On Supermen and Human Dignity: The Polarizing Character of Russia’s Biotechnological Policy
by Alexey Zhavoronkov
The deepening rift with Western nations and the ongoing war against Ukraine foster the Russian government’s obsession with biotechnologies – as a basis for food security, a way to extend life, and, last but not least, a potentially powerful weapon in the civilizational conflict with the ‘collective West’. An in-depth examination of Vladimir Putin’s speeches and interviews from recent years reveals a substantial rise in the number of subjects pertaining to biotechnological advancements and threats. In his speech from July 2017, Putin included biotechnologies, along with digital technologies, as priority areas for future development. On another occasion in late October 2017, he bemoaned that unidentified foreign actors are, once again (given the previous incident back in 2007 when Putin imposed a ban on exporting biosamples), gathering biological samples of various ethnic groups living in Russia, which provoked a reaction from the Pentagon. In May 2020, he compared the advancement of genetic technology to space exploration and the breakthroughs in nuclear technologies in the 20th century when he announced the establishment of three genomic centers by the Rosneft corporation. In March 2022, he and a number of other Russian officials accused Ukraine of hosting biowarfare labs supported by the United States. In November 2023, at the III Congress of young Russian scientists, he emphasized the importance of studying the ‘Russian genome’ as a vital source of “good information”. Lastly, in his interview with Tucker Carlson in February 2024, Putin mentioned the danger associated with the potential to create enhanced, “genetically engineered” supermen but, at the same time, expressed his admiration for Elon Musk’s Neuralink project.
Putin’s recent comments on biotechnologies show an intriguing mix of cautiousness and boldness. He praises biotechnological advancements while harshly criticizing (real or, in many cases, imaginary) biotechnological threats. Like some of his technocratic colleagues, he repeatedly emphasizes that biotechnology can and will be used as a weapon against the Russian state and Russians as a nation (or, more precisely, as a ‘civilization’ – a concept that reflects the multiethnic nature of the country and its intricate federal system). Despite the disguise provided by the pseudo-conservative ‘civilizational’ rhetoric, this duality of Putin’s attitude reveals a potential conflict between (and within) two major groups in the Russian governmental circles, namely those who support a conservative approach to human life and those who actively support biotechnological advancements in a moderate or radical way. The first group is primarily supported by the Russian Orthodox Church with its project of ‘Orthodox bioethics’. The second is centered around technocrats, whose radical wing envisions technological breakthroughs unhindered by moral precepts. The unwritten obligation for Church officials to back all governmental decisions, including those that conflict with their beliefs, creates a divide between the theoretical project and the actual practices. In turn, the critical problem of the technocratic project, primarily its various radical versions that prioritize breakthroughs and securitization, lies in its shallow understanding of life sciences and scientific practices in general. Furthermore, this dangerous fusion of the concept of scientific breakthroughs with a heterogenous understanding of biotechnological threats is in significant ways grounded in pseudoscientific sources and conspiracy theories, like the ones about the existence of American ethnic bioweapons and Ukrainian biolabs that, for instance, use bats and birds as biological weapons. The eclectic nature of the government’s attitude toward biotechnology research illustrates its fundamentally pseudo-conservative political practices.
1. Biotechnological Initiatives and Bioethical Expertise
Putin’s interest in biotechnological subjects is mirrored by the Russian government’s rapidly increasing interest in biotechnological projects, particularly those that seek to gain greater control over this field and secure important data. In 2018, the Russian Ministry of Health founded the National Association of Biobanks and Biobanking Specialists. On November 28 2018, Putin signed the decree “On the development of genetic technologies in the Russian Federation”, which directed the government to develop a national program that would run from 2019 to 2027. Shortly after, on March 11 2019, Putin signed the decree “On the fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring chemical and biological safety for the period until 2025 and the future perspective”, which included the task of genetic passportization of Russian citizens. In December 2020, the Russian Duma and the Federation Council enacted the law “On biological security in the Russian Federation”. Among other things, this law imposed stringent restrictions on the transboundary transportation of biological material. Furthermore, in May 2020, Putin announced his intention to create a National Database of Genetic Information. This announcement was followed by a number of governmental initiatives and decrees, most notably by the 2022 amendments to Federal Law “On state regulation in the field of genetic engineering activities” and by January 2024 governmental decree “On the state information system in the field of genetic information ‘National Database of Genetic Information’” which is scheduled to go into effect in September 2024. (The database bears formal similarities to several existing biobanks in other countries, including the UK Biobank, but its primary objectives are distinctly different, as it is intended to serve as a secure repository of samples and data that should be primarily accessible to governmental officials instead of providing public access and supporting international scientific research.) The institutions with a leading role in implementing most of these initiatives are the Kurchatov Institute, headed by Mikhail Kovalchuk, and, somewhat surprisingly for those who did not follow the events in this field, the Rosneft corporation, one of the cornerstones of the Russian economy. One example of a project that Rosneft is in charge of is a large-scale database of genomic portraits, called “100.000 + Me” (“100000 + Я”). Its activities illustrate the emerging trend in Russian politics – to view individuals as the ‘new oil’, a valuable resource containing genetic information.[1]
As is customary in modern-day Russia, these and many other initiatives ‘from the top’ do not arise from a prior dialogue between the government and the expert community. Bioethical commissions (like the Synodal Commission on Bioethics, the Russian National Committee on Bioethics, or the Patriarchal Commission for Family, Maternity, and Childhood Protection) can give their recommendations and feedback. Still, they are not the main force behind most changes in the biotechnological field, nor can they significantly influence them. Moreover, proportionally to the expanding governmental engagement in matters concerning biotechnologies, the etatist (bureaucratic) agenda increasingly overshadows many existing positions in the bioethical field, blurring the arguments and silencing the voices of dissent.
In what follows, I will introduce two previously mentioned major groups that play a significant (although unequal) role in the recent developments: those affiliated with the Russian Orthodox Church, whose policy concerning biotechnologies is primarily based on the principles of ‘Orthodox bioethics’, and the governmental technocrats with their agenda of securitization and technological breakthrough. The brief character of the introduction allows me to mention only a few names without going into the specifics of the opinions of individual bioethicists. My main objective is to demonstrate how and why two diametrically opposed approaches to biotechnologies can coexist within the same political structures.
2. Orthodox Bioethics: Theory and Practice
Since the 1990s, the development of ‘Orthodox bioethics’ has been greatly influenced by the bioethical positions of the Catholic Church, as exemplified by the popularity of studies by Elio Sgrecchia. The fundamental principles of ‘Orthodox bioethics’, stated on the Sinodal Commission on Bioethics website, were mostly formulated in the 2000s, during a period of active cooperation with Catholics. It should, therefore, come as no surprise that ‘Orthodox bioethics’ aligns with the positions we know from the bioethical debates in which the representatives of the Catholic Church have participated. The document outlining these principles (entitled “Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church: XII. Problems of Bioethics”) begins with the following statement:
The rapid advancement of biomedical technologies that actively infiltrate the life of modern man from birth to death and the impossibility to provide, within the framework of traditional medical ethics, a solution to the moral quandaries raised by these technologies are causing grave public concern. Humanity may experience more hardship and suffering as a result of people’s attempts to put themselves in the place of God, altering and ‘improving’ His creation. The development of biomedical technologies is far ahead of our comprehension of possible spiritual, moral and social consequences of their uncontrolled application, which naturally causes deep pastoral concern of the Church. The Church bases its approach to the bioethics issues that are widely debated in the contemporary world, mainly those that have a direct impact on human beings, on the Divine Revelation of the idea of life a priceless gift of God, founded in the inherent freedom and Godlike dignity of every human being.
The statement is followed by a brief description of the Orthodox Church’s stance on abortion, contraception, surrogacy, hereditary diseases, cloning, organ donation and transplantation, same-sex partnerships, and transsexuality. Several of the arguments presented in this description align with those put forth by various Christian organizations. For instance, the hard-liner approach opposing abortions on most grounds (except situations when there is a direct threat to the mother’s life) is very similar to the viewpoint of the Polish Catholic Church.
Nonetheless, there are also significant differences which, as we will see later, affect the Russian Orthodox Church’s attitude towards specific healthcare practices. For instance, the document claims that “genetic disorders are often a consequence of neglect of moral principles, a result of a vicious way of life, which also affects the descendants.” The same argument is frequently used in publications and official statements by the Church’s representatives and those in Russian academia who hold similar or more radical views. These beliefs might occasionally prove too much even for the Russian government, as seen by the example of the (now former) head of the Vavilov Institute of General Genetics, Alexander Kudryavtsev. During a theological conference in Minsk in March 2023, he asserted that genetic disorders and humanity’s limited lifespan are caused by its original sin.
The main concern for the ‘Orthodox bioethics’ is abortion. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this subject was, once again, at the forefront of the public discussion since the government was now – more energetically than ever – searching for quick and straightforward cures to the country’s demographic problems. Initiatives that had been previously considered in the Orthodox circles were now made public together with other proposals put forward by government officials. Like the government, the Church is in favor of limiting access to abortion (a measure that has been widely unpopular in Russian society since the Soviet period, as the USSR had a very high abortion rate, for a while possibly the highest in the world). To achieve this, the Church suggests removing abortions from the compulsory health insurance system, prohibiting abortions in private clinics (a move that the government has partially implemented), considering the partner’s opinion when determining whether to carry out an abortion, and outlawing any ‘abortion propaganda’ (which, again, has been put into effect in a number of Russian regions).
The pro-life stance of the Orthodox Church is affected by several restrictions specific to Russia. While the Church strongly supports the government’s policy against abortions (a policy that never could solve the demographic crisis that was caused by a wide range of factors, including the ongoing war), it does not react to cases of forced abortions in regions with prevalently Muslim population, for instance, in Dagestan. While this position can be explained by the multiethnic and multi-confessional character of the Russian Federation, the Church’s representatives also remain silent in essential matters concerning communities with a predominantly Christian population. In this sense, the issue of hereditary and chronic illnesses is arguably the biggest obstacle to the Church’s pro-life stance. The Church’s officials systematically avoid handling cases of discrimination against specific categories of patients in Russian clinics, for instance, forced sterilization and pregnancy termination for patients with mental disabilities (a stark contrast to the previously mentioned ultraconservative agenda of the Catholic Church in Poland). The same lack of interest is exhibited in cases of doctors urging patients with chronic diseases to have an abortion, frequently without considering medical data about the risks of hereditary transmission.
The brief description of the ‘Orthodox bioethics’ is based on official documents and statements and does not encompass the whole palette of opinions of individual Orthodox priests and scholars who occasionally disagree with the government’s side on crucial issues, risking criticism and excommunication as a result. Instead, it introduces a consensus position that can commonly serve as a reference for the Church’s officials. Still, even this consensus position is a long way from the actual political practices of the Russian government, which are defined not by pro-life principles but by pragmatic interests of overcoming demographic challenges, gaining firm control over decisions concerning citizens’ private matters (like their health), and achieving technological supremacy, primarily in the military sector. These interests are represented by the technocratic group.
3. A Technocratic War Against the West?
The technocratic group in government circles is represented by those who primarily view the current isolation as a biotechnological opportunity rather than a hindrance. Their objective is to address internal (social and political) issues and, in the case of more radical interpretations, to avert possible foreign interventions by means of achieving technological supremacy. As previously noted in the text on Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson, a prominent member of the technocratic camp is the physicist Mikhail Kovalchuk, the current Director of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute” (the organization in charge of carrying out major governmental projects in the field of biotechnology) and Putin’s primary information source on biotechnological developments and threats.
Kovalchuk’s views on biotechnologies are closely related to Russian political concepts of scientific ‘sovereignty’, technological breakthrough and securitization. The fundamental component of the ‘sovereignty’ concept is the need to attain a closed cycle of scientific and technological development, using Rosatom’s full cycle of nuclear competencies as a sample. The concept of a technological breakthrough is basically a modification of the Soviet idea of scientific and technological evolution, adjusted to the new circumstances of severely limited economic and human resources (even more so during the ongoing war). The securitization aspect, which presupposes constant existential threats from weaponized foreign biotechnologies, is particularly appealing to those in Putin’s circle who are affiliated with (and/or have the mindset of) state intelligence agencies.
All these aspects are illustrated by Kovalchuk’s public remarks, most prominently by his programmatic speech delivered in September 2015 during a Federation Council session. He underlines that, in today’s international relations, “military colonization has been replaced by technological subjugation, […] mainly of developed countries” (a tendency that was observed by David Goldman in the case of China). Therefore, technological development should be a strategic, long-term priority (compared to tactical priorities, such as food and medicine production). The cornerstone of this strategic priority is “a fusion of the sciences and technological assimilation of the results of interdisciplinary research.” So far, so good, provided that we refrain from delving too deeply into specific examples of technological innovations brought up by Kovalchuk. However, the second part of his speech takes a sharp turn, as Kovalchuk lists numerous (primarily biotechnological) concerns resulting from the militarization of these innovations. Kovalchuk highlights the dangers of – allegedly already existing – “biogenetic” (meaning ‘ethnobiological’) weapons that could be used to target particular ethnos, citing unspecified DARPA agency research as an example. He also refers to the Internet as a tool for the manipulation “of individual and mass consciousness,” echoing similar remarks made by Putin, who has long maintained that the Internet was invented – and is still developed – by the CIA. By the end of his speech, the lengthy list of biotechnological threats, the majority of which come from the United States, is supplemented by strategies of “social and psychological” manipulation intended to destabilize Russia’s demographic situation by bringing about “an allegedly spontaneous reduction of the birthrate”.
The central theme of Kovalchuk’s speech and his later talks and interviews is the need to prevail in the ‘civilizational’ war with the United States – a war in the shape of a technological race. In this ‘hybrid war’, the development of biotechnologies (which are “more dangerous” than nuclear technologies), coupled with the proper moral mindset that always prioritizes the demands and goals of the state over individual freedom and needs, is the make-or-break factor in retaining Russia’s sovereignty. Quite characteristically, Kovalchuk makes no mention of the bioethical guidelines needed to regulate biotechnological advancement. Instead, he stresses the crucial role of the state (and not of the expert community) and its interests in governing this process. To put it differently, during the permanent ‘Ausnahmezustand’ (‘state of exception’) brought on by the global war the Russian government always talks about, the state alone can stop existential threats against its citizens, which is why all other concerns can only receive second-rate treatment.
While ‘Orthodox bioethics’ is one of the preferred topics for Russian mainstream Orthodox media like Pravoslavie.ru or for more radical ones like Tsargrad, the technocratic agenda is mainly found in publications of secular pro-government media. These publications often focus on human enhancement, particularly on genome editing. In 2023, the weekly business magazine Expert devoted a whole issue to this subject. The issue includes an intriguing piece entitled “Superhuman: Trying not to be afraid” (“Сверхчеловек: попытка не испугаться”). Its authors advocate for applying biotechnologies not solely to cure genetic disorders but also to augment human intellectual capabilities in a revolutionary way. For instance, they argue that the UK's genomics industry has flourished since Brexit, allegedly because the country is no longer subject to more stringent bioethical regulations of the European Union. (This line of argument can easily give the reader the impression that Russia’s isolation and the war with the ‘collective West’ are actually a biotechnological blessing in disguise, as the country’s government is free to choose the directions and means of developing this field without being constrained by bioethical guidelines of international organizations, such as the WHO.) The article also references the human gene-editing experiment of He Jiankui without addressing its unethical nature caused by the breach of crucial regulations, which was repeatedly emphasized by his Chinese colleagues and the scientific community in general. The authors also denounce the Russian government’s decision to ban the project by the biologist Denis Rebrikov who was essentially going to carry out the same research as He Jiankui, editing the human CCR5 gene responsible for the spread of HIV. The central argument is that genome editing has to be at the core of Russia’s biotechnological development and should not be restricted in any way, as it offers a unique opportunity to close the gap to most developed countries, such as the United States and China. As the title implies, the authors aim to get readers, most prominently the Russian business community as the core target audience, interested (and invested) in the most extreme form of the ‘genomic revolution’.
Fortunately, the article’s authors are not involved in the decision-making process concerning Russian biotechnological initiatives. A number of prominent governmental representatives in this field, including Putin’s eldest daughter, Maria Vorontsova, advocate for a highly cautious approach to gene-editing projects (in line with the bioethical principles of exceptional regulation). They also stress the importance of adhering to internationally approved bioethical principles, such as those outlined in the Declaration of Helsinki. However, there is also no shortage of radical voices among the representatives of the technocratic camp proposing radical experiments as a quick way to achieve technological supremacy or highlighting the dangers posed by ‘foreign’ biotechnologies that Russian counter-initiatives must neutralize. An essential figure in the radical group, aside from Mikhail Kovalchuk, is a member of the Russian State Duma and one of the Kremlin’s top propagandists, Oleg Matveychev. He promotes the idea of searching for deeper roots, a genetic ‘prime code’ of Russian civilization, which could prove that it is several thousand years rather than only one millennium old, strengthening the country’s cultural and moral foundations in its war against the West (and for the future of all humankind). Matveychev’s grasp of genetics is far more hazy than Kovalchuk’s, making it unclear how precisely he hopes to accomplish his objectives.
The steadily declining influence of internationally accepted bioethical principles in biotechnological decision-making, which is becoming an increasingly opaque process even for experts working at Russian academic institutions (and much more so for international experts and scholars), poses significant risks on a global scale. The etatist approach to biotechnologies, coupled with the eclectic (at times decidedly non-scientific) nature of decision justification, gives outside observers room to speculate what (real or imagined) events and facts might spur future governmental decisions and whether moderate technocrats in the Russian government will always keep their radical colleagues at bay.
4. Conclusion
While it is difficult to forecast the direction of internal debates regarding the next biotechnological projects, it is clear that Russian biotechnological policy cannot be regarded as conservative, which proves to be another strong piece of evidence against Russia’s ‘conservative turn’ theory. The official bioethical principles of the Orthodox Church may create the impression that the conservative agenda of the Church is the driving force behind the interest of the Russian government in bioethical and biotechnological subjects. A detailed analysis of governmental statements and practices, including those pertaining to abortions and genome editing, can swiftly dispel this misconception. Moreover, the existence of the more influential technocratic faction ought to prompt us to look at a wider picture, which becomes considerably more intricate and dismal if we take into account potential risks. Instead of a ‘conservative turn’, we witness an eclectic blend of conservative rhetorical façade that uses both cultural and biological interpretations of national identity as crucial ingredients in the ‘civilizational’ narrative, a pseudo-conservative praxis that masks the decisively etatist modus operandi, and a neoliberal, technocratic program of development that bears little relation to Putin’s rhetorical discourse on conservatism as the cautious development that prioritizes preservation instead of radical experiments and futuristic (ultra-progressivist) goals. The only level of discourse that allows the representatives of the two groups of Russian officials to converse without any complications is the bureaucratic level of shallow rhetorical constructs without actual conservative content. Otherwise, their principles and goals should be significantly (and in many ways polarly) different.
In the official statements of the Russian government, we increasingly encounter an explosive mixture of the idea of ‘civilizational’ exceptionalism, pseudo-scientific justifications, and a willingness to take all necessary steps to counter any external biotechnological threat. This willingness is further evidenced by the recent creation of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation on countering modern threats to biological security. Politicians and experts alike should make more effort to evaluate the likelihood of a conflict escalation caused or justified by biotechnological arguments or factors. Unfortunately, there haven’t been any visible and consolidated attempts of this kind yet.
[1] For a more detailed analysis of this trend in the context of the recent biotechnological initiatives, see the article by Vadim Chaly and Olga Popova.