in greater detail to distinguish Kondylis' approach from Marx's, presents a decidedly preferential interpretation of dialectical materialism. I wish to mention only a philological remark by Raymond Aron to avoid completely bypassing the topic and to indicate the complexity of the discussion while providing interested readers with useful reading suggestions.

Lefebvre identifies the birth of historical materialism in Die Deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology); for him, it is a theory that Marx developed from 1844 onwards, yet it must remain incomplete without dialectical materialism: „At this stage, Marx’s economic theory had not yet been fully worked out, let alone systematized.“ (Lefebvre 2009: 70) This comprehensive systematization is achieved only by dialectical materialism, whose scope extends far beyond the economic orientation of historical materialism: „[D]ialetical materialism looks on ideas, institutions and cultures—on consciousness—as a frivolous and unimportant superstructure above an economic substance which alone is solid.“ (Ibid.: 73) In terms of its claims, the achievement is even more impressive:„[I]t determines the practical relations inherent in every organized human existence.“ (Ibid.) In short, he provides us with a total theory, and because he offers us a total theory, he achieves theoretical bindingness for every social scientific theory: „[E]every historical or sociological theory which sets out to be a science must establish the reality of its object.“ (Ibid.: 91)

In stark contrast to Aron, who philologically locates historical materialism differently within Marx's corpus and considers both variants of materialism as not strictly bound to one another: "Neither the historical materialism, as presented in the introduction to the 'Critique of Political Economy,' nor the critical analysis of 'Capital' necessitate dialectical materialism" (Aron 1970: 127) which Aron also regards as a late construction arising from Engels' Anti-Dühring (see ibid.). Aron agrees with Lefebvre regarding the theoretical claim to totality of dialectical materialism but appears to be more familiar with the economic writings than Lefebvre, which is why he does not underestimate the autonomy of the approach developed therein and provides an evaluation that is diametrically opposed to that of Lefebvre:

"The theory of the capitalist mode of production based on historical materialism forms the core of Marxism, both that of Marx himself and that of his successors, whether revolutionaries or revisionists. Marxism claims scientific dignity only as a theory of capitalism." (Ibid.: 169—170)

Now let's get to Lefebvre and the core of dialectical materialism as he sees it.

Three tenets of dialectical materialism according to Lefebvre

I will gather some fundamental theses and ideas of Lefebvre, as his propositions crystallize the central tenets of Marxian thought with remarkable clarity. The points I will address concern:

1. the concept of objectivity

2. the scientific method

3. the pursuit of a practical solution, wherein I distinguish two internally interconnected motives:
   a) Marx's eschatology and and his reconciliation motive

   b) the goal of emancipation as manifested in the concept of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Concept of Objectivity

The notion of objectivity within Marxism departs significantly from its common meaning, deriving from Marx's appropriation of Hegelian philosophy. Of course, this line of influence cannot be traced here adequately without writing an essay in itself on this; but hints to give the reader a clear orientation can be given.

Lefebvre says: "The objectivity of the commodity, of the market and of money is both an appearance and a reality." (Lefebvre 2009: 80) It is both, because as an appearance it has a lower ontological status, as it is not purposefully connected to the human as the τέλος (telos) of nature. It represents, as Lefebvre rightfully and in accordance with Marx's writings says, "the human within the inhuman" (ibid.: 135); as an appearance it falls into the realm of "statistical results of elementary phenomena" (ibid.), or of mere or brute facts. This type of objectivity constitutes in its primitive form of lawfulness, the material substrate of an "economic and historical determinism – a brutal objectivity" (ibid.: 84). This is contrasted with a double teleology: the inherently teleological concept of an in itself teleological objectivity: "But this objectivity is not self-sufficient, it is not the highest objectivity, that of man's vital activity, consciously producing the human." (Ibid.) To posit the human as teleological objectivity in contrast to a merely factual objectivity, which therefore represents a mere appearance and thus represents a false consciousness or misguided fetishism - also helps to elucidate why Marxism is simply seductive as humanism. Through Hegel, it philosophically introduces what is known from everyday understanding as the difference between merely chronometric time and quality time, between mere, alienated consumption and a humanly meaningful relationship.

When I speak of a double teleology, it is important that the theory is teleologically determined to the same degree as it determines its objects teleologically. Less critical of his own methodology, Lefebvre terms this teleological overdetermination the methodical construction of the object: „Thus understood, the dialectical method therefore constructs the historical and sociological object, while locating and determining its specific objectivity“ (ibid.: 91) – „specific objectivity“ here to be read as: specific objectivity as a humanly meaningful objectivity inherently relating to inherently human needs and purposes. The dialectical method is dialectical insofar as it takes up a primitive, factual objectivity in the light of a humane objectivity that theory has to develop further. In this sense, the teleology of dialectics is maieutical; whose destiny it is and purpose to transcend is alienation: „The individual is alienated, but as part of its development. Alienation is the objectification, at once real and illusory, of an activity which itself exists objectively. It is a moment in the development of this activtiy, in the increasing power and consciousness of man.“ (Ibid.: 88) „Once real and illusory“ means: real in the sense of factually real, while illusory in the sense of not only not achieving, but also hindering teleological self-realization. „Exists objectively“ here means also existing in the trivial sense, while the realization of the τέλος (telos) of this objectivity lies in achieving the higher objectivity of Marxian teleological man. I’ll say more on this below.

Here, Kondylis deliberately adopts a much more modest methodological approach, not due to a lack of means. The objective description of concrete historical situation that he aims for according to the introductory remarks to Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg (Planetary Politics after the Cold War) is to be understood in terms of correspondence theory: The description of a situation is objective when it adequately represents the situation. Methodologically, descriptive decisionism stipulates the following: Objectivity is only attainable where the situation itself is described without relying on normative presuppositions, prejudices, or premises that overlay and distort the perception of the situation. The matter-of-fact style in which Kondylis states facts often creates the appearance of self-sufficiency and naivety because it does not co-thematize the methodological mindset that takes shape in it. Therefore in Kondylis there is no "economic and historical determinism," but only an "economic and historical determinedness" that must be meticulously demonstrated in each case.

The Scientific Method

Although Marx spoke of turning Hegel from his head on his feet, his scientific method turns what we understand by it today from its feet to its head. However, the dialectical method underwent significant transformations in Marx's work, especially through Engels' additions after Marx's death. While a strict historical materialism is in principle capable of being scientific, the dialectical method is an extension of the method into the philosophical realm, whereby the philosophical does not merely add to the scientific but is placed at the center of the approach.

The key statement here is likely: "The materialist dialectic is an analysis of the movement of this content, and a reconstruction of the total movement." (Ibid.: 90) The total movement as the decisive Hegelian motif that remained determinant in Marx is the teleological vanishing point, whose moment of truth consists in the fact that materialist dialectics knows no isolated facts but fundamentally thinks in terms of connections - albeit in teleologically preformed connections. What constitutes a fact and what it means depends on the total movement, which results in a historical overdetermination of what was in Hegel a comparatively formal method: „The movement of this content involves a certain dialectic: the conflict between classes, between property and deprivation, and the transcending of this conflict." (Ibid.: 69)

What Kondylis explicitly aims for in Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg (Planetary Politics after the Cold War), namely to provide a description of the world political post-Cold War situation, is methodologically only possible here if the described situation is thought of as a moment of movement according to laws of motion that derive from theory rather than from situation analysis. This type of overdetermination of an analysis is precisely what Kondylis deems impermissible, and descriptive decisionism not only does not strive for it, it seeks to circumvent it because it views it as a normatively and teleologically prefigured trap. Lefebvre must be corrected where he says : "Dialectical materialism is not an economicism. It analyses relations and then reintegrates them into the total movement." (Ibid.: 73) The analysis cannot yield results that cannot be integrated into the total movement, because dialectics effectively bends and shapes the results to conform to its theoretical premises. This is not a problem for Lefebvre because: "The dialectic, far from being an inner movement of the mind, is real, it precedes the mind, in Being." (Ibid.: 97) In Kondylis’ works, Being is analyzed with regard to its underlying regularities; the result is called social ontology, not dialectical materialism. An inner movement of the mind is neither the starting point nor the endpoint; rather, the imperatives flow from reality to observation. Even if one were to concede to Marxism that its claimed regularities were derived from an analysis of reality, there still remains a significant difference in claim: While Marxism moves from situation to a totalizing grand theory, Kondylis moves from situations to an analysis of constellations from which anthropological and social-ontological foundations can be derived. Due to the primacy of reality over theory, these foundations do not enable a philosophy of history but only future validation on a case-by-case basis.

Secular Eschatology and Reconciliation (Versöhnung)

Anyone who truly wants to be a Marxist must pursue to its conclusion and believe in the proletariat or a functionally equivalent placeholder for redemption from capitalism and humanity's reconciliation with itself. In other words: Anyone who truly wants to be a Marxist must follow the dual path of eschatology of reconciliation and emancipation including the dictatorship of the proletariat; they must therefore also postulate that there exists a social class capable of and charged with the task of redemption. In Lefebvre, the ideal anthropology of the "total man" forms the τέλος (telos) of the process that should lead to reconciliation:

"The total man is the living subject-object, who is first of all torn asunder, dissociated and chained to necessity and abstraction. Through this tearing apart, he moves towards freedom; he becomes Nature, but free. He becomes a totality, like Nature, but by bringing it under control. The total man is 'de-alienated' man." (Ibid.: 150) Here, Lefebvre aligns closely with Marx's exposition in Die Heilige Familie (The Holy Family); thus dialectical materialism does not go beyond Marx but rather remains true to Marx's intention: "The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-alienation." (Marx 1956: 51) These are not sentences arbitrarily taken out of context, but ones of fundamental significance that must determine the problem horizon of thinking if it claims to be Marxist in the genuine sense. However, Kondylis could hardly be further removed from this, both in fundamental questions and in basic theoretical premises, as well as in concrete analyses, where such questions and needs are not subsequently projected.

Conclusion

His profound sympathy for Marx's way of thinking mentioned above does not make Kondylis a Marxist. For Kondylis, Marx is to social theory what Kant was to modern philosophy as an epistemologist. Therefore, even more of Marx's thought can retain its value for Kondylis, as he does not impose on himself the duty to preserve Marxism as a whole. This demonstrates not Kondylis' Marxism, but rather a fundamental social-theoretical orientation and – quite non-Marxist – a freedom of spirit and independence in thinking, because theoretical appropriations do not lead to intellectual submission or loss of self.

In brief, Kondylis' relationship to Marx manifests itself in a systematic adaptation of the transcendental mode of thought (transzendentale Denkungsart), which Marx extended to the social sphere. The fundamental orientation expressed therein opens up a broad theoretical space and paves the way for a variety of different theoretical approaches, without forcing thought into specific tracks or necessitating or producing concrete determinations.

References:

Aron, Raymond. 1970. Die heiligen Familien des Marxismus. Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag. (Translated from the German edition in this essay.)

Eysenck, Hans-Jürgen. 1973. The Measurement of Intelligence. Lancaster, England: Medical and Technical Publishing Co. Ltd.

Kondylis, Panajotis. 2001. Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert. Heidelberg: Manutius Verlag.

Lefebvre, Henri. 2009. Dialectical Materialism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Marx, Karl. 1956. The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique. (Die Heilige Familie) Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.

Kondylis' approach is simultaneously an anthropological and a social-ontological approach. From anthropology and social ontology, we arrive at the foundations and an outline of Kondylis' theory of power. The fundamental question that ties Kondylis’ theory of power, his intellectual history approach and his geopolitical reflections together is: Who, when, in what polemical constellation, took what position against whom, for what reasons and with which arguments, and in what situation of power struggle? This question essentially defines what not only Kondylis (but also his doctoral advisor Dieter Henrich) calls the polemical constellation (see Kondylis 1981: 531)

I will take the theoretical foundations formulated by Kondylis in Power and Decision as my starting point, but before I get into the book a brief remark on a translational issue. The central term ‘Weltbild’ in Kondylis' work cannot be accurately translated as ‘worldview.’ The literal translation 'world picture' may sound strange, but it better preserves the original meaning: ‘Bild’ in German refers to the object in its appearance, while the English term ‘view’ shifts the emphasis to the subject's act of seeing. I thought about simply sticking to the German Weltbild here, but then I would feel inclined to also stick to the German declension of the word which would probably totally mess up everyone's brain. Therefore, I'll go with world picture, although it sounds a little odd.

Power and Decision aims to provide an answer to how world pictures arise and what role the question of values plays in this process, i.e., also: how world pictures are created for whom in which world in opposition to other world pictures and their respective holders. This also includes the question of ‘authorship’: Who is creating a certain world picture? Kondylis does not speak of the human being but of the subject of decision and of the constitution of a world picture. Here, 'subject' is not be equated with ‘individual;’ subjects can also be collectives and groups. In this, Kondylis rejects methodological individualism; he also does not inquire into individual psychology or the psychic processes of an individual subject:1

The beginnings of this path remain hermeneutically inaccessible, as they disappear into the unexploitable, shimmering biopsychological structure of the subject, into the labyrinth of its existential core, where the stirrings of organic matter become what we customarily refer to as spirit and thought.

From this point, there is no path to an anthropology in the contemporary sense, if one understands this to mean a theory of human nature that extensively links to biology. While these explanations are fundamentally naturalistic, they are presented in such an abstract manner that it becomes difficult to argue for or against them. So, what constitutes the essence of anthropology in Kondylis' work? As the title of the book suggests, the concept of decision serves as the central theme.

Through decisions, a subject forms itself. In the decision, the subject decides for and against something. It decides explicitly for something and, to some extent, necessarily implicitly for what is bound to it, and it also decides against other things in affirmative decisions. The identification with a group does not necessarily directly mark the rejection of a specific other, but it implies at least a distancing from the same, which prepares for an explicit rejection where it becomes necessary. In the elementary decisions, where it is not about luxurious options but about identificatory pros and cons, the subject forms itself. To provide three examples: Kondylis speaks of 'friendly or hostile encounters with objects' and of the 'concentration on what is important for self-preservation, on the friendly and the hostile'; however, he also speaks of 'concrete friends and enemies,' where he means friend and enemy in their individual embodiment. One could now say: The explicit emphasis on the fact that these are concrete instances demonstrates precisely the level of abstraction at which these concepts are grasped. Kondylis employs the friend/enemy distinction at a fundamental level of decision-making, referring to decision as the nucleus of the internal logic underlying the constitution the world picture through practical distinctions, while simultaneously using it in a social-ontological sense, not in a political sense like Carl Schmitt. For Kondylis, friend/enemy is closer to affirmation/negation than to ally/enemy; ally/enemy would be closest to 'concrete friends or enemies,' with only the specific naming needed for individual differentiation absent.

The decision-making process as a whole cannot be merely passive, since the subject must not only make decisions but also affirm them. In Kondylis' words:2

A subject that owes its world, its identity, and its concrete perspective to the decision must, as it were, merge with it. Identity, in this sense, means identification with that decision-making act or process that is reflected in the creation of a world picture.

The important aspect of this quote lies in Kondylis' formulation of the connection between identification and identity: precisely because decisions are also identifications (and, on the reverse side, negations), an identity is formed through them; the identity establishes itself, as it were, through the decisions that basically build up a history, in which something structurally fundamental develops: namely a hierarchy.3

Decision, as separation, means judgment(s) and, since it both distinguishes the relevant from the irrelevant and establishes the hierarchy and structure of the relevant, it does so in a way that is fundamental.

If decisions have structured the formative process to the extent that hierarchies acquire an independent existence, then not only does a subject in the substantial sense come into being, but a world picture also emerges. The subject begins to shape itself even before it articulates an explicit world picture, laying the groundwork for such world pictures through the identifications and negations inherent in its decisions. The result of these accumulating identifications is identity—a term that Kondylis employs systematically in Power and Decision. This brings us to an important passage that encapsulates the aforementioned ideas. To quote Kondylis:4

It [the decision] itself, however, represents nothing other than the expression of the concrete identity of that subject, from which it is evident that this identity has formed in tandem with the respective world picture. World picture and identity, identity and decision must be intimately connected, as identity can be defined as the precise positioning of the subject within the world that has arisen from the decision, i.e., as the exhaustive determination of its relationships to the components or hierarchical stages of the respective world picture.

This passage best summarizes the previous concepts, although it might initially be interpreted in a psychological sense. It is therefore important to explain why it must not be understood in this way. Instead, we must shift our focus to the social-ontological aspect, which does not need to be introduced into these considerations in an artificial manner, as both are simultaneously structured anthropologically and social-ontologically. The concept of decision is once again central here.

Through decisions, crucial to conceive not only as acts but also as a medium, a subject structures the world; it does not design it for itself in a constructivist sense; rather, it structures it – both cognitively for itself and objectively through the formation of the social cosmos and the scientific-technical world. The decision is not merely a mental construct, but it is an act in the world, even if it may initially exist only as an intellectual design. A decision in the mind that never becomes effective in any way in the world is a mere fantasy and ultimately indistinguishable from a dream. Here, the primacy of ontology over epistemology is obvious, as the logic of decision already shapes the genesis of the subject before it is capable of engaging in reflective thought. And even if and to the extent that the subject is capable of such reflection, it still operates self-formingly within the channels of this decision logic, which is then also epistemologically binding for it. If ontology as such is analytically elaborated through what constitutes a thing as such, then the primacy of ontology–more specifically, social ontology–holds true in this context.

To better illustrate the rather formal character of Kondylis' work, I would like to briefly discuss Luhmann, since the decision logic in Kondylis bears a strong resemblance to Luhmann's observation logic, which is in turn informed by Spencer Brown's Laws of Form. At the heart of Luhmann’s theory is the concept of the 'unity of distinction between distinction and designation' (Einheit der Unterscheidung von Unterscheidung und Bezeichnung)5. What does this mean? No identification of something as something is possible without designation, and the designation itself constitutes a marked space as well as, as its constitutive, but undesignated backside, an unmarked space. Luhmann specifies the process of designation as the establishment of a ‘two-sided form of designation’ that must be present simultaneously; this structure is not present for the observer’s consciousness because the observer does not need to observe the act of observing during the observation process. However, it is present in the process of observation as an element of that process and must be in place for observation to be factually possible. The observation itself inherently contains a distinction within the unity of the observation process, which can only process both as a difference. Applying this to Kondylis' decision logic: every decision implies a negative decision, or negative backside, and where it is supposed to imply none explicitly, the implicit negative decision necessarily still has a shaping effect on the world picture and future decision-making options. This unity is inseparable in the decision process; thus, every revision of a decision is therefore a decision in relation to previous decisions rather than an undoing of a decision. Where decisions conflict, hierarchizations must guide and structure further decision-making. The unmarked space in Luhmann and the passive aspect of decisions are not mere voids; rather, they present a necessary unitary moment of the process.

I have also indicated why the term 'social ontology' specifies this approach most accurately. The hierarchization of decisions does not lead to the emergence of isolated world pictures of individuals in a solipsistic sense, but rather to individual world pictures within a society determined by a totality of world pictures, both individual ones as well as collective ones. Kondylis refers to the mediation between the individual and the overall societal hierarchization of decisions as 'disciplinization'. At its core, disciplinization functions as an internalization imperative: the subject is tasked with internalizing and assimilating a traditional world picture as well as assimilating itself to the latter; here, one could also replace or rephrase 'world picture' with mandatory inventory of guiding concepts and incentives, because that is what the transmission of knowledge and societal wisdom is about. Disciplinization must claim strict binding force because it must simultaneously render itself invisible. The decisions that are objectified—both individually and collectively—during the processes of disciplinization and internalization should no longer be perceived as decisions but rather as unquestionable facts. Society forms and maintains itself, i.e., it produces and secures its intellectual foundations through disciplinization. Kondylis gives this process of rendering disciplinization invisible through disciplinization a name: the elevation to the ideal.6

The elevation of all factors related to self-preservation into the ideal thus permits their mediation with the necessity of disciplinization in the context of organized society.

I would like to highlight a particular aspect here: Kondylis prioritizes social ontology over individuation. This is particularly evident in his definition of culture:7

Culture develops and is refined to the extent that disciplinization (both external and internal) is perceived as an indispensable prerequisite for collective and, generally, individual self-preservation; all cultural accomplishments, including the so-called intellectual ones, are direct and indirect products of this disciplinization.

To illustrate this: Many might be inclined to define the flourishing of culture through the innovations achieved by individual geniuses. However, while every genius's work is ambivalent because it also generates disruption, Kondylis here is primarily concerned with the supply-and-distribution aspect. Geniuses emerge only when this system is intact to such an extent that a sufficient number of individuals accept disciplinization in the sense that they absorb enough cultural achievements to become geniuses in the first place. The reproduction of cultural foundations, i.e., cultivation, takes precedence what is essentially a byproduct of these foundations and would be impossible without them.

Regarding the intellectual products of disciplinization, the concept of spirit, or Geist in German, serves as an effective transition point from the ideas presented in Power and Decision to an intellectual-historical perspective, particularly in relation to a specific quote from that work. Kondylis states at one point that8

the spirit [that is Geist, because this word is basically untranslatable], even in the narrower sense of intellectual-theoretical activity, is polemically in nature and practical disposition, i.e., conditioned no less than all other phenomena of life by the central friend-enemy relationship.

Here, we can now directly incorporate the fundamental questions that I posed at the beginning and briefly repeat: Who, when, in what polemical constellation, took what position against whom, for what reasons and with which arguments, and in what situation of power struggle?

Intellectual History

To preface this paragraph, once again, with Kondylis' basic question:

Who, when, in what polemical constellation, took what position against whom, for what reasons and with which arguments, and in what situation of power struggle?

Kondylis' book The Enlightenment within the Framework of Modern Rationalism contains a brief passage about Thomas Aquinas. Kondylis notes that in the 13th century, a vibrant intellectual pluralism emerged, within which Thomas developed his philosophy amid numerous controversies. Despite the contentious nature of these debates, there exists an absolute binding force; one aspect is dogmatic, while the other is performative. The Aristotelian framework remains sacrosanct, implying that any subversion must occur within this structure with utmost subtlety. This is precisely what transpired with Aquinas playing a pivotal role, as he prepared the groundwork for the later emancipation of ontology from metaphysics in the 16th century and of philosophy from theology alike. His bold and modern act can be characterized as follows: Thomas sought to secure for philosophy, as a methodology of theology, its own right, and by doing so he shaped in a highly influential way the dichotomy between reason, represented by philosophical methodology, and faith, represented by theology. He argued philosophy could only be an instrument for presenting truths of faith, but naturally, by securing the autonomy and methodological dignity of philosophy the Pandora's box had been opened. Thomas' strategy to grant philosophy autonomy forced him into several tactical compromises with its opponents, whose needs he simultaneously subverted. In De ente et essentia, we see an almost purely philosophical treatise where the Aristotelian 'unmoved mover' is basically renamed 'actus purus'. While ostensibly refining the Aristotelian framework, this work in fact represents a fundamental challenge to the immunity claim of faith against philosophy.

This explains why Thomas Aquinas emerged as a central figure in the heated philosophical disputes of the 13th century, in which he pursued the daring goal of strengthening philosophy against theology. The Church is both a partner and an adversary; he needs its blessing, but he works toward undermining its authority. The Aristotelian framework is a mandatory tool, which serves as a normative standard but is also utilized as a weapon by him. In this context, only fundamental and long-term goals could be pursued; only preparations could be made for what would later become effective through the emancipation of philosophy from theology. A parallel to Thomas's situation can be found later with Descartes, who tried to shield himself against accusations of atheism. In response to Galileo's execution, he did not publish some of his writings throughout his life, despite various sincere assurances regarding the inviolability of belief in God. Descartes’ maneuver was similar to Thomas's but more radical, and it also reappeared many times during the Enlightenment: By that time, the critique of theology had become openly manifest, but a prevailing taboo led to the establishment of various theoretical safeguards against the suspicion of strictly forbidden nihilism, a topic Kondylis explores extensively in his work on the Enlightenment. One of the best examples might be Hobbes, who writes explicitly as a Christian but has left us a major work that is hardly ever read as if any belief in God or theology existed at all – and this is largely due to Hobbes himself. The common denominator of all those maneuvers in accordance to Kondylis’ methodological framework is: the polemical constellation dictated the situational employment of means in service of the strategy.

Human Rights Universalism as Farce and the Principle of Demise in Planetary Politics

What we are witnessing here–and suffering from–is the transformation of a victorious ideology, specifically the human rights universalism espoused by Western intellectuals, into an ideological prison and a deadly trap. This prison becomes particularly confining when a victor starts to falter yet remains unable to adapt; as they weaken, they can no longer bear the consequences of their ideologically driven actions while being unable to disengage from the mechanisms they have set in motion. Multiculturalism has evolved from being an ideology into a reality that has cannibalized its own ideological roots and taken on a fatal independent existence. Why was this ideology so significant? The West embraced it during its ideological struggle against the Soviet Union, which accompanied the economic and military confrontation. Both sides claimed to represent humanity; thus, as victors, Western powers had to portray their economic-political triumph as fundamentally an ideologically driven victory: the superior ideology and consequently better people had triumphed. This resulted in being ensnared by human rights universalism's ideology which had been stretched beyond limits until it began cannibalizing and destroying societies.

Initially, when human rights universalism served merely as ideological background music for what Kondylis refers to as ‘the economization of politics,’ it was primarily within political and economic spheres that both the implementation and limitations of this ideology were regulated; it sounded appealing and legitimized—particularly in America—a predominantly targeted yet moderate migration without seeming suicidal. Since then end of the Cold War, however, this ideology has spiraled out of control into self-perpetuation while detaching from economic necessities and social integration capacities. It has been utilized by various actors in different ways as a weapon against the West, particularly from within the West itself. Critics often portray human rights universalism as a mere pretext for colonial strategies. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, describes the conflict between European universalism and universal universalism as ‘the central ideological struggle of the contemporary world.’ (Wallerstein 2006: xiv) Additionally, there are those who want to manipulate us into turning the virtue of self-critique into a vehicle for the constant imposition of self-loathing. The decline of social cohesion, homogeneity, and self-respect, all of which are vital for intergenerational self-cultivation—though we should avoid being overly defensive by framing it solely as a matter of self-preservation—marks a significant social disintegration.

What Kondylis foresaw was an impending social disintegration coupled with resource scarcity; we can clearly observe this disintegration today while Europe will soon experience resource scarcity as well. In such circumstances, human rights universalism becomes a mere remnant; it fails to provide diagnostic insight into current situations or effectively tackle challenges ahead. How could it, as the primary ideological motor of our contemporary misery, be of any help in alleviating that misery? It represents an additional burden and paralyzes those who require decisive action, as clarity about their circumstances can only emerge if they do not view reality through this ideological lens—like being trapped in a vise—where reality reflects solely what this ideology dictates. It may sound strange, but interpreting Kondylis' methodological axiom normatively indeed makes sense. Why? Because today’s planetary developments should not be explained by Western ideologies that contribute to the West's suffering; furthermore, contemporary phenomena should no longer be interpreted through Western ideologies or scientific theories that align with them It is a principle of sound reasoning to discard frameworks that fail to provide meaningful explanations while simultaneously exacerbating the very issues they seek to address. I specifically have in mind so-called sciences like sociology or political science.

However, I do not intend to dictate or proclaim new ideologies here but rather emphasize that ideologies reproduce themselves, as Kondylis tirelessly points out, through their social carriers—but only if those carriers biologically reproduce themselves. Human rights universalism will not last much longer; however, it has acted like a panacea leading us into an existentially perilous situation—a fact Kondylis recognized back in the 1990s while presciently predicting its consequences. For details see my Substack post entitled Kondylis' Theory of Planetary Politics. To conclude with a quote that I have yet to find cited in other works, which articulates Kondylis' diagnosis with dark humor; if we substitute ‘embassy’ with ‘the West's ethnic foundations,’ applying this message directly to today's context becomes straightforward:9

The rule of law here inappropriately portrays itself as the guardian of human rights, behaving as inconsistently as an ethical universalist who runs into trouble in a foreign country but opts to appeal to humanity, instead of reaching out to the embassy of the nation that issued his passport.

We are in deep, deep trouble in the West; let us act intelligently, which is quite unlike how an ethical universalist would want us to behave. That’s a pragmatic prescription, not a normative one—it’s explicitly open to interpretation: whatever that may mean.

References:

Kondylis, P. (1981): Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus. München: dtv. (The Enlightenment within the Framework of Modern Rationalism)

Kondylis, P. (1984): Macht und Entscheidung. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. (Power and Decision)

Kondylis, P. (1986): Konservativismus. Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. (Conservatism)

Kondylis, P. (1999): Das Politische und der Mensch. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. (The Political and Man)

Kondylis, P. (2001): Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert. Heidelberg: Manutius. (The Political in the 20th Century)

Luhmann, N. (1997): Die Kunst der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (Art as a Social System)

Wallerstein, I. (2006): European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power. New York: The Free Press.

I will say just a few words about Lauren Southern in these opening remarks – this is not a grift, and it could not be further from being one. I am going to present some very important psychological data in this article, that has not yet been fully understood or widely discussed in terms of its significance, and the fact that this has not happened is causing profound and destructive societal problems, akin to the impact of a “social nuclear bomb." The key difference between this and an actual bomb is that the detonation arises not from what is done, but from what is refused to be confronted.

What my remarks take as a starting point is a small screenshot, which is unfortunately highly representative of a significant and pervasive problem:

To make it clear from the outset: I have only superficially familiarized myself with who 'Destiny' is (but even that brief exposure was enough to reveal the nonsensical nature of Southern's assertion). I have never followed Lauren Southern’s work in depth, primarily because what I have seen has failed to impress me. Fundamentally, I draw a sharp distinction between influencers (primarily podcasters who are not particularly well-read and lack a scientific background, and who generally do not consume content that is significantly more complex than what they produce themselves) and intellectuals (serious intellectuals who are both at home in the realm of scholarship and can communicate with the public in an intelligent, elaborate, and educated manner), with the latter operating within a strict, multi-tiered hierarchy. For me, the difference is as stark as that between a koala and a chimpanzee: both are sentient beings, but cognitively worlds apart. However, within the realm of human diversity and complexity, there are also transitional figures. In my view, whatifalthist qualifies as both an intellectual and an influencer.

Another thing I must mention in advance: Lauren Southern does not provide an estimate of Destiny's IQ. However, given her extensive network and deep involvement in the right-wing scene over many years, as well as her likely personal acquaintance with numerous individuals within that milieu, one can infer from her statement that she must place Destiny's IQ at least in the 140+ range. It is rather peculiar that she compliments someone for being highly intelligent who appears to be driven by sexual desires to the same extent that a dog is obsessed with food (a grieving dog would likely become more averse to food than Destiny's libido would suffer from any emotional pain).

Is this merely a trivial matter of gossip talk? No, not at all. Gilles E. Gignac and Marcin Zajenkowski published a study titled People tend to overestimate their romantic partner's intelligence even more than their own, where they present the following findings:

"We found that people overestimated their own IQ (women and men ≈ 30 IQ points) and their partner's IQ (women = 38 IQ points; men = 36 IQ points). Furthermore, both women and men predicted their partner's IQ with some degree of accuracy (women: r = 0.30; men: r = 0.19). However, the numerical difference in the correlations was not found to be significant statistically."

You can miss the mark (by 5 to 8 points), you can be really off (9 - 15 points), you can be off in a seriously questionable manner (let’s say, 16 - 25 points), but 36 points? You then qualify as an utterly delusional fantasist, even according to La La Land standards (assuming such a thing as “standards” can exist in this case).

What does this mean? We are not dealing with erroneous estimations; we are not dealing with people who are slightly off the mark; what we are dealing here with is the outright creation of fairytales creatures. To illustrate this: A woman describes to her friend, while gushing about his attractiveness, a prime-time Arnold Schwarzenegger, when in reality it's an overweight, bald dwarf in a wheelchair. (Of course, this also works the other way around with men, as the numbers clearly demonstrate.) Or consider this: Someone builds a paper airplane and mistakes it for a real plane. (In a world where such delusions are not systematically curbed, it is almost consistent and nearly rational for the builder to attempt to patent the paper airplane and sell it to Boeing; considering all the Boeing mishaps attributed to the DEI-driven disdain for talent and meritocracy, the chances of succeeding with this are not so slim). Or someone believes they can ride a bicycle faster than a hypersonic missile flies. A 36- to 38-point misjudgment is so severe that it defies linguistic description. This is the predicament of at least 75% of people when it comes to judging others' intelligence or estimating their IQ. Brace for impact, the crash will be horrific. To take the analogy even further: Don't expect Chesley Sullenberger to be in the cockpit; this plane is destined to crash into the water.

What does that mean in purely factual terms?

In 1997, Linda Gottfredson published a (in my opinion, extremely important) study in the journal Intelligence titled Why g Matters: The Complexity of Everyday Life. In this study, she references the findings on adult literacy from the National Adult Literacy Survey (NALS). The NALS identifies five levels of reading competency, which, as indicated by the positive manifold, correlate strongly with IQ scores. To quote the main findings at length:

"Generally about 4% reach the highest level. Level 5 (376-500) signals an 80% probability, for example, of being able to summarize two ways that lawyers challenge prospective jurors (based on a pas­sage discussing such practices) and to use a calculator to determine the total cost of carpet to cover a room (see Figure 2). Roughly another 20% of White adults reach Level 4 (326-375), where individuals can perform such tasks as restating an argument made in a lengthy article and calculating the money needed to raise a child based on information stated in a news article. A total of about one third of White adults reach Level 3 (276-325), but no higher, which includes capabilities for writing a brief letter explaining an error in a credit card bill and using a flight schedule to plan travel arrangements. Level 2 proficiency (226-275) includes locating an intersection on a street map, entering background information on an application for a social security card, and deter­mining the price difference between two show tickets. This level is reached but not exceeded by about 25% of Whites. Finally, one out of seven White adults functions routinely no higher than Level 1 (less than 225), which is limited to 80% proficiency in skills like locating an expiration date on a driver’s license and totaling a bank deposit."

The fact that only 4% of whites reach Level 5 corresponds to the average IQ found in white countries when they were still predominantly homogeneous: around 5% (4.75%) fall into the IQ range of 125+, 10% into the range of 120+, roughly 2.3% into the range of 130+, and about 1% into the range of 135+). Overall, we find that about 24%, or roughly one-quarter of all whites, can read at a very high (Level 5) or good (Level 4) level. It's important to note that even within Level 5, there would be significant internal differentiation if correspondingly detailed and specialized studies were conducted. In any case, 75% possess at best solid skills, and I would argue that 75% of all people are essentially useless when it comes to estimating other people's IQ. About 15–20% would be off by no more than one standard deviation (which already qualifies as “weak judgment”), and sometimes less, while around 5% have the baseline intelligence necessary to reliably estimate their own IQ, the IQ of those less intelligent (thanks to the overview granted by a heightened position), and also the baseline IQ needed to differentiate even higher IQ-levels in a fundamentally solid manner.

Expressed in IQ numbers:

Attributing an IQ of 136 to someone with a factual IQ of 100 transforms a statistically normal person into a one-percenter (IQ threshold = 135). Someone with a typical midwit IQ of 115, who doesn't really belong in a university, is catapulted over the 150 threshold. What level of rarity are we talking about here? One in 2,500 – that's the magical transformation your midwit is undergoing. Someone in the IQ range of 70–79 (“Borderline”) can be catapulted into the range of 110–119 (“High Average”); one gets granted an effortless transition from an imbecile’s IQ of 78 to a nice 114; and from an average IQ of 85, which is typical in certain countries with certain typical problems, one can easily ascend for no valid reason at all into the 120–129 range of “Superiority.” Is anyone surprised that most people believe all cultures and ethnicities are equal?

Do I need to provide further examples to illustrate the wild frenzy of disturbing madness we are dealing with here?

Let’s take a look at Gottfredson’s study again:

“By this measure, one needs an IQ of about 120 (the 91st percent­ ile of the general population) to be competitive for the highest level jobs in Figure 1  (research analyst and advertising manager). The IQ levels required for compet­itiveness drop with job level: for example, IQ 112 (81st percentile of the general adult population) for accountant and teacher; IQ 100 (50th percentile) for cashier, meter reader, and teller; IQ 90 (25th percentile) for custodian  and material han­dler.”

You see how people get “beamed” upward several IQ levels by the uncanny synergy of projection and lack of understanding? Am I really being too harsh here?

IQ itself is not a totality; it is embedded in a totality that is called personality. IQs do not get estimated by other IQs but by persons. (The criteria for general competence laid out by Gaius Baltar are pretty useful here: “General competence requires three necessary conditions: a) High general intelligence or IQ, b) the ability to be objective, even in situations where the result of your conclusions may not be to your liking, and c) the ability to reach conclusions without being influenced by others (i.e. independent thinking).” — The percentage of 1.5 he offers is a lot more realistic than the 8% he also considers possible.) Persons who should be highly aware of giftedness and prepared to diagnose it due to proper, specialized education in that regard are teachers. However, in my opinion, teachers’ estimates are pretty poor. Their estimates provide us with rather discouraging results (an error rate of approximately 50% when generously allowing for a deviation of up to one standard deviation!):

"In addition, we tested whether cue-utilization differed between: accurate (n = 78) and inaccurate (n = 80) teacher judgments of students’ performance (RQ3b), and between accurate (n = 79) and inaccurate (n = 76) teacher judgments of students’ monitoring judgments (RQ4b). We defined accurate judgments as teacher judgment accuracy scores (both teacher judgment accuracy of students’ performance [TJA] and of students’ monitoring judgments [TJASMJ]) as scores that deviate ≤ 1 standard deviation from the mean (+ or -) and inaccurate judgments as scores that deviate more than 1 standard deviation from the mean (+ or -)." (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11409-023-09349-8)

In the Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence, a correlation of .56 is reported between teachers' estimates and measured IQ, which means that their estimates are only slightly better than those of parents (.5), but they are nonetheless described as "relatively good." But is .56 genuinely good when parents – laypeople basically by definition – achieve nearly the same figure? I lean more toward the evaluation offered by Sonja Falck in her excellent introduction The Psychology of Intelligence: "I would see it as a positive development if teachers, students, and parents had better education about intelligence." (Falck 2021: 100) Teachers can only provide valid assessments if they are equipped to identify gifted underachievers – precisely by being blind to longstanding professional biases. Studies cited by Silvia Greiten in her book Hochbegabte Underachiever (Gifted Underachievers) estimate the underachiever rate to be between 15% and 40% (Greiten 2013: 46). Needless to say, most of these individuals remain invisible during their school time. Unsurprisingly, as what I said above suggests, the by far worst judges are couples (.29), performing even below self-assessments (.32) and strangers’ evaluations (.43).

"After knowing their peers for only one week, individuals could already estimate the peers’ intelligence with low to medium accuracy (r = 0.25). Interestingly, accuracy rates were similar in size after four (r = 0.27) and eight months(r = 0.22) of acquaintance. Peer- but not self-ratings directly predicted academic success, that is, grades and staying in school. Borkenau and Liebler (1993) asked cohabiting pairs − most of them romantic couples − to estimate their own and each other’ s intelligence and found medium accuracy for both types of estimates (r other = 0.29, r self = 0.32). The researchers also fi lmed the individuals during the seemingly mundane tasks of entering a room and reading a weather forecast aloud. They later presented these videotapes with or without sound to strangers and asked them to rate the participants’ intelligence. Strikingly, stranger-ratings were even slightly more accurate (r = 0.43)." (Aljoscha C. Neubauer and Gabriela Hofer: Self- and Other-Estimates of Intelligence, in: Robert J. Sternberg, Ed.: The Cambridge Handbook of Intelligence. Cambridge, 2020, p. 1188)

Let us now examine further data.

Michael Ferguson, in his excellent essay The Inappropriately Excluded, discusses findings that might surprise many. Two examples mentioned by Ferguson present facts that certainly lie outside the imaginative scope of the "average IQ understanding":

"For example, Gibson and Lightfound that 148 members of the Cambridge University faculty had a mean IQ of 126 with a standard deviation of 6.3. The highest score was 139. J.D. Matarazzo and S.G. Goldstein found that the mean IQ of 80 medical students was 125 with a standard deviation of about 6.7. There was one outlier at 149, but the next highest score was 138."

These findings do not align with the prevailing clumsy mindset of IQ exoticism which substitutes estimates based on institutional animism (Cambridge! The elite of the elite!) for empirical reality and the sober realism it dictates.

A few remarks on the data Ferguson gives on Cambridge: Based on these numbers, the rate of giftedness is an astonishing 26% (rounded). The top 1% comprises nearly 8% here (yes, 8%, not 80%). However, the difference between an IQ of 130 and one of 135 is still highly significant. Is Cambridge University on the faculty level a haven for individuals with IQs of 140, as laypeople might believe? Statistically, no. While about one in four meets the threshold for giftedness − an absurdly high rate compared to the general occurrence rate of roughly 2 out of 100 (2.28%) in classic White England −, approximately 1.5% score an IQ of 140, which translates to roughly 3 in 200 people at Cambridge. If we grant people an arbitrary bonus of 36 points, an IQ of 104 (around 40% of people) would then be equivalent to an IQ of 140 (3 in 200 at Cambridge, approximately 1 in 300 in the general population). If that doesn’t define magic, what does? Does this reflect poorly on Cambridge or on the general IQ mythology?

In conclusion, there are three primary sources of error to consider:

1. Sympathy, which skews assessments significantly.

2. Limerence, which creates fairytale beings in worlds devoid of physics or biology. This, incidentally, cannot persist indefinitely, and coming back down to earth in this case means landing very hard. (And people should really, really read and discuss Dorothy Tennov’s prolific book Love and Limerence a lot more. Please!) — At least, the data discussed in this article allows us to explain sapiophilia (or sapiosexuality), which is one of the most ludicrous concepts that have ever floated around. Well, those people are likely not lying, but they have been hormonally tricked or fucked into seeing an awful lot of sapio where there actually is awful little or almost none.

3. And most critically: a very widespread practical lack of familiarity with high intelligence.

When it comes to the specific problem of creating fairytale beings, especially regarding intelligence estimates, in romantic relationships: We cannot allow this to continue; something must be done. There is a reason why, in more eugenic times, marriage was not merely a private affair for flirting teenagers. The fact that these teenagers are now in their 30s or 40s does not change the situation when the selection process remains unregulated and unsupervised by emotionally less engaged individuals with more wisdom. (The maximum duration of the honeymoon phase typically lasts up to 24 months. Making it significantly past that point is for adults; not realizing within three weeks that, in a certain constellation, it is utterly impossible is for children. If this time passes without realization, it is only a matter of time before the object of idealization, in a crashing failure accompanied by counter-projection, becomes a one-percenter in the opposite sense: from a one-percenter at the upper end to a one-percenter at the lower end of the IQ scale.)

This is my way of expressing what Mary Harrington is focused on when she says: “Abolish Big Romance.” She is right; romance must be sufficient. Replace “big” with “enlightened” (don’t eliminate the quotation marks) and transform it into something positive: embrace and organize “enlightened” romance and marriages based on it. Divorce statistics tell us in a very alarming way what happens if the first 18–24 months aren’t used properly or are wasted nonsensically.

It’s about more than IQ estimates; it's about creating fairytale beings regarding a feature that is more stable than personality traits (“Test- retest reliability […] is around 0.9 for IQ tests, and typically on the order of 0.7 for things like personality trait measures”; Mitchell 2018: 52), that is astonishingly stable throughout life (with a correlation of .73 from age 11 to age 77; Deary et al. 2000) and that has a test-rest reliability of .85 (and of .86 in the case of twins – so much for that debate). Leaving this problem unchecked is a recipe for disaster.

References:

Deary, I. J., Whalley, L.. J., Lemmon, H., Crawford, J. R,, und Starr, J. M. (2000): The stability of Individual Differences in Mental Ability from Childhood to Old Age: Follow-up of the 1932 Scot­tish Mental Survey. In: Intelligence, 28 (1), S. 49-55.

Falck, Sonja: The Psychology of Intelligence. London; New York, 2021.

Greiten, Silvia: Hochbegabte Underachiever. Perspektiven und Fallstudien im schulischen Kontext. Berlin, 2013.

Mitchell, Kevin J.: Innate. How the Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are. Princeton, 2018.

Die Psychologie ist in den letzten Jahren außerhalb ihrer Fachgrenzen vor allem durch das Problem der Bestätigungs- und Replikationskrise bekanntgeworden, was sich zu einem nicht geringen Anteil inzestuöser Rekrutierung verdankt: Wenn Psychologen ihre Experimente mit Psychologiestudenten durchführen, hat man Probanden für die Studien schnell gefunden, auch wenn man sich nur innerhalb einer eng und notwendig auf Selbstbespiegelung hin präselektierten Gruppe umschaut. Einer solchen Disziplin würde man wenig zutrauen, wenn es um die Diagnose gesellschaftlicher Schieflagen und der ihnen zugrunde liegenden Probleme geht – und das um so weniger, als die Untersuchung eines Kulturkampfes erfordert, daß das Psychologische nicht in der Psyche, sondern – wie der Begriff es sagt – in der Kultur (bzw. der Gesellschaft) aufgefunden werden muß. Umgekehrt ist, was in der Psychologie wahrlich sich bewährt hat, gesellschaftlich verhaßt und tabuisiert: die Intelligenzforschung, mit der auch Psychologen äußerst selten öffentlich etwas zu tun haben wollen, obwohl sie, wenn ihre Abschlüsse nicht nur auf dem Papier existieren sollen, genau wissen müssen, was es mit der Validität und Reliabilität ihrer Ergebnisse auf sich hat.

Zudem sind Abwehrhaltungen gegen eine psychologische Durchleuchtung von Verhaltensdefiziten und -pathologien nicht nur gesellschaftlich weit verbreitet, gerade an den neueren Massenuniversitäten (wenn es ja ein Oxymoron gab…) ist darüber hinaus auch noch ein zu Abwehrzwecken einsetzbarer Jargon vorhanden. Das Kernwort ist leider das unselige, nur noch unter Ächzen und Stöhnen verwendbare Wort „Komplexität“, das sich der größten Beliebtheit gerade bei denjenigen erfreut, die allzu offensichtlich zu keiner nennenswerten Komplexitätsbewältigung fähig sind. Kulturkämpfe sind per se zu komplex, als daß die Psychologie hier genügend vorzubringen imstande sein könnte. In einer stärker marxistisch zugerichteten Fassung bringt der Jargon dann als Gemeinplatz z.B. hervor, daß das Bewußtsein in einer solchen diagnostischen Anmaßung sich über die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse erhebe, deren Ausdruck es sei (oder von denen es lediglich ausgespuckt werde).

Wer akademischen Jargon mit intellektueller Potenz verwechselt, kann Bockwyt leicht unterschätzen; die Neigung dazu dürfte besonders verbreitet sein bei denjenigen, die hier aufs ideengeschichtliche Terrain auszuweichen versuchen, als ließen ihre Kerngedanken sich durch – meist ohnehin hohle – (Halbleser-)Protzerei auf dem Felde entkräften. Der Leser wird direkt im Vorwort wie in einem offenen Brief adressiert, die wissenschaftliche Form, der die Autorin sicherlich Genüge leisten könnte, wird verworfen. Zentrale Grundsätze werden unbeschwert im Idiom großmütterlicher Lebensweisheiten formuliert, z.B. der öfter in verschiedenen Varianten angeführte Satz „Die Dosis macht das Gift“ (mindestens Bockwyt 2024: 81, 132, 148, 164). Die pharmakologisch-physiologische Metaphorik kann leicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, daß weitreichende anthropologische Grundannahmen dieselbe fundamentieren. Das möchte ich im folgenden etwas genauer beleuchten, da Bockwyt die philosophischen und anthropologischen Bezüge ihrer Überlegungen psychologisch ausformuliert, diese Bezüge manifest vorhanden und aufweisbar sind. Anders gesagt: Ich stelle konkrete Bezüge her, über deren Existenz Bockwyt sich in abstracto im klaren ist, denn daß gerade im Anthropologischen die Psychologie und die Philosophie sich treffen, weiß sie auch: „Diese Fragen sind letztlich psychologische Fragen. Sie fragen nach der psychischen Beschaffenheit des Menschen und nach den Wirkungen der politischen Mittel auf die Menschen in ihrer psychischen und körperlichen Verfassung. Deshalb führen sie immer wieder zur Psychologie oder zur Philosophie zurück.“ (Ebd.: 103; allerdings befremdet eine Formulierung wie „dem Philosophen Andreas Reckwitz“, ebd.: 121, doch erheblich.)

Das Spezifische, Wokeness, ist im Verhältnis zum Universalen, der menschlichen Psyche, zu sehen. Bockwyt antezipiert, was mittlerweile, da die Rechte groß genug geworden ist, um ähnliche Herdenphänomene mit weitreichender Sichtbarkeit auszubilden, teilweise „woke right“ genannt wird (und amüsanterweise Rechte für eine Mischung aus Crybaby-Verhalten und zensorial gesinnter, die normativen Verhaltenspotentiale Erwachsener unterbietender Engstirnigkeit aufs Korn nimmt). Die spezifische „Leistung“ der Wokeness im Bereich der ideologischen Imagination und der Zieldefinition besteht darin, das jeweils für sich Unlebbare und miteinander maximal Unvereinbare in einer kleinkindhaft reflexionsarmen Synthese miteinander zu versöhnen, also in einer “Art Bullerbü in stereotypem Takt“ bei gleichzeitiger „radikale[r] Dekonstruktion und Veränderung all dessen […], was Menschen Halt gibt“ (ebd.: 157). Schauen wir uns den anthropologischen Cocktail genauer an, der einen zu solchen Absurditäten verleiten kann.

Zum Universalen bzw. Anthropologischen: „In uns allen sind woke psychische Mechanismen angelegt und zudem durch Sozialisation mehr oder weniger stark etabliert. Narzissmus und Histrionie beispielsweise sind keine Pathologien, sondern normale menschliche Psychologien.“ (Ebd.: 104) Zu den psychologischen Grundeigenschaften, die hier merkwürdigerweise „Psychologien“ genannt werden, zählt die Aggression, die Bockwyt in dem Buch ebenfalls ausführlich behandelt. Die Aggression wird von Bockwyt keineswegs verdammt, sondern als eine Grundenergie, die es ermöglicht, proaktiv in die Welt einzutreten und mit ihr in Kontakt zu treten, vielmehr begrüßt: „Aggression ist daher im gesunden Maße auch Ausdruck der wichtigen Fähigkeit zur Selbstbehauptung.“ (Ebd.: 137) Was mit Aggression gemeint ist, ist die Grundenergie, die nötig ist, um aktiv mit Welt und Mitwelt in Kontakt zu treten und produktiv in sie einzutreten.

Aggression, wie sie allerdings die Wokeness kennzeichnet, äußert sich in etlichen Verhaltensweisen, die Bockwyt behandelt: „Degradierung“ (ebd.: 149), „aggressive Einschüchterung“ (ebd.: 151), Versuche, „unliebsame Kritiker auf sozialen Netzwerken sperren zu lassen“ (ebd.: 141), „Anprangerungen“ (ebd.: 142), „Beleidigungen und Bedrohungen“ (ebd.: 149). Nichts davon ist nicht universal, aber nichts davon findet in einer Rhetorik der sozialen Gerechtigkeit seinen natürlichen Verbündeten, die den Narzißmus befeuert, der der Aggression ihre Richtung gibt: Erst der Narzißmus leitet die Aggression zum konkreten Verhalten an, und eine nötige Reaktion auf solches kann darin bestehen, die Aggression abwehren zu müssen und damit den Narzißmus durch Verletzung zu befeuern. In welcher Weise aggressives Verhalten erlernt, d.h. kanalisiert und zivilisiert wird, hängt davon ab, inwieweit der Narzißmus in der Individuation als Aufgabe gemeistert wird.

Hier korrespondieren Bockwyts Ausführungen weitreichend mit der Philosophie Helmuth Plessners – so weitreichend, daß man sagen kann, Bockwyts Buch stelle genau 100 Jahre später eine Reaktualisierung von Plessners Grenzen der Gemeinschaft dar. Um dies zu erläutern:

Individuation zur Person (im Unterschied zum bloßen Menschen) vollzieht sich Plessner zufolge im Rollenspiel, im Zentrum der philosophischen Anthropologie steht deshalb der „Rollenbegriff, dem das Doppelgängertum privat-öffentlich zugrunde“ (Plessner 1985: 231) liegt.1 Das existenziale Medium dieses privat-öffentlichen Doppelgängertums ist Unaufhebbarkeit und Ausgleichsbedürftigkeit von Leibsein und Körperhaben: „Der Zwang zum Ausgleich seines körper-leiblichen Doppelaspekts ist die Wiege des Handelns, dem sich der Mensch in seiner Motorik nicht entziehen kann, wenn er sein möglichstes, das menschenmögliche versucht.“ (Plessner 2003a: 386) Unaufhebbar privat ist das Leibsein insofern, als leibliches Empfinden intransitiv ist, woran auch eine ekstatische Romantik der Symbiose nichts ändern kann; unaufhebbar öffentlich ist der Körper insofern, als er beobachtbar ist und wir immer mehr zeigen, als wir an uns selber wahrnehmen können, was wiederum für den Narzißmus ein Problem ist, weil wir uns immer ein Stück weit entzogen sind. Kinder merken das spätestens, wenn sie von anderen ausgelacht werden und vor Scham erröten, ihr Leid ist dann so ganz ihr eigenes. Eine wichtige Pointe bei Plessner besteht darin, daß Leibsein und Körperhaben jeweils eine Doppelaspektivität zukommt: der Leib, der ich bin, ist zugleich Körper gerade deshalb eine soziale Dimension meiner Identität, aber als solcher auch z.B. medizinisch behandelbar, weshalb die Überführung des Leibseins ins Körperhaben zum Schutze des leiblichen Wohls wichtig sein. Das Körperhaben umgekehrt ist eine Aufgabe in der Erlernung von Instrumenten z.B., wo bewußt körperlich gesteuertes Verhalten habitualisiert und insoweit verleiblicht werden soll (die Natürlichkeit das Virtuosen ist eine erworbene), aber auch im Schauspielen, denn der Schauspieler muß Verleiblichungsweisen, die der Verkörperung einer Rolle zugrunde liegen, erlernen. Ausgleich meint bei Plessner, allerdings wie bei Bockwyt, ein immer wieder zu vollziehender, das Erreichen eines temporären Äquilibriums, keinen finalen Ausgleich und keine Erlösung – im Gegenteil: „Hier ist das Ziel der Ausgleich, die Balance, und zwar eine durchaus labile, weil der Unterstützungspunkt den Schwerpunkt der Situation über sich hat, weil es an Normen für die Verankerung der individuell verteilten Gewichte fehlt.“ (Plessner 1981: 109)

Worin besteht hier die direkte Verbindung zu Bockwyts Buch? Die unaufhebbare Spaltung, die sich im privat-öffentlichen Doppelgängertum manifestiert, bedarf Plessner zufolge des Ausgleichs. Bei Bockwyt ist ein zentraler Satz des Buchs: „Die Psyche strebt stets nach Ausgleich“ (Bockwyt 2024: 195), während es bei Plessner 1924 hieß: „Unter Radikalismus verstehen wir allgemein die Überzeugung, daß wahrhaft Großes und Gutes nur aus bewußtem Rückgang auf die Wurzeln der Existenz entsteht; den Glauben an die Heilkraft der Extreme, die Methode, gegen alle traditionellen Werte und Kompromisse Front zu machen. Sozialer Radikalismus ist daher die Opposition gegen das Bestehende, insofern als es immer einen gewissen Ausgleich zwischen den widerstreitenden Kräften der menschlichen Natur einschließt und den Gesetzen der Verwirklichung, dem Zwang des Möglichen gehorcht.“ (Plessner 1981: 14) Der Radikalismus des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts war eine Jugendbewegung, der Radikalismus und Gemeinschaftskult, der unter dem Namen des Wokismus ein Unwesen treibt, ist eine Identitätsbewegung, die nicht mehr an eine Altersgruppe gebunden ist. Doch Plessners und Bockwyts Antwort überschneiden sich trotzdem (zurecht) im Grundsätzlichen: Das Gegenprinzip läßt sich als „Ausgleich“ bzw. als die Annahme des Gesellschaftlichen, d.h. des Öffentlichen, in seiner irreduziblen Naturgebundenheit einerseits und seiner Bindung an Kultivierungsimperativ andererseits bezeichnen. Was bei Bockwyt als Finden einer Mitte im Erwachsenwerden behandelt wird, erhält bei Plessner konkrete Namen: Takt, Zeremoniell, Prestige.

Was versteht Plessner unter „Takt“?

Die Antwort im Zitat, das jede Paraphrasierung verbietet:

„Takt ist das Vermögen der Wahrnehmung unwägbarer Verschiedenheiten, die Fähigkeit, jene unübersetzbare Sprache der Erscheinungen zu begreifen, welche die Situationen, die Personen ohne Worte in ihrer Konstellation, in ihrem Benehmen, ihrer Physiognomie nach unergründlichen Symbolen des Lebens reden. Takt ist die Bereitschaft, auf diese feinsten Vibrationen der Umwelt anzusprechen, die willige Geöffnetheit, andere zu sehen und sich selber dabei aus dem Blickfeld auszuschalten, andere nach ihrem Maßstab und nicht dem eigenen zu messen.“ (Ebd.: 107)

Niemand wird ernsthaft behaupten können, irgendwas dergleichen im Milieu oder auch nur im direkten Umfeld von Wokeness je beobachtet zu haben. Takt erfordert die sympathetische Reaktion auch dort, wo Sympathie nicht gegeben ist, die Sensibilität dort, wo der kleinkindlich in sich selbst zusammengeschrumpfte Narzißmus nur die Sensitivität hysterisch zu artikulieren und gegen andere zu mobilisieren weiß. Takt wird von der Gesellschaft von jenen verlangt, die sich innerhalb der Gesellschaft in Situationen zu bewegen vermögen, in denen sie gegenüber Anderen in ihrer Andersheit bestehen müssen, ohne einen Anspruch darauf erheben zu können, alles den eigenen Launen und präpersonalen Regungen unterwerfen zu können. Taktvoll sein erfordert minimal, eine über die Subjektivität hinausreichende normative Objektivität sozialer Art zu verstehen und ins eigene Verhalten zu integrieren, d.h. auch: eigene Verhaltenskapazitäten in Auseinandersetzung mit gesellschaftlichen und öffentlichen Erwartungen zu entwickeln, die autonom gegenüber den Befindlichkeiten einzelner sind, ohne deshalb ihnen gegenüber – das versteht das großgewordene dumme „Ich, ich, ich!“-Kind schon nicht mehr – indifferent oder ihnen feindlich gesinnt zu sein.

Was versteht Plessner unter „Zeremoniell“?

Es handelt sich hier um ein Bedingungsverhältnis: Kein Takt ohne Zeremoniell, da der Takt am Zeremoniell sich bildet, denn im Zeremoniell – der Spielcharakter ist hier wichtig und wird von Plessner betont – ist „die Beobachtung seiner Gesetze und Formen ist bindend“ (ebd.: 85), es hat also Einübungscharakter. Eingeübt wird dabei nicht die mechanische Wiederholung des Zeremoniells, sondern die personalisierende Integration des Individuums in gesellschaftliche Bezüge durch das Verstehen des Geistes des Zeremoniells, d.h. des Geistes des sozialen Kosmos von Bezügen und Praktiken, innerhalb dessen es steht und den es selber repräsentiert. Im Zeremoniell „ordnet sich die Individualität ein und unter, ein Allgemeines verbindet eine unbestimmte Fülle von Personen, die in gewissen Bedeutungsverhältnissen entweder zueinander oder zu dritten stehen, zu einheitlichem Verhalten von objektiv geregeltem Gepräge.“ (Ebd.: 85 f.) Nicht um Unterwerfung geht, sondern darum, „die Sicherheit und Würde des Benehmens“ zu erhöhen und zu sichern. Das Zeremoniell ist prinzipiell anti-narzißtisch, für den Narzißmus gibt es hier nur etwas zu gewinnen, wenn das Individuum sich durch Bezug auf etwas es weit, weit Übersteigendes formt. Daß Wokeness, wie Bockwyt (siehe oben) sagt, die „radikale Dekonstruktion und Veränderung all dessen […], was den Menschen Halt gibt“ (Bockwyt 2024: 157), anstrebt, ist insofern bemerkenswert, als Plessner zurecht sagt: „Kein Volk, es mag auf einer noch so primitiven Stufe der Kultur stehen, entbehrt des Zeremoniells in seinen religiösen, politischen und ökonomischen Handlungen.“ (Plessner 1981: 86) Nicht umsonst habe ich an anderer Stelle in einer grundsätzlicheren Kritik der Linken darauf hingewiesen, daß man nicht ohne Grund im linken Lager viel mit Carl Schmitt (und der Verwendung der Freund-Feind-Unterscheidung in Machtkämpfen), aber nichts etwa mit Hobbes anfangen; es kann einen Links-Schmittianismus geben, aber keinen Links-Hobbesianismus, weil der produktive Sinn von Hobbes’schen Grundbegriffen wie Autorität, Ordnung, Gemeinwohl oder Gesetzlichkeit von der heutigen Linken nicht im anspruchsvollen Sinn verstanden werden kann. Intersektionalität als Ziel anzusehen, ist das Geständnis, statt einer gesellschaftlich-öffentlichen Ordnung nur noch das brüchige sektenhafte Keinstmilieu als Refugium finden zu können, bis das Unausweichliche passiert – irgendeine neue „Selbstidentifikation“, die sich gerade jemand auf dem Klo ausgedacht hat, erzeugt eine neue Sektion und damit Feindschaft zwischen den Sektionen, die sich kurz zuvor noch als geeinte Bastion gegen “den Faschismus” (oder irgendwas dergleichen bzw. derungleichen) verstanden hatten.

Was versteht Plessner nun unter „Prestige“?

Auch Prestige ist nicht einfach ein weiterer Grundbegriff, sondern strikt komplementär zum Zeremoniell zu verstehen. Prestige steht für die das Angebot, in der gesellschaftlichen Selbstbehauptung durch Erfolg Ansehen zu erlangen. Prestige enthält das Versprechen von Ansehen, weil Erfolg darin besteht, sich innerhalb eines umgrenzten Rahmens durch untriviale Leistungen auszuzeichnen und hervorzutun, kurz: Prestige setzt die objektive Geltung allgemein verstandener Leistungskriterien, die Anerkennungswürdigkeit der sie erfüllenden Leistungen und einen meritokratischen Rahmen voraus, in dem bedeutende Qualitäten durchaus vielfältiger Art nicht willkürliche Konstrukte, sondern Ausweise von Exzeptionalität sind. Jemand sein kann nicht irgendeiner, aber jemand kann einer auch nur sein, weil man verstehen kann, was es heißt, jemand zu sein. Wer dies erreichen will, muß „danach trachten, seiner Individualität für die Abenteuer des praktischen Lebens ein besonderes, einzigartiges Ansehen zu geben“ (Plessner 1981: 88). Das Prestige ist bei Plessner aber auch an Qualitäten gebunden, die diejenigen, die Geschlecht für ein Konstrukt halten, vermutlich für maskulinistischen Heldenfanatismus halten: Dem nach Prestige Strebenden „wird die Aufgabe, in seinen Handlungen streng darauf zu sehen, daß er das Gesicht wahrt, daß er sich nichts vergibt und nirgends zurückgeht. Eine individuelle Unangreifbarkeit im Gegensatz zur formal-abstrakten, objektiv-regelhaften, wie sie das Zeremoniell verschafft, eine aus der persönlichen Natur stammende, möglichst nicht eindeutig definierbare Kraft wird verlangt, die dem einzelnen Kredit einbringt und die Umwelt an ihn glauben macht“ (ebd.). Mit bloßer Bankkonto-Hypergamie, eintagsfliegenhaften physischen Vorzügen (Fitness-Influencer und dergleichen) oder medienindustriell fabrizierten Pseudopersönlichkeiten mit demonstrabler Nichtleistungsfähigkeit, aber schicken Accessoires und glänzendem Tand und Plunder ist es in einer solchen Gesellschaft nicht getan, dem Zoologischen kommt hier keine Auszeichnungskraft zu. Prestige „erzeugt, indem es reelle Kräfte mobil macht, ernsthafte Bemühung um die Kraftquellen des menschlichen Daseins, es stiftet Kultur“ (ebd.: 90) und ist zudem seiner inneren Qualität nach mit Macht verbunden, allerdings nicht im Sinne der Raffgier, sondern der Überwältigung durch Kultiviertheit und Können: „Was dem Machthunger entspringt, findet seinen über den bloßen Sättigungszweck hinausreichenden Sinn, dadurch sein geistiges Rückgrat und eine dauernde Rechtsquelle seiner Befriedigung in dem Streben des Menschen nach Ausdruck und Geltung: nach Selbstobjektivation.“ (Ebd.: 90 f.) Selbstobjektivation setzt hier ein substantiell gesättigtes Selbst voraus; nichts entspricht diesem Begriff weniger als das sinnlose Aufblasprodukt, das heute Influencer heißt, den massenuniversitären Influencer-Intellektuellen ausdrücklich eingeschlossen.

Um all das geht es bei Bockwyt explizit nirgends und implizit letztlich überall. So wie Plessners Kernbegriffe bei Bockwyt keine Rolle spielen, so spielen Aggression und Narzißmus keine bei Plessner, und doch gibt es ein Konzept, in dem beide sich – wie bei der geistigen Verwandtschaft zu erwarten wäre – nahekommen: das Histrionische bei Bockwyt, das Rollenspiel bei Plessner. Was Bockwyt als Psychologin mit Blick für nichtausgleichsbedingte Schieflagen ins Visier nimmt, betrachtet Plessner sowohl sozialontologisch als auch radikalismuskritisch.

Das Histrionische ist nach Bockwyt das Resultat der Unfähigkeit, das, was bei Plessner das privat-öffentliche Doppelgängertum wäre, in der Gestaltung der individuativen Entwicklung zur anspruchsvoll ausgebildeten Personalität zu meistern. Was kennzeichnet die histrionische Persönlichkeitsstruktur? Die „Unfähigkeit, die notwendigen Begrenzungen des Lebens auszuhalten. Ein Mensch, der innerlich Kind geblieben ist – oder bleiben musste“ (Bockwyt 2024: 165), ist in Plessners Sprache: ein Mensch, der die Lernleistungen, die das Zeremoniell ihm auferlegte, nicht zu vollziehen imstande war. Um die Verbindungen weiter zu verdeutlichen, Bockwyt: „Das Histrionische im Menschen ist also das Leidenschaftliche, das Kindliche und die Sehnsucht nach unbändiger Freiheit“ (ebd.: 169), die leere und deshalb übermäßig verkrampfte und verbissene Sehnsucht nach „unbegrenzten freiheitlichen Möglichkeiten und Verleugnungen von begrenzenden Realität“ (ebd.: 192), eine Sehnsucht, die, wenn sie auf die Sexualität der allermeisten übergreift, nur dazu führt, „die Sexualität des Menschen in das Triebhafte zu banalisieren“ (ebd.: 169). Das Histrionische berührt sich mit dem, was bei Plessner die Nacktheit ist:

„Alles Psychische, das sich nackt hervorwagt, es mag so echt gefühlt, gewollt, gedacht sein, wie es will, es mag die Inbrunst, die ganze Not unmittelbaren Getriebenseins hinter ihm stehen, trägt, indem es sich hervorwagt und erscheint, das Risiko der Lächerlichkeit. Der pure Affekt, das Sich-los-lassen der Seele in den Ausdruck hinein, die Unmittelbarkeit der Äußerung, die wahrhafte Rückhaltlosigkeit in der Manifestation der Urteile ebenso wie der Handlungen oder des Mienenspiels wirkt – vielleicht nicht notwendig, aber immer möglicherweise – lächerlich.“ (Ebd.: 70)

Das Risiko der Lächerlichkeit gar nicht mehr erkennen oder gar erkennen zu können, die Sexualität durch scheinpolitische Überhöhung (Emanzipations-bla-bla betäubungssüchtiger Triebopfer, die nur in Kurzzeitbeziehungen, wenn überhaupt noch, vor sich dümpeln, oder eben die Scheidungsraten innerhalb von 3 bis 5 Jahren durch ihre kolossale Unfähigkeit, andere und sich selbst zu erkennen und einzuschätzen, bereichern) zu maskieren und durch eine leere rhetorische Aufplusterung, die einem 8jährigen jämmerlich erscheinen muß, auszustaffieren – ist lächerlich.

Was Bockwyt mit Plessner gemeinsam hat und 100 Jahre später aktualisiert, sollte klargeworden sein: eine Kritik an einer überschießenden Selbstfixiertheit, die in einen Kultus des Selbst und, wo im sektiererischen Stil vorhanden, eine cliquenhaft organisierte Selbstbespiegelung infantiler Lustpartikel mündet, die sich dem Gesellschaftlichen, dem Öffentlichen, dem Erwachsenwerden, dem Leben im anspruchsvollen Sinne verweigern, denn wo letzteres angenommen wird, kommt das vanitas-Motiv auf eine nicht erhebende Weise ins Spiel: daß man vielleicht das Menschsein am ehesten und besten anzunehmen bereit ist, wo man akzeptiert, ein Durchgangspunkt im Generationengang zu sein, aber bestrebt ist, dies auf die bestmögliche Weise zu sein – ob in der Elternschaft oder im kulturellen oder gesellschaftlichen Wirken.

Bockwyt und Plessner trennen sich ironischerweise gerade dort, wo sie sich von Plessner her treffen. Ihre Kritik des Histrionischen führt Bockwyt zu einer Kritik des Schauspielerischen per se; mit dem Schauspieler hält sie sich als ontologischer Figur nicht auf, sondern kommt direkt zur „narzisstische[n] Präsentation des Körpers“ (ebd.: 170), ihre Ausführungen bleiben hier schemenhaft. Plessner hingegen entwickelt eine Anthropologie des Schauspielers, die ein Kernstück seiner Theorie des privat-öffentlichen Doppelgängertums bildet: „Daß sich die philosophische Anthropologie einmal mit dem Schauspieler beschäftigt, mag auf den ersten Blick befremden. Befremdlicher ist die Tatsache, daß sie es bisher meistens unterlassen hat. Der Schauspieler stellt den Menschen dar. Ein Mensch verkörpert einen anderen.“ (Plessner 2003b: 403) Das muß man erst einmal können können, und wer solches Geschehen in anspruchsvoller Weise versteht, kann aus dieser Keimzelle der Personalisierung durch das Rollenspiel hindurch wiederum vertieft lernen: am Theater, an der Literatur, womöglich sogar am Film. In der schauspielerischen Verkörperung und Präsentation ein anderer zu werden, setzt Distanz und Vergegenständlichung voraus, vor allem Distanz in der Identifikation, die nötig ist, wenn die Präsentation gelingen soll. Deshalb fragt Plessner mit Blick auf den ontologischen Typus, nicht im Hinblick auf diesen oder jenen Typus auf der Bühne: „Enthüllt der Schauspieler nicht, wenn sein Darstellungsbereich der Möglichkeit nach unbegrenzt ist, jedenfalls in einer besonderen Hinsicht die menschliche Konfiguration?“ (Ebd.: 410)

In beiden Fällen erhält der Leser eine Diagnose, aber keine Lösung, auch keine Anleitung zu einer Lösung. Bockwyt formuliert eine Psychologie des Kulturkampfs, Plessner legt zwar eine sprachgewaltige Kampfschrift vor, aber ohne therapeutische Anleitung zum happy end (worin Plessner sich allerdings eminent von Bockwyt unterscheidet, ist die überall – und insbesondere im Selbstbehauptungsstolz, im aristokratischen, aber auch dem heutigen Verständnis weitgehend als solches unzugänglich gewordenen männlichen Verständnis von Würde – spürbare Herkunft aus dem Großbürgertum der Jahrhundertwende). Plessner definiert die Erfolgskriterien praktisch bescheiden und theoretisch anspruchsvoll (weil nur eine Minderheit für das erreichbar ist, was ihm vorschwebt): „Die vorliegende Abhandlung hat ihren Zweck erreicht, wenn es ihr gelungen ist, zu zeigen, daß die ganze Sphäre der Öffentlichkeit unter diesem Gesichtspunkt eines Hygienesystems der Seele, wir wollen nicht sagen, so wie sie heute aussieht, sich rechtfertigen läßt.“ (Plessner 1981: 133) Bockwyt spricht von den „gesellschaftlich erstrebenswerte[n] Zustände[n] der Balance“ (Bockwyt 2024: 192), kann aber dieselben natürlich weder hervorbringen noch verordnen mit ihrem Buch. Beide sind sich aber nicht nur einig darin, daß das Psychische kein isoliertes eigenes Reich ist, sondern es – egal, welche Terminologie man bemüht – darum gehen muß: „Maß und Begrenzung ist das Höchste für menschliches Streben.“ (Plessner 1981: 131; Hervorhebung, S.E.)

Literatur:
Bockwyt, Esther (2024): Woke. Psychologie eines Kulturkampfs. Berlin: Westend.

Krüger, Hans-Peter (1999): Zwischen Lachen und Weinen, Bd. 1. Das Spektrum menschlicher Phänomene. Berlin: Akademie.

Krüger, Hans-Peter (2001): Zwischen Lachen und Weinen, Bd. 2. Der dritte Weg Philosophischer Anthropologie und die Geschlechterfrage. Berlin: Akademie.

Plessner, Helmuth (1981): Grenzen der Gemeinschaft. Eine Kritik des sozialen Radikalismus. In: Ders.: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 5. Macht und menschliche Natur. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 7 – 133.

Plessner, Helmuth (1985): Soziale Rolle und menschliche Natur. In: Ders.: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 10. Schriften zur Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 227 – 239.

Plessner, Helmuth (2003a): Anthropologie der Sinne. In: Ders.: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. 3. Anthropologie der Sinne. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Plessner, Helmuth (2003b): Zur Anthropologie des Schauspielers. In: Ders.: Gesammelte Schriften, Bd 7. Ausdruck und menschliche Natur, 399 – 418.

Bücher, die das Wort "Generation" im Titel enthalten, gibt es mittlerweile mehr, als es verschiedene Generationen überhaupt in den letzten zwei Jahrhunderten gegeben haben kann. Der Grund liegt natürlich in der Verkaufsträchtigkeit, Generationenporträts sind beliebt, man hofft, über das eigene Leben und das von Freunden oder über das von älteren oder jüngeren Verwandten in einer gleichermaßen physiognomisch vielsagenden und damit das gar nicht in concreto dem Autor vor Augen liegende könnende Individuelle mehr zu erfahren oder es wenigstens auf den treffenden Begriff gebracht zu finden. Gerade dieses Bedürfnis kollidiert nicht selten in unguter Weise mit dem Bedürfnis von Verlagen, Absatz für Bücher zu finden. Was dann in der Realität passiert, ist, daß ein Schema überstrapaziert wird und sich totläuft. (Beispiele für gelungene Bücher in diesem "Genre" sind, um drei Beispiele zu nennen, Stefan Bonners und Anne Weiss' 2008 erschienenes Generation Doof. Wie blöd sind wir eigentlich?, das in gewisser Weise ein gutes Präludium zu Voss' Buch darstellt, weil man tatsächlich eine ganz und gar kon-nongeniale Generation Doof braucht, um mit der Generation Krokodilstränen nicht die Geduld zu verlieren und sie und kommende Generationen nicht einem harten Erziehungsregime unterwerfen zu wollen, dazu Michael Nasts betrübliches Buch Generation beziehungsunfähig von 2016 und Mark Bauerleins den dysgenischen Vorlauf des aktuell sich vor unseren Augen resultativ ausbreitenden kognitiven Horrors hervorragend darstellendes Buch The Dumbest Generation. How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future aus dem Jahr 2008).

Pauline Voss' intelligentes, gewitztes, in vielem subtiles, hellsichtiges und erfrischendes Buch bedient das Bedürfnis, ohne sich marktschreierisch dann im Vagen und Nichtssagenden zu verlieren, und das, obwohl sie das Soziologenbedürfnis einer Definition der Generation Krokodilstränen entlang von Geburtsdaten in ihrem Buch nicht gibt. Sie erwähnt 1992 geborene Künstler, die sie als „damit typische Vertreter der Generation Krokodilstränen" (Voss 2024: 78) bezeichnet, diskutiert unter dem Namen auch Billie Eilish (geb. 2001), den Rapper Maurice Conrad (geb. 2000), und Sophie Passmann (Jahrgang 1994). Vielleicht kann man hier vom gemeinsamen Nenner her definieren: Es scheint sich um diejenigen zu handeln, die zu früh ein Smartphone besaßen, um den ihnen begegnenden Inhalten auf der Basis einer hinreichend entwickelten Personalität begegnen zu können, und die weder kulturell noch – in der weiten Mehrzahl der Fälle – familiär in gegensteuernden Kräften den Rückhalt gefunden hätten, der sie davor hätte bewahren können, Opfer dessen zu werden, als dessen Nutzer sie sich gerne verstehen und als die sie liebend gerne von denen adressiert werden, die ihnen etwas zu verkaufen haben oder die schlicht sie als Produkt verkaufen wollen. Meine provisorische Definition deckt sich jedenfalls mit dem, was Voss uns in einer gedankenreichen Phänomenologie vors geistige Auge bringt.

Die Lektüre des ersten Kapitels läßt den Leser schnell verstehen, woraus dieses Buch primär erwachsen ist: aus einer weit überdurchschnittlichen Auffassungsgabe, geistigen Wachheit und Lebendigkeit, die sich unter anderem in Voss' Rückgang auf eigene Kindheitserinnerungen bekundet, die nicht als Erzählungen aus einer gänzlich anderen Welt präsentiert werden, sondern als Frühinnervierungen der Pathologien, die das Buch behandelt. Die Fähigkeit, Dinge zu memorieren, und die, sie zu artikulieren (Voss beherrscht die deutsche Sprache sogar so gut, daß sie von „Selbstwirksamkeit" (ebd.: 13) spricht, statt dem Leser in der üblichen Faulheit agency ins Gesicht zu spucken), finden hier glücklich zueinander – vielleicht auch weniger glücklich, wenn man sieht, wie Voss die schulische Sexual"aufklärung" als einen Spießrutenlauf durch eine institutionalisierte sexuelle Belästigung (auf gleichwohl gewitzte und deshalb amüsante Weise) schildert; das Resultat der nutzlosen Zeitverschwendung: „Und so mündete der Kampf gegen die sexuelle Unterdrückung darin, dass wir uns im Biologieunterricht Sextipps unserer Lehrerin anhören mussten." (Ebd.: 42)

Der wache Sinn für das, was die Realität ihr vor Augen führt, bestimmt auch ihren Zugang zu Theoretischem, das nie aufgrund eines bestenfallsigen Halbverstandenseins in der Luft hängt als als legitimitätslose Legitimationskeule herangezogen wird, die ihre Wirkung nur einer Aura verdankt, die lediglich für ein bestimmtes Milieu existiert, außerhalb desselben aber eher Kopfschütteln erzeugt, als jemanden zu beeindrucken. So bekommt sie das Kunststück hin, mit Foucault zu arbeiten, ihn also tatsächlich als Werkzeugkasten zu benutzen statt als Gängelband, d.h. ohne damit zu langweilen oder geradezu zu enervieren, denn das akademische Schrifttum ist zu Foucault zum größten Teil unerträglich einfallslos, belanglos, trivial und krückengängerisch beim gleichzeitigen Glauben daran, man könne oder würde fliegen, wenn man nur Meister Foucault zitiere.

Den „Wokies“ hält Voss eine Verkehrung der Foucault'schen Intention vor: „Anstatt seine Untersuchung totalitärer Machtmechanismen als Analyse zu verstehen, verwenden sie sie als Anleitung zu totalitärem Denken." (Ebd.: 19) Wie? Indem man nicht mehr Machtmechanismen analysiert, sondern sie registriert, um sich ihnen anzupassen und zu unterwerfen – natürlich nicht, ohne in ein double bind zu geraten: als Wegweiser zu benötigen, was man als Peitsche verdammt. Die wohl beiden wichtigsten Aspekte der Machttechniken der Wokeness, die Voss analysiert, dürften sein:

(1) die Logik des Panopticons zu internalisieren und gegen sich selbst zu wenden, vor allem aber gegen andere in Anschlag zu bringen, woraus dann eine Verklemmtheit, Gehemmtheit und untergründige Dauergereiztheit und absurd angewachsene passive oder offene Aggressivität resultiert,

(2) das Pathos der Befreiung, das in eine Unterdrückung dadurch umschlägt, daß das Reden an allen Ecken und Enden mit Verboten und Regulationsimperativen (richtige Wortwahl, mehr noch: vor allem die falsche vermeiden) umzingelt ist; mit Voss' Worten: „Statt in Kategorien des Normalen und des Pathologischen denken wir wieder in den Kategorien 'der Verfehlung und der Sünde, des Exzesses oder der Überschreitung' (ebd.: 49);

(3) direkt widerstreitend: die behauptete Realität der Repression bzw., wie Voss an vielen Stellen sagt, die Repressionshypothese;

(4) als Spezifikation der Repressionshypothese die Diskriminierungshypothese.

Zu (1) Internalisierung der Logik des Panopticons:

Das führt zu folgendem bizarrem Verhalten: „Es ist gerade diese Unberechenbarkeit [der Cancel Culture, S.E.], die den Einzelnen dazu zwingt, permanent die eigene Einhaltung der Regeln zu kontrollieren, oder in den Worten von Foucault: die Zwangsmittel der Macht gegen sich selbst auszuspielen." (Ebd.: 22) Konkreter: „Längst denken wir im Voraus mit, welche Aussagen oder Ausdrucksweisen auf Ablehnung stoßen könnten. Jetzt ist nicht mehr das Gegenüber, das uns kontrolliert, sondern wir selbst.“ (Ebd.: 24) Das macht bereits, wer darauf achtet, was er (zu wem) sagt. Im Modus der Externalisierung und Projektion tut es, wer das Sprechen anderer nach gegen sie verwendbaren Regel- bzw. Tabubrüchen absucht. Voss gibt etliche Beispiele dafür in ihrem Buch, eines davon ist: „Das Imperial College London warnt davor, Frauen im Alter von über dreißig Jahren auf den Ringfinger zu schauen, weil dies sie in traditionelle Geschlechterrollen dränge.“ (Ebd.: 97) Wenn man weiß, daß jemand weiß, daß es ein Problem sein könnte, wo er hinschaut, könnte es bei entsprechender Böswilligkeit und Geringfügigkeit des Verstandes, der nichts Größeres mehr anvisieren kann als Geländegewinne in solchem Intellektualschlammterritorium, lohnend sein, aufs Schauen desjenigen zu schauen. Im großen Stil manifestiert sich die panoptische Introjektion, wenn Intimbeziehungen rituell verrechtlicht werden und die Art der rechtlich korrekten Durchführung sogenannten „Studierenden“ mit sehr kleinkindlichem Verstand eigens beigebracht wird; Voss’ theoretisch unterfütterte Schilderung des Irrsinns der Princeton-Initiative UMatter ist ein Genuß, der hier nicht vorweggenommen werden soll. Nicht nur muß die Logik des Panopticons internalisiert werden, sie muß auch der Verrechtlichung zugeführt werden.

Zu (2) Pathos der Befreiung:

Voss’ Buch enthält zahllose Analysen von den Satiriker mit Material bombardierenden Verschränkungen des Befreiungspathos mit Unterdrückungsexzessen im Gefolge. Die Befreiung ist in der heutigen Gesellschaft eine vorgestanzte, nicht nur regelgeleitete, sondern minutiös angeleitete, durchregulierte, in der der Disziplinarmacht gehorcht wird, wo das Aufbegehren gegen was auch immer (das Patriarchat wird z.B. gerne bemüht, ohne daß einer derjenigen, die das Wort aussprechen, es nur halbwegs sinnvoll definieren könnte, wenn ihr Leben davon abhinge) zelebriert wird. Mit Voss’ Worten: „‘Befreie dich verdammt noch mal!', lautet die Botschaft; es ist die vielleicht raffinierteste der heutigen Disziplinarmacht. Und das Merkwürdige ist, wie sehr wir sie anbeten. Die Selbstdisziplinierung im Namen unserer Befreiung verschafft uns offenbar einen solchen Lustgewinn, dass sie sogar als Werbeversprechen funktioniert. Wir leben in Zeiten des moralischen Masochismus." (Ebd.: 32) Die Pointe des Pathos der Befreiung ist die Unterwerfung unter die Ostension von Befreiung. Die konkrete Gestalt der Absurdität solcher Befreiung wird von Voss (mitunter unangenehm) farbenreich geschildert, z.B. so: „Jungen, die Röcke tragen wollen, und Mädchen, die lieber wild als brav sind, wird immer öfter nahegelegt, sie müssten ihren Körper mit Hormonen und später mit Operationen modifizieren, damit er mit ihrem Wesen übereinstimme. Das binäre Denken gedeiht auf dem Boden seiner vermeintlichen Überwindung.“ (Ebd.: 36 f.) Voss zeigt zudem am Beispiel der Influencerin Anouk Lamm Anouk, daß im Anwendungsfall „Befreiung vom Patriarchat" die Pointe des Kampfes gegen das Patriarchat in der Abhängigkeit von der monetären Verwertbarkeit der Inszenierung des Kampfes besteht; wird das Patriarchat wirklich überwunden, so wird die Luxuswohnung in Wien anderweitig finanziert werden müssen. Wie? Darauf erwarte man bloß keine Antwort von jenen, die auf keine einzige der Floskeln, die sie in die Welt hinausposaunen, je selber gekommen wären. Geliefert oder erzeugt werden hier Identitäten, die ach so einzigartig und individuell (und ununterscheidbar) sind, wie sie entdeckt werden – nämlich geradezu industriell: „Um den Diskurs fortzuführen, müssen immer neue Minderheiten identifiziert werden, die anschließend befreit werden können.“ (Ebd.: 53)

Die internalisierte Logik des Panopticons gibt dem Pathos der Befreiung die praktische Anleitung zur selbigen, allerdings mit dem Resultat einer Verrechtlichung des ehemals Intimen; um einen zentralen Satz erneut zu zitieren: „Der Blick ins Schlafzimmer wirkt nicht übergriffig, solange er sich dem Schutz der unterdrückten Individuen verschreibt.“ (Ebd.: 50) Wer einen vor allem schützen soll, muß alles wissen dürfen. Man ist gegen die totale Überwachung? Dann muß man gegebenenfalls darauf verzichten, Ansprüche gegenüber anderen geltend machen zu können und, wo der Wunsch nach auf dem Weg der Anklage artikuliertem Ersehnten versagt bleibt, weiter unterdrückt bleiben. Die Pointe des Juridischen ist hier wiederum, was Ulrich Sonnemann1 bereits in den 1960ern geißelte und Gilles Deleuze2 im Begriff der Kontrollgesellschaft auf den Punkt bringt: „Um den Sex hat sich – unter dem Banner der Befreiung – eine Atmosphäre der Kontrolle etabliert: Kontrollieren, um zu befreien.“ (Voss 2024: 34) Den bürokratisch sterilisierten und dadurch nur um so obszöneren Über-Ich-Aspekt, der die Überwachung durch eine partikular allwissende, obwohl generell verstörend unwissende Instanz auf bizarre Weise legitimiert, durchschaut Voss natürlich auch: „Die sexuellen Befreiungskämpfer der Gegenwart treten auf wie Gutachter eines Sex-TÜVs, die die Deutungshoheit über das Erlaubte innehaben.“ (Ebd.: 56) Was sich über Voss’ Ausführungen hinausgehend hier noch besonders zu thematisieren lohnen würde: Die Befreiung erfolgt nicht nur nicht ohne Kontrolle und Verrechtlichung, sondern auch nicht ohne Kompetenzabtretung in der Beurteilung der Kriterien des Befreitwordenseins – aber wer figuriert hier als „kompetent“? Wenn Mädchen dazu „genötigt [werden], vor der Schulklasse über ihr Masturbationsverhalten zu sprechen – im Namen ihrer eigenen ‚Befreiung‘“ (ebd.: 41) und zu den Resultaten dieser aufgenötigten Selbstausstellung (oder notgedrungenen „Selbsterfindung“) gehört, „dass allein in meinem Umfeld zwei Mädchen [...] wochenlang nicht zur Schule gingen, weil die erzwungenen sexuellen Geständnisse Missbrauchserfahrungen hatten hochkommen lassen“ (ebd.), dann drängt sich die Frage nach den elementaren Verstandesfähigkeiten der vermeintlichen Bildungs- und Aufklärungsbeauftragten nur um so stärker auf. Aber vielleicht sind die angesprochenen Sextips der Biologie“lehrerin“ schon die (im mehrfachen Sinn) erschöpfende Antwort. Bekommt man derartige Auswüchse der Totalisierung von Überwachung und Kontrolle vor Augen geführt, kann man sich nur schwer des Eindrucks erwehren, man würde hier eine Fortsetzung von Blödmaschinen (Metz/Seeßlen 2011) lesen, aber zum Westen in seiner heutigen Verfallsform gehört die Ununterscheidbarkeit des schlechthin Totalitären vom schlechthin Blödsinnigen (= des schlechthin Lächerlichen).

Zu (3): die Repressionshypothese.

Voss, die in autobiographischer Synopsis sagt „Über gesellschaftliche Repression klagten wir nicht“, faßt die Repressionshypothese erfreulich bündig zusammen: „Erstens: Die Sexualität wird unterdrückt. Zweitens: Die Sexualität kann und muss befreit werden.“ (Voss 2024: 42) Wie in sämtlichen Themen, die sie behandelt, arbeitet Voss auch hier klar heraus, wie die Befreiung zur Befreiungsindustrie gerät und auf keinen Fall des Gegenstands ihrer Bemühungen verlustig gehen werden darf; ihr Erfolg darf immer nur in kleiner Teilerfolg sein, der um so mehr verdeutlicht, wieviel im ganzen genommen zu tun bleibt:

„Die größte Bedrohung der Repressionshypothese geht von ihrem eigenen Erfolg aus. Sobald die Mehrheit der Gesellschaft der Hypothese zustimmt und die Repression zu bekämpfen beginnt, wird es schwieriger, über Repression zu klagen. Wenn sich eine ganze Gesellschaft oder zumindest ihre kulturelle Elite erfolgreich gegen die Unterdrückung wehren würde, würde die Unterdrückung verschwinden; die Repressionshypothese wäre entkräftet.“ (Ebd.: 46)

Die Bekämpfung der Repression, die als totale angesehen wird, bedarf der totalen Überwachung, um effektiv sein zu können: „In der panoptischen Gesellschaft ermöglicht die Sichtbarkeit erst jene gesellschaftliche Kontrolle, vor der sich die sexuellen Minderheiten ursprünglich einmal schützen wollten." (Ebd.: 55) Das sollte bedrohlich klingen, doch der Effekt ist, da das Mitwirken am Befreiungskampf etliche Gratifikationen einzuheimsen ermöglicht, ein ganz anderer und wird von Voss mittels einer ins Schwarze treffenden entomologischen Metaphorik geschildert: „Die Bekenntnissüchtigen erinnern an Insekten, die an die Fensterscheibe des Labors pochen, sich unters Mikroskop legen und selbst sezieren." (Ebd.) Woher die Bekenntnissucht? Man kann als Unterdrückter durchs Bekenntnis sich befreien und zum Befreier anderer (Symbol, Repräsentant, oder – um die Sache in ihrer dysgenisch-massendemokratischen Form zu benennen – als „Influencer“) werden: „Die Repressionshypothese funktioniert über Dualität: Dem Unterdrücker ist der Befreier gegenübergestellt, dem Vertuschen das Enthüllen.“ (Ebd.: 48) Wer will nicht zu einer so heldenhaften Figur dadurch werden, daß er ein Skript und nicht selten strikte Anweisungen befolgt? Wer wird nicht verführt durch ein solches Transzendenzversprechen, auch wenn man das Wort nicht kennt und nicht versteht? Die Repressionshypothese ist sensu stricto keine Hypothese, die verifiziert oder falsifiziert werden kann oder soll, sondern ein Ticket: Kommen Sie herein, machen Sie mit uns die Unterdrücker platt. Es geht schließlich um nicht weniger als um das industrielle Maximum im Befreiungskampf, es geht um jeden, weil es um „die Gesellschaft“ (ebd.: 48) geht, und es muß um „die Gesellschaft“ gehen, wenn es ernsthaft um jeden gehen können soll. Verwundert es dann wirklich noch, daß Voss die so triftige wie kluge Frage stellt: „Ist sein Buch ‚Der Wille zum Wissen« bei genauerer Betrachtung nicht auch ein Versuch, die Sexualität zu befreien – eben nicht zu befreien aus der Unterdrückung, sondern aus der vermeintlichen Befreiung?" (Ebd.: 75 f.)

Zu (4) die Diskriminierungshypothese:

„Die Repressionshypothese hat sich verwandelt. Sie ist zu einer Diskriminierungshypothese mutiert.“ (Ebd.: 51) Beide Hypothesen sind dadurch verschwistert, daß ihr Erfolg, den sie anstreben müssen, Gift wäre, würden sie ihn als solchen akzeptieren. Auch hier gilt: „Diskriminierung muss erkannt, dokumentiert, angeprangert, bekämpft, verhindert werden.“ (Ebd.) Den Aufwand können Marginalisierte nicht leisten (vgl. ebd.: 53), hier muß das Zentrum agieren, hier muß die totale Überwachung die Diskriminierung bekämpfen, d.h. zwischen Diskriminierern und Diskriminierten diskriminieren, um den Diskriminierten die Gerechtigkeit widerfahren zu lassen, die die Diskriminierer als die Rache erfahren, die sie ist. Versöhnung, Schlichtung oder das Finden eines modus vivendi ist hier kein Ziel: „Indem ein Sprecher als Regelbrecher markiert wird, soll er entweder zur Anpassung gezwungen oder aus dem Diskurs ausgeschlossen werden.“ (Ebd.: 30) Ein Beispiel, an dem Voss dies alles hervorragend veranschaulicht, ist das einst riskante, nun auf Verwertung abgestellte, peepshowhafte coming out, dessen Eventcharakter sich in den Augen derer, denen nichts mehr am Herzen liegt, als den Beichtenden unter den identitären Rock zu schauen und solchen Voyeurismus für teilnahmsvolle Zeugenschaft zu halten, der ganzen Chose nichts von ihrer beschworenen Authentizität nimmt.

Der voyeuristische Charakter der Diskriminierungsaufarbeitung wird am deutlichsten, wenn sexuelle Diskriminierung untersucht wird, wenn also in Form von Geständnissen darüber gesprochen werden muß; keine industrielle Aufarbeitung behaupteter, realer oder erfundener sexueller Diskriminierung ohne und außerhalb von Geständnispornographie: „Wie die Sexualität, so muss auch die Diskriminierung zum Sprechen gebracht werden, um sie diskursiv verwerten zu können, und zwar mittels Bekenntnissen, abgerungenen Geständnissen, Prüfungen, in denen der Geständige entschlüsselbare Zeichen und Codes verwendet.“ (Ebd.: 81) All das ist strapaziös und leidvoll, aber im wesentlichen für diejenigen, die es reale Probleme erzeugt, nicht für diejenigen, die das Leiden an der Sache zelebrieren und genießen, wie Voss eindringlich am Beispiel Sophie Passmann zeigt; das Aufgezeigte in grundsätzlicher Form artikuliert: „Die Generation Krokodilstränen beschwört ihre Verletzungen mit einer solchen Leidenschaft, dass man unmöglich annehmen kann, sie litte unter ihnen.“ (Ebd.: 86)

Im Klartext-Modus wendet Voss sich auch an den Leser, wo es um Corona geht: „Die Pandemie bewies wie wahrscheinlich kein zweites Ereignis, dass den Verfechtern der Diskriminierungshypothese das Phänomen der Diskriminierung vollkommen gleichgültig ist, ja, dass sie es sogar gutheißen, wenn es ihren politischen Zielen dient.“ (Ebd.: 115) Voss veranschaulicht daran, daß hier die Stigmatisierung, deren Verfolgung öffentlich als Heilsereignis der Inschutznahme der Guten ausgerufen wird, als „repressive Macht“ (ebd.), was sie pointiert auf der logischen Ebene zum Funktionieren der Diskriminierungshypothese artikuliert: „Das Disziplinarsystem hat sich der Logik der Diskriminierung angepasst, seine Mechanismen auf sie abgestimmt. Die Diskriminierung dient als Projektionsfläche und ist der erfolgversprechendste Hebel der Diskursivierung.“ (Ebd.: 81) Und die Diskursivierung dient wiederum der Verwertung der Diskursivierung, sie muß deshalb alles beobachten, um alles verwerten zu können. Dabei bleibt dann vieles auf der Strecke, und zu diesem Vielen gehört neben dem vielen Einzelnen das Erkennen grundsätzlicher Probleme: „Je weiter die Diskriminierungshypothese den Diskurs durchdringt, desto abgekoppelter erscheint dieser von realen Problemen.“ (Ebd.: 103)

Ein letzter Aspekt soll noch hervorgehoben werden: Neben der flächendeckenden Überwachung und der latent hysterischen Dauerbereitschaft zur Verfolgung und sozialen Vernichtung geht es darum, den politischen und identitären Gegner in eine Vorab-Selbstunterwerfung hineinzudrängen:

„Nur ein Spießer störe sich an ein paar Gendersternen, behaupten die Diskurswächter und verwalten die korrekte Sprache derweil selbst wie Erbsenzähler. Gleichzeitig lassen die scheinbar winzigen Forderungen, deren Erfüllung zumindest für intelligente Menschen keine große Hürde darstellt, jeden Widerstand bösartig erscheinen. Wer sich solch minimalen Zugeständnissen verweigere, dem bereite es wohl Freude, Minderheiten zu diskriminieren.“ (Ebd.: 102)

Wo die Aufgabe der überlieferten Normalität zugelassen wird, wird der Rücktritt von der Aufgabe, weil sie als Teil eines Generalangriffs auf alles Bestehende erkannt und verworfen wird, zum aggressiven statt zum defensiven Akt. Es geht um die Auferpressung eines Kotaus, ohne daß er noch explizit gefordert werden muß. Hier weist Voss auf etwas hin, das man nicht entschieden genug herausstellen kann: Jede Unterwerfung ist Unterwerfung nicht primär unter dieses oder jenes mit der Freiheit, Entscheidungen zu revidieren, sondern Unterwerfung unter die normative Normalität der Unterwerfung. Es ist zu hoffen, daß genügend Menschen das Buch lesen und genau dies begreifen, um fortan, nötigenfalls aggressiv und konfrontativ, jegliche Unterwerfung zu verweigern – jede Entschuldigung, die ohnehin keinem Verzeihen, sondern nur der Vernichtung auf der Basis der eingestandenen Angemessenheit des Vernichtens durch das „Schuldbekenntnis“ ist, inklusive.

Was bleibt kritisch anzumerken? Auch Voss geht einem Thema aus dem Weg, das nicht länger in Schweigen gehüllt werden kann. Um drei Beispiele zu geben:

(1) „Warum widmet sich meine Generation Problemen mit wachsender Dringlichkeit, je weiter diese von der eigenen Realität entfernt sind?“ (Ebd.: 12) – Vielleicht weil diese Probleme verbindlicher definiert sind durch Vorgaben und durch den allgemeinen Konformismus, der diese Probleme gerade unangetastet läßt, während das eigene Leben ein Gegenstand von Konfusion und Unverständnis ist, da es in einer Gesellschaft gelebt wird, die einem kaum Verstehensmöglichkeiten (die erschließen sich die wenigen durch ernsthaftes Klassikerstudium, während die meisten nie etwas kennenlernen als die kulturindustrielle Kloake), statt dessen aber haufenweise nutzlose Ideologeme und Mythologeme an die Hand gibt, ja, sie einem als Gängelband aufzwingt? Das hat zu tun mit:

(2) „Ob in der Popmusik, in der Politik, im Aktivismus, im Journalismus, in der Belletristik – überall beweisen junge Frauen heute Mut zum Größeren und setzen sich leidenschaftlich für ihre Anliegen ein. Und stechen dabei ihre männlichen Kollegen vielfach aus. Auch die anderen von Passmann aufgestellten Behauptungen zeugen eher von Talent zur Fiktion als von Beobachtungsgabe." (Ebd.: 151) – Wer? Und wie viele sind viele? 10 wären m.E. eine ganze Menge. Können sie (noch) nicht bekannt sein, weil sie als „widerständige Elemente“ kleingehalten und, etwa im Kunstsektor, nicht gefördert werden? Wäre es, wo möglich, nicht sinnvoll, Namen zu nennen? Voss gehört zu dieser Gruppe, aber Namen wären hier nützlich, da die Lage in Deutschland vergleichsweise deprimierend ist, wenn man einmal (altersunabhängig) den Blick auf Großbritannien richtet, wo etliche Frauen sich als bedeutende öffentliche Intellektuelle außerhalb bestimmter Nischen und Milieus hervorgetan haben, z.B. Poppy Coburn, Helen Dale, Mary Harrington, Helen Joyce, Louise Perry, J.K.Rowling, Kathleen Stock, Emma Webb (Musterbeispiel eines in Intonation und Artikulation würdevollen und respektgebietenden Vortragsstils):

– wo sind Personen von vergleichbarem Format in Deutschland?

(3) „Während die sprachlichen Regeln und Kategorien angeblich alle sexuellen Subjekte davor schützen sollen, ausgeschlossen zu werden, schließen sie aufgrund ihrer Komplexität absichtlich den Großteil der Bevölkerung aus. Begriffe wie ‚grey-sexuell‘ oder ‚demiromatisch‘ dienen nicht der Verständigung, sondern der Distinktion des Sprechers. Am zeitgenössischen sexuellen Diskurs teilnehmen zu können, ist aufgrund des nötigen Vorwissens ein Zeichen von intellektuellem Prestige.“ (Ebd.: 54) – Leider hat Voss hier eine Gelegenheit ungenutzt gelassen. Intellektuelle Distinktion beim Geplapper über die immer mehr Leute immer mehr und sinnloser konsumierende Sexualität? Distinktion auf welchem Niveau? Es wäre m.E. an der Zeit, hier aggressiv in den Klartext-Modus überzugehen: Es ist die Pseudo-Distinktion für Midwits und Sub-Midwits, denen alle Distinguiertheit abgeht und die nicht im Ansatz über nennenswerte intellektuelle Fähigkeiten verfügen, sonst würden sie intellektuelles Prestige aus ganz anderen Dingen herzuleiten versuchen. In Ermangelung von etwas, das auch nur entfernt nach bescheidenem geistigem Talent aussieht, wird auf Grundschulniveau in peinlichen Zankereien über nichts hyper- und pseudodifferenziert, während man ernstzunehmenden Stoff intellektuell weder bewältigen kann noch sich an ihn herantraut, vermutlich aber auch nie darauf kommen würde, damit überhaupt etwas zu tun haben wollen zu können, da dazu jeder genuine Antrieb und die Geisteskraft fehlt, mit der er sich verbünden könnte. Gemäß den Universitäten der hedonistischen Massendemokratien und den dort verschleuderten Klopapierzertifikaten handelt es sich bei solcher Distinktion um die Triumphe derer, die es für einen Hochbegabungsnachweis halten, das neueste Suhrkampheftchen einigermaßen problemlos lesen zu können. Natürlich wird Voss keinerlei noch so minimale intellektuelle Herausforderung darin sehen, sich solche Sprachspiele nebenbei anzueignen, falls es für ihre Arbeit nötig sein sollte, aber es wäre zu wünschen, daß sie dabei mitwirkt, solchen lächerlichen Distinguiertheitsprätentionen den Anschein jeglichen Geltungsanspruch zu bestreiten.

Voss bringt Frische in eine geistig allzu hüftsteife Öffentlichkeit, die intelligente, auffallend gut und elegant formulierte Widerworte mehr als nötig hat. Zudem hat Voss, was alles andere als leicht ist, einen Zugang zu Foucault präsentiert, der ihn nicht zum linksakademischen, den Leser schon bei der Erwähnung des Namens zum anhaltenden Gähnen verdammenden Agendaclown macht; dementsprechend überrascht es nicht und erfreut ausdrücklich, daß Voss gemäß der unvorbelasteten Eigenständigkeit, mit der sie das Thema angeht, ohne akademische Fußnoten und (notgedrungen) masochistische Referenzen auf die sogenannte "Foucault-Literatur" (schlimmstenfalls "Foucault-Forschungsliteratur") auskommt. Beeindruckend ist auf jeden Fall, wie unbeeindruckt Voss von den eingeübten Immergleichheiten ist. Hoffen wir, daß sie sich als Fanal erweisen wird – gerade für die Frauen ihrer Generation, die sich hoffentlich zunehmend aus der Deckung wagen werden.

Literatur:
Deleuze, Gilles (2005): Schizophrenie und Gesellschaft. Texte und Gespräche von 1975 bis 1995. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.

Metz, Markus/Seeßlen, Georg (2011): Blödmaschinen. Die Fabrikation der Stupidität. Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Sonnemann, Ulrich (1989): Rehabilitierung des Unverfügbaren oder Warum erst Vernunft, die auch über sich selbst sich noch aufklärte, eine ist. In: Gerhard Bolte (Hrsg.): Unkritische Theorie. Gegen Habermas. Lüneburg: zu Klampen, 67 – 79.

Voss, Pauline (2024): Generation Krokodilstränen. Über die Machttechniken der Wokeness. München: Europa Verlag.

The Philosophical Encounter Between Kondylis and Lykiardopoulos

Fast forward thirteen years: Kondylis has completed his studies in Greece and has translated ten titles from Italian, German, English, and French into Greek for Kalvos publishing company. He has also recently submitted his doctoral dissertation at the University of Heidelberg. The books he translated reflect his interests at that time: Ideology by John Plamenatz; The Social History of Art by Arnold Hauser; History of Bourgeois Society by Leo Kofler; The Philosophy of the French Revolution by Bernard Groethuysen, to name a few.1 Between the translations and the dissertation intercede also two unpublished small essays, the first focusing on utopian constructions (1971), the second on Lukacs (1975).2 His almost two-hundred-page introduction to the translation of Machiavelli’s writings, published in 1971, signifies also Kondylis’s entrance to the scholarly world.

While at first glance the subject of his dissertation—the emergence of dialectics in German idealism—seems to be detached from his earlier historical and political inquiries, in reality it constitutes a continuation and a deepening of it. It represents an examination of the prehistory of Marxism,3 and more specifically, of its all too glorified method: the dialectic. The title of the dissertation was Die Entstehung der Dialektik: Eine Analyse der geistigen Entwicklung von Hölderlin, Schelling und Hegel bis 1802 [The Emergence of Dialectics: An Analysis of the Intellectual Development of Hölderlin, Schelling and Hegel until 1802] and its purpose is to show that dialectics, the pulse of Marx’s theoretical system, arose out of a metaphysical need and was an “idealistic construct”.4

At any rate, our focus here is not on Kondylis’s dissertation, but rather on a theoretical exchange he had with his old friend from the journal Martyries, Gerasimos Lykiardopoulos, one year after its submission. This is a theoretical encounter that Kondylis wanted to translate and publish in German,5 but for different reasons did not manage to. The discussion was initiated in November 1977 by Marios Markidis, who published an article in the journal Simeioseis titled “Erich Fromm: The Fear of Freedom and its Cure”. The article is presented in the form of a letter addressed to Antonis Lavrantonis, who had previously expressed orally his reservations about Fromm’s attempt to revitalize the vocabulary of “atheist humanism”. In his article, Markidis expounds on Lavrantonis’s positions and expresses also a moderate ‘metaphysical distrust towards the social dogma of man’.6 A few months later, Kondylis wrote an article aiming to shed further philosophical light on the reservations expressed by Marios Markidis. An exchange of philosophical ideas between Kondylis and Lykiardopoulos ensued, which centered around the same political and ethical predicament: the texture and fate of revolutionary ideologies. Ioannidis is right to observe that the exchange between the two philosophers is essentially a ‘dispute between a Thucydidean and a romantic conception’7 of human affairs.

This exchange between Kondylis and Lykiardopoulos holds great importance for several reasons. Firstly, it is the first publication in which Kondylis outlines a rough framework of his philosophical system. The two essays published in the journal Simeioseis serve as a precursor to central ideas that some years later would become developed and refined in his primary philosophical work, Power and Decision. Thus, these two relatively compact essays also serve as an introduction to the philosophical principles guiding Kondylis’s thought and offer insight into the chronological development of his ideas. Furthermore, these essays are significant because they elucidate how Kondylis’s philosophy diverges from approaches aiming to retain their emancipatory character, and more specifically from what he would later call ‘militant theories of decision’. Kondylis firmly emphasizes the complete and irreversible separation between the Is and the Ought while Lykiardopoulos refuses to make this distinction the cornerstone of his thought. In reality, we are dealing here with a Kantian and a Hegelian reading of Marx.8

Let us now delve deeper into this interesting philosophical discussion. Kondylis’s initial essay is titled “The Old and the New Deity” and its objective is to provide further substantiation for Markidis’s thesis. His motivation lies in scrutinizing the philosophical presuppositions of what is broadly termed the “atheist humanist” tradition. As a result of this scrutinization Kondylis draws certain unfavorable conclusions about the nature and destiny of emancipatory thought. The main core of his argument is relatively straightforward: all ideologies and worldviews share a common conceptual structure, which can be subjected to scientific examination.9 Conflicting ideologies do, of course, appeal to radically opposing ideas, but this difference pertains only to their content. A historian of ideas seeks to identify the identity of their conceptual structure and should not be distracted by content variations.10 The distinction between the conceptual structure and the content of a given worldview constitutes a step towards the understanding of how human thought functions in general. It also mirrors the form and content distinction founded in the science of logic— an observation of primary importance because Kondylis believes that typical logic has the capacity to remain historically neutral, with its fundamental principles (the law of contradiction, the principle of identity, etc.) being used by various agents to prove different points.

Let us return to our main topic. After establishing the critical distinction between the conceptual structure and the content of a given worldview, Kondylis seeks to synthesize the diversity of existing worldviews into a single, coherent, and representative formula. To be comprehensive, this formula must take into consideration the inherent historical plasticity of human thought. Kondylis argues that there are sufficient grounds to believe that every historical worldview is rooted in an explicit or implicit dualism, dividing the world into an Empirical Here (Εντεύθεν/Diesseits) and a Transcendental There (Εκείθεν/Jenseits).11 This dualism suggests that the Transcendental There embodies the true essence of the world, with the Empirical Here conforming to the dictates stemming from the transcendental constructed reality. In other words, the dictates that emanate out of the Transcendental There form and shape the worldview of a given society.

In essence, Kondylis addresses here the classic problem of metaphysics and attempts to provide a theoretical solution that renders this issue more comprehensible. One of his central aims is to elucidate how intertwined the construction of a metaphysical worldview and the production of moral principles are.12 Every philosophical construction, according to Kondylis, bears the imprint of this dualism and in its quest for intellectual supremacy it nullifies opposing worldviews, having as an aim to expand its own sphere of influence. The various modern theories of human “alienation” —whether they come from the Left or from the Right—are merely variations of this primordial human need, since they implicitly or explicitly imply that the current state of man is not yet perfected or completed—a better version of humanity is to expected to emerge when this or that theoretical dictate is realized in the future. It is important to note that the historical actors must remain unaware of the distinction discussed above. By overlooking what they share with their adversaries (the identity of conceptual structure), they can find the necessary psychological motivation to oppose them and fight them.13

To illustrate this idea further, Kondylis considers the recurrent historical phenomenon of two religions vying for spiritual supremacy. The theoretical foundations of their respective doctrines are clearly based on this dualism, and Kondylis’s formula captures successfully this dynamic. Complications arise, however, when historical actors embrace and profess a certain version of secularized humanism. Kondylis is in this case equally adamant: secular humanism is making use of the exact same conceptual structure that is so characteristic of the religious worldview. It may occasionally instill in us the impression that it carries its own unique and peculiar logic,14 which cannot be deduced to religious forms of reasoning, but this is only an optical illusion.

Kondylis here draws from scholars like Karl Löwith,15 Rudolf Bultmann,16 Carl Schmitt,17 Reinhart Koselleck,18 and the Lexikon Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe to support his argument that modern (atheistic) modes of thought bear striking structural similarities to premodern (theistic) ones. There is no need here to delve into the details of each separate study to which Kondylis refers. Suffice it for now to mention that the idea of progress, central to modernity’s self-understanding, is considered by these scholars as a secularized adaptation of the Christian eschatological view of history. Kondylis takes this conceptual appropriation seriously for understanding the mechanisms of ideologies and worldviews. The distinction between conceptual structure and content, along with the recognition that a social group must appropriate its opponent’s conceptual structure to rise to dominance, are two central motifs that Kondylis seizes upon, and which shape the core of his approach to the history of ideas.

Kondylis thus claims that “atheist humanism”, knowingly or unknowingly, adopted the conceptual structure of Christianity. To explain this paradoxical development, Kondylis turns his attention to what is generally seen as the culmination of modern atheistic and emancipatory thought: the writings of Karl Marx. He begins his analysis by noting that Hegel expanded the semantic meaning of history to the extent that it virtually eliminated the traditional metaphysical distinction between Transcendental There and Empirical Here.19 This led to the elevation of new abstract concepts (notably, the human subject and history), whose function was to provide a substitute for the lost transcendental realm. In other words, the notions of history and humanity were recruited to recompensate for the loss of the traditional metaphysical realm—modernity, as every historical epoch, was in search of its own idols.

Marx too followed closely this pattern, further emphasizing the idea of man as the master of his historical destiny.20 However, according to Kondylis, Marx’s analyses suggest that the idea of man does not correspond to the empirical man of his society. The realization of philosophy, taking the form of a classless society, is thus postponed to the future. Kondylis remarks: ‘the “alienated” Here of man pales in comparison to the immaculate There, which serves as the absolute standard of reference and comparison’.21 To this Kondylis adds that the ontologizing of the immaculate There would not have been achieved if Marx had not presupposed a theory of human nature and if he had not implicitly considered man as being capable to achieve the “good” and the “rational”.

In summarizing his discussion regarding the ideological nature of the concept of progress and the complementary belief in the “alienation” of man, Kondylis makes an observation of crucial importance. This observation allows us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations that lie behind his own philosophical project. Kondylis points out that Hegel’s and Marx’s utilization of history reflect an ‘ideological employment of historicism’ which should not be expected to arrive at a more ‘scientific theory of human nature’.22 Most practitioners of historicism have typically emphasized that ‘everything in the human world is the product of its historical causes, that it is made by its specific temporal context […] so historicism led to the denial of an eternal human nature or reason’.23 Kondylis seems to suggest that this approach requires modification. He remains a resolute historicist in the sense that he denies the existence of an eternal human reason. Nonetheless, he seems to be calling for a radicalization of historicism itself. The fundamental insight of historicism, that everything in the human world is historically conditioned, has the potential to lead us to a deeper understanding of the very nature of what it means to be human to the extent that such a theory would be composed out of strictly historical, empirically falsifiable, material. In short, Kondylis views history as a tool to develop a theory of human nature, rather than the other way around. He is acutely aware of the theoretical pitfalls associated with the postulation of a dogmatic theory of human nature that would limit human historical activity to either its spiritual or biological component.24 In fact, one of the central goals of his book Power and Decision is precisely the overcoming of this dualism. At any rate, Kondylis considered authors like Thucydides to have already arrived at similar conclusions.25 His personal mission consisted in reviving their anthropological approach by renewing its terminology and making it match the standards of modern scientific discourse.

Lykiardopoulos responded to Kondylis’s philosophical objections with an eloquent and impassionate essay. While Lykiardopoulos agrees with the main points of Kondylis’s argumentation and shares the Frankfurt School’s concerns about the risks associated with developing a new positive, emancipatory doctrine, he is nonetheless unable to accept Kondylis’s value-nihilistic claims, which ‘eliminate the contradiction from the world’26 and reduce all worldviews to the “identity of the conceptual structure”. The Greek essayist remarks that ‘our objection towards these sentences is not directed against their logical validity […] but rather against their tautological method, which is encapsulated in these sentences in a form of a conclusion’.27 These remarks bear the stamp of Adorno’s negative dialectics and the latter’s attempt to develop a philosophy which aims at ‘the dissolution of standpoint thinking itself’.28

In a typical dialectical fashion, Lykiardopoulos contends that Kondylis uses the ‘myth of truth’ to ‘destroy the ‘truth of myth’,29 that is, he clings to a mythical concept of philosophical “truth” which enables him to undermine or overlook the genuine suffering inherent in human life. In a similar vein, Lykiardopoulos argues that Kondylis’s equation of every thought into a rigid logical formula extinguishes the diversity and singularity of human life, treating them as mere semblances and deceptions. Lykiardopoulos essentially accuses Kondylis of perpetuating the inherent fallacies of the ‘logic of identity’, which ‘always seeks to deny, repress, and violate otherness, difference, and singularity’.30 He simply cannot tolerate the idea that thought is eo ipso an instrument of power, since the real ‘issue is how each one of us lives and dies’.31 The Greek essayist concludes that ‘contradiction is an integral element of thought’32 and as such it cannot be subordinated to rigid logical formulas.

Kondylis continues the dialogue with an essay titled “The Bright and the Shadowy Sides of Visions”. He immediately expresses his surprise at Lykiardopoulos’s acceptance of his individual observations while rejecting the larger conclusions drawn from them and accuses his interlocutor of making unwarranted logical leaps and of misinterpreting his theses.33Kondylis clarifies that he never claimed that the employment of his concept of the “identity of the conceptual structure” negates the plurality of historical manifestations. Instead, his text highlights the complementary relationship between the two concepts.34 The “identity of conceptual structure” is the common source which enables different historical actors to encounter each other and fight for the same space. Consequently, Lykiardopoulos’s accusation that Kondylis reduces the manifold of human experience to the simple is outright false. His philosophical motivation is exactly the opposite: he seeks to find epistemological tools through which he could render to an extent graspable the capacity of historical agents with completely different ideological convictions to fight for the same space.

Kondylis faced similar criticism multiple times during his lifetime, and it is thus worthwhile to open a parenthesis to delve further into the matter. Whether Kondylis employed philosophical formulas like the one presented above or utilized Weberian “ideal-types” to capture the dynamics of historical and sociological phenomena, the primary accusation remained consistent: his approach to human affairs is perceived as indifferent to the multifaceted nature of human reality. Let us closely examine the reasons Kondylis put forth to justify his scientific activity. Kondylis reminded Lykiardopoulos that while nobody has ever consumed a “fruit” in their entire life, but only an “apple”, a “banana” and so forth, we are still obligated to use the term “fruit” for the sake of precise communication.35 Consequently, abstract philosophical or historical schemata are necessary for accurate scientific communication and are indeed unavoidable, even in the most basic usage of language.36 Generic protestations against philosophical or historical abstractions are futile and do nothing more than signify the protester’s dissatisfaction with the inherent limitations of human cognitive abilities.37The real issue for Kondylis is not the use of abstraction, which is unavoidable, but rather its effectiveness in capturing the essence of inherently dynamic phenomena. In a letter to his friend Spyros Tsaknias, Kondylis explained why a critique of his book The Decline of Bourgeois Civilization missed the essence of scientific activity.

The major -and basically, the sole- criticism of my book consists in the argument that it condenses reality in one schema and that it thus leaves out of the picture the real agonies of human beings, the antithetical currents, etc. This is an allegation that can be raised against every book that is driven by an ambition to generalize […]. But [conceptual] schemes and abstractions are entirely inescapable, as anyone should know who uses the word “fruit”, although, as Hegel says, nobody ever ate a “fruit” but an apple, an orange, etc. In my book I emphatically stress that the conceptualization of reality and reality itself are two completely different things.38

The last sentence is crucial. Kondylis explains that his conceptualization of reality and actual reality are two distinct things. Hence, he clearly admits that his theory is only an interpretation of reality and does not claim to have discovered its ultimate essence. Following Max Weber’s methodology of the social sciences, Kondylis insists that the use of abstraction in science is legitimate provided that the scientist clarifies that his formulas are not reality itself, but just a means to rationally reconstruct it. Discussing the role of “ideal types” in the social sciences, Weber writes:

an ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidely emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical research faces the task of determining in each individual case, the extent to which this ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality […] the ideal-type is an attempt to analyze historically unique configurations or their individual components by means of generic concepts.39

One could argue that Kondylis’s ‘morphology of thought’40 is an attempt to apply Weberian mental constructs in the domain of thought rather than in history. In a letter to Lavrantonis, Kondylis explains: ‘it is very difficult for one to find something better than the study of thought structures’.41 Since Kondylis believes that human thought is a historical activity, and not something which occurs outside the temporal and spatial boundaries of any given concrete situation, the application of such mental constructs in the sphere of the mind could be considered legitimate to the extent that they can withstand the tribunal of empirical verification. In fact, Kondylis seems to believe that the superiority of his approach is derived precisely from its ability to remain as closely attached to history as possible and from its capacity to bring within its purview a plurality of human phenomena. Therefore, Kondylis requests that critics like Lykiardopoulos demonstrate explicitly how and in what sense his abstract philosophical schema is unsuitable for describing a particular object of study.42 He would, together with Wilhelm Dilthey, claim that ‘the best way to find out whether a knife is sharp is to use it. The fruitfulness of a method can only be established by making discoveries by means of it’.43Furthermore, Kondylis challenges Lykiardopoulos’s assertion that he treats the differences between conflicting sides merely as phenomenal. He contends that the battle between these sides is infused with the existential vitality so characteristic of human social life.44 What Kondylis considers phenomenal is the claim by historical actors that their worldview represents the “true” reality and their subsequent calls for the eradication of human suffering and domination. On the one hand, Kondylis emphasizes the catalytic roles of ideas in shaping human experience. On the other hand, he deems it scientifically unacceptable to accept their content at face value. Therefore, he seeks to create an interpretive scheme which would explain the paradox that human beings are existentially dependent on the content of specific ideas, which, from a scientific point of view, cannot be deemed legitimate.45

Lykiardopoulos responds that Kondylis still operates within the epistemological illusion of organic wholeness, an illusion which has tormented European philosophical consciousness at least since Descartes. For Lykiardopoulos and other members of the Simeioseis circle, such epistemological fantasies are not only impossible but also politically regressive. According to Lykiardopoulos, Kondylis appears to be seeking a conclusive Hegelian Aufhebung, a philosophical synthesis which would encompass the entirety of human activity through stifling conceptual schemes. In his closing sentences, Lykiardopoulos remarks that ‘no matter how much craft of abstraction I try to assemble, I cannot see into a man who is being crashed nothing else than what he is today’.46 This final judgment echoes once again the teachings of critical theory, and in particular Adorno’s perspective that ‘the only philosophy which can be responsible practiced in the face of despair is the attempt to contemplate all things as they would present themselves from the standpoint of redemption’47 and that ‘the need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth’.48

Ioannidis has accurately observed that Kondylis’s and Lykiardopoulos’s philosophical exchange revolves around a crucial passage from Karl Marx:

For each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution comes forward from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class.49

As mentioned at the beginning of the exposition, it is the paradox of revolutionary process that which is truly at stake in this discussion. Kondylis forcefully asserts that history’s testimony has convincingly demonstrated that every single liberating vision of society ultimately transforms into a new form of domination. The task for Kondylis consists in comprehending the deeper philosophical, sociological, and anthropological reasons underlying this transformation by utilizing available historical material to formulate a theory of human nature. Five years before this exchange, Kondylis had described succinctly his philosophical standpoint in a letter addressed to his friend, Antonis Lavrantonis:

Unfortunately, I do not have enough reserves of delusions to work for the good of humanity. The only thing I have in sufficient amount is the theoretical curiosity, and I use it to study the mechanisms of mutual devouring or the mechanisms of the ideological whitewashing of this mutual devouring, which is one and the same thing.50 On the other hand, Lykiardopoulos perceives Kondylis’s scientific realism as a capitulation to existing conditions, as a refusal to acknowledge that every social organization harbors inherently possibilities of social and political salvation.

Ultimately, Kondylis’s understanding of Marxism as an ideology among others led him to the relativization of modernity in toto. Having to a large extent absorbed the teachings of the German historicist tradition, Kondylis attempted to address the challenge of epistemological skepticism through a radicalization of historicism’s foundational premises. The ascertainment of the relativity of worldviews constitutes for Kondylis the first step toward the construction of a sound scientific theory of human affairs, i.e. of a political anthropology that takes into consideration the inherent plasticity of the human condition. Contrary to a number of currents of the second half of the twentieth century, which, forced by the disasters and the disappointments of the first half of the century, refused to develop an anthropology in positive terms, and usually found refuge to the declaration of a negative of anthropology or the ‘death of man’, Kondylis believed that such adversities provided the perfect material out of which a political anthropology could be constructed. His ‘morphology of thought’ was only the first step towards this direction.

By Sokratis Vekris

I. The Problem of Skepticism in Post-War European Political Thought

The development of Kondylis’s philosophy cannot be properly understood without grasping the roots from which it sprang. He himself admits in multiple occasions that his experience with Marxism played a crucial role in shaping the direction of this thought.1 His ideas were no doubt cultivated in Greek soil and carry within them the traces of such origins. However, as he began to follow the theoretical developments that were part of a broader Western discourse, his Greek origins fused with the international horizon of his time. While Greece in the 1950s and 1960s was a country deeply wounded by the scars of the Greek Civil War (1944-1949), and while the political and cultural hegemony of the victorious right-wing establishment reigned undisputed, the country did at the same time undergo a series of economic, social, and political changes which were aimed at the modernization of the country according to the standards of the Western liberal model.2 Notwithstanding the peculiarities of the Greek case, we must first place Kondylis’s intellectual development within the context of post-war European political thought.

The 1950s and the 1960s have been described as a period of “consensus politics”, a time when the center expanded and extreme forms of political radicalism gradually faded away.3 The reason is plain enough: the rehabilitation of post-war European democracies took place ‘with an eye both to the immediate fascist past and to the claims their Eastern rivals were making to embody true democracy’.4 This double threat—fascist past on the one hand, Soviet danger on the other—led most European countries to establish some kind of compromise between liberal and socialist values.5 Kondylis would some years later state that the liberal ideal of typical equality was reinterpreted by the democratic ideal of material equality.6 The regulation of the economy by the welfare state, the accommodation of pluralism, and the construction of a supranational European identity in an era which had demographically and geopolitically experienced the ‘dwarfing of Europe’7 after centuries of economic and political dominance, became central issues on the political agendas of socialists, liberals, and conservatives alike.8 This consensual reigning attitude, psychologically driven by what Judith Skhlar has aptly termed as the ‘liberalism of fear’9 — that is, fear of the extremes, fear of totalitarianism—, animated, by and large, the overarching mental climate of these decades. In the field of political theory, the situation evoked several responses, ranging from a retreat to positivism to the call for a return to the natural law tradition of classical political thought.10

Finding themselves in this political landscape, a large portion of the most sensitive Marxist thinkers arrived at a serious political deadlock. On the one hand, they faced what seemed to them as an undesirable, reformist compromise between the ideals to which they had invested their spiritual energies and the liberal status quo, which for years had constituted their ideological archenemy. On the other hand, as it became increasingly visible—and the evidence did accumulate day by day—that the Soviet Union had not established socialism on earth, they could no longer maintain their uncritical support for it; historical reality confronted them with a set of new difficulties. Suffice it to recall that Khrushchev’s Secret Speech was leaked to the West in 1956 and caused understandable bewilderment among the leaders of the respective Communist Parties. The same year also witnessed the Hungarian Uprising and its subsequent crushing by the Soviet tanks.11

Several other social and political developments were at odds with certain tangible historical predictions of Marx’s sociological schema: the emergence of a consumer society or what J.K. Galbraith named in 1958 ‘the affluent society’ straightforwardly contradicted Marx’s prediction that the development of capitalism would necessarily lead to the impoverishment of the working class. This led several Marxist political theorists such as Herbert Marcuse to declare ‘the absence of demonstrable agents and agencies of social change’12 and the subsequent need to reevaluate certain core aspects of the Marxian legacy. Furthermore, the decolonization revolutions in Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam showcased once again the inadequacies of Marxian economic determinism in making sense of contemporary political developments.13 Last, but not least, the Sino-Soviet split in 1961 should have made apparent even to the most stubborn sympathizers that the communist cause was ‘neither a monolithic bloc nor a coherent alliance, let alone a viable alternative world order’.14

The result was a pervasive feeling of puzzlement. The age-old question among the radicals of the New Left was raised anew: what is it to be done? The first task at hand, which had already been taking place since the 1930s, was to determine what kind of society was the Soviet Union. This was a duty of existential importance, even for those individuals like Kondylis who very soon acknowledged the shortcomings of the Soviet experiment. It also signaled the only way through which a concrete understanding of their contemporary situation could be achieved. The second one, for those at least who were ready enough to admit the most blatant failures of “actually existing socialism”, was to begin looking for alternative research programs, which would salvage, if not Marxism itself, at the very least the idea of human emancipation. In short, something needed to be rescued: whether it was the idea of socialism from the writings of Marx, Marx from its Stalinist distortion, or, in the most extreme cases, the Soviet Union itself from its alleged Western propaganda, remained a matter of dispute and depended on the background, preferences, and commitments of the individual in question.

Notwithstanding the variety of responses, we should keep in mind that the political outlook of the New Left that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century differed substantially from the classical Marxist tradition. For to remold or even completely abandon central Marxist categories (such as the world-historical mission of the proletariat, the notion that history is governed by certain immutable law, etc.), essentially implied to question the very premises of the Marxian corpus — oftentimes to even question Marx himself. Not surprisingly, then, Leszek Kołakowski titled the third volume of his magisterial work, Main Currents of Marxism, which deals with the canon of the Western Marxist tradition and whose major theorists (the Frankfurt School, Lukacs, Gramsci, etc.) were the major source of inspiration for the New Left, as “the Breakdown” of Marxism. The different variations of Marxism that emerged after what Kołakowski refers to as “The Golden Age” reflect a historical disintegration of this tradition for the simple reason that these movements were not anymore in the position to support those elements of Marxism that once had imbued it with the vitality and optimism which enabled it to become an active motor of historical change. Kołakowski remarks: ‘Marxism […] would not be Marxism without its claim to “scientific knowledge”’ and without its ability to offer clear-cut historical prognoses’.15

In an unpublished essay from 1964, Kondylis, sensing the theoretical and practical set of difficulties at which Marxism had arrived, boldly claimed that Marxism ‘has been overcome as a revolutionary ideology’.16 He was one of the few of his generation to dispel so quickly and categorically what he thought to be an antiquated creed— but certainly not for the same reasons as his liberal or socialist contemporaries. At the same time, however, the gradual demystification of Marx’s writings led to the rise of a persistent political and philosophical skepticism. What seemed to be here at stake was not the failure of this or that political ideology to carry through its potential, but rather the ‘growing doubt about the ability of reason to provide absolute, universally valid foundations for moral and political values’.17 Behind the political failure of Stalinism lay a deeper philosophical one, which was connected to the collapse of the idea of progress that had constituted the backbone of both the Marxist and the liberal philosophies of history. The collapse of modernity’s grand narratives, famously enunciated by Francois Lyotard some years later, loomed large in the horizon. In the words of Shklar: ‘the urge to construct grand designs for the political future of mankind is gone. The last vestiges of utopian faith required for such an enterprise have vanished’.18 Kondylis’ philosophy is the product of this great disillusionment; his “descriptive theory of decision” stems out directly from this political deadlock.19

II. Student Years and Political Activism

After graduating from Kifissia’s High School in 1961, Kondylis enrolled as a law student at the University of Athens only to realize that his chosen field of study could not satisfy his deeper philosophical inclinations, which had been gradually developing since his early adolescence. Consequently, he decided to interrupt his studies in law and to apply the following year to the university’s philosophy department to study classical philology. He ranked first among four thousand candidates in the rigorous—and notoriously psychologically torturous—Panhellenic exams and secured a scholarship from the Greek State Foundation (IKY) for the duration of his studies. During the next four years he attended lectures and seminars by esteemed Greek professors in the fields of classical philology, history, linguistics, and philosophy. Among his notable professors was the distinguished neo-Kantian and Platonist philosopher, Ioannis Theodorakopoulos (1900-1981), with whom Kondylis would some years later share his enthusiasm and discuss in private the subject of his doctoral dissertation.20 Other notable professors whose lectures Kondylis regularly attended included the Byzantine historian, Dionysios Zakynthinos (1905-1993), the linguist Georgios Kourmoulis (1907-1977), the philosopher and pedagogist, Konstantinos Spetsieris (1899-1989), the philologists Georgios Zoras (1908-1982) and Konstantinos Vourveris (1899-1978), and the archeologist Spyridon Marinatos (1901-1974).

Parallel to his studies, Kondylis continued to independently explore numerous topics of interest, ranging from philosophy to politics, and from history to literature. Despite the diversity of his inquiries, history—-in the broad sense of the word—-emerged as the overarching backdrop that united his early intellectual pursuits. He developed a habit of transcribing extensive passages from classical authors in their original languages, be it ancient Greek, French, Italian, or German, while keeping copious notes on the marginalia. He kept a separate notebook for the examination of classical, historically-oriented writers, such as Thucydides, Montesquieu, Marx and Engels, and Benedetto Croce; he dedicated separated notebooks to the study of history proper, mainly using the multivolume book Histoire Générale des Civilisations by Andre Aymard and Jeannine Auboyer as his main source; another for the study of the towering figures of sociology; and lastly, he transcribed a vast array of articles from contemporary Greek journals that had piqued his interest.

Even though his extensive notes on Thucydides indicate quite clearly that Kondylis had, from the age of eighteen, formed a very basic sketch of what would later evolve into a comprehensive political theory—distinction between facts and values, ideology as an essential driver of human history, human nature as an anthropological constant—this did not immediately discourage him from becoming involved in a number of political activities of his time, which were part of the left democratic movement. This is entirely natural considering, first, that similar problems abound in the Marxian corpus as well, and second, that he had not yet matured intellectually to be in the position to make categorical dismissals.

Kondylis became a member of the student journal Panspoudastiki [All-Student], which was originally founded in 1956. He participated in the Fourth All-Student Congress, which took place on April 1963 and whose topic was educational reform. He was also a member of the Lambrakis Democratic Youth,21 a political organization which was triggered by the assassination of the political activist and member of the United Democratic Left (EDA), Grigoris Lambrakis in 1963. Mikis Theodorakis, the renowned communist composer, was the leader of the movement. It should be noted here parenthetically that the period between 1956 and 1965 saw a shift in the parliamentary outlook of the country, which gradually—and as it turned out, only temporarily—led Greek politics to overcome its post-civil war heavy conservative leanings.22 The turning point of this shift were the 1961 elections, in which the political leader of the Centre Union, Georgios Papandreou (1888-1968) accused Constantine Karamanlis of committing electoral fraud. This chain of events, coupled by the increasing dissatisfaction of the Greek people, and especially of the student movement, with the “Cyprus Problem”, allowed for the first time a centrist party to rise to power in 1963, somewhat balancing the post-war right-wing conservatist monopoly of power and discourse. Kondylis saw this development positively.23 In short, Kondylis became involved in political activism at a time when Greek politics were themselves, at least for a brief period, experiencing a moment toward the establishment of a more liberal parliamentary system, trying to leave its civil war wounds behind. This shift was also manifested, or even incited, by the growth, flourishment and political radicalization of the student movement,24 in which Kondylis belonged and formed his first political experiences.

The Panspoudastiki journal maintained links with EDA since its inception, but gradually began to take on its own independent identity. In 1962, the year during which Kondylis also joined the organization, Stelios Ramfos (1939), a Greek intellectual and friend of Kondylis, who became the chief of the editorial board, implemented a series of changes related to its internal functioning and organization: the newspaper was aesthetically and technically updated; the editorial board was expanded to include individuals who were not affiliated with the Party; and the content was diversified, with issues related to culture and civilization becoming of prime importance.25 Older renowned poets like Giannis Ritsos and Georgios Seferis, who, incidentally, represented vastly opposing political ideologies—the former being the poet of the Communist Party par excellence, the latter, a diplomat, representing the conservative establishment—, published their poems in the journal. The thing to remember about Kondylis’ involvement in this organization is that he became a part of a vibrant intellectual community that promoted dialogue and politicization, while opposing blind partisanship.26 It was within this organization’s offices that he met several individuals, with whom he would maintain contact until the end of his life. These included the chief editors of Panspoudastiki, Stelios Ramfos and Giannis Kalioris; his future publisher at Kalvos publishing house, Giorgos Chatzopoulos (1938); the Greek psychiatrist Ioannis Tsegkos; and Kosmas Psychopaidis (1944-2004), a Greek social and political philosopher and student of Habermas, who later played a role in Kondylis’ decision to study in Frankfurt.

III. The Journal Martyries and the Paradox of Ideology

Within this atmosphere, Kondylis moved about, encountering people of diverse backgrounds at the university and other settings, and as a young student looking for answers, he ‘lended one’s ears to all kinds of heretical views’.27 Sometime during the second year of his student years, the psychiatrist Ioannis Tsegkos, recognizing Kondylis’ intellectual acumen, introduced him to his friend and colleague, Marios Markidis (1940 – 2003),28 with whom he thought Kondylis would have much to share. Markidis belonged to a group of intellectuals of leftist origins who had quickly recognized the impasses Marxism faced in the light of the Stalinist experience. Markidis recalls: ‘We, the politically suspicious sect of the 1960s! Leftists, but not so “ordinary” leftists’.29 In other words, they represented a rather heretical undercurrent of the Left.

The intellectual platform that brought these individuals together to discuss their political and philosophical concerns was the journal Martyries [Testimonies], which was founded in 1961 and was active until the establishment of the Regime of the Colonels in 1967. Although the influence of the journal on the broader public was rather limited, it nevertheless played a decisive role in introducing several previously unknown figures of the Western Marxist tradition to Greece. After the fall of the military junta in 1974, the individuals behind the journal Martyries founded a new journal, named Simeioseis [Notes], along with a publishing company called Erasmos, both of which remain in operation today. Some of the key figures within this group, who belonged to the same generation as Kondylis, included the translator and essayist, Gerasimos Lykiardopoulos (1936), the philosopher Stefanos Rozanis (1942), the poet Viron Leontaris (1932-2014), the poet Markos Meskos (1935-2018), and the lawyer Andreas-Kitsos Milonas (1938-2004).

Kondylis became associated with this group of people and participated regularly in heated discussions, which often departed from pure politics to delve into more fundamental philosophical questions underlying Karl Marx’s emancipatory project. These included the meaning and limits of human freedom, the biological and psychological conditions that determine the human condition, and the multiplicity of perspectives that have existed about such questions and may just as easily emerge in the future.30 These are, in embryonic form, the central questions that would tantalize Kondylis until the end of his life. While politics remained the central axis around which the thought and discussions of the Martyries circle revolved, aesthetics, psychology, and philosophy formed an indispensable part of their understanding of it.

Ultimately, the journal Martyries became, in the 1960s, a platform for Marxist-inspired emancipatory thought, which was equally opposed to the crudest versions of Marxist orthodoxy and to the reigning liberal or conservative status quo. Describing the outlook of this group of people, Fotis Terzakis, an associated member himself of the next generation, concludes that the individuals composing this intellectual group was something akin to the Frankfurt School of the Greek intellectual world.31 Indeed, the thought of the core members of the Martyries group is characterized by what Judith Shklar has named ‘the romanticism of defeat’; that is, by an ‘aesthetic idealism [which] survives only in its negative form, as a basis for social criticism. Again, the dramatic view of life as struggle remains, but it is now a story of defeat’.32

To better understand how the intellectual identity of this group was forged, it is necessary to take a step back and examine two figures from the Greek Trotskyist tradition, whose unresolved internal disagreement shaped the journal’s identity. The story leads us back to Agis Stinas (pseudonym for Spiros Priftis) (1900-1987), one of the most prominent figures in the history of Trotskyism in Greece. As it is well-known, Trotskyism, as a political ideology and movement rooted in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, was viewed as the nemesis of Stalinist orthodoxy.33 Despite undergoing numerous transformations, Trotskyism maintained an internationalist outlook throughout its existence, rejecting Stalin’s idea of “socialism in one country” and perceiving the Russian worker’s state as the first act in a global proletarian revolution destined to unfold elsewhere. Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky’s acclaimed Polish biographer, who never concealed his unreserved sympathy for the Russian revolutionary, accurately asserts that ‘for a whole epoch Trotskyism was the sole revolutionary alternative to Stalinism’,34 at least from the standpoint of the Left.

The status of Trotskyism in Greece was no different. Marginalized by the official line given by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), it fought its battle in the realm of ideas.35 In the context of Greek politics, Stinas and other Trotskyists opposed both the capitalist establishment and the Stalinist leadership of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and argued for a more internationalist approach, in line with Trotsky’s critique of Stalinism and his pressing for “permanent revolution”. However, Stinas was forced to abandon his Trotskyist ideals after certain events that took place after the Second World War, which shattered his beliefs.36 The Greek political philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997), a friend and comrade of Agis Stinas during that period, retrospectively described why the events that took place in Athens in December 1944, also known as “Dekemvriana”, could no longer be explained by typical Trotskyist or Marxist categories.37

Out of these bitter disappointments, a tripartite schism emerged in Stina’s team in 1948.38 The schism was later embodied by two charismatic individuals, who, despite their marginal role in shaping mainstream discussions, played a crucial role in shaping the mental climate animating the journal Martyries.39 The first figure is Antonis Lavrantonis (1920-2023), a lawyer who began his political action as a Trotskyist and ended up developing—always orally—a theory of human affairs that doubted the very possibility of the betterment of human relations. A certain eerie sense of fatalism permeated the teachings of this man, who captivated the minds and irritated the ears of his young audience, and occasionally ‘transformed radically the universe of [their] ideas’. Markidis recalls:

Lavrantonis did not write; he spoke. And what he said transformed radically for most of us the universe of our ideas. It was not only that he grounded our various enlightened flights abruptly. The most important thing was that he placed the axioms of humanism itself within brackets, presenting it as a human-centered perspective, which, in order to realize its ideals, must subjugate nature – selfishly devour it and destroy it. Lavrantonis saw history as an expression of a fate that began before any political economy, before Marxism, perhaps with Darwin and Freud […] In this sense Lavrantonis was not in the mood for anticommunism. But he did not feel obliged to declare himself an antifascist either.40

Lavrantonis’ influence on young Kondylis has been well-documented.41 His critique of various aspects of Marxist theory along with the development of a philosophical outline which provided an interpretation of the socialist failure, played a decisive role in forcing Kondylis to quickly abandon his emancipatory ideals. The second figure is Manolis Lambridis (pseudonym for Manolis Leontaris) (1920-2002), who was also a former Trotskyist and for years an employee of the National Bank of Greece, and the spiritual father behind the journal Martyries. Lambridis was also the first Greek Marxist who advocated—contrary to orthodox beliefs—for the autonomy of the aesthetic realm, mainly through the introduction of Lukacs’ ideas. He preferred the fragmentary nature of the essay form to convey his ideas, a practice that became characteristic for most members of this intellectual circle.

What united these two figures was their shared recognition of a common political deadlock: the dispelling of the illusion that Russia resembled anything close to a socialist country. On this point both parties concurred. What separated them was the theoretical tools they employed to navigate and finally overcome this deadlock; on this point Lambridis and Lavrantonis spoke a wholly different language. The philosophical gulf separating them became apparent in a theoretical encounter which took place in the tenth volume of the journal Martyries in November 1964. We will discuss later the subject and the ethical predicament of the discussion—which would, thirteen years later, mutatis mutandis, be repeated, this time by Kondylis and Lykiardopoulos; the former echoing Lavrantonis’ position and the latter Lambridis’.

To comprehend the intellectual environment that Kondylis had knowingly or unknowingly entered, it is necessary to consider some of the critical points raised by Lavrantonis during that period. At the time Kondylis joined the group, Lavrantonis rejected several key notions of the Marxist-Leninist heritage: the concept of a Leninist avant-garde; the distinction between “utopian” and “scientific” socialism; the feasibility of a transitional phase towards socialism; and the occurrence of a proletarian revolution in Russia (arguing instead that it was a popular revolution like many others in history). The last two points constitute central arguments of Labriola in his book Al di là del Capitalismo e del Socialismo [Beyond Capitalism and Socialism],42 which Kondylis was reading with great enthusiasm at the time. Particularly important must have been the central argument put forward by Labriola that ‘a connection between capitalism and socialism cannot be established’43 since socialism pre-existed capitalism. Such an examination of socialism implied a radical dissociation of its content from any sort of evolutionary philosophy of history and necessitated an understanding of it as a constantly recurring historical phenomenon; the problem of socialism was in this way reduced to the schema: rulers and oppressed.

This is why Lavrantonis believed that while Marx’s anatomy of capitalism retained its contemporary relevance and, in this sense, remained a consistent materialistic doctrine, his eschatological and messianic elements, which were part and parcel of Marx’s vision of historical development, imbued his thought with an unmistakable idealistic component. Last, but not least, Lavrantonis consistently criticized those who conflated the economic category of “relations of production” with the legal category of “relations of ownership”, since he had observed that this conceptual confusion led many apologists of the Soviet Union to cling to the idea that the relations of production had been socialized in the Soviet Union, merely because the titles of ownership had become directed by the state.44

The question concerning the social and political nature of the Soviet Union had been explored by various other prominent Marxists of the preceding generation. Trotsky himself was one of the first individuals to observe that communist Russia experienced the rise of a new “bureaucratic caste”, which had wielded political power and was in control of the state. Nevertheless, the Russian revolutionary insisted that since this “bureaucratic caste” did not have ownership rights over the means of production, it could not be classified as a new ruling class. Instead, he interpreted the emergence of this new bureaucratic class as a byproduct of Russia’s political and social backwardness.45 In 1964, the journal Martyries released a brochure featuring Pierre Naville’s work titled “Bureaucratization”.46 In this work, Naville criticized the work of two prominent figures: the Italian political theorist Bruno Rizzi (1901-1977) and the American political philosopher James Burnham (1905-1987).

It was through this publication that Kondylis first encountered the ideas of these two scholars. It is noteworthy to point out that both Rizzi and Burnham initially identified as Trotskyists. As a matter of fact, Burnham was a member of the Socialist Worker’s Party in the United States led by Max Schachtman, a member of the Fourth International, and had personally met Leon Trotsky.47 Burnham’s influential book, The Managerial Revolution, first published in 1941, played a particularly crucial role in shaping some of his perspectives on the questions mentioned above. In fact, Kondylis was so captivated by Burnham’s arguments that he decided to translate a few sections of the book he deemed important, so that he could share them and discuss them with his friend Lavrantonis, who could not read English and had only second-hand knowledge of his ideas.48 This was also the sample he shared some years later with his future publisher to prove his abilities in the art of translation.

Burnham’s book, significantly influenced by Rizzi’s La Bureaucratisation du Monde [The Bureaucratization of the World], published a few years prior, addressed for the most part the critical question related to the social and political nature of Russia. Burnham sought to determine whether Russia could be viewed as representing a socialist society in the making, a transformed form of state capitalism, or an entirely new historical phenomenon. While, as we saw, Trotsky insisted that the new “bureaucratic caste” could not be perceived as a new dominant, exploitative class in the traditional sense of the word, since the new legal framework had nationalized the means of production, Rizzi counterargued that the “bureaucracy” could indeed become the dominant class without requiring formal ownership titles provided that it retains control over the state and the management of production.

Through the manipulation of state mechanisms, the bureaucracy collectively appropriated all surplus value and participated in an organized and systematic exploitation.49 To put it plainly, Rizzi’s argument is the following: state-directed control of production is something fundamentally different from the socialization of the relations of production. Hence, the bureaucracy represents a new ruling class in the very traditional sense of the word.50 The natural and paradoxical conclusion stemming from such an understanding of Soviet Russia was, as Aron sarcastically remarks, that the ‘European Left has taken a pyramid-builder for its God’.51

Burnham embraced the key ideas put forth by Rizzi and aimed to further clarify the role and features characterizing this emerging ruling class. A crucial argument presented by Burnham is the shift from the traditional bourgeois capitalist, who owned and operated their business and was instrumental in the success of capitalism, to a new anthropological type he termed “the managers”. Burnham believed that the transition to the “managerial” society manifested itself more conspicuously in the Communist and Nazi regimes, but he was convinced that similar developments were taking place in the United States. The key to understanding this change was the separation of ownership and control of production.52 While the traditional bourgeois capitalist owns the means of production, the manager maintains an administrative position. The actual ownership of the means of production now resides with the stakeholders,53 who lack the ethos of the classical entrepreneur—- they no longer retain ownership of a business in the conventional capitalist sense.54 This is the major thread that runs throughout Burnham’s book, and which convinced Kondylis that the world was witnessing a social and political shift of global proportions.

Burnham’s book is crucial in understanding the evolution of Kondylis’s thought for several reasons. First, it offers a subtle sociological explanation that delineates the differences between traditional bourgeois capitalism and what Burnham terms “managerial” capitalism, a concept also referred to by other writers as “state-capitalism”, “bureaucratic collectivism”, and so on. Second, it links this sociopolitical transformation to broader structural changes taking place in Western societies, thereby providing a comprehensive theory of historical change, which, however, is devoid of the eschatological presuppositions of the Marxist framework. The transformation of a given political structure must surely find its corresponding manifestations in the socio-economic and intellectual fields. Years later Kondylis would offer a much more nuanced and comprehensive theory of this historical change in his The Decline of Bourgeois Civilization. In a small article which summarizes some of the positions of this book (and of his book on conservatism), he states:

This process [the emergence of mass-democracy] was accompanied by an extensive democratization in all areas and the emergence of new elites in business and politics, which largely displaced or replaced the old bourgeoisie; incidentally, their own composition in personnel changes much faster compared to earlier ruling groups due to the generally increased social mobility. Managers, technocrats, and yuppies are sociological types and functionaries that are fundamentally different from the bourgeois; today, when considering the overall picture, bourgeois lifestyle fulfills the same picturesque-mundane tasks that once were carried out by some survivors of aristocratic families.55

Third, Burnham’s theory aligns with overarching conclusions from political theorists like Mosca, Pareto, and Michels, who, since the end of the nineteenth century, posited that historical experience teaches us that the “iron law of oligarchy” and the “circulation of elites” are inevitable outcomes of any historical phenomenon, democratic ones included. The doctrine stemming from the writings of these theorists was both anti-Marxist and anti-liberalist: they reproached both traditions for unjustifiably making the economic factor the centerpiece of their conceptual analysis, whereas they believed that politics is an autonomous realm.56 Fourth, Burnham, much like Kondylis, perceived scientific activity as a “descriptive” rather than a “normative” endeavor.57 More generally, it must be underlined that Burnham’s political thought, although later regarded as a typical specimen of American conservatism, had its roots in the empiricist and historicist tradition rather than the tradition of natural law, which was typical of other representatives of American conservatism.58 This explains why his analysis resonated so deeply with Kondylis. Indeed, in his introduction Kondylis defends Burnham’s book from various critics precisely by invoking its ability to draw convincing historical analogies.59

While Rizzi and Burnham were arguably the first to forcefully argue that the Russian “bureaucratic” class was a new dominant class, albeit with different characteristics, the debate continued to echo throughout the 1950s and the 1960s. In Greece, Cornelius Castoriadis, the pupil of Agis Stinas, wrote in 1950 an article with the title “The Relations of Production in Russia”, which directly criticized the alleged socialization of the relations of production in this country.60 Since 1945, the Greek philosopher had similarly come to the conclusion that the ‘nationalization of the means of production are not related to socialism’61 and that the Soviet Union had saw the emergence of a new dominant bureaucratic class, which clearly took advantage of its position of power, despite not having itself the ownership of the means of production.62 This led Castoriadis to the conclusion that Russia is a class society, in which the bureaucracy had taken the role of the bourgeoisie and that the ‘basic distinction of all contemporary — Eastern and Western—societies is not anymore the division between owners and not owners of the means of production, but rather the division between managers and executors’.63 Given the close relationship between Stinas and Lavrantonis, it is reasonable to assume that Kondylis was aware of Castoriadis’s critique and that it provided further grounds for his critical disposition towards the Soviet Union.

Another at least partially disillusioned Marxist, George Lichtheim, commenting on the contemporary situation of socialism in Europe during the time Kondylis was translating Burnham’s book, also realized the importance of the shifts taking place on a global level due to the rise of such bureaucratic sociopolitical structures:

What is the relevance of this “bureaucratic collectivism” to the so-called “new class” of managers or administrators? First of all, what is called managerialism obviously relates to all types of advanced industrial society; whether capitalist or socialist, democratic or authoritarian, pluralist or one-party, Western or Eastern. In other words, being a global phenomenon associated with what may be termed bureaucratization, it cannot be pressed into service for purposes of argument in a controversy between liberals and socialists.64

This novel understanding of Russia and the subsequent “bureaucratization” of the world delivered the final blow to the Marxist philosophy of history, as it managed to expose several predictive inconsistencies of the Marxian schema, the most important one being that socialism was not necessarily the historical stage following capitalism. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had experienced its own Thermidorian Reaction, which turned out to be even more nightmarish: a bureaucratic Leviathan whose new ruling class ‘would resemble the ancient nobility rather than the bourgeoisie, for it would combine military, political, economic, social, and cultural functions—something the European middle class never managed to do on a national scale’.65 Trotsky’s “betrayed revolution” offered for a few years a theoretical antidote to the paradoxes arising from Stalin’s brutal regime. In the 1950s and the 1960s, however, historical reality could no longer be ignored: the majority of Western Marxists began to gradually understand that uncovering what went wrong with the Soviet Union necessitated digging even deeper and examining flaws within Marx himself. Not coincidentally, committed Trotskyists like Isaac Deutscher regarded the entire discussion on the “managerial revolution” or “bureaucratic collectivism” with clear hostility.66

This radical critique of the U.S.S.R. and the subsequent understanding of Marxism as an eschatological philosophy of history brought to the fore the problem of ideology with renewed urgency. If Marxism had been used and was still being used to justify the crimes and atrocities of an authoritarian regime, its examination as an ideology and not as a “science” (or, at the very least, as a science and as an ideology) was a matter of paramount importance. As mentioned above, within the circles of Martyries, the need for this reexamination took place in 1964, when Lavrantonis and Lambridis published two articles on the concept of ideology. In what was meant to be the sole piece of published writing of this mysterious individual, Lavrantonis titled his essay “The Revolutionary Ideology and its Adventures”, while Lambridis named his own as “The Problem of Ideology”.67

The common ground that both shared was an understanding of ideology as ‘false consciousness’. However, Lavrantonis counterposed ideology with the notion of scientific research.68 Lavrantonis argued that the contemporary social democratic movement—in all its different guises—is merely a transformation of a primordial human longing to retrieve a Golden Age free from evil, a longing common to all religious doctrines and countless myths created throughout human existence. Every time this notion of emancipation emerges, notes Lavrantonis, it ‘stumbles upon the insurmountable objective conditions that this prevent its fulfillment’.69 Since the recovery of a human paradise, where exploitation of man by man will ceases to exist, is deemed de facto impossible, i.e., a utopia, all that remains is a scientific understanding of the deeper mechanisms perpetuating the human condition.

Lambridis, on the other hand, while animated by a spirit of ‘tragic humanism’,70 had no time for the fatalism characterizing the tone of his interlocutor. He argued that although communism may have distorted the writings of Marx, this distortion does not negate Marx’s ultimate message. Hence, Lambridis, following Lukacs, counterposed ideology with the notion of class consciousness. Ideological is a form of thought that distorts and conceals class interests; only the ruling class has an ideological consciousness, not the oppressed one. The contemporary consciousness of the proletariat is not identified with the members of a specific class, but with humanity as a whole.71 All in all, Lambridis criticized contemporary civilization without ‘looking forward to some definite result, but as the only means to salvage his existential integrity, even within conditions of a predetermined collapse’.72

After this heated discussion, Kondylis wrote an unpublished paper titled “The Revolutionary Ideologies and Marxism”, in which he declared the bankruptcy of Marxism as an ideology, he identified a thread necessarily connecting its major historical protagonists—Marx, Engels, Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin73—and described the four historical stages that all revolutionary ideologies essentially undergo: first, the emergence of a spontaneous and unsystematic revolutionary ideology; second, the systematization of the revolutionary ideology, which is now supplemented by an organized worldview; third, the distortion of the ideology’s meaning by the ideological epigones, who are forced to act according to practical historical needs; and fourth, the complete ideologization and conservatization of the revolutionary theory.74

Where does all of this lead us? In one of his interviews, Kondylis explains that his experience with Marxist theory was crucial in at least three main respects.75 First, he understood very quickly that at the heart of Marx’s theory lies what he calls the interweaving of Being and Ought. This means that a noble hope or ethical imperative (the classless, non-antagonistic society) is presented as constituting reality itself: economic and historical determinism become, in the works of Marx and his successors, laws of universal validity, the Being of society as such. This drove Kondylis to adopt a scientific imperative: the radical disjunction of Is and Ought, of fact and value, of descriptive and normative judgments. This is, for Kondylis, the conditio sine qua non of scientific activity—even if (or perhaps precisely because) it is in principle almost impossible to fully achieve. This realization also led him to construct a genealogy of this phenomenon, tracing the interweaving of Being and Ought through four major worldviews: the ancient, the Christian, the bourgeois, and the mass-democratic. He then identified their common enemy, with which Kondylis wholeheartedly—and somewhat provocatively—identifies: the specter of value-nihilism.

Second, the problem of ideology (or, more broadly, of the ‘metaphysical need of man’) became for him an issue of central importance. Immersing himself into the writings of German historicism, Weber, Mannheim, Nietzsche and a handful of other thinkers, led Kondylis to realize that ideological forms of being constitute the natural human condition. Human society cannot do away with either ideology (of the ruling class) or utopia (of the oppressed class). Both are expressed in terms of value preferences and are thus stricto sensu metaphysical. Moreover, when utopian yearnings succeed in gaining historical and political prominence, they are automatically transformed into a new ideology. For Kondylis, there is no way out of this vicious cycle; history records no utopia achieving the liberating ideals set at the outset of its process, as the example of the Soviet Union forcefully showcased. Utopians of all sorts are future candidates for power. However, the fact that ideologymconstitutes such an all-encompassing aspect of human reality did not lead him to embrace a paralyzing form of skepticism, but rather it motivated him to seek a viable epistemological solution that would incorporate the polytheism, clash, and incompatibility of different values and worldviews in it.

Third, after rejecting the economic determinism common to both the Marxist and liberal schemas, he concluded that it is not the economy but politics—the Political—that is the engine that drives human history. The bourgeois illusion that the economy will supplant politics and eliminate war and human suffering can only be understood if we recognize that such a development was employed by specific individuals as a weapon in their struggle for political power. The predominance of the economyin modern capitalistic society—the economization of the political— is neither a neutral nor a “natural” phenomenon. Nor does it have the final say in the unfolding of history.

Since the mid-2010s (and especially since 2022), Russian officials and ideologists have been actively promoting the project of a ‘sovereign’ Russian philosophy that purifies itself from destructive foreign influences, establishing the basis for a new state ideology. The concept of ‘sovereign’ philosophy is dualistic, offering two possible interpretations. It can be viewed as a completely novel undertaking, a fresh start that demands immense intellectual capacity. The latter is currently absent, as evidenced by recent manifestoes that are usually stuck at the level of defining the boundaries (by exploring whether a ‘sovereign’ philosophy should have a corresponding ‘sovereign’ nomenclature and field of research). An alternative, more pragmatic option is to capitalize on the achievements of the predecessors by selecting concepts that align best with the political and ideological objectives of the government. This latter goal, however, requires a clear distinction between those who belong to the canon of ‘sovereign’ Russian philosophy and those who do not. A short list of names (such as Carl Schmitt and Iwan Ilyin) is already in the canon because of their enduring significance for the official discourse. In most cases, however, the jury is still out on whether a Russian or non-Russian philosopher should be included, ignored or outright excluded. This uncertainty is exemplified by the recent debate surrounding Immanuel Kant’s ‘Western’ cosmopolitanism, sparked by the statements of the governor of the Kaliningrad Region.

In the case of Nikolai Berdyaev, one of the most prominent political philosophers in the Russian intellectual tradition, the decision has currently fallen in his favor. This decision was the outcome of a long-term development which many scholars would characterize as the gradual emergence of post-Soviet conservatism in Russian politics. However, this picture only includes ideological claims rather than a detailed examination of how specific concepts are employed to justify political decisions in various fields. In what follows, I will first provide some examples of Berdyaev’s significance for the current Russian political discourse. I will then show that the official impression of Berdyaev’s suitability for the ‘sovereign’ ideological canon stems from a lack of knowledge about his political ideas. Lastly, I will explain why Berdyaev’s political thought can be most useful for a critical evaluation of Russian pseudo-conservative politics in the broader framework of the contemporary crisis of conservatism.

1.               Berdyaev and the ‘Sovereign’ Canon

During a conversation with the families of soldiers who perished in Russia’s war against Ukraine, Putin mentioned Nikolai Berdyaev and Immanuel Kant as two of his favorite philosophers. While the mention of Kant’s name can be explained by his 300^th anniversary (instead of the unlikely possibility that Putin has read Kant’s works), the appearance of Berdyaev’s name has a different cause beyond his recent 150^th anniversary. For a long time, Berdyaev enjoyed popularity in self-described conservative pro-government circles and in Orthodox circles in Russia and beyond. Moreover, Russian politicians and bureaucrats have been mentioning his name on official occasions since the early 2010s. During a party congress of “United Russia” back in 2013, Berdyaev’s books as well as those by Ilyin and Solovyev were gifted to the party members – with the explanation that one must be familiar with Putin’s favorite thinkers. The claim does not look unfounded, as during his annual Presidential address to the Federal Assembly on December 12, 2013, held just a few months before the annexation of Crimea, Putin made reference to Berdyaev’s definition of conservatism from the fifth letter (chapter) of Philosophy of Inequality (1923):

We know that there are more and more people in the world who support our position on defending traditional values that have made up the spiritual and moral foundation of civilisation in every nation for thousands of years: the values of traditional families, real human life, including religious life, not just material existence but also spirituality, the values of humanism and global diversity. Of course, this is a conservative position. But speaking in the words of Nikolai Berdyaev, the point of conservatism is not that it prevents movement forward and upward, but that it prevents movement backward and downward, into chaotic darkness and a return to a primitive state.

In the works of ‘conservative’ Russian ideologists, we come across numerous laudatory references to Berdyaev’s thought. Alexander Dugin, in his Fourth Political Theory, praises Berdyaev’s concept of the new Middle Ages (Dugin 2012, 69). Alexander Prokhanov, who also makes frequent allusions to Berdyaev (primarily to his criticism against the Westernizers among Russian intellectuals), back in 2014, characterized Berdyaev’s ideas as the essence of future state ideology. (Of course, there are exceptions to this general pattern; for instance, authors from the ultraorthodox camp centred around certain media, such as Tsargrad, are more cautious in their evaluation of Berdyaev’s political thought due to his criticism against monarchy.)

Given this, it is not surprising that Berdyaev’s name plays a prominent role in the current debates on ‘sovereign philosophy’ that have gained momentum since February 2022. Apart from the standard claim that Berdyaev, like many intellectuals from Plato to Heidegger, would undoubtedly endorse the ‘special military operation’ and Putin’s politics in general, the arguments in favor of Berdyaev’s inclusion into the ‘sovereign’ canon can be divided into three groups.

First, it is argued that Berdyaev advocates the necessity of a new Medieval era, essentially a reversal of history. As mentioned before, this interpretation is primarily promoted by Dugin, who regards it as perfectly aligning with his concept of Russia as a non-modern (or pre-modern) state. It mainly stems from a misreading of Berdyaev’s theory of history and historical development, which I will briefly address later.

Second is the assertion that among Russian philosophers in emigration, Berdyaev was the one who showed the greatest support for the Soviet Union and Stalinism. The claim is based on the fact that the late Berdyaev gradually accepted the necessity of revolutions throughout Russian history. However, it is also generally known that, even in the late period (1930s–1940s), Berdyaev harshly criticized communism. Furthermore, Berdyaev’s related argument that Russian history is a series of discontinuities due to revolutions and revolts might undermine political and ideological attempts at selective instrumentalization of historical examples on the level of conservative rhetoric.

Thirdly, a number of ideologists from the Izborsk club circle argue that Berdyaev’s late concept of the ‘Russian idea’ (from his 1946 work of the same name) can be used as a foundation of contemporary national ideology. For instance, Vitaly Averyanov’s 2021 book Mental Map and the National Mythos («Ментальная карта и национальный миф») was seen by many of his colleagues as a direct continuation of Dostoevsky’s and Berdyaev’s analysis of Russian national type, this time with a 20^th-century focus. Given Berdyaev’s criticism against real politics in the Russian Empire, this claim turns out to be quite challenging to justify.

Lastly and most broadly, Berdyaev is considered by many Russian officials, Putin himself included, as a conservative thinker and thus a forefather of today’s ‘new Russian conservatism’ (to use a popular notion from contemporary Russian studies). In the next section, I will address this final point by focusing on Berdyaev’s works that specifically examine the historical background and fundamental traits of Russian conservatism.

2. Conservatism in Berdyaev’s Political Philosophy

Berdyaev’s interest in conservatism as an ideological movement arises early in his intellectual career. In an essay published in 1904, he examines the conservative ideas of Boris Chicherin (1828–1904), one of the most respected Russian jurists and legal philosophers at the time. Describing Chicherin’s key work Science and Religion (1879), Berdyaev, in his usual sharp style, makes the following remark from the standpoint of his conception of freedom, which remained a central theme in his thought throughout the middle and late periods:

He [Chicherin] understands religion as a conserving force, not a liberating one. It preserves the old economy, family, state and other foundations of life. Therefore, the birth of new life forms is out of the question. Chicherin is a very versatile and strong thinker, yet he always lacked creativity and defended a form of Hegelianism that considers the truth to be discovered once and for all. It was somewhat dreary and stuffy to live in this rationalistic dungeon of Kantian Hegelianism, where all search had already ceased. (Berdyaev 1904/2002, 230)

Berdyaev follows up by claiming that, for him, Chicherin’s quest for a stable foundation of life, knowledge, morals, family, and state is too conservative, lacking the boldness needed to look for a new, transfigured kind of human being. Still, he gives Chicherin explicit credit for his outstanding defense of natural law theory (ibid., 231). In a note to this passage, Berdyaev makes it clear that he regards Chicherin’s approach as conservative, despite him being “one of the strongest theorists of liberalism”. These remarks are not as contradictory as they could seem, as Chicherin combines the notion of individual reason (from the liberal tradition of political thought) with conservative topics and goals.

In December 1904, Berdyaev publishes his programmatic essay The Fate of Russian Conservatism, which focuses on why Russian conservatives could not overcome the deep crisis they faced since the late 19th century. Berdyaev points out that these days, Russia has no genuine conservative journals anymore. Instead, there are many allegedly conservative pro-government newspapers, like Our Life («Наша жизнь»), Son of the Fatherland («Сын Отечества»), or the recent editions of The New Times («Новая газета»). In Berdyaev’s words, “those from whom one could expect all kinds of betrayal, betrayal of literature to those in power, could not be accepted into the literary family. A literary movement can only be recognized as ideological if it respects ideas and free thought, providing literature with an independent creative value” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 256).

Berdyaev’s criticism of Russian conservatism as an ideological movement is severe. He argues that in Russia, conservative thought has not survived as a legitimate intellectual movement, as it eventually degenerated into a shallow pro-government agenda with no proper intellectual core to speak of. Understandably, this development was accompanied by a loss of intellectual freedom. Berdyaev elaborates on these arguments by comparing the current state of conservatism with its early stages. For him, the standard of a proper conservative intellectual movement is the Slavophilia movement during the mid-19th century. The ‘proper’ label does not mean the movement was exclusively conservative, as it contained “many progressive elements and demands that were common with the opposing camp of Westernizers” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 257). According to Berdyaev, Slavophiles attempted to combine two opposites – freedom of the people and the mystically grounded authority of the ruler (which at the time did not equal an unconditional justification of actions of real rulers). This strategy was doomed from the start, not only because there was not much to conserve (a problem unique to Russian conservatism; see Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 265) but also because “freedom cannot be built on the authority of power which is its opposite.” More precisely, freedom can only be desired “by people themselves” rather than by rulers who frequently seek to enslave their subjects (ibid.). According to Berdyaev, it is understandable that the romantic approach of the Slavophiles “has undergone a realistic decomposition” (ibid.), transforming into etatist positivism, a “governmental conventionalism” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 258), as exemplified by people like the journalist Mikhail Katkov and his even less gifted followers (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 258–259; Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 259–260). As soon as this process concluded, every idea was lost. Now, there was “only power, naked, uncovered, and shameless” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 258–259).

The bureaucratization of conservatism has affected intellectuals who were once part of the conservative movement. Berdyaev describes the results of this influence as a “flight from the conservative camp of all that is alive, talented and honest” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 260). Among many examples he mentions is Vladimir Solovyev, who became a brilliant critic of conservatism and nationalism, “unveiling the irreconcilable contradictions between bureaucratic conventionalism and the universal principles of the Christian religion” (ibid.). Another example is Vasily Rozanov, whose romantic approach to conservatism was “abhorred by the practice of gloomy reactionism, by the bureaucratic rather than mystical sanctioning of life” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 261). Berdyaev even goes as far as to characterize Konstantin Leontyev as a thinker who, despite the essentially reactionary and misanthropic character of his religious philosophy, did not fit into political schemes of bureaucratic conservatism (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 260).

For Slavophiles in Berdyaev’s description, the authority had to be complemented by the creativeness of the national spirit. Only half of this concept has survived in subsequent generations of conservative authors, as the veneration of authority “has quietly devolved into servitude to the fact of power itself” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 259). Behind the formal mask consisting of references to the “common good” and calls for a violent rescue of the Russian people hides the utilitarian bureaucratic conservatism that “with its every manifestation denies absolute values, inalienable rights, the religious and metaphysical meaning of freedom” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 264). According to Berdyaev, the conservative political system in Russia “is an organized, nihilistic (in the most precise sense of the word) denial of culture, denial of religion, philosophy, science, literature, art, morality, law, all the spiritual content of human life. Our conservatives have turned into true nihilists, maintaining a conspiracy against all creativity in life” (Berdyaev 1904a/2002, 265).

Berdyaev’s anti-authoritarian approach to conservatism reminds us of the old (aristocratic) conservative European tradition before the French Revolution. Berdyaev’s conclusion on the fate of Russian conservatism in the late 19th century can, in some essential aspects, be applied to Western conservative traditions. He brilliantly recognizes the disease that plagued conservatism during the 19th-century crisis due to the gradual erosion of religious authority and rapid technological developments. His diagnosis also sounds like a forewarning, forecasting many later developments, from the ones during the 20th-century Interwar period to the contemporary events unfolding before our eyes.

Early Berdyaev’s understanding of conservatism is decisively anti-etatist and anti-authoritarian. Did his views drastically change during the Revolution or as a consequence of Berdyaev’s forced emigration, as his contemporary political readers seem to imply? Let us first look at further examples of Berdyaev’s analysis of conservatism, starting with Philosophy of Inequality (1923), which serves as a reference in Putin’s 2013 speech. In this work, Berdyaev’s focus shifts from the origins and development of Russian conservative thought to conservative principles themselves. Accordingly, his judgement of conservatism is less harsh, as he is more interested in the question of the possibility of conservatism as a contemporary intellectual position. The shallow and imitational bureaucratic conservatism is studied as one of the major causes behind the Russian Revolution, which, according to Berdyaev, was driven by an equally shallow ideology.

At the beginning of his fifth letter, On Conservatism, Berdyaev argues that a conservative environment is essential for the development of creative individuals (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 119). For Berdyaev, this kind of conservative depth that contrasts with external and political conservatism can be found in great individuals, such as Goethe, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, de Maistre, Pushkin, Dostoevsky, Leontyev, Solovyev, and many others (ibid.). These individuals search for new life forms without placing their beliefs in revolutionary ways. Internal (intellectual) conservatism is opposed to the revolutionary spirit, as the latter “throws everything past into the devouring abyss of the future” (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 120). However, respecting the past does not entail deifying its idealized image by leaving out all “ugliness and abomination” (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 121) and solely focusing on the beauty in what is long gone. Instead, it is the respect for “the beauty of the present that is now, after the transformation of the past by the struggle of eternity with time” (ibid.). For Berdyaev, one illustration of this type of beauty is an old church that appeals to us not because we can instantly picture how it looked some 500 years ago but because we find it beautiful in its current state (ibid.).

Instead of idealizing conservatism in all its forms simply as an opposition to revolutionary thought, Berdyaev makes an explicit point about what should be preserved. He once again differentiates between intellectual conservatism and reactionary politics with its bureaucratic conservatism:

The truth [правда] of conservatism is not in impeding creative movement but in preserving and resurrecting the eternal and imperishable of the past. Still, in the past, many things were corruptible, sinful, evil, dark, and thus doomed to fire. The preservation of all husks of the past […] is a bad, evil, negative conservatism. This conservatism prepares revolutions and is their culprit. The rotten, decaying processes of the past have no right to be protected. (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 124)

Without mentioning specific examples and names, Berdyaev refers to reactionary, inert conservatism as a type of conservatism that “has done more to compromise all conservatism than anything else.” This kind of conservatism and its opposite side and nemesis, which is revolutionism, worship death (that is, decay or destruction) rather than life (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 125).

According to Berdyaev, every culture requires both a conservative and a creative element, and it can perish if one suppresses the other. In public life, conservatism prevents the destruction of the “social space formed by the creative and organizing work of history.” At this point, we encounter Berdyaev’s argument mentioned by Putin:

The meaning of conservatism is not to prevent the forward and upward movement but to prevent the backward and downward movement toward chaotic darkness, a return to the state that preceded the formation of states and cultures. (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 130).

However, as Berdyaev emphasizes once more, conservatism can become a force that prevents the forward and upward movement if it “thinks itself as the only cosmic origin of human life and thus becomes hostile to the creative origin” (ibid.). The chaotic, formless darkness (a description that reminds us of Nietzsche’s concept of the Dionysian) is not inherently evil, as it can be enlightened and creatively transformed rather than sanctified. The role of conservatism is not to violently suppress but to promote any organic development by ensuring that “the future does not eradicate the past, but continues to develop it” (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 133). In contrast, a false conservatism that impedes development quickly becomes tedious and repulsive, driving a wedge between the government and its citizens (Berdyaev 1923/2012, 133–134).

As we can see, Berdyaev does not abandon his previous views on conservatism. While revolutionism is now the main target of his criticism, he further elaborates on his distinction between intellectual and bureaucratic, real and false conservatism. Much as he did in his 1904 essay, he stresses the importance of creative freedom that should complement conservative thought. From Berdyaev’s perspective, political conservatism’s abandonment of these principles (or rather of the idea of ever pursuing them) is one of the primary causes of the Russian Revolution.

While the late Berdyaev did not publish further essays that specifically focus on social and political facets of conservatism, he touches on a number of conservative concepts in various works. In The Russian Idea, he looks at conservatism from the panoramic perspective of Russian intellectual history. He largely attributes the “traditional and conservative character” of Russian thought to Byzantine cultural influences (Berdyaev 1948, 5). He also points out that the 17th century, referenced by many thinkers of Russian conservatism (and currently by a number of Russian politicians) as a ‘golden standard’, was, in fact, a century marked by schism, social radicalization, and turmoil (Berdyaev 1948, 10). Furthermore, he stresses the important differences between the Western and Russian traditions of conservatism, manifested in examples of specific thinkers like Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald; what was perceived by the Western audience as traditionalist concepts was viewed as revolutionary by Russian intellectuals (Berdyaev 1948, 35). Most of these observations on conservatism and specific conservative or liberal-conservative thinkers (like Chicherin) present an expansion and development of his early remarks. Still, there is also a crucial difference compared to earlier periods, as Berdyaev regularly addresses the limitations of conservative views of history, arguing that we “must not recognize as historical only what pleases conservative taste” (Berdyaev 1948, 129). In this context, he modifies his view of revolutionism, recognizing revolutions (and nihilism) as an integral part of Russian history (ibid.), thus significantly softening his previous opposition of conservatism and revolutionism. Instead of admiring Stalinism (as suggested by Berdyaev’s political readers in the 21st century Russia), he compromises with the fact that Russian culture per se was not completely destroyed by the 1917 Revolution.

3. Final Thoughts from a Contemporary Perspective

Berdyaev’s political philosophy is both captivating and troublesome for the ‘sovereign’ canon. His politically opportunistic readers among today’s Russian intellectuals who argue that his thought has to be studied in more detail should prepare themselves for an unpleasant surprise. The false, bureaucratic conservatism Berdyaev coherently criticizes throughout his philosophical career bears a striking resemblance to contemporary Russia. The fundamental role that freedom and creativity play in Berdyaev’s work is hardly compatible with the repressive and reactionary direction of Russian politics, which suppresses all civil efforts that do not align with the vertical of power. Berdyaev would consider the rhetoric of death and decay that has permeated the Russian political discourse as repulsive and exceedingly dangerous. His analysis of the current state of Russian politics would likely provide a similar warning against false conservatism as in his texts before and after the Russian Revolution. Finally, the general idea of a ‘sovereign’ philosophy that seeks to sever its ties with the Western tradition would appear ridiculous to Berdyaev, who was deeply integrated into the European intellectual life.

Still, Berdyaev’s ‘sovereign’ readers have got one thing right: his political philosophy is still largely unexplored and underappreciated (otherwise, there would be no plausible explanation of why he is neglected in numerous studies on the history of Russian political thought). This fact becomes even more striking if we consider that Berdyaev’s concepts and arguments can be instrumental in the analysis of the radical conservatism of Russian politics as a form of pseudo-conservatism. Berdyaev’s approach has solid foundations in intellectual history, which allows him to recognize crucial differences between Western and Russian traditions of conservative thought. As such, it could be used to put Russian pseudo-conservatism into a broader perspective of the worldwide crisis of traditional conservatism. Indeed, many problems of today’s conservatism are essentially the same unsolved issues from the 19th and 20th centuries, which were accurately diagnosed by Berdyaev a century ago. Most importantly, conservatism is still struggling to define its boundaries, primarily in relation to liberalism. Berdyaev’s analysis of the nihilistic nature of radical forms of conservatism could prove instrumental in understanding the problems that arise from this struggle. Furthermore, Berdyaev’s sober assessment of conservative thought, as well as his repeated attempts to engage conservatism and liberalism in a dialog, would be equally welcome in the current climate of political and social radicalization.

References

Berdyaev, Nikolai. The Russian Idea. New York: Macmillan, 1948.

Berdyaev, Nikolai. Sub specie aeternitatis: Opyty filosofskiye, sotsialniye i literaturnye [Sub specie aeternitatis. Philosophical, social and literary essays]. Moscow: Kanon, 2002.

Berdyaev, Nikolai. Filisofiya neravenstva [Philosophy of Inequality]. Moscow: Institute of Russian Civilization, 2012.

Dugin, Alexander. The Fourth Political Theory. London: Arktos, 2012.

The deepening rift with Western nations and the ongoing war against Ukraine foster the Russian government’s obsession with biotechnologies – as a basis for food security, a way to extend life, and, last but not least, a potentially powerful weapon in the civilizational conflict with the ‘collective West’. An in-depth examination of Vladimir Putin’s speeches and interviews from recent years reveals a substantial rise in the number of subjects pertaining to biotechnological advancements and threats. In his speech from July 2017, Putin included biotechnologies, along with digital technologies, as priority areas for future development. On another occasion in late October 2017, he bemoaned that unidentified foreign actors are, once again (given the previous incident back in 2007 when Putin imposed a ban on exporting biosamples), gathering biological samples of various ethnic groups living in Russia, which provoked a reaction from the Pentagon. In May 2020, he compared the advancement of genetic technology to space exploration and the breakthroughs in nuclear technologies in the 20th century when he announced the establishment of three genomic centers by the Rosneft corporation. In March 2022, he and a number of other Russian officials accused Ukraine of hosting biowarfare labs supported by the United States. In November 2023, at the III Congress of young Russian scientists, he emphasized the importance of studying the ‘Russian genome’ as a vital source of “good information”. Lastly, in his interview with Tucker Carlson in February 2024, Putin mentioned the danger associated with the potential to create enhanced, “genetically engineered” supermen but, at the same time, expressed his admiration for Elon Musk’s Neuralink project.

Putin’s recent comments on biotechnologies show an intriguing mix of cautiousness and boldness. He praises biotechnological advancements while harshly criticizing (real or, in many cases, imaginary) biotechnological threats. Like some of his technocratic colleagues, he repeatedly emphasizes that biotechnology can and will be used as a weapon against the Russian state and Russians as a nation (or, more precisely, as a ‘civilization’ – a concept that reflects the multiethnic nature of the country and its intricate federal system). Despite the disguise provided by the pseudo-conservative ‘civilizational’ rhetoric, this duality of Putin’s attitude reveals a potential conflict between (and within) two major groups in the Russian governmental circles, namely those who support a conservative approach to human life and those who actively support biotechnological advancements in a moderate or radical way. The first group is primarily supported by the Russian Orthodox Church with its project of ‘Orthodox bioethics’. The second is centered around technocrats, whose radical wing envisions technological breakthroughs unhindered by moral precepts. The unwritten obligation for Church officials to back all governmental decisions, including those that conflict with their beliefs, creates a divide between the theoretical project and the actual practices. In turn, the critical problem of the technocratic project, primarily its various radical versions that prioritize breakthroughs and securitization, lies in its shallow understanding of life sciences and scientific practices in general. Furthermore, this dangerous fusion of the concept of scientific breakthroughs with a heterogenous understanding of biotechnological threats is in significant ways grounded in pseudoscientific sources and conspiracy theories, like the ones about the existence of American ethnic bioweapons and Ukrainian biolabs that, for instance, use bats and birds as biological weapons. The eclectic nature of the government’s attitude toward biotechnology research illustrates its fundamentally pseudo-conservative political practices.

1. Biotechnological Initiatives and Bioethical Expertise

Putin’s interest in biotechnological subjects is mirrored by the Russian government’s rapidly increasing interest in biotechnological projects, particularly those that seek to gain greater control over this field and secure important data. In 2018, the Russian Ministry of Health founded the National Association of Biobanks and Biobanking Specialists. On November 28 2018, Putin signed the decree “On the development of genetic technologies in the Russian Federation”, which directed the government to develop a national program that would run from 2019 to 2027. Shortly after, on March 11 2019, Putin signed the decree “On the fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring chemical and biological safety for the period until 2025 and the future perspective”, which included the task of genetic passportization of Russian citizens. In December 2020, the Russian Duma and the Federation Council enacted the law “On biological security in the Russian Federation”. Among other things, this law imposed stringent restrictions on the transboundary transportation of biological material. Furthermore, in May 2020, Putin announced his intention to create a National Database of Genetic Information. This announcement was followed by a number of governmental initiatives and decrees, most notably by the 2022 amendments to Federal Law “On state regulation in the field of genetic engineering activities” and by January 2024 governmental decree “On the state information system in the field of genetic information ‘National Database of Genetic Information’” which is scheduled to go into effect in September 2024. (The database bears formal similarities to several existing biobanks in other countries, including the UK Biobank, but its primary objectives are distinctly different, as it is intended to serve as a secure repository of samples and data that should be primarily accessible to governmental officials instead of providing public access and supporting international scientific research.) The institutions with a leading role in implementing most of these initiatives are the Kurchatov Institute, headed by Mikhail Kovalchuk, and, somewhat surprisingly for those who did not follow the events in this field, the Rosneft corporation, one of the cornerstones of the Russian economy. One example of a project that Rosneft is in charge of is a large-scale database of genomic portraits, called “100.000 + Me” (“100000 + Я”). Its activities illustrate the emerging trend in Russian politics – to view individuals as the ‘new oil’, a valuable resource containing genetic information.[1]

As is customary in modern-day Russia, these and many other initiatives ‘from the top’ do not arise from a prior dialogue between the government and the expert community. Bioethical commissions (like the Synodal Commission on Bioethics, the Russian National Committee on Bioethics, or the Patriarchal Commission for Family, Maternity, and Childhood Protection) can give their recommendations and feedback. Still, they are not the main force behind most changes in the biotechnological field, nor can they significantly influence them. Moreover, proportionally to the expanding governmental engagement in matters concerning biotechnologies, the etatist (bureaucratic) agenda increasingly overshadows many existing positions in the bioethical field, blurring the arguments and silencing the voices of dissent.

In what follows, I will introduce two previously mentioned major groups that play a significant (although unequal) role in the recent developments: those affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, whose policy concerning biotechnologies is primarily based on the principles of ‘Orthodox bioethics’, and the governmental technocrats with their agenda of securitization and technological breakthrough. The brief character of the introduction allows me to mention only a few names without going into the specifics of the opinions of individual bioethicists. My main objective is to demonstrate how and why two diametrically opposed approaches to biotechnologies can coexist within the same political structures.

2. Orthodox Bioethics: Theory and Practice

Since the 1990s, the development of ‘Orthodox bioethics’ has been greatly influenced by the bioethical positions of the Catholic Church, as exemplified by the popularity of studies by Elio Sgrecchia. The fundamental principles of ‘Orthodox bioethics’, stated on the Sinodal Commission on Bioethics website, were mostly formulated in the 2000s, during a period of active cooperation with Catholics. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that ‘Orthodox bioethics’ aligns with the positions we know from the bioethical debates in which the representatives of the Catholic Church have participated. The document outlining these principles (entitled “Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church: XII. Problems of Bioethics”) begins with the following statement:

The rapid advancement of biomedical technologies that actively infiltrate the life of modern man from birth to death and the impossibility to provide, within the framework of traditional medical ethics, a solution to the moral quandaries raised by these technologies are causing grave public concern. Humanity may experience more hardship and suffering as a result of people’s attempts to put themselves in the place of God, altering and ‘improving’ His creation. The development of biomedical technologies is far ahead of our comprehension of possible spiritual, moral and social consequences of their uncontrolled application, which naturally causes deep pastoral concern of the Church. The Church bases its approach to the bioethics issues that are widely debated in the contemporary world, mainly those that have a direct impact on human beings, on the Divine Revelation of the idea of life a priceless gift of God, founded in the inherent freedom and Godlike dignity of every human being.

The statement is followed by a brief description of the Orthodox Church’s stance on abortion, contraception, surrogacy, hereditary diseases, cloning, organ donation and transplantation, same-sex partnerships, and transsexuality. Several of the arguments presented in this description align with those put forth by various Christian organizations. For instance, the hard-liner approach opposing abortions on most grounds (except situations when there is a direct threat to the mother’s life) is very similar to the viewpoint of the Polish Catholic Church.

Nonetheless, there are also significant differences which, as we will see later, affect the Russian Orthodox Church’s attitude towards specific healthcare practices. For instance, the document claims that “genetic disorders are often a consequence of neglect of moral principles, a result of a vicious way of life, which also affects the descendants.” The same argument is frequently used in publications and official statements by the Church’s representatives and those in Russian academia who hold similar or more radical views. These beliefs might occasionally prove too much even for the Russian government, as seen by the example of the (now former) head of the Vavilov Institute of General Genetics, Alexander Kudryavtsev. During a theological conference in Minsk in March 2023, he asserted that genetic disorders and humanity’s limited lifespan are caused by its original sin.

The main concern for the ‘Orthodox bioethics’ is abortion. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this subject was, once again, at the forefront of the public discussion since the government was now – more energetically than ever – searching for quick and straightforward cures to the country’s demographic problems. Initiatives that had been previously considered in the Orthodox circles were now made public together with other proposals put forward by government officials. Like the government, the Church is in favor of limiting access to abortion (a measure that has been widely unpopular in Russian society since the Soviet period, as the USSR had a very high abortion rate, for a while possibly the highest in the world). To achieve this, the Church suggests removing abortions from the compulsory health insurance system, prohibiting abortions in private clinics (a move that the government has partially implemented), considering the partner’s opinion when determining whether to carry out an abortion, and outlawing any ‘abortion propaganda’ (which, again, has been put into effect in a number of Russian regions).

The pro-life stance of the Orthodox Church is affected by several restrictions specific to Russia. While the Church strongly supports the government’s policy against abortions (a policy that never could solve the demographic crisis that was caused by a wide range of factors, including the ongoing war), it does not react to cases of forced abortions in regions with prevalently Muslim population, for instance, in Dagestan. While this position can be explained by the multiethnic and multi-confessional character of the Russian Federation, the Church’s representatives also remain silent in essential matters concerning communities with a predominantly Christian population. In this sense, the issue of hereditary and chronic illnesses is arguably the biggest obstacle to the Church’s pro-life stance. The Church’s officials systematically avoid handling cases of discrimination against specific categories of patients in Russian clinics, for instance, forced sterilization and pregnancy termination for patients with mental disabilities (a stark contrast to the previously mentioned ultraconservative agenda of the Catholic Church in Poland). The same lack of interest is exhibited in cases of doctors urging patients with chronic diseases to have an abortion, frequently without considering medical data about the risks of hereditary transmission.

The brief description of the ‘Orthodox bioethics’ is based on official documents and statements and does not encompass the whole palette of opinions of individual Orthodox priests and scholars who occasionally disagree with the government’s side on crucial issues, risking criticism and excommunication as a result. Instead, it introduces a consensus position that can commonly serve as a reference for the Church’s officials. Still, even this consensus position is a long way from the actual political practices of the Russian government, which are defined not by pro-life principles but by pragmatic interests of overcoming demographic challenges, gaining firm control over decisions concerning citizens’ private matters (like their health), and achieving technological supremacy, primarily in the military sector. These interests are represented by the technocratic group.

3. A Technocratic War Against the West?

The technocratic group in government circles is represented by those who primarily view the current isolation as a biotechnological opportunity rather than a hindrance. Their objective is to address internal (social and political) issues and, in the case of more radical interpretations, to avert possible foreign interventions by means of achieving technological supremacy. As previously noted in the text on Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson, a prominent member of the technocratic camp is the physicist Mikhail Kovalchuk, the current Director of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute” (the organization in charge of carrying out major governmental projects in the field of biotechnology) and Putin’s primary information source on biotechnological developments and threats.

Kovalchuk’s views on biotechnologies are closely related to Russian political concepts of scientific ‘sovereignty’, technological breakthrough and securitization. The fundamental component of the ‘sovereignty’ concept is the need to attain a closed cycle of scientific and technological development, using Rosatom’s full cycle of nuclear competencies as a sample. The concept of a technological breakthrough is basically a modification of the Soviet idea of scientific and technological evolution, adjusted to the new circumstances of severely limited economic and human resources (even more so during the ongoing war). The securitization aspect, which presupposes constant existential threats from weaponized foreign biotechnologies, is particularly appealing to those in Putin’s circle who are affiliated with (and/or have the mindset of) state intelligence agencies.

All these aspects are illustrated by Kovalchuk’s public remarks, most prominently by his programmatic speech delivered in September 2015 during a Federation Council session. He underlines that, in today’s international relations, “military colonization has been replaced by technological subjugation, […] mainly of developed countries” (a tendency that was observed by David Goldman in the case of China). Therefore, technological development should be a strategic, long-term priority (compared to tactical priorities, such as food and medicine production). The cornerstone of this strategic priority is “a fusion of the sciences and technological assimilation of the results of interdisciplinary research.” So far, so good, provided that we refrain from delving too deeply into specific examples of technological innovations brought up by Kovalchuk. However, the second part of his speech takes a sharp turn, as Kovalchuk lists numerous (primarily biotechnological) concerns resulting from the militarization of these innovations. Kovalchuk highlights the dangers of – allegedly already existing – “biogenetic” (meaning ‘ethnobiological’) weapons that could be used to target particular ethnos, citing unspecified DARPA agency research as an example. He also refers to the Internet as a tool for the manipulation “of individual and mass consciousness,” echoing similar remarks made by Putin, who has long maintained that the Internet was invented – and is still developed – by the CIA. By the end of his speech, the lengthy list of biotechnological threats, the majority of which come from the United States, is supplemented by strategies of “social and psychological” manipulation intended to destabilize Russia’s demographic situation by bringing about “an allegedly spontaneous reduction of the birthrate”.

The central theme of Kovalchuk’s speech and his later talks and interviews is the need to prevail in the ‘civilizational’ war with the United States – a war in the shape of a technological race. In this ‘hybrid war’, the development of biotechnologies (which are “more dangerous” than nuclear technologies), coupled with the proper moral mindset that always prioritizes the demands and goals of the state over individual freedom and needs, is the make-or-break factor in retaining Russia’s sovereignty. Quite characteristically, Kovalchuk makes no mention of the bioethical guidelines needed to regulate biotechnological advancement. Instead, he stresses the crucial role of the state (and not of the expert community) and its interests in governing this process. To put it differently, during the permanent ‘Ausnahmezustand’ (‘state of exception’) brought on by the global war the Russian government always talks about, the state alone can stop existential threats against its citizens, which is why all other concerns can only receive second-rate treatment.

While ‘Orthodox bioethics’ is one of the preferred topics for Russian mainstream Orthodox media like Pravoslavie.ru or for more radical ones like Tsargrad, the technocratic agenda is mainly found in publications of secular pro-government media. These publications often focus on human enhancement, particularly on genome editing. In 2023, the weekly business magazine Expert devoted a whole issue to this subject. The issue includes an intriguing piece entitled “Superhuman: Trying not to be afraid” (“Сверхчеловек: попытка не испугаться”). Its authors advocate for applying biotechnologies not solely to cure genetic disorders but also to augment human intellectual capabilities in a revolutionary way. For instance, they argue that the UK's genomics industry has flourished since Brexit, allegedly because the country is no longer subject to more stringent bioethical regulations of the European Union. (This line of argument can easily give the reader the impression that Russia’s isolation and the war with the ‘collective West’ are actually a biotechnological blessing in disguise, as the country’s government is free to choose the directions and means of developing this field without being constrained by bioethical guidelines of international organizations, such as the WHO.) The article also references the human gene-editing experiment of He Jiankui without addressing its unethical nature caused by the breach of crucial regulations, which was repeatedly emphasized by his Chinese colleagues and the scientific community in general. The authors also denounce the Russian government’s decision to ban the project by the biologist Denis Rebrikov who was essentially going to carry out the same research as He Jiankui, editing the human CCR5 gene responsible for the spread of HIV. The central argument is that genome editing has to be at the core of Russia’s biotechnological development and should not be restricted in any way, as it offers a unique opportunity to close the gap to most developed countries, such as the United States and China. As the title implies, the authors aim to get readers, most prominently the Russian business community as the core target audience, interested (and invested) in the most extreme form of the ‘genomic revolution’.

Fortunately, the article’s authors are not involved in the decision-making process concerning Russian biotechnological initiatives. A number of prominent governmental representatives in this field, including Putin’s eldest daughter, Maria Vorontsova, advocate for a highly cautious approach to gene-editing projects (in line with the bioethical principles of exceptional regulation). They also stress the importance of adhering to internationally approved bioethical principles, such as those outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki. However, there is also no shortage of radical voices among the representatives of the technocratic camp proposing radical experiments as a quick way to achieve technological supremacy or highlighting the dangers posed by ‘foreign’ biotechnologies that Russian counter-initiatives must neutralize. An essential figure in the radical group, aside from Mikhail Kovalchuk, is a member of the Russian State Duma and one of the Kremlin’s top propagandists, Oleg Matveychev. He promotes the idea of searching for deeper roots, a genetic ‘prime code’ of Russian civilization, which could prove that it is several thousand years rather than only one millennium old, strengthening the country’s cultural and moral foundations in its war against the West (and for the future of all humankind). Matveychev’s grasp of genetics is far more hazy than Kovalchuk’s, making it unclear how precisely he hopes to accomplish his objectives.

The steadily declining influence of internationally accepted bioethical principles in biotechnological decision-making, which is becoming an increasingly opaque process even for experts working at Russian academic institutions (and much more so for international experts and scholars), poses significant risks on a global scale. The etatist approach to biotechnologies, coupled with the eclectic (at times decidedly non-scientific) nature of decision justification, gives outside observers room to speculate what (real or imagined) events and facts might spur future governmental decisions and whether moderate technocrats in the Russian government will always keep their radical colleagues at bay.

4. Conclusion

While it is difficult to forecast the direction of internal debates regarding the next biotechnological projects, it is clear that Russian biotechnological policy cannot be regarded as conservative, which proves to be another strong piece of evidence against Russia’s ‘conservative turn’ theory. The official bioethical principles of the Orthodox Church may create the impression that the conservative agenda of the Church is the driving force behind the interest of the Russian government in bioethical and biotechnological subjects. A detailed analysis of governmental statements and practices, including those pertaining to abortions and genome editing, can swiftly dispel this misconception. Moreover, the existence of the more influential technocratic faction ought to prompt us to look at a wider picture, which becomes considerably more intricate and dismal if we take into account potential risks. Instead of a ‘conservative turn’, we witness an eclectic blend of conservative rhetorical façade that uses both cultural and biological interpretations of national identity as crucial ingredients in the ‘civilizational’ narrative, a pseudo-conservative praxis that masks the decisively etatist modus operandi, and a neoliberal, technocratic program of development that bears little relation to Putin’s rhetorical discourse on conservatism as the cautious development that prioritizes preservation instead of radical experiments and futuristic (ultra-progressivist) goals. The only level of discourse that allows the representatives of the two groups of Russian officials to converse without any complications is the bureaucratic level of shallow rhetorical constructs without actual conservative content. Otherwise, their principles and goals should be significantly (and in many ways polarly) different.

In the official statements of the Russian government, we increasingly encounter an explosive mixture of the idea of ‘civilizational’ exceptionalism, pseudo-scientific justifications, and a willingness to take all necessary steps to counter any external biotechnological threat. This willingness is further evidenced by the recent creation of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on countering modern threats to biological security. Politicians and experts alike should make more effort to evaluate the likelihood of a conflict escalation caused or justified by biotechnological arguments or factors. Unfortunately, there haven’t been any visible and consolidated attempts of this kind yet.

[1] For a more detailed analysis of this trend in the context of the recent biotechnological initiatives, see the article by Vadim Chaly and Olga Popova.

Self-help literature usually revolves around the solipsistic axiom: Only you yourself can be the source of your salvation. What I just called the solipsistic axiom is closely related to what Philip Rieff called the therapeutic doctrine: “The psychological man of our therapeutic doctrine is not reconcilable with the moral man of preceding doctrines.”1 Not just your pop science-rooted worldview-fabrication nonsense like Dawkins or Harari are atheists, but also a secular pseudo-religion that is based on metaphysical castration and an inward turn, which itself functions as a principle of labor. The soteriology is castrated; salvation comes in the shallowly mundane form of money and fame. The motto is: Become the best version of yourself; this is how you do it. But one very important piece is missing: the person who tells you how to do it – your guide, your mentor, your preacher, your guru, your savior, and nowadays, often, your ersatz father. A few people have stepped into that role lately, and their popularity has a lot to do with Joe Rogan's massively influential podcast (Huberman has also made the list at 3.0 M).

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2024-03-21/spotify-reveals-podcast-numbers-for-joe-rogan-alex-cooper-travis-kelce?embedded-checkout=true

Jordan Peterson was the gateway drug to a new self-help religion (new because the US has a tradition of getting obsessed with self-help gurus; the earliest "mega success" maybe being the evangelist Billy Graham, who already preached self-discipline) that found its, in my opinion, grotesquely overblown and comically overrated gurus in John Gretton "Jocko" Willink (from here on "Jocko") and Andrew Huberman.

Rogan and Peterson

I don't want to spend a lot of time on Joe Rogan, whom this article isn't aimed at, but it has to be mentioned that his podcast is the birthplace of Jocko and Huberman, as well as several other podcasts started by people who utilized the notoriety Rogan gave them through regular appearances on his podcast (Lex Fridman, for example). And I’ll also keep my remarks on Jordan Peterson very, very short because he is not what I want to get to here. But he needs to be mentioned briefly since he is, as far as I can see, the first self-help guru who appeared several times on Rogan’s podcast and grew his audience considerably through his relationship with Rogan. Also, Peterson is the first person in this sphere, once labeled the “Intellectual Dark Web,"  who specifically centered on self-help, the need for men to grow up and take responsibility for themselves; in short, he is the inception point of a new wave of self-help publishing specifically aimed at depressed, directionless, and often desperate young men.

Rogan gives us the journey of a man who understands mixed martial arts as a self-help project, with its center being the overcoming of fear and the limits of burden through hard work. Ultimately, MMA for Rogan is, besides a display of athletic prowess, about growth through self-overcoming (aside from obsessively hoping that his beloved sauna routines will someday be considered the philosopher's stone). What makes him relatable is his obsession with personal growth mediated through the self-help industry's recipes; what makes him likeable is his humility and his conversational style: Whether he asks the best or the right questions or not, the questions he asks are genuinely his own. He is not working his way through a script handed to him, nor is he insulting his viewers with scripted-TV sterility.

Jordan Peterson represents a more mature and less solipsistic approach than Jocko and Huberman: "Clean up your room" has as its goal: Get yourself prepared for the dating world and, ultimately, for taking on the responsibilities of adult life. As far as I can see, Peterson has not used the term "voluntary apprenticeship" that he uses in Maps of Meaning, although the term points to what his rules of life are about: "After all, dedication to an ideal necessitates the development of self-discipline. This is a voluntary apprenticeship.”2 The term "ideal" appeals to the psychologist who knows distinctions like that between the "ego ideal" and the "ideal ego." Problems of psychological reflection that have to occur at a considerably high level, if one terminologically refers to "ideals" in self-conceptualization, are not part of Jocko's extreme ownership.

From Jordan Peterson's approach, you can go in different directions and end up on different paths. The absolute worst route one can take is the one that leads to Jocko Willink, who is basically a complexity-stripped military Jordan Peterson, and I say this while agreeing with the description of Peterson as "the stupid man's intellectual." Jocko, then, is the guardian of the very stupid man.

Jocko

Extreme Ownership is the propagation of military leadership principles into an ideology of mastering your personal life. You are not successful; you collect victories in a world full of enemies in which survival means outcompeting and outgrinding others and thereby triumphing over them. "This book provides the reader with our formula for success: the mindset and guiding principles that enable SEAL leaders and combat units to achieve extraordinary results. It demonstrates how to apply these directly in business and life to likewise achieve victory."

What qualities is Jocko promoting? First and foremost, it's discipline, specifically self-discipline. (While he promotes it, Rogan can't stop masturbating ferociously over it when sitting down with Jocko. Isn't it deeply unsettling to you to see an adult in that kind of frenzy over "the grind"?) The latter implies willpower, rigidity, and toughness. What you must be able to add is a lot more innate than these qualities: intelligence. You need it to effectively organize your tasks and execute them, which again requires analytical thinking, recognizing the right steps you need to take without losing sight of higher-order problems, and supervening structures. All the willpower alone doesn't cut it, and intelligence cannot be created through willpower. If you choose Jocko as your guardian, chances are you are intellectually severely limited and, therefore, all the more reliant on putting your energy into becoming a highly disciplined servant who devoutly follows orders or, when it comes to modeling his own life, recipes handed to him by self-help gurus.

Who could have guessed that (self-)discipline, hierarchical thinking, and task organization would prove useful in so many aspects of life that are defined by competition? Who could have guessed that these qualities are necessary for those in high positions in the military? Does anyone truly believe that renowned researchers (old-school, pre-wokeness, not the people you find on today's campuses), accomplished scholars, or dedicated and studious individuals from all backgrounds lack these qualities? What Jocko adds on top of it is a military story that is centered around brotherhood, the social-bond form of discipline, and the necessity to grind (instead of studying/working hard) in the face of mortal danger, which adds the readiness to put your life on the line to a whole bunch of qualities otherwise unaltered.

How much he is captured by this world he inhabited for the majority of his lifetime is reflected not only in his application of the principles in question but also in the entire rhetoric of war, as in the above-quoted passage. I quote again because it gives you the whole Jocko package (or gimmick) in two sentences: "This book provides the reader with our formula for success: the mindset and guiding principles that enable SEAL leaders and combat units to achieve extraordinary results. It demonstrates how to apply these directly in business and life to likewise achieve victory.” Jordan Peterson advises you to clean up your room and strive to become an employable and marriageable person, while Jocko adds that you can only achieve this as your own success if you follow military guidelines (determination and consistency are not enough; you need the real grind). Your job is a victory, and your spouse is a victory; whatever you achieve, you are a conqueror in doing so.

Instead of reflecting on how and why the military is a very special area in the lives of nations, closed and walled off from civil life (which is why transitioning back to civilian life is a complicated task and even a topic of psychiatric study), Jocko suggests that civilian life is a form of life that fails to live up to the standards of military requirements. Military principles are superior to civilian ones; therefore, life in the civilian world has to be enhanced by the application of military principles to it. I have to admit, although I consider this ridiculous, that I can understand the appeal of this approach since people, men especially, have generally become too soft, whimsical, whiny, petty, and pet-like and are bombarded with incentives to become shells of their potential selves. But if you want to find a cure for all the illnesses of degenerate civil society in the age of hedonistic mass democracy, you have to find a way to bring about a responsible man who can become a responsible husband, not a commander. Here, Peterson is a lot closer to how we can reasonably approach the problems at hand. This brings me to a fundamental distinction: Jocko exemplifies that the opposite of collectivism is not individualism, but solipsism. And he has to exemplify it, since the military is a tightly organized collective with no room for the development of a truly substantial individuality; the more the participants suppress any individuality, the better everything functions. It is collectivism in action, and if you try to strip away the military structure and top-down organized discipline, you are left with a shallow sense of responsibility, rigorous task focus that knows neither left nor right, and the thirst for victories that drives you onto the path of empty trophy hunting; in short, you will get militant solipsism as a result. You will get caught in an 'it's me against the rest of the world' mindset, but in civilian life, especially in a truly humane world, Jocko's ideology only helps you become a militantly self-centered jerk. What responsibility is he promoting? Execute your task successfully, or humbly admit, "Yes, it was my fault." Responsibility comes without complexity; all you get is a strictly task-dependent victory or humiliation. It's like succeeding on the golf course or feeling humiliated; nothing closely resembling real human life is involved here. It's all about task execution.

What you will not get is responsible individualism. The military does not prepare you for becoming a responsible individualist. Your social existence basically merges with military brotherhood, a brotherhood that is embedded in an organizational structure that completely determines it. Bonds are needed for survival and fulfilling the task; friendships may arise at some point, but friendships are not required in the military, nor are they desired, nor is there room to cultivate them in any meaningful way; if you want to do the latter, you need a much more complex life setting. The particles (or members, if you want to be nice) of the brotherhood are not individuals but ideologically hyper-conditioned task fulfillers. Especially if you apply Jocko's principles to civilian life, you may turn task fulfillment into a "me, me, me" mentality, striving for victory as if it were a physical fight for superiority. The collectivism of military brotherhood is not replicated by friendships or networks, and the principles of discipline, hierarchical organization of tasks, and determination to execute them properly in order to achieve victory become everything. Brotherhood is embedded in an organizational structure that determines it gaplessly.

When the collectivist superstructure disappears in the civilian world, solipsism takes over in the conqueror's mind because it is inherent. This solipsism is reflected in reactionary habits: Due to the lack of a τέλος the grind itself has to be its own purpose; growth is just perseverance in repeating the grind. Solipsism, collectivism, and responsible individualism operate with very different anthropological core models: The core model of solipsism is the libido-ridden intellectual toddler. The core model of collectivism is the insect-like functional agent and the functional units they constitute. The core model of responsible individualism is the adult human being with a refined relationship to the common good on the one hand and to the good life, which can only be instantiated in a highly individual way, on the other. Responsible individualism does not know the collapse from one extreme (e.g., solipsism) into the other (e.g., collectivism). It acknowledges that there are not only comrades and enemies but also women and children, possible partners, close friends, grandparents, and obligations of marriage that are entirely alien to military life. Marriage and close friendships are not bonds comparable to the bond of brotherhood in the military; extreme ownership is the best recipe for self-exclusion from your wife, tyranny against her and your children, and being married to your own protocol of success. If you think I am arguing against the meaning of discipline in marital life and family organization, you have fallen for Jocko's extremely narrow ideology. Propagating that extreme ownership should be applied to all kinds of relationships according to their own logic sounds nice, but that's it.

Huberman

Huberman stands for the extension of Jocko's extreme ownership approach to the cellular level. Discipline is necessary to take full control of your physiology, which is who you are. You can't succeed in life without physiological integrity and control (manifesting themselves as supremacy in physiological competition), and Huberman tells you how to achieve it. What he lacks in military talking points, he makes up for with his deep immersion in therapeutic talk. The cultural illness of therapy talk merges with a physiological regimen of self-control to turn people into the best version of themselves. But don't forget that you'll get the specific Palo Alto version of therapeutic self-obsessiveness. Inez Stepman, herself from Palo Alto, wrote a great article on the specific structure of Palo Alto-originated identity crises entitled “Ambitious Nihilism”; there she says: "The angst in Palo Alto isn't bequeathed by the alleged crimes of Leland Stanford, but springs up because the closest thing its hyper-distilled neoliberal worldview can offer to transcendence is the dream of merging with circuitry." With Huberman, you get the physiological complement of finding transcendence in merging with circuitry. The difference from the literal circuitry focus is that you are your physiology and the master of it at the same time; it can't take you over like AI can in dystopian scenarios. (Of course, desperation is an irremovable sting in this shallow self-optimization attempt since the transhumanist enhancement ideal, as expressed in Cyborg fantasies, is not achievable; adult physiology is too imperfect, and you attack your human imperfection too late and not on a deep enough level.)

When Huberman became a guru-like figure, he had to extend his advice beyond just physiology due to his interest in his personality alone. You will receive a manufactured product, not a person; he has a team behind him, the job of which is to protect and polish his image, not to let the public know who he truly is. It would be easy to bombard me with quotes to exemplify that he is not only a preacher of a La Mettriean-style gospel, but an advocate for wholesomeness. And, again, of course, he can create this illusion since he basically grew up in therapy talk. Every child of therapy talk knows how to emulate a cheap and empty wholesomeness that appeals to the masses. His personal life is testimony to his real message, which is: How do you reconcile your everyday life and your relationships with what is at the core of everything: your dopamine levels, the center of your hedonic experience, the physiological mecca of your addictions? What we found out about his private life represents authentically what his core message was always mainly about: optimizing addictive joy through the application of physiological knowledge. He was laying out more truth than he literally articulated when he got lost in ranting about dopamine, and he also didn't lie when he engaged in therapy talk since he is, when it comes to this, a true believer like so many people; he is truly relatable in this regard. He just didn't confess to his audience that, between dopamine and therapy talk, women and family life cannot have the status they need to have if relationships are to flourish. But this missing piece is what the usefulness of everything he says is tied to, and here he has nothing to offer but another shallow regurgitation of therapy talk. In the end, Huberman is a better counselor when it comes to optimizing your jerk-off after long dopamine starvation – caused by not touching yourself – than he is at giving the kind of advice Jordan Peterson aims to offer. Is this a formula for civilizational renewal? - This shallow antidote to DEI self-worship porn could be called grind porn. The common denominator is “me, me, me!”.

Are they successful? Yes and no, but they are certainly symptoms of decay

According to the ideology of vulgar libertarianism (which, ironically, is compatible with what libertarianism, as an ideology, is largely incompatible with, namely mass democracy), they are, especially Jocko, who is a married father of four. Even Huberman is a success, according to a very extreme form of libertarianism, since he is wealthy and well-known. Considering how much effort he puts into hiding lies that keep women around, he certainly is not a successful person. Given that he is not doing this to "friends with benefits" (to refer to rotten intellectual underclass terminology), but even to at least one woman he wanted to have a family with, he is certainly not a success.

What probably differentiates Huberman from Peterson and Jocko is his audience. There is probably a huge overlap, but due to his Stanford credentials and his emphasis on science, which he transformed into pop science for his audience, of course, Huberman resembles, as someone on X suggested, an Andrew Tate for college graduates. Women exist in relation to your dopamine level; his physiological advice is useful for bodily optimization, which, in turn, is helpful in attracting women; in the end, it's the physiological supplement to pick-up artistry.

The huge success of all these people does not stand for America becoming healthier:

People would do a lot better if they stopped looking for saviors. If you want to listen to podcasters, listen to people who understand the principles of a wholesome human life, who are not ideological partisans of one sex (and who are therefore predominantly appealing to those who are, functionally or attitudinally, enemies of the other), who are not salesmen of some narrow-minded extremism (at least Jocko and Huberman are vulgarly libertarian salesmen of narrowly success-obsessed extremism) parading as civilizational saviors. Societal problems worsen, and these people’s success is (and will prove to be) futile. Furthermore, if a historian from a future civilization reviews the decline of the West and inquires the question, "Were there influential figures who tried to warn or guide people towards the right path amidst impending collapse?" and Jocko and Andrew Huberman are presented to them, I believe the historians will conclude, "If these were significant influencers at that time, it's evident that this society wasn't capable of surviving and didn't deserve to."3

You ask for alternatives? It’s not about saviors (or a cult of personality), but about persons who represent types of mentalities you can scale up to social philosophies. Three names:

Louise Perry (The Case Against the Sexual Revolution; Maiden Mother Matriarch podcast),

Mary Harrington (Feminism Against Progress),

and Mary Eberstadt (How the West Really Lost God; and: Primal Screams. How the Sexual Revolution Created Identity Politics)

None of the women mentioned here (many could be added, for example, Alex Kaschuta, Poppy Coburn, or Inez Stepman) tell guys to become feminine, to give up their masculinity, to not go or stop going to the gym (Perry, for example, mocks the “noodle-armed soyboys”), to effectively become pets, that their masculinity is toxic, or that society should be feminized.4 They all cherish responsible men, but they expect a lot more from men than anyone can develop who is religiously devoted to Jocko or Huberman. We are all in this mess that the West has become, and Jocko and Huberman do not possess the intellectual tools and capabilities to diagnose our misery adequately; they represent it instead. They speak to one half of humanity and address this one half in a one-dimensional, theoretically shallow way. Listen to those who have much more to offer and who represent those with whom you will need to find a way to live together if you want the West to have any chance of reversing its horrific decline.

(A little comprehension test: If you think this criticism also applies to Bronze Age Pervert, either intentionally or indirectly, you better think twice or thrice. However, it probably applies pretty well to the dumb fraction of his followers, among whom are probably quite a bunch of low-IQ people who, in proper intellectual underclass style, consider my recommendations "simping".)