The Underlying Question of Kondylis' Methodology

The Common Methodological Denominator of His Theory of Power, His Intellectual History Approach and His Theory of Planetary Politics

By Sebastian Edinger

Kondylis' approach is simultaneously an anthropological and a social-ontological approach. From anthropology and social ontology, we arrive at the foundations and an outline of Kondylis' theory of power. The fundamental question that ties Kondylis’ theory of power, his intellectual history approach and his geopolitical reflections together is: Who, when, in what polemical constellation, took what position against whom, for what reasons and with which arguments, and in what situation of power struggle? This question essentially defines what not only Kondylis (but also his doctoral advisor Dieter Henrich) calls the polemical constellation (see Kondylis 1981: 531)

I will take the theoretical foundations formulated by Kondylis in Power and Decision as my starting point, but before I get into the book a brief remark on a translational issue. The central term ‘Weltbild’ in Kondylis' work cannot be accurately translated as ‘worldview.’ The literal translation 'world picture' may sound strange, but it better preserves the original meaning: ‘Bild’ in German refers to the object in its appearance, while the English term ‘view’ shifts the emphasis to the subject's act of seeing. I thought about simply sticking to the German Weltbild here, but then I would feel inclined to also stick to the German declension of the word which would probably totally mess up everyone's brain. Therefore, I'll go with world picture, although it sounds a little odd.

Power and Decision aims to provide an answer to how world pictures arise and what role the question of values plays in this process, i.e., also: how world pictures are created for whom in which world in opposition to other world pictures and their respective holders. This also includes the question of ‘authorship’: Who is creating a certain world picture? Kondylis does not speak of the human being but of the subject of decision and of the constitution of a world picture. Here, 'subject' is not be equated with ‘individual;’ subjects can also be collectives and groups. In this, Kondylis rejects methodological individualism; he also does not inquire into individual psychology or the psychic processes of an individual subject:¹

The beginnings of this path remain hermeneutically inaccessible, as they disappear into the unexploitable, shimmering biopsychological structure of the subject, into the labyrinth of its existential core, where the stirrings of organic matter become what we customarily refer to as spirit and thought.

From this point, there is no path to an anthropology in the contemporary sense, if one understands this to mean a theory of human nature that extensively links to biology. While these explanations are fundamentally naturalistic, they are presented in such an abstract manner that it becomes difficult to argue for or against them. So, what constitutes the essence of anthropology in Kondylis' work? As the title of the book suggests, the concept of decision serves as the central theme.

Through decisions, a subject forms itself. In the decision, the subject decides for and against something. It decides explicitly for something and, to some extent, necessarily implicitly for what is bound to it, and it also decides against other things in affirmative decisions. The identification with a group does not necessarily directly mark the rejection of a specific other, but it implies at least a distancing from the same, which prepares for an explicit rejection where it becomes necessary. In the elementary decisions, where it is not about luxurious options but about identificatory pros and cons, the subject forms itself. To provide three examples: Kondylis speaks of 'friendly or hostile encounters with objects' and of the 'concentration on what is important for self-preservation, on the friendly and the hostile'; however, he also speaks of 'concrete friends and enemies,' where he means friend and enemy in their individual embodiment. One could now say: The explicit emphasis on the fact that these are concrete instances demonstrates precisely the level of abstraction at which these concepts are grasped. Kondylis employs the friend/enemy distinction at a fundamental level of decision-making, referring to decision as the nucleus of the internal logic underlying the constitution the world picture through practical distinctions, while simultaneously using it in a social-ontological sense, not in a political sense like Carl Schmitt. For Kondylis, friend/enemy is closer to affirmation/negation than to ally/enemy; ally/enemy would be closest to 'concrete friends or enemies,' with only the specific naming needed for individual differentiation absent.

The decision-making process as a whole cannot be merely passive, since the subject must not only make decisions but also affirm them. In Kondylis' words:²

A subject that owes its world, its identity, and its concrete perspective to the decision must, as it were, merge with it. Identity, in this sense, means identification with that decision-making act or process that is reflected in the creation of a world picture.

The important aspect of this quote lies in Kondylis' formulation of the connection between identification and identity: precisely because decisions are also identifications (and, on the reverse side, negations), an identity is formed through them; the identity establishes itself, as it were, through the decisions that basically build up a history, in which something structurally fundamental develops: namely a hierarchy.³

Decision, as separation, means judgment(s) and, since it both distinguishes the relevant from the irrelevant and establishes the hierarchy and structure of the relevant, it does so in a way that is fundamental.

If decisions have structured the formative process to the extent that hierarchies acquire an independent existence, then not only does a subject in the substantial sense come into being, but a world picture also emerges. The subject begins to shape itself even before it articulates an explicit world picture, laying the groundwork for such world pictures through the identifications and negations inherent in its decisions. The result of these accumulating identifications is identity—a term that Kondylis employs systematically in Power and Decision. This brings us to an important passage that encapsulates the aforementioned ideas. To quote Kondylis:⁴

It [the decision] itself, however, represents nothing other than the expression of the concrete identity of that subject, from which it is evident that this identity has formed in tandem with the respective world picture. World picture and identity, identity and decision must be intimately connected, as identity can be defined as the precise positioning of the subject within the world that has arisen from the decision, i.e., as the exhaustive determination of its relationships to the components or hierarchical stages of the respective world picture.

This passage best summarizes the previous concepts, although it might initially be interpreted in a psychological sense. It is therefore important to explain why it must not be understood in this way. Instead, we must shift our focus to the social-ontological aspect, which does not need to be introduced into these considerations in an artificial manner, as both are simultaneously structured anthropologically and social-ontologically. The concept of decision is once again central here.

Through decisions, crucial to conceive not only as acts but also as a medium, a subject structures the world; it does not design it for itself in a constructivist sense; rather, it structures it – both cognitively for itself and objectively through the formation of the social cosmos and the scientific-technical world. The decision is not merely a mental construct, but it is an act in the world, even if it may initially exist only as an intellectual design. A decision in the mind that never becomes effective in any way in the world is a mere fantasy and ultimately indistinguishable from a dream. Here, the primacy of ontology over epistemology is obvious, as the logic of decision already shapes the genesis of the subject before it is capable of engaging in reflective thought. And even if and to the extent that the subject is capable of such reflection, it still operates self-formingly within the channels of this decision logic, which is then also epistemologically binding for it. If ontology as such is analytically elaborated through what constitutes a thing as such, then the primacy of ontology–more specifically, social ontology–holds true in this context.

To better illustrate the rather formal character of Kondylis' work, I would like to briefly discuss Luhmann, since the decision logic in Kondylis bears a strong resemblance to Luhmann's observation logic, which is in turn informed by Spencer Brown's Laws of Form. At the heart of Luhmann’s theory is the concept of the 'unity of distinction between distinction and designation' (Einheit der Unterscheidung von Unterscheidung und Bezeichnung)⁵. What does this mean? No identification of something as something is possible without designation, and the designation itself constitutes a marked space as well as, as its constitutive, but undesignated backside, an unmarked space. Luhmann specifies the process of designation as the establishment of a ‘two-sided form of designation’ that must be present simultaneously; this structure is not present for the observer’s consciousness because the observer does not need to observe the act of observing during the observation process. However, it is present in the process of observation as an element of that process and must be in place for observation to be factually possible. The observation itself inherently contains a distinction within the unity of the observation process, which can only process both as a difference. Applying this to Kondylis' decision logic: every decision implies a negative decision, or negative backside, and where it is supposed to imply none explicitly, the implicit negative decision necessarily still has a shaping effect on the world picture and future decision-making options. This unity is inseparable in the decision process; thus, every revision of a decision is therefore a decision in relation to previous decisions rather than an undoing of a decision. Where decisions conflict, hierarchizations must guide and structure further decision-making. The unmarked space in Luhmann and the passive aspect of decisions are not mere voids; rather, they present a necessary unitary moment of the process.

I have also indicated why the term 'social ontology' specifies this approach most accurately. The hierarchization of decisions does not lead to the emergence of isolated world pictures of individuals in a solipsistic sense, but rather to individual world pictures within a society determined by a totality of world pictures, both individual ones as well as collective ones. Kondylis refers to the mediation between the individual and the overall societal hierarchization of decisions as 'disciplinization'. At its core, disciplinization functions as an internalization imperative: the subject is tasked with internalizing and assimilating a traditional world picture as well as assimilating itself to the latter; here, one could also replace or rephrase 'world picture' with mandatory inventory of guiding concepts and incentives, because that is what the transmission of knowledge and societal wisdom is about. Disciplinization must claim strict binding force because it must simultaneously render itself invisible. The decisions that are objectified—both individually and collectively—during the processes of disciplinization and internalization should no longer be perceived as decisions but rather as unquestionable facts. Society forms and maintains itself, i.e., it produces and secures its intellectual foundations through disciplinization. Kondylis gives this process of rendering disciplinization invisible through disciplinization a name: the elevation to the ideal.⁶

The elevation of all factors related to self-preservation into the ideal thus permits their mediation with the necessity of disciplinization in the context of organized society.

I would like to highlight a particular aspect here: Kondylis prioritizes social ontology over individuation. This is particularly evident in his definition of culture:⁷

Culture develops and is refined to the extent that disciplinization (both external and internal) is perceived as an indispensable prerequisite for collective and, generally, individual self-preservation; all cultural accomplishments, including the so-called intellectual ones, are direct and indirect products of this disciplinization.

To illustrate this: Many might be inclined to define the flourishing of culture through the innovations achieved by individual geniuses. However, while every genius's work is ambivalent because it also generates disruption, Kondylis here is primarily concerned with the supply-and-distribution aspect. Geniuses emerge only when this system is intact to such an extent that a sufficient number of individuals accept disciplinization in the sense that they absorb enough cultural achievements to become geniuses in the first place. The reproduction of cultural foundations, i.e., cultivation, takes precedence what is essentially a byproduct of these foundations and would be impossible without them.

Regarding the intellectual products of disciplinization, the concept of spirit, or Geist in German, serves as an effective transition point from the ideas presented in Power and Decision to an intellectual-historical perspective, particularly in relation to a specific quote from that work. Kondylis states at one point that⁸

the spirit [that is Geist, because this word is basically untranslatable], even in the narrower sense of intellectual-theoretical activity, is polemically in nature and practical disposition, i.e., conditioned no less than all other phenomena of life by the central friend-enemy relationship.

Here, we can now directly incorporate the fundamental questions that I posed at the beginning and briefly repeat: Who, when, in what polemical constellation, took what position against whom, for what reasons and with which arguments, and in what situation of power struggle?

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Intellectual History

To preface this paragraph, once again, with Kondylis' basic question:

Who, when, in what polemical constellation, took what position against whom, for what reasons and with which arguments, and in what situation of power struggle?

Kondylis' book The Enlightenment within the Framework of Modern Rationalism contains a brief passage about Thomas Aquinas. Kondylis notes that in the 13th century, a vibrant intellectual pluralism emerged, within which Thomas developed his philosophy amid numerous controversies. Despite the contentious nature of these debates, there exists an absolute binding force; one aspect is dogmatic, while the other is performative. The Aristotelian framework remains sacrosanct, implying that any subversion must occur within this structure with utmost subtlety. This is precisely what transpired with Aquinas playing a pivotal role, as he prepared the groundwork for the later emancipation of ontology from metaphysics in the 16th century and of philosophy from theology alike. His bold and modern act can be characterized as follows: Thomas sought to secure for philosophy, as a methodology of theology, its own right, and by doing so he shaped in a highly influential way the dichotomy between reason, represented by philosophical methodology, and faith, represented by theology. He argued philosophy could only be an instrument for presenting truths of faith, but naturally, by securing the autonomy and methodological dignity of philosophy the Pandora's box had been opened. Thomas' strategy to grant philosophy autonomy forced him into several tactical compromises with its opponents, whose needs he simultaneously subverted. In De ente et essentia, we see an almost purely philosophical treatise where the Aristotelian 'unmoved mover' is basically renamed 'actus purus'. While ostensibly refining the Aristotelian framework, this work in fact represents a fundamental challenge to the immunity claim of faith against philosophy.

This explains why Thomas Aquinas emerged as a central figure in the heated philosophical disputes of the 13th century, in which he pursued the daring goal of strengthening philosophy against theology. The Church is both a partner and an adversary; he needs its blessing, but he works toward undermining its authority. The Aristotelian framework is a mandatory tool, which serves as a normative standard but is also utilized as a weapon by him. In this context, only fundamental and long-term goals could be pursued; only preparations could be made for what would later become effective through the emancipation of philosophy from theology. A parallel to Thomas's situation can be found later with Descartes, who tried to shield himself against accusations of atheism. In response to Galileo's execution, he did not publish some of his writings throughout his life, despite various sincere assurances regarding the inviolability of belief in God. Descartes’ maneuver was similar to Thomas's but more radical, and it also reappeared many times during the Enlightenment: By that time, the critique of theology had become openly manifest, but a prevailing taboo led to the establishment of various theoretical safeguards against the suspicion of strictly forbidden nihilism, a topic Kondylis explores extensively in his work on the Enlightenment. One of the best examples might be Hobbes, who writes explicitly as a Christian but has left us a major work that is hardly ever read as if any belief in God or theology existed at all – and this is largely due to Hobbes himself. The common denominator of all those maneuvers in accordance to Kondylis’ methodological framework is: the polemical constellation dictated the situational employment of means in service of the strategy.

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Human Rights Universalism as Farce and the Principle of Demise in Planetary Politics

What we are witnessing here–and suffering from–is the transformation of a victorious ideology, specifically the human rights universalism espoused by Western intellectuals, into an ideological prison and a deadly trap. This prison becomes particularly confining when a victor starts to falter yet remains unable to adapt; as they weaken, they can no longer bear the consequences of their ideologically driven actions while being unable to disengage from the mechanisms they have set in motion. Multiculturalism has evolved from being an ideology into a reality that has cannibalized its own ideological roots and taken on a fatal independent existence. Why was this ideology so significant? The West embraced it during its ideological struggle against the Soviet Union, which accompanied the economic and military confrontation. Both sides claimed to represent humanity; thus, as victors, Western powers had to portray their economic-political triumph as fundamentally an ideologically driven victory: the superior ideology and consequently better people had triumphed. This resulted in being ensnared by human rights universalism's ideology which had been stretched beyond limits until it began cannibalizing and destroying societies.

Initially, when human rights universalism served merely as ideological background music for what Kondylis refers to as ‘the economization of politics,’ it was primarily within political and economic spheres that both the implementation and limitations of this ideology were regulated; it sounded appealing and legitimized—particularly in America—a predominantly targeted yet moderate migration without seeming suicidal. Since then end of the Cold War, however, this ideology has spiraled out of control into self-perpetuation while detaching from economic necessities and social integration capacities. It has been utilized by various actors in different ways as a weapon against the West, particularly from within the West itself. Critics often portray human rights universalism as a mere pretext for colonial strategies. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, describes the conflict between European universalism and universal universalism as ‘the central ideological struggle of the contemporary world.’ (Wallerstein 2006: xiv) Additionally, there are those who want to manipulate us into turning the virtue of self-critique into a vehicle for the constant imposition of self-loathing. The decline of social cohesion, homogeneity, and self-respect, all of which are vital for intergenerational self-cultivation—though we should avoid being overly defensive by framing it solely as a matter of self-preservation—marks a significant social disintegration.

What Kondylis foresaw was an impending social disintegration coupled with resource scarcity; we can clearly observe this disintegration today while Europe will soon experience resource scarcity as well. In such circumstances, human rights universalism becomes a mere remnant; it fails to provide diagnostic insight into current situations or effectively tackle challenges ahead. How could it, as the primary ideological motor of our contemporary misery, be of any help in alleviating that misery? It represents an additional burden and paralyzes those who require decisive action, as clarity about their circumstances can only emerge if they do not view reality through this ideological lens—like being trapped in a vise—where reality reflects solely what this ideology dictates. It may sound strange, but interpreting Kondylis' methodological axiom normatively indeed makes sense. Why? Because today’s planetary developments should not be explained by Western ideologies that contribute to the West's suffering; furthermore, contemporary phenomena should no longer be interpreted through Western ideologies or scientific theories that align with them It is a principle of sound reasoning to discard frameworks that fail to provide meaningful explanations while simultaneously exacerbating the very issues they seek to address. I specifically have in mind so-called sciences like sociology or political science.

However, I do not intend to dictate or proclaim new ideologies here but rather emphasize that ideologies reproduce themselves, as Kondylis tirelessly points out, through their social carriers—but only if those carriers biologically reproduce themselves. Human rights universalism will not last much longer; however, it has acted like a panacea leading us into an existentially perilous situation—a fact Kondylis recognized back in the 1990s while presciently predicting its consequences. For details see my Substack post entitled Kondylis' Theory of Planetary Politics. To conclude with a quote that I have yet to find cited in other works, which articulates Kondylis' diagnosis with dark humor; if we substitute ‘embassy’ with ‘the West's ethnic foundations,’ applying this message directly to today's context becomes straightforward:⁹

The rule of law here inappropriately portrays itself as the guardian of human rights, behaving as inconsistently as an ethical universalist who runs into trouble in a foreign country but opts to appeal to humanity, instead of reaching out to the embassy of the nation that issued his passport.

We are in deep, deep trouble in the West; let us act intelligently, which is quite unlike how an ethical universalist would want us to behave. That’s a pragmatic prescription, not a normative one—it’s explicitly open to interpretation: whatever that may mean.

References:

Kondylis, P. (1981): Die Aufklärung im Rahmen des neuzeitlichen Rationalismus. München: dtv. (The Enlightenment within the Framework of Modern Rationalism)

Kondylis, P. (1984): Macht und Entscheidung. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. (Power and Decision)

Kondylis, P. (1986): Konservativismus. Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta. (Conservatism)

Kondylis, P. (1999): Das Politische und der Mensch. Berlin: Akademie Verlag. (The Political and Man)

Kondylis, P. (2001): Das Politische im 20. Jahrhundert. Heidelberg: Manutius. (The Political in the 20th Century)

Luhmann, N. (1997): Die Kunst der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. (Art as a Social System)

Wallerstein, I. (2006): European Universalism. The Rhetoric of Power. New York: The Free Press.

1. The quoted passage in German: “Die Anfänge dieses Weges bleiben dennoch hermeneutisch unzugänglich, verlieren sie sich doch in der unerschließbaren, schillernden biopsychischen Struktur des Subjekts, im Labyrinth seines existenziellen Kerns, wo die Regungen der organischen Materie zu dem w erden, was wir Geist und Denken zu nennen pflegen". (Kondylis 1984: 21)

2. The quoted passage in German: “Ein Subjekt, das der Ent-scheidung seine Welt und gleichzeitig seine Identität und konkrete Sehweise verdankt, muß mit ihr gleichsam verschmelzen. Identität bedeuteti n dieser Hinsicht Identifizierung mit jenem Ent-scheidungsakt oder -vorgang, der sich im Entwerfen eines Weltbildes niederschlägt." (Kondylis 1984: 17)

3. The quoted passage in German: “Als Absonderung bedeutet ja die Ent-scheidung soviel wie Urteil(en) und, da sie sowohl Relevantes von Irrelevantem trennt als auch Hierarchie und Struktur des Relevanten festlegt, so liegt in ihr ein Schluß über die jeweilige Relevanz, der gleichzeitig ein Be-schluß über dieselbe ist.“ (Kondylis 1984: 29 f.)

4. The quoted passage in German: “Sie selber stellt aber nichts anderes als den Ausdruck der konkreten Identität jenes Subjekts dar, woraus erhellt, daß sich diese Identität ihrerseits Hand in Hand mit dem fraglichen Weltbild geformt hat. Weltbild und Identität, Identität und Entscheidung müssen am engsten miteinander verbunden sein, zumal Identität als genaue Verortung des Subjekts innerhalb der aus Ent-scheidung hervorgegangenen Welt, d.h. als erschöpfende Bestimmung seiner Verhältnisse zu den Bestandteilen oder hierarchischen Stufen des jeweiligen Weltbildes definiert werden kann." (Kondylis 1984: 17)

5. “Die Operation Beobachtung realisiert mithin die Einheit der Unterscheidung von Unterscheidung und Bezeichnung, das ist ihre Spezialität.” (Luhmann 1997: 100)

6. The quoted passage in German: “Die Erhebung aller Faktoren, die mit dem Selbsterhaltungsbestreben zusammenhängen, ins Ideelle gestattet also schließlich ihre Vermittlung mit der Disziplinierungsnotwendigkeit im Sinne der organisierten Gesellschaft." (Kondylis 1984: 50)

7. The quoted passage in German: “Kultur entsteht und verfeinert sich in dem Maße, wie Disziplinierung (äußere und innere) als nicht wegzudenkende Voraussetzung der kollektiven und auch (wenigstens in der Regel) der individuellen Selbsterhaltung empfunden wird; alle kulturellen Leistungen, auch die sogenannten geistigen, sind direkt und indirekt Produkte dieser Disziplinierung." (Kondylis 1984: 49)

8. The complete sentence in German: "Als Weiterbildung der nach Machterweiterung und -festigung auf verschiedene Weisen strebenden Existenz ist also der „Geist“, auch im engeren Sinne der intellektuell-theoretischen Tätigkeit, polemisch eingestellt, d. h. nicht weniger als alle anderen sozialen Lebenserscheinungen durch die zentrale Freund-Feind-Beziehung bedingt." (Kondylis 1984: 84)

9. The quoted passage in German: “Der Rechtsstaat stellt sich hier mißbräuchlicherweise als Hüter von Menschen­rechten hin, und er verhält sich dabei ebenso inkonsequent wie ein ethischer Universalist, der in einem fremden Land Schwierigkeiten bekommt, sich aber dann nicht mit der Menschheit, sondern lieber mit der Botschaft jenes Landes in Verbindung setzt, das seinen Paß ausgestellt hat.” (Kondylis 2001: 64)