Why Kondylis was not a Marxist, and why it is actually not that easy to be one

By Sebastian Edinger

Recently, Paul Gottfried, to date the only American academic familiar with the work of Panagiotis Kondylis, claimed in an interview that Kondylis was a Marxist. He also claimed that Kondylis was a power theorist who underestimated the role of ideologies in shaping social and political reality.

These two claims seem to contradict each other on the face of it, if you have read Marx. Power, in the Marxist view, is mediated by ideologies, and those who want to assert their claims to power have to gather people behind it, which in the most efficient way is done by developing a full-fledged and comprehensive ideology. If Kondylis really was a Marxist in Gottfried's view, he should have taken this relationship into account properly and should have thought a lot more in the vein of theory style thinking. But Kondylis was not a Marxist, and he was not one for many weighty reasons. Before I explain why he wasn't one, I'll explain why he can easily be mistaken for one. In Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert (The Political in the 20th Century), Kondylis gives us a vividly positive and emphatic portrait of Marx, which I would like to quote in full:

„In relation to the great scientist that Marx was, it would still be unjust and a significant loss for the social sciences if one did not add that certain fundamental ideas of his possess lasting value and are inherently immune to ideological use; indeed, they can serve as a key to uncover the tricks of ideological thinking. I believe that never before have certain fundamental positions of Marx's historical perspective been as true and relevant as in the currently emerging phase of planetary history, particularly the views that the level and character of the relationship between the natural being of humans and the rest of nature significantly influence the nature of social forms. that the human relationships that crystallize in these forms of socialization are captured and solidified or modified by the actors through ideologies, thus reflecting a "false consciousness" that meets normative and at the same time polemical needs; that the discrepancy between false consciousness and real events does not bring historical development to a standstill, but rather drives it forward, and that the heterogeneity of purposes represents the natural mechanism for the unfolding of processes of "longue durée." Interpreted undogmatically, these theses hold true regardless of sociological preferences regarding the priority of this or that material and ideal factor, and they can be fruitfully linked with methodological, anthropological, and social theoretical approaches that differ more or less from the corresponding Marxist ones. This proves that Marx's scientific work, even if one considers it merely an inventory of fundamental questions, is an integral part of modern social science. No modern thinker has presented as deeply and vividly as Marx that history, economics, politics, philosophy, and anthropology are fundamentally one single thing and one single discipline – regardless of the signs under which he himself sought to achieve this great unification. When the mass of self-sufficient "specialists" who populate the mass-democratic scene of knowledge can no longer keep up with this achievement and either mock it or can only imitate it through anemic constructs pieced together from second or third hand, this great thinker is certainly not to blame for it.“ (my emphasis; Kondylis 2001: 34-35)

This passage shows that the concept of ideology is explicitly employed here and that is by no means dissolved into mere relations of power. However, as indicated by the reference to the "natural being of humans," Kondylis anchors ideologies in life itself—not as a conceptual fetish, but as an attempt of humans to comprehend their existence and their place in the political world. In this context, Marx becomes crucial, as he articulates this ontological approach, recognizing life as a vertical category that connects the vital sphere with the ideological sphere. He does not regard ideology merely as an immanent phenomenon but rather as a manifestation and reflection of natural existence within history. Thus, Kondylis integrates nature and history in a manner that transcends the notion of ideologies being mere expressions or instruments of power. Consequently, Marx is lauded as an integrative source of ideas, transcending the boundaries of various disciplines by theoretically consolidating their foundational assumptions. This is particularly important for Kondylis because one can adopt this fundamental approach without needing to wholly embrace or endorse Marx's worldview in its entirety.

This can also be illuminated through a philosophical-historical analogy: just as it is said of Kant that he established the transcendental mode of thought, one could describe Kondylis' tribute to Marx as an acknowledgment of his founding of the sociological mode of thought or the transposition of the principle of transcendental thinking into the sociological realm. If one understands Kondylis' praise for Marx's methodological foundational contributions in this manner—an interpretation I find persuasive—then nearly every Marxist embodies this mode of thought, as it has become second nature to us all. Only extreme reductionists stand somewhat apart from it, perhaps exemplified by Dawkins with the concept of the selfish gene, particularly if one were to articulate this in an exaggerated form (as Dawkins has done). To draw another analogy: when Eysenck estimates the interplay between nature and nurture as 80% genetic and 20% environmental (see Eysenck 1973: 291), this does not constitute a break with the sociological mode of thought; such a rupture might only begin at a ratio of 95 to 5. What Eysenck produces, in my opinion, is a weighting of genetics within a framework of explanation that does not negate the sociological mode of thought but rather—significantly—narrows it.

I shall now outline, through a series of points, the extent to which Kondylis fundamentally and significantly diverges from Marx—so much so that one must caricature him to label him a Marxist. What I cannot discuss here, due to space constraints, is the notoriously contentious relationship between historical and dialectical materialism, a topic that Kondylis does not examine in depth anywhere,, not even in his book Marx und die griechische Antike. Thus, his portrayal of Marx is not that of a specific Marx who has long since devolved into a fatal autonomy of Marxist philology. Why is this important? Henri Lefebvre, whose book Dialectical Materialism I will analyze in greater detail to distinguish Kondylis' approach from Marx's, presents a decidedly preferential interpretation of dialectical materialism. I wish to mention only a philological remark by Raymond Aron to avoid completely bypassing the topic and to indicate the complexity of the discussion while providing interested readers with useful reading suggestions.

Lefebvre identifies the birth of historical materialism in Die Deutsche Ideologie (The German Ideology); for him, it is a theory that Marx developed from 1844 onwards, yet it must remain incomplete without dialectical materialism: „At this stage, Marx’s economic theory had not yet been fully worked out, let alone systematized.“ (Lefebvre 2009: 70) This comprehensive systematization is achieved only by dialectical materialism, whose scope extends far beyond the economic orientation of historical materialism: „[D]ialetical materialism looks on ideas, institutions and cultures—on consciousness—as a frivolous and unimportant superstructure above an economic substance which alone is solid.“ (Ibid.: 73) In terms of its claims, the achievement is even more impressive:„[I]t determines the practical relations inherent in every organized human existence.“ (Ibid.) In short, he provides us with a total theory, and because he offers us a total theory, he achieves theoretical bindingness for every social scientific theory: „[E]every historical or sociological theory which sets out to be a science must establish the reality of its object.“ (Ibid.: 91)

In stark contrast to Aron, who philologically locates historical materialism differently within Marx's corpus and considers both variants of materialism as not strictly bound to one another: "Neither the historical materialism, as presented in the introduction to the 'Critique of Political Economy,' nor the critical analysis of 'Capital' necessitate dialectical materialism" (Aron 1970: 127) which Aron also regards as a late construction arising from Engels' Anti-Dühring (see ibid.). Aron agrees with Lefebvre regarding the theoretical claim to totality of dialectical materialism but appears to be more familiar with the economic writings than Lefebvre, which is why he does not underestimate the autonomy of the approach developed therein and provides an evaluation that is diametrically opposed to that of Lefebvre:

"The theory of the capitalist mode of production based on historical materialism forms the core of Marxism, both that of Marx himself and that of his successors, whether revolutionaries or revisionists. Marxism claims scientific dignity only as a theory of capitalism." (Ibid.: 169—170)

Now let's get to Lefebvre and the core of dialectical materialism as he sees it.

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Three tenets of dialectical materialism according to Lefebvre

I will gather some fundamental theses and ideas of Lefebvre, as his propositions crystallize the central tenets of Marxian thought with remarkable clarity. The points I will address concern:

1. the concept of objectivity

2. the scientific method

3. the pursuit of a practical solution, wherein I distinguish two internally interconnected motives:
   a) Marx's eschatology and and his reconciliation motive

   b) the goal of emancipation as manifested in the concept of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Concept of Objectivity

The notion of objectivity within Marxism departs significantly from its common meaning, deriving from Marx's appropriation of Hegelian philosophy. Of course, this line of influence cannot be traced here adequately without writing an essay in itself on this; but hints to give the reader a clear orientation can be given.

Lefebvre says: "The objectivity of the commodity, of the market and of money is both an appearance and a reality." (Lefebvre 2009: 80) It is both, because as an appearance it has a lower ontological status, as it is not purposefully connected to the human as the τέλος (telos) of nature. It represents, as Lefebvre rightfully and in accordance with Marx's writings says, "the human within the inhuman" (ibid.: 135); as an appearance it falls into the realm of "statistical results of elementary phenomena" (ibid.), or of mere or brute facts. This type of objectivity constitutes in its primitive form of lawfulness, the material substrate of an "economic and historical determinism – a brutal objectivity" (ibid.: 84). This is contrasted with a double teleology: the inherently teleological concept of an in itself teleological objectivity: "But this objectivity is not self-sufficient, it is not the highest objectivity, that of man's vital activity, consciously producing the human." (Ibid.) To posit the human as teleological objectivity in contrast to a merely factual objectivity, which therefore represents a mere appearance and thus represents a false consciousness or misguided fetishism - also helps to elucidate why Marxism is simply seductive as humanism. Through Hegel, it philosophically introduces what is known from everyday understanding as the difference between merely chronometric time and quality time, between mere, alienated consumption and a humanly meaningful relationship.

When I speak of a double teleology, it is important that the theory is teleologically determined to the same degree as it determines its objects teleologically. Less critical of his own methodology, Lefebvre terms this teleological overdetermination the methodical construction of the object: „Thus understood, the dialectical method therefore constructs the historical and sociological object, while locating and determining its specific objectivity“ (ibid.: 91) – „specific objectivity“ here to be read as: specific objectivity as a humanly meaningful objectivity inherently relating to inherently human needs and purposes. The dialectical method is dialectical insofar as it takes up a primitive, factual objectivity in the light of a humane objectivity that theory has to develop further. In this sense, the teleology of dialectics is maieutical; whose destiny it is and purpose to transcend is alienation: „The individual is alienated, but as part of its development. Alienation is the objectification, at once real and illusory, of an activity which itself exists objectively. It is a moment in the development of this activtiy, in the increasing power and consciousness of man.“ (Ibid.: 88) „Once real and illusory“ means: real in the sense of factually real, while illusory in the sense of not only not achieving, but also hindering teleological self-realization. „Exists objectively“ here means also existing in the trivial sense, while the realization of the τέλος (telos) of this objectivity lies in achieving the higher objectivity of Marxian teleological man. I’ll say more on this below.

Here, Kondylis deliberately adopts a much more modest methodological approach, not due to a lack of means. The objective description of concrete historical situation that he aims for according to the introductory remarks to Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg (Planetary Politics after the Cold War) is to be understood in terms of correspondence theory: The description of a situation is objective when it adequately represents the situation. Methodologically, descriptive decisionism stipulates the following: Objectivity is only attainable where the situation itself is described without relying on normative presuppositions, prejudices, or premises that overlay and distort the perception of the situation. The matter-of-fact style in which Kondylis states facts often creates the appearance of self-sufficiency and naivety because it does not co-thematize the methodological mindset that takes shape in it. Therefore in Kondylis there is no "economic and historical determinism," but only an "economic and historical determinedness" that must be meticulously demonstrated in each case.

The Scientific Method

Although Marx spoke of turning Hegel from his head on his feet, his scientific method turns what we understand by it today from its feet to its head. However, the dialectical method underwent significant transformations in Marx's work, especially through Engels' additions after Marx's death. While a strict historical materialism is in principle capable of being scientific, the dialectical method is an extension of the method into the philosophical realm, whereby the philosophical does not merely add to the scientific but is placed at the center of the approach.

The key statement here is likely: "The materialist dialectic is an analysis of the movement of this content, and a reconstruction of the total movement." (Ibid.: 90) The total movement as the decisive Hegelian motif that remained determinant in Marx is the teleological vanishing point, whose moment of truth consists in the fact that materialist dialectics knows no isolated facts but fundamentally thinks in terms of connections - albeit in teleologically preformed connections. What constitutes a fact and what it means depends on the total movement, which results in a historical overdetermination of what was in Hegel a comparatively formal method: „The movement of this content involves a certain dialectic: the conflict between classes, between property and deprivation, and the transcending of this conflict." (Ibid.: 69)

What Kondylis explicitly aims for in Planetarische Politik nach dem Kalten Krieg (Planetary Politics after the Cold War), namely to provide a description of the world political post-Cold War situation, is methodologically only possible here if the described situation is thought of as a moment of movement according to laws of motion that derive from theory rather than from situation analysis. This type of overdetermination of an analysis is precisely what Kondylis deems impermissible, and descriptive decisionism not only does not strive for it, it seeks to circumvent it because it views it as a normatively and teleologically prefigured trap. Lefebvre must be corrected where he says : "Dialectical materialism is not an economicism. It analyses relations and then reintegrates them into the total movement." (Ibid.: 73) The analysis cannot yield results that cannot be integrated into the total movement, because dialectics effectively bends and shapes the results to conform to its theoretical premises. This is not a problem for Lefebvre because: "The dialectic, far from being an inner movement of the mind, is real, it precedes the mind, in Being." (Ibid.: 97) In Kondylis’ works, Being is analyzed with regard to its underlying regularities; the result is called social ontology, not dialectical materialism. An inner movement of the mind is neither the starting point nor the endpoint; rather, the imperatives flow from reality to observation. Even if one were to concede to Marxism that its claimed regularities were derived from an analysis of reality, there still remains a significant difference in claim: While Marxism moves from situation to a totalizing grand theory, Kondylis moves from situations to an analysis of constellations from which anthropological and social-ontological foundations can be derived. Due to the primacy of reality over theory, these foundations do not enable a philosophy of history but only future validation on a case-by-case basis.

Secular Eschatology and Reconciliation (Versöhnung)

Anyone who truly wants to be a Marxist must pursue to its conclusion and believe in the proletariat or a functionally equivalent placeholder for redemption from capitalism and humanity's reconciliation with itself. In other words: Anyone who truly wants to be a Marxist must follow the dual path of eschatology of reconciliation and emancipation including the dictatorship of the proletariat; they must therefore also postulate that there exists a social class capable of and charged with the task of redemption. In Lefebvre, the ideal anthropology of the "total man" forms the τέλος (telos) of the process that should lead to reconciliation:

"The total man is the living subject-object, who is first of all torn asunder, dissociated and chained to necessity and abstraction. Through this tearing apart, he moves towards freedom; he becomes Nature, but free. He becomes a totality, like Nature, but by bringing it under control. The total man is 'de-alienated' man." (Ibid.: 150) Here, Lefebvre aligns closely with Marx's exposition in Die Heilige Familie (The Holy Family); thus dialectical materialism does not go beyond Marx but rather remains true to Marx's intention: "The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-alienation." (Marx 1956: 51) These are not sentences arbitrarily taken out of context, but ones of fundamental significance that must determine the problem horizon of thinking if it claims to be Marxist in the genuine sense. However, Kondylis could hardly be further removed from this, both in fundamental questions and in basic theoretical premises, as well as in concrete analyses, where such questions and needs are not subsequently projected.

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Conclusion

His profound sympathy for Marx's way of thinking mentioned above does not make Kondylis a Marxist. For Kondylis, Marx is to social theory what Kant was to modern philosophy as an epistemologist. Therefore, even more of Marx's thought can retain its value for Kondylis, as he does not impose on himself the duty to preserve Marxism as a whole. This demonstrates not Kondylis' Marxism, but rather a fundamental social-theoretical orientation and – quite non-Marxist – a freedom of spirit and independence in thinking, because theoretical appropriations do not lead to intellectual submission or loss of self.

In brief, Kondylis' relationship to Marx manifests itself in a systematic adaptation of the transcendental mode of thought (transzendentale Denkungsart), which Marx extended to the social sphere. The fundamental orientation expressed therein opens up a broad theoretical space and paves the way for a variety of different theoretical approaches, without forcing thought into specific tracks or necessitating or producing concrete determinations.

References:

Aron, Raymond. 1970. Die heiligen Familien des Marxismus. Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag. (Translated from the German edition in this essay.)

Eysenck, Hans-Jürgen. 1973. The Measurement of Intelligence. Lancaster, England: Medical and Technical Publishing Co. Ltd.

Kondylis, Panajotis. 2001. Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert. Heidelberg: Manutius Verlag.

Lefebvre, Henri. 2009. Dialectical Materialism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Marx, Karl. 1956. The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique. (Die Heilige Familie) Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.